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Commit Graph

1461 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Stefan Metzmacher
c56cb12f34 s3:auth: make_user_info_map() should not set mapped_state
mapped_state is only evaluated in authsam_check_password_internals()
of auth_sam.c in source4, so setting it in the auth3 code
doesn't make any difference. I've proved that with
an SMB_ASSERT() and a full pipeline not triggering it.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13879

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2022-03-10 03:16:35 +00:00
Stefan Metzmacher
012bd9f5b7 s3:auth: let make_user_info_netlogon_interactive() set USER_INFO_INTERACTIVE_LOGON
This is not really relevant for now, as USER_INFO_INTERACTIVE_LOGON is
not evaluated in the source3/auth stack. But better add it to
be consistent.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15001

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2022-03-10 03:16:35 +00:00
Ralph Boehme
1e61de8306 CVE-2020-25717: s3-auth: fix MIT Realm regression
This looks like a regression introduced by the recent security fixes. This
commit should hopefully fixes it.

As a quick solution it might be possible to use the username map script based on
the example in https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14901#c0. We're not
sure this behaves identical, but it might work in the standalone server case.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14922

Reported-at: https://lists.samba.org/archive/samba/2021-November/238720.html

Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
2021-12-03 12:05:42 +00:00
Andrew Bartlett
0a546be052 CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: Fallback to a SID/UID based mapping if the named based lookup fails
Before the CVE-2020-25717 fixes we had a fallback from
getpwnam('DOMAIN\user') to getpwnam('user') which was very dangerous and
unpredictable.

Now we do the fallback based on sid_to_uid() followed by
getpwuid() on the returned uid.

This obsoletes 'username map [script]' based workaround adviced
for CVE-2020-25717, when nss_winbindd is not used or
idmap_nss is actually used.

In future we may decide to prefer or only do the SID/UID based
lookup, but for now we want to keep this unchanged as much as possible.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14901

Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

[metze@samba.org moved the new logic into the fallback codepath only
 in order to avoid behavior changes as much as possible]
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>

Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Nov 15 19:01:56 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
2021-11-15 19:01:56 +00:00
Ralph Boehme
25043ebb2e source3: move lib/substitute.c functions out of proto.h
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14897

Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
2021-11-11 13:49:32 +00:00
Stefan Metzmacher
757f1d20e4 CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: simplify make_session_info_krb5() by removing unused arguments
This is only ever be called in standalone mode with an MIT realm,
so we don't have a PAC/info3 structure.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-09 19:45:33 +00:00
Stefan Metzmacher
e8bb009009 CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: simplify get_user_from_kerberos_info() by removing the unused logon_info argument
This code is only every called in standalone mode on a MIT realm,
it means we never have a PAC and we also don't have winbindd arround.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-09 19:45:33 +00:00
Stefan Metzmacher
2609e4297e CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: let auth3_generate_session_info_pac() reject a PAC in standalone mode
We should be strict in standalone mode, that we only support MIT realms
without a PAC in order to keep the code sane.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-09 19:45:33 +00:00
Stefan Metzmacher
566c2b296d CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: let auth3_generate_session_info_pac() delegate everything to make_server_info_wbcAuthUserInfo()
This consolidates the code paths used for NTLMSSP and Kerberos!

I checked what we were already doing for NTLMSSP, which is this:

a) source3/auth/auth_winbind.c calls wbcAuthenticateUserEx()
b) as a domain member we require a valid response from winbindd,
   otherwise we'll return NT_STATUS_NO_LOGON_SERVERS
c) we call make_server_info_wbcAuthUserInfo(), which internally
   calls make_server_info_info3()
d) auth_check_ntlm_password() calls
   smb_pam_accountcheck(unix_username, rhost), where rhost
   is only an ipv4 or ipv6 address (without reverse dns lookup)
e) from auth3_check_password_send/auth3_check_password_recv()
   server_returned_info will be passed to auth3_generate_session_info(),
   triggered by gensec_session_info(), which means we'll call into
   create_local_token() in order to transform auth_serversupplied_info
   into auth_session_info.

