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Exposes an existing problem where "ret" is overwritten
in the directory scan.
Add knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14892
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This will allow the usage 'POSIX Basic Regular Expression'
instead of 'ms wildcard' strings.
We allow exactly one 'subexpression' starting with '\(' and
ending with '\)' in order to find a replacement (byte) region
in the matching string.
This will be used in the vfs_preopen module in the following
commits.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
I want to assert at least some of the behavior as the
next commits will add a new abstraction that should
at least partly behave the same.
Note: case_[in]sensitive_idx is the index to the patterns
in the namelist, set to -1 on non-match, otherwise to
a value >= 0.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This ensure we never blunder into indirecting a NULL fsp pointer
in the server. Currently this crashes the server in several info
levels.
Add knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14742
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
This ensure we never blunder into indirecting a NULL fsp pointer
in the server. We already pass this, but this test will ensure
we continue to do so as we make fileserver changes.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power<npower@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jun 15 11:06:23 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
Shows we must protect against a null fsp handle when doing POSIX chmod on a symlink,
whether the symlink points to a real object or is dangling.
Add to knownfail for now. Commit 9722732b1867e359304594ada72ff40cd1341be5
removed the fsp == NULL protection for POSIX, and we need to put it back.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This creates a directory, then a symlink to a directory,
and then checks we can POSIX create and delete file, directory,
symlink and hardlink filesystem objects under the symlink
parent directory.
Mark as knownfail until next commit.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
It shows this isn't done correctly for streams_xattr.
A common config is:
vfs_objects = streams_xattr acl_xattr
to store both streams and Windows ACLs in xattrs.
Unfortunately getting and setting ACLs using handles
opened on stream files isn't being done correctly
in Samba.
This test passes against Windows 10.
This adds tests that prove this doesn't work. Next
patch will add the fix and remove the knownfail.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
For this test only, explicitly copy the SMB1 tcon struct,
don't use cli_state_save_tcon()//cli_state_restore_tcon()
as these calls will soon change to just manipulate the pointer
to avoid TALLOC_FREE() on the tcon struct which calls
destructors on child pipe data.
In SMB1 this test calls cli_tdis() twice with an invalid
vuid and expects the SMB1 tcon struct to be preserved
across the calls.
SMB1 cli_tdis() frees cli->smb1.tcon so we must put back
a deep copy into cli->smb1.tcon to be able to safely call
cli_tdis() again.
This is a test-only hack. Real client code
uses cli_state_save_tcon()/cli_state_restore_tcon()
if it needs to temporarily swap out the active
tcon on a client connection.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13992
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Note that uses SMB2 for the "Windows client" (aka non-POSIX) connection as SMB1
directory listing code translates a directory listing with a search mask that
matches an existing file to a CREATE which won't cut it for our test as we're
targetting the directory listing code.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
do_list()/do_list_helper() in source3/client/client.c was the only user of this
argument. And that use was wrong.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
samba3.smbtorture_s3.crypt_client.SMB1-WILD-MANGLE-RENAME(nt4_dc_smb1)
samba3.smbtorture_s3.plain.SMB1-WILD-MANGLE-RENAME(fileserver_smb1)
knownfail for now.
The recent wildcard changes broke something that used to work.
Consider a directory with 2 files:
dir/
foo
fo*
The 'fo*' file has a mangled name of FSHCRD~2.
SMB1rename("dir/FSHCRD~2", "dir/ba*") will rename *both* files
as the new 'rename has wildcard' check is done after
the name unmangle.
SMB2 doesn't allow wildcard renames so doesn't have this problem.
Fix to follow.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
samba3.smbtorture_s3.crypt_client.SMB1-WILD-MANGLE-UNLINK(nt4_dc_smb1)
samba3.smbtorture_s3.plain.SMB1-WILD-MANGLE-UNLINK(fileserver_smb1)
knownfail for now.
The recent wildcard changes broke something that used to work.
Consider a directory with 2 files:
dir/
a
*
The '*' file has a mangled name of _2X68P~X.
SMB1unlink("_2X68P~X") will delete *both* files
as the new 'unlink has wildcard' check is done after
the name unmangle.
SMB2 doesn't suffer from this problem, as it doesn't
allow wildcard unlinks.
Fix to follow.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Will make converting _internal_resolve_name() to return a size_t easier.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Rather than have safe_string.h #include string_wrappers.h, make users of
string_wrappers.h include it explicitly.
includes.h now no longer includes string_wrappers.h transitively. Still
allow includes.h to #include safe_string.h for now so that as many
modules as possible get the safety checks in it.
Signed-off-by: Matthew DeVore <matvore@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Mulder <dmulder@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Confirm that record overwrite with TDB_INSERT and record insert with
TDB_MODIFY both fail with appropriate error values.
Signed-off-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Jun 10 20:28:45 UTC 2020 on sn-devel-184
Fix the callers. Note the special casing of mapping (uint16)-1 -> (uint32_t)-1
in SMBC_setatr() where we can't change the ABI.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Cleanup. It's never been a UNIX mode, always a DOS attribute field.
Make that explicit.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Create -o files per -N client connections, set a specific timestamp, then write
a bit. This leads to the locking.tdb dmasters to be spread across all nodes.
Then list from one node. This makes sure that the async share mode fetch works
right.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
canonicalize_absolute_path() has a bug.
In canonicalize_absolute_path()
///a/./././///component/../////path/ -> /a//path
It should go to /a/path. Mark as knownfail.
Adding these tests so I can ultimately remove
resolve_realpath_name() and re-use the existing
canonicalize_absolute_path() code in vfs_widelinks.c
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Shows bits needed to set/get a SACL. We need a script within Samba to run this
as it depends on a user with SeSecurityPrivilege to work.
Test does the following:
1). Create a test file.
2). Open with SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY *only*. ACCESS_DENIED.
NB. SMB2-only behavior. SMB1 allows this as tested in SMB1-SYSTEM-SECURITY.
3). Open with SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY|FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES.
4). Write SACL. Should fail with ACCESS_DENIED (seems to need WRITE_DAC).
5). Close (3).
6). Open with SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY|SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC.
7). Write SACL. Success.
8). Close (4).
9). Open with SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY|READ_ATTRIBUTES.
10). Read SACL. Success.
11). Read DACL. Should fail with ACCESS_DENIED (no READ_CONTROL).
12). Close (9).
13 - and on error). Delete test file.
Passes against Windows 10.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
NB. This is also tested in samba3.base.createx_access
but this makes it very explicit what we're looking for.
Shows SMB1 allows explicit open of a file with only
he SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY access mask requested.
SMB2 doesn't.
Requires a Windows 10 system with a user with
SeSecurityPrivilege set. Passes against Windows 10
with SMB1 enabled.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This walks different code paths in the subsequent locker. And the one
that we did not test so far is in fact buggy
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
