IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO GET AN ACCOUNT, please write an
email to Administrator. User accounts are meant only to access repo
and report issues and/or generate pull requests.
This is a purpose-specific Git hosting for
BaseALT
projects. Thank you for your understanding!
Только зарегистрированные пользователи имеют доступ к сервису!
Для получения аккаунта, обратитесь к администратору.
There were some reports that strace output an LDAP server socket is in
CLOSE_WAIT state, returning EAGAIN for writev over and over (after a call to
epoll() each time).
In the tstream_bsd code the problem happens when we have a pending
writev_send, while there's no readv_send pending. In that case
we still ask for TEVENT_FD_READ in order to notice connection errors
early, so we try to call writev even if the socket doesn't report TEVENT_FD_WRITE.
And there are situations where we do that over and over again.
It happens like this with a Linux kernel:
tcp_fin() has this:
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
inet_csk_schedule_ack(sk);
sk->sk_shutdown |= RCV_SHUTDOWN;
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE);
switch (sk->sk_state) {
case TCP_SYN_RECV:
case TCP_ESTABLISHED:
/* Move to CLOSE_WAIT */
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_CLOSE_WAIT);
inet_csk_enter_pingpong_mode(sk);
break;
It means RCV_SHUTDOWN gets set as well as TCP_CLOSE_WAIT, but
sk->sk_err is not changed to indicate an error.
tcp_sendmsg_locked has this:
...
err = -EPIPE;
if (sk->sk_err || (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN))
goto do_error;
while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
int copy = 0;
skb = tcp_write_queue_tail(sk);
if (skb)
copy = size_goal - skb->len;
if (copy <= 0 || !tcp_skb_can_collapse_to(skb)) {
bool first_skb;
new_segment:
if (!sk_stream_memory_free(sk))
goto wait_for_space;
...
wait_for_space:
set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
if (copied)
tcp_push(sk, flags & ~MSG_MORE, mss_now,
TCP_NAGLE_PUSH, size_goal);
err = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo);
if (err != 0)
goto do_error;
It means if (sk->sk_err || (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN)) doesn't
hit as we only have RCV_SHUTDOWN and sk_stream_wait_memory returns
-EAGAIN.
tcp_poll has this:
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM | EPOLLRDHUP;
So we'll get EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM | EPOLLRDHUP triggering
TEVENT_FD_READ and writev/sendmsg keeps getting EAGAIN.
So we need to always clear TEVENT_FD_READ if we don't
have readable handler in order to avoid burning cpu.
But we turn it on again after a timeout of 1 second
in order to monitor the error state of the connection.
And now that our tsocket_bsd_error() helper checks for POLLRDHUP,
we can check if the socket is in an error state before calling the
writable handler when TEVENT_FD_READ was reported.
Only on error we'll call the writable handler, which will pick
the error without calling writev().
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15202
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15202
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Remove knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15195
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Filipenský <pfilipensky@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Oct 19 00:13:56 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
For type == ADOUBLE_META, fio->fake_fd is true so
writes are already synchronous, just call tevent_req_post().
For type == ADOUBLE_RSRC we know we are configured
with FRUIT_RSRC_ADFILE (because fruit_must_handle_aio_stream()
returned true), so we can just call SMB_VFS_NEXT_FSYNC_SEND()
after replacing fsp with fio->ad_fsp.
Remove knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15182
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
This shows we currently hang when sending an SMB2_OP_FLUSH on
an AFP_Resource fork.
Adds knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15182
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Samba 4.5 and earlier will fail to do GET_ANC correctly and will not
replicate non-critical parents of objects with isCriticalSystemObject=TRUE
when DRSUAPI_DRS_CRITICAL_ONLY is set.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15189
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
The chgdcpass server now emulates older verions of Samba that
fail to implement DRSUAPI_DRS_GET_ANC correctly and totally fails to support
DRSUAPI_DRS_GET_TGT.
We now show this is in effect by the fact that tests now fail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15189
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
The chgdcpass environment will emulate older verions of Samba
that fail to implement DRSUAPI_DRS_GET_ANC correctly and
totally fails to support DRSUAPI_DRS_GET_TGT.
This will allow testing of a client-side fallback, allowing migration
from sites that run very old Samba versions over DRSUAPI (currently
the only option is to attempt an in-place upgrade).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15189
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Uses non-DFS names and DFS-names against a DFS share, shows that Windows
looks correctly at the DFS flag when SMB2 requests are
made on a DFS share. Passes against Windows 2022.