For Kerberos gensec_session_info() will call
auth3_generate_session_info_pac() via the gensec_generate_session_info_pac()
helper function. The current logic is this:

a) gensec_generate_session_info_pac() is the function that
   evaluates the 'gensec:require_pac', which defaulted to 'no'
   before.
b) auth3_generate_session_info_pac() called
   wbcAuthenticateUserEx() in order to pass the PAC blob
   to winbindd, but only to prime its cache, e.g. netsamlogon cache
   and others. Most failures were just ignored.
c) If the PAC blob is available, it extracted the PAC_LOGON_INFO
   from it.
d) Then we called the horrible get_user_from_kerberos_info() function:
   - It uses a first part of the tickets principal name (before the @)
     as username and combines that with the 'logon_info->base.logon_domain'
     if the logon_info (PAC) is present.
   - As a fallback without a PAC it's tries to ask winbindd for a mapping
     from realm to netbios domain name.
   - Finally is falls back to using the realm as netbios domain name
   With this information is builds 'userdomain+winbind_separator+useraccount'
   and calls map_username() followed by smb_getpwnam() with create=true,
   Note this is similar to the make_server_info_info3() => check_account()
   => smb_getpwnam() logic under 3.
   - It also calls smb_pam_accountcheck(), but may pass the reverse DNS lookup name
     instead of the ip address as rhost.
   - It does some MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_UID logic and auto creates the
     guest account.
e) We called create_info3_from_pac_logon_info()
f) make_session_info_krb5() calls gets called and triggers this:
   - If get_user_from_kerberos_info() mapped to guest, it calls
     make_server_info_guest()
   - If create_info3_from_pac_logon_info() created a info3 from logon_info,
     it calls make_server_info_info3()
   - Without a PAC it tries pdb_getsampwnam()/make_server_info_sam() with
     a fallback to make_server_info_pw()
   From there it calls create_local_token()

I tried to change auth3_generate_session_info_pac() to behave similar
to auth_winbind.c together with auth3_generate_session_info() as
a domain member, as we now rely on a PAC:

a) As domain member we require a PAC and always call wbcAuthenticateUserEx()
   and require a valid response!
b) we call make_server_info_wbcAuthUserInfo(), which internally
   calls make_server_info_info3(). Note make_server_info_info3()
   handles MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_UID and make_server_info_guest()
   internally.
c) Similar to auth_check_ntlm_password() we now call
   smb_pam_accountcheck(unix_username, rhost), where rhost
   is only an ipv4 or ipv6 address (without reverse dns lookup)
d) From there it calls create_local_token()

As standalone server (in an MIT realm) we continue
with the already existing code logic, which works without a PAC:
a) we keep smb_getpwnam() with create=true logic as it
   also requires an explicit 'add user script' option.
b) In the following commits we assert that there's
   actually no PAC in this mode, which means we can
   remove unused and confusing code.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14646
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-09 19:45:33 +00:00
Alexander Bokovoy
e2d5b4d709 CVE-2020-25717: Add FreeIPA domain controller role
As we want to reduce use of 'classic domain controller' role but FreeIPA
relies on it internally, add a separate role to mark FreeIPA domain
controller role.

It means that role won't result in ROLE_STANDALONE.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-09 19:45:33 +00:00
Stefan Metzmacher
57abb7f8f8 CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: don't let create_local_token depend on !winbind_ping()
We always require a running winbindd on a domain member, so
we should better fail a request instead of silently alter
the behaviour, which results in a different unix token, just
because winbindd might be restarted.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-09 19:45:33 +00:00
Ralph Boehme
8f79ee99a6 CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: remove fallbacks in smb_getpwnam()
So far we tried getpwnam("DOMAIN\account") first and
always did a fallback to getpwnam("account") completely
ignoring the domain part, this just causes problems
as we mix "DOMAIN1\account", "DOMAIN2\account",
and "account"!

As we require a running winbindd for domain member setups
we should no longer do a fallback to just "account" for
users served by winbindd!

For users of the local SAM don't use this code path,
as check_sam_security() doesn't call check_account().

The only case where smb_getpwnam("account") happens is
when map_username() via ("username map [script]")  mapped
"DOMAIN\account" to something without '\', but that is
explicitly desired by the admin.

Note: use 'git show -w'

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-09 19:45:33 +00:00
Stefan Metzmacher
dd0423bfbb CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: no longer let check_account() autocreate local users
So far we autocreated local user accounts based on just the
account_name (just ignoring any domain part).