Mark as knownfail for smbd.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Sep 28 19:34:29 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
Test using non-priviledged accounts now need to make sure they have
WP access on the prvided attributes, or Write-DACL
Some test create organizational units with a specific SD, and those now
need the user to have WD or else they give errors
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14810
Signed-off-by: Nadezhda Ivanova <nivanova@symas.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Up to now, the rights to modify an attribute were not checked during an LDAP
add operation. This means that even if a user has no right to modify
an attribute, they can still specify any value during object creation,
and the validated writes were not checked.
This patch changes this behavior. During an add operation,
a security descriptor is created that does not include the one provided by the
user, and is used to verify that the user has the right to modify the supplied attributes.
Exception is made for an object's mandatory attributes, and if the user has Write DACL right,
further checks are skipped.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14810
Pair-Programmed-With: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Nadezhda Ivanova <nivanova@symas.com>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Up to now, the rights to modify an attribute were not checked during an LDAP
add operation. This means that even if a user has no right to modify
an attribute, they can still specify any value during object creation,
and the validated writes were not checked.
This patch includes tests for the proposed change of behavior.
test_add_c3 and c4 pass, because mandatory attributes can still be
set, and in the old behavior SD permissions were irrelevant
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14810
Pair-Programmed-With: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Nadezhda Ivanova <nivanova@symas.com>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Only tests SMB1unlink for now, but I will add other operations
later.
smbtorture3 test is: SMB1-DFS-OPERATIONS.
Passes fully against Windows. Adds knownfail for smbd.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
This one is tricky. It sends SMB2 DFS pathnames to a non-DFS
share, and sets the SMB2 flag FLAGS2_DFS_PATHNAMES in the SMB2
packet.
Windows will have non of it and (correctly) treats the pathnames
as local paths (they're going to a non-DFS share). Samba fails.
This proves the server looks as the share DFS capability to
override the flag in the SMB2 packet.
Passes against Windows. Added knownfail for Samba.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
These variables are not important to protect against a race with
and a double-read can easily be avoided by moving them up the file
a little.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Ensure that the bad password count is incremented atomically,
and that the successful logon accounting data is updated atomically.
Use bad password indicator (in a distinct TDB) to determine if to open a transaction
We open a transaction when we have seen the hint that this user
has recorded a bad password. This allows us to avoid always
needing one, while not missing a possible lockout.
We also go back and get a transation if we did not take out
one out but we chose to do a write (eg for lastLogonTimestamp)
Based on patches by Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
cmocka unit tests for the authsam_reread_user_logon_data in
source4/auth/sam.c
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14937
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Douglas Bagnall <dbagnall@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Sep 7 06:02:20 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
Most likely it is a bad filename or attribute, not the wrong type of
argument.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14937
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Not TypeError, which is supposed to be about Python data types. This
way we get to check/see an errno and strerror, and will allow us to
set the filename which will be useful for some errors.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We want `samba-tool ntacl sysvolreset` and `samba-tool ntacl
sysvolcheck` to fail when the Policies folder is not in place, but not
to produce an inscrutable stacktrace.
https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14937
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
To match convention, and elsewhere.
We can't easily use colour.is_colour_wanted() because we could (via
--output) be intending to write to a file that isn't open yet, so we
have no .isatty() to query.
Also, because --color-scheme implies --color (as documented in
--help), it trumps most 'auto' checks, but not NO_COLOR.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
By convention, 'tty' is a common alias for 'auto', 'always' and
'force' mean 'yes', and 'never' means no. It seems 'never; and
'always' are more common than 'yes' and 'no'.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
As described at https://no-color.org/, the NO_COLOR environment
variable is a widely used defacto-ish standard for asking for no
colour. If someone goes
NO_COLOR=whatever samba-tool ...
we want to assume they want no ANSI colour codes, as if they had used
--color=no. But first we want to test that, so here we are.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
If a client disconnected all its interfaces and reconnects when
the come back, it will likely start from any ip address returned
dns, which means it can try to connect to a different ctdb node.
The old node may not have noticed the disconnect and still holds
the client_guid based smbd.
Up unil now the new node returned NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED to
the SMB2 Negotiate request, as messaging_send_iov[_from]() will
return -1/ENOSYS if a file descriptor os passed to a process on
a different node.
Now we tell the other node to teardown all client connections
belonging to the client-guid.
Note that this is not authenticated, but if an attacker can
capture the client-guid, he can also inject TCP resets anyway,
to get the same effect.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15159
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Sep 2 20:59:15 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
This demonstrates that a client-guid connected to ctdb node 0
caused a connection with the same client-guid to be rejected by
ctdb node 1. Node 1 rejects the SMB2 Negotiate with
NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED, because passing the multi-channel connection
to a different node is not supported.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15159
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
smbtorture3 test is: SMB1-DFS-PATHS
Tests open, and then all 4 methods of renaming/hardlinking
files:
1). SMBmv
2). SMBtrans2 SETPATHINFO
3). SMBtrans2 SETFILEINFO
4). SMBntrename
Also added a test for SMB1findfirst.
smbtorture3 test is: SMB1-DFS-SEARCH-PATHS.