This only happens via a possible 'add user script',
which is not typically defined on domain members
and on NT4 DCs local users already exist in the
local passdb anyway.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-09 19:45:33 +00:00
Stefan Metzmacher
28fae9c221 CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: we should not try to autocreate the guest account
We should avoid autocreation of users as much as possible.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-09 19:45:33 +00:00
Samuel Cabrero
4b78ad7346 CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: Check minimum domain uid
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>

[abartlet@samba.org Removed knownfail on advice from metze]
2021-11-09 19:45:33 +00:00
Stefan Metzmacher
97d5402791 CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: let auth3_generate_session_info_pac() forward the low level errors
Mapping everything to ACCESS_DENIED makes it hard to debug problems,
which may happen because of our more restrictive behaviour in future.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-09 19:45:33 +00:00
Stefan Metzmacher
27d20fc335 CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: start with authoritative = 1
This is not strictly needed, but makes it easier to audit
that we don't miss important places.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-09 19:45:32 +00:00
Jeremy Allison
91c024dfd8 s3: auth: Andrew noticed f585f01148 doesn't keep the same logic.
This should make it identical.

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>

Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Sep  8 06:38:21 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
2021-09-08 06:38:21 +00:00
Volker Lendecke
ba237d9403 auth: Fix a typo
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2021-09-07 18:26:33 +00:00
Volker Lendecke
f585f01148 auth: Simplify is_our_machine_account()
Use strnequal instead of duplicating a string

Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2021-09-07 18:26:33 +00:00
Andreas Schneider
ced8390c95 s3:auth: Check return code of cli_credentials_set_conf()
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-06-29 02:19:35 +00:00
Andreas Schneider
521f77c667 auth:creds: Add obtained arg to cli_credentials_set_kerberos_state()
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-04-28 03:43:34 +00:00
Volker Lendecke
c9508b971c auth3: talloc_strackframe() panics on failure
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>

Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Apr 27 14:14:22 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
2021-04-27 14:14:22 +00:00
Volker Lendecke
4e034e8f8f auth3: if (ret==False) just looks weird
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
2021-04-27 13:24:35 +00:00
Volker Lendecke
ee431a2987 auth3: Fix a typo
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
2021-04-27 13:24:35 +00:00
Volker Lendecke
b150982d90 auth3: Use auth3_context_set_challenge() in auth3_set_challenge()
Don't duplicate what's already there.

Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
2021-04-27 13:24:35 +00:00
Volker Lendecke
cdd9d42371 auth3: Apply some const to auth3_context_set_challenge()
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
2021-04-27 13:24:35 +00:00
Andreas Schneider
edda7a329e s3:smbd: Remove NIS support
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2021-04-22 17:57:30 +00:00
Volker Lendecke
bd0f6671c7 auth3: Make auth3_session_info_create() static
Only used in the static artifical session creation

Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2021-04-19 18:18:32 +00:00
Volker Lendecke
015cfe2ecd auth3: Add an error check to auth_generic_prepare()
gensec_set_credentials() can fail

Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2021-04-19 18:18:32 +00:00
Volker Lendecke
1f4f6a4305 auth3: Remove unnecessary talloc_unlink() calls
The structures we unlinked have been talloc_reference()ed in gensec
and thus don't need the second talloc parent anymore. But this
talloc_unlink isn't necessary because tmp_ctx is free()ed a few lines
down.

Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2021-04-19 18:18:32 +00:00
Volker Lendecke
d145453572 auth3: Make load_auth_module() static
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2021-04-19 18:18:31 +00:00
Volker Lendecke
1a696c9ae2 create_local_token: Add error checks
add_sid_to_array_unique() only fails for ENOMEM, and other parts of
the auth stack would probably crash under ENOMEM anyway. But this is
authorization-related code that should be as clean as possible.

Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2021-04-19 18:18:31 +00:00
Volker Lendecke
42906e971d auth3: Fix a few error path memleaks in create_local_token()
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2021-04-19 18:18:31 +00:00
Volker Lendecke
12b523223c auth3: Fix a typo
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2021-04-19 18:18:31 +00:00
Volker Lendecke
062a0c14c6 auth3: Simplify check_samba4_security()
First set up "server_info" in a local variable and once it's fully set
up, assign it to the out parameter "pserver_info".

Pointer dereferencing obfuscates the code for me.

Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2021-04-19 18:18:31 +00:00
Volker Lendecke
8536bf7fce auth: Simplify DEBUG statements in make_auth3_context_for_ntlm()
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2021-04-19 18:18:31 +00:00
Volker Lendecke
5864566627 auth3: Fix a error path memleak
(find the missing TALLOC_FREE() in the - part of the patch...)

Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2021-04-19 18:18:31 +00:00
Volker Lendecke
999a412db9 auth3: Use talloc_move() instead of talloc_steal()
More recent coding style, avoid ambiguities about ownership

Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2021-04-19 18:18:31 +00:00
Andreas Schneider
d34445312d s3:auth: Use cli_credentials_init_server()
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-04-09 10:46:28 +00:00
Volker Lendecke
c6ccf1b91b auth3: Make it a bit easier to #include "source3/include/auth.h"
Avoid using "uchar" in source3/auth/proto.h, this is #defined in includes.h

Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2021-03-16 17:09:32 +00:00
Volker Lendecke
e6c6407623 auth3: Align integer types
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2021-03-16 17:09:32 +00:00
Ralph Boehme
df5fe2d835 s3/auth: implement "winbind:ignore domains"
Under the following conditions a user from an ignored domain might be able to
authenticate:

- using Kerberos

- successfully previous authentication so the idmap and name caches are filled

- winbind not running (fwiw, winbindd is mandatory on a domain member)

- nscd running with a cached getpwnam for the ignored user (otherwise auth fails
  because getpwnam fails)

- lookup_name() function being modified to look into the name cache before
  contacting winbindd. Currently it talks directly to winbindd and that will
  check the cache.

Currently, authentication will only fail because creating the local token for
the user fails because an LSA lookupname RPC call fails (because winbindd is not
running).

All of this makes a successfull authentication unlikelly, but that is more by
accident then by design.

To ensures that if winbindd is not running and as such winbindd itself can not
enforce the restriction, also implement the ignored domains check in the auth
system as a last line of defense.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14602
RN: "winbind:ignore domains" doesn't prevent user login from trusted domain

Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2021-01-21 21:48:30 +00:00
Volker Lendecke
d82acf7685 lib: give global_contexts.c its own header file
It's a bit shocking how many references we have to global
contexts. Make this a bit more obvious.

Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2021-01-08 20:31:33 +00:00
Alexander Bokovoy
2a8b672652 auth_sam: use pdb_get_domain_info to look up DNS forest information
When Samba is used as a part of FreeIPA domain controller, Windows
clients for a trusted AD forest may try to authenticate (perform logon
operation) as a REALM\name user account.

Fix auth_sam plugins to accept DNS forest name if we are running on a DC
with PASSDB module providing domain information (e.g. pdb_get_domain_info()
returning non-NULL structure). Right now, only FreeIPA or Samba AD DC
PASSDB backends return this information but Samba AD DC configuration is
explicitly ignored by the two auth_sam (strict and netlogon3) modules.

Detailed logs below:

[2020/11/11 09:23:53.281296,  1, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=rpc_parse] ../../librpc/ndr/ndr.c:482(ndr_print_function_debug)
       netr_LogonSamLogonWithFlags: struct netr_LogonSamLogonWithFlags
          in: struct netr_LogonSamLogonWithFlags
              server_name              : *
                  server_name              : '\\master.ipa.test'
              computer_name            : *
                  computer_name            : 'AD1'
              credential               : *
                  credential: struct netr_Authenticator
                      cred: struct netr_Credential
                          data                     : 529f4b087c5f6546
                      timestamp                : Wed Nov 11 09:23:55 AM 2020 UTC
              return_authenticator     : *
                  return_authenticator: struct netr_Authenticator
                      cred: struct netr_Credential
                          data                     : 204f28f622010000
                      timestamp                : Fri May  2 06:37:50 AM 1986 UTC
              logon_level              : NetlogonNetworkTransitiveInformation (6)
              logon                    : *
                  logon                    : union netr_LogonLevel(case 6)
                  network                  : *
                      network: struct netr_NetworkInfo
                          identity_info: struct netr_IdentityInfo
                              domain_name: struct lsa_String
                                  length                   : 0x0010 (16)
                                  size                     : 0x01fe (510)
                                  string                   : *
                                      string                   : 'IPA.TEST'
                              parameter_control        : 0x00002ae0 (10976)
                                     0: MSV1_0_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED
                                     0: MSV1_0_UPDATE_LOGON_STATISTICS
                                     0: MSV1_0_RETURN_USER_PARAMETERS
                                     0: MSV1_0_DONT_TRY_GUEST_ACCOUNT
                                     1: MSV1_0_ALLOW_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT
                                     1: MSV1_0_RETURN_PASSWORD_EXPIRY
                                     1: MSV1_0_USE_CLIENT_CHALLENGE
                                     0: MSV1_0_TRY_GUEST_ACCOUNT_ONLY
                                     1: MSV1_0_RETURN_PROFILE_PATH
                                     0: MSV1_0_TRY_SPECIFIED_DOMAIN_ONLY
                                     1: MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT
                                     0: MSV1_0_DISABLE_PERSONAL_FALLBACK
                                     1: MSV1_0_ALLOW_FORCE_GUEST
                                     0: MSV1_0_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD_SUPPLIED
                                     0: MSV1_0_USE_DOMAIN_FOR_ROUTING_ONLY
                                     0: MSV1_0_ALLOW_MSVCHAPV2
                                     0: MSV1_0_S4U2SELF
                                     0: MSV1_0_CHECK_LOGONHOURS_FOR_S4U
                                     0: MSV1_0_SUBAUTHENTICATION_DLL_EX
                              logon_id                 : 0x0000000000884ef2 (8933106)
                              account_name: struct lsa_String
                                  length                   : 0x000e (14)
                                  size                     : 0x000e (14)
                                  string                   : *
                                      string                   : 'idmuser'
                              workstation: struct lsa_String
                                  length                   : 0x0000 (0)
                                  size                     : 0x0000 (0)
                                  string                   : *
                                      string                   : ''
                         challenge                : 417207867bd33c74
                          nt: struct netr_ChallengeResponse
                              length                   : 0x00c0 (192)
                              size                     : 0x00c0 (192)
                              data                     : *
                                  data: ARRAY(192)
  [0000] A5 24 62 6E 31 DF 69 66   9E DC 54 D6 63 4C D6 2F   .$bn1.if ..T.cL./
  [0010] 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00   50 37 D7 60 0C B8 D6 01   ........ P7.`....
  [0020] 15 1B 38 4F 47 95 4D 62   00 00 00 00 02 00 0E 00   ..8OG.Mb ........
  [0030] 57 00 49 00 4E 00 32 00   30 00 31 00 36 00 01 00   W.I.N.2. 0.1.6...
  [0040] 06 00 41 00 44 00 31 00   04 00 18 00 77 00 69 00   ..A.D.1. ....w.i.
  [0050] 6E 00 32 00 30 00 31 00   36 00 2E 00 74 00 65 00   n.2.0.1. 6...t.e.
  [0060] 73 00 74 00 03 00 20 00   61 00 64 00 31 00 2E 00   s.t... . a.d.1...
  [0070] 77 00 69 00 6E 00 32 00   30 00 31 00 36 00 2E 00   w.i.n.2. 0.1.6...
  [0080] 74 00 65 00 73 00 74 00   05 00 18 00 77 00 69 00   t.e.s.t. ....w.i.
  [0090] 6E 00 32 00 30 00 31 00   36 00 2E 00 74 00 65 00   n.2.0.1. 6...t.e.
  [00A0] 73 00 74 00 07 00 08 00   50 37 D7 60 0C B8 D6 01   s.t..... P7.`....
  [00B0] 06 00 04 00 02 00 00 00   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ........ ........
                          lm: struct netr_ChallengeResponse
                              length                   : 0x0018 (24)
                              size                     : 0x0018 (24)
                              data                     : *
                                  data                     : 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
              validation_level         : 0x0006 (6)
              flags                    : *
                  flags                    : 0x00000000 (0)
                         0: NETLOGON_SAMLOGON_FLAG_PASS_TO_FOREST_ROOT
                         0: NETLOGON_SAMLOGON_FLAG_PASS_CROSS_FOREST_HOP
                         0: NETLOGON_SAMLOGON_FLAG_RODC_TO_OTHER_DOMAIN
                         0: NETLOGON_SAMLOGON_FLAG_RODC_NTLM_REQUEST

In such case checks for a workgroup name will not match the DNS forest
name used in the username specification:

[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283055,  3, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth.c:200(auth_check_ntlm_password)
  check_ntlm_password:  Checking password for unmapped user [IPA.TEST]\[idmuser]@[] with the new password interface
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283073,  3, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth.c:203(auth_check_ntlm_password)
  check_ntlm_password:  mapped user is: [IPA.TEST]\[idmuser]@[]
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283082, 10, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth.c:213(auth_check_ntlm_password)
  check_ntlm_password: auth_context challenge created by fixed
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283091, 10, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth.c:216(auth_check_ntlm_password)
  challenge is:
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283099,  5, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0)] ../../lib/util/util.c:678(dump_data)
  [0000] 41 72 07 86 7B D3 3C 74                             Ar..{.<t
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283113, 10, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth_sam.c:209(auth_sam_netlogon3_auth)
  auth_sam_netlogon3_auth: Check auth for: [IPA.TEST]\[idmuser]
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283123,  5, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth_sam.c:234(auth_sam_netlogon3_auth)
  auth_sam_netlogon3_auth: IPA.TEST is not our domain name (DC for IPA)
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283131, 10, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth.c:249(auth_check_ntlm_password)
  auth_check_ntlm_password: sam_netlogon3 had nothing to say

and overall authentication attempt will fail: auth_winbind will complain
that this domain is not a trusted one and refuse operating on it:

[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283784, 10, pid=42663, effective(0, 0), real(0, 0), class=winbind] ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd.c:742(process_request_send)
  process_request_send: process_request: Handling async request smbd(42677):PAM_AUTH_CRAP
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283796,  3, pid=42663, effective(0, 0), real(0, 0), class=winbind] ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd_pam_auth_crap.c:110(winbindd_pam_auth_crap_send)
  [42677]: pam auth crap domain: [IPA.TEST] user: idmuser
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283810,  3, pid=42663, effective(0, 0), real(0, 0), class=winbind] ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd_pam.c:409(find_auth_domain)
  Authentication for domain [IPA.TEST] refused as it is not a trusted domain
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283825, 10, pid=42663, effective(0, 0), real(0, 0), class=winbind] ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd.c:810(process_request_done)
  process_request_done: [smbd(42677):PAM_AUTH_CRAP]: NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283844, 10, pid=42663, effective(0, 0), real(0, 0), class=winbind] ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd.c:855(process_request_written)
  process_request_written: [smbd(42677):PAM_AUTH_CRAP]: delivered response to client

Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
2020-11-12 13:49:34 +00:00
Björn Jacke
cce4e8012c auth_generic: fix empty initializer compile warning
Signed-off-by: Bjoern Jacke <bjacke@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2020-11-10 06:53:42 +00:00
Andreas Schneider
1298280a22 auth:creds: Rename CRED_USE_KERBEROS values
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
2020-11-03 15:25:37 +00:00
Matthew DeVore
c2ac923c6a s3: safe_string: do not include string_wrappers.h
Rather than have safe_string.h #include string_wrappers.h, make users of
string_wrappers.h include it explicitly.

includes.h now no longer includes string_wrappers.h transitively. Still
allow includes.h to #include safe_string.h for now so that as many
modules as possible get the safety checks in it.

Signed-off-by: Matthew DeVore <matvore@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Mulder <dmulder@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2020-08-28 00:56:34 +00:00
Ralph Boehme
b7e77ce32d s3:auth: fill in info3 domain name in passwd_to_SamInfo3()
This is needed for make_session_info_from_username() to fill in the domain
name. The callchain goes like this:

make_session_info_from_username()
-> make_server_info_pw()
-> passwd_to_SamInfo3()

Other callers of passwd_to_SamInfo3() are also affected. A subsequent change
will let set_conn_force_user_group() user the domainname from the session_info
returned from make_session_info_from_username() to create substitution
context. Without this fix domain name would be NULL.

Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2020-05-30 01:17:36 +00:00
Volker Lendecke
ef0350221e auth: Fix CID 1458418 Null pointer dereferences (REVERSE_INULL)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14247

Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
2020-02-14 12:15:32 +00:00