What this shows is that Windows strips off the
SMB1findfirst mask *before* calling the DFS path
parser (smbd currently does not).
Added so we know how to fix the server code to match Windows
behavior in parsing DFS paths in different calls going forward.
Passes fully against Windows. Adds knownfails for smbd.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Passes fully against Windows.
This shows that DFS paths on Windows on SMB2 must
be of the form:
SERVER\SHARE\PATH
but the actual contents of the strings SERVER and
SHARE don't need to match the given server or share.
The algorithm the Windows server uses is the following:
Look for a '\\' character, and assign anything before
that to the SERVER component. The characters in this
component are not checked for validity.
Look for a second '\\' character and assign anything
between the first and second '\\' characters to the
SHARE component. The characters in the share component
are checked for validity, but only ':' is flagged as
an illegal sharename character despite what:
[MS-FSCC] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/dc9978d7-6299-4c5a-a22d-a039cdc716ea
says.
Anything after the second '\\' character is assigned
to the PATH component and becomes the share-relative
path.
If there aren't two '\\' characters it removes
everything and ends up with the empty string as
the share relative path.
To give some examples, the following pathnames all map
to the directory at the root of the DFS share:
SERVER\SHARE
SERVER
""
ANY\NAME
ANY
::::\NAME
the name:
SERVER\:
is illegal (sharename contains ':') and the name:
ANY\NAME\file
maps to a share-relative pathname of "file",
despite "ANY" not being the server name, and
"NAME" not being the DFS share name we are
connected to.
Adds a knownfail for smbd as our current code
in parse_dfs_path() is completely incorrect
here and tries to map "incorrect" DFS names
into local paths. I will work on fixing this
later, but we should be able to remove parse_dfs_path()
entirely and move the DFS pathname logic before
the call to filename_convert_dirfsp() in the
same way Volker suggested and was able to achieve
for extract_snapshot_token() and the @GMT pathname
processing.
Also proves the "target" paths for SMB2_SETINFO
rename and hardlink must *not* be DFS-paths.
Next I will work on a torture tester for SMB1
DFS paths.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reivewed-by: Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Aug 30 17:10:33 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14215
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Aug 29 18:20:20 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
Passes against Windows, currently fails against Samba.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14215
RN: Requesting maximum allowed permission of file with DOS read-only attribute results in access denied error
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
The spec lists the following as requiring special access:
- for requiring FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES:
FileBasicInformation
FileAllInformation
FileNetworkOpenInformation
FileAttributeTagInformation
- for requiring FILE_READ_EA:
FileFullEaInformation
All other infolevels are unrestricted.
We ignore the IPC related infolevels:
FilePipeInformation
FilePipeLocalInformation
FilePipeRemoteInformation
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15153
RN: Missing SMB2-GETINFO access checks from MS-SMB2 3.3.5.20.1
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Aug 23 12:54:08 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
Commit d71ef1365cdde47aeb3465699181656b0655fa04 caused a regression where the
creation date on streams wasn't updated anymore on the stream fsp.
By adding a simple wrapper vfs_fget_dos_attributes() that takes care of
- passing only the base_fsp to the VFS, so the VFS can be completely agnostic of
all the streams related complexity like fake fds,
- propagating any updated btime from the base_fsp->fsp_name to the
stream_fsp->fsp_name
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15126
MR: https://gitlab.com/samba-team/samba/-/merge_requests/2643
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
If contend_level2_oplocks_begin_default() skips break it's
own lease, we should not clear SHARE_MODE_LEASE_READ
in share_mode_data->flags.
Otherwise that lease won't see any lease break notifications
for writes from other clients (file handles not using the same lease
key).
So we need to count the number existing read leases (including
the one with the same lease key) in order to know it's
safe to clear SMB2_LEASE_READ/SHARE_MODE_LEASE_READ.
Otherwise the next run (likely from another client)
will get the wrong result from file_has_read_lease().
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15148
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Aug 18 19:41:33 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
This demonstrates the bug that happens with a
write to a file handle holding an R lease,
while there are other openers without any lease.
When one of the other openers writes to the file,
the R lease of the only lease holder isn't broken to NONE.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15148
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Returns NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND for final component.
Note we have to call the check before each call to
openat_pathref_fsp(), as each call may be using a
different filesystem name. The first name is the
one passed into openat_pathref_fsp_case_insensitive()
by the caller, the second one is a name retrieved from
get_real_filename_cache_key(), and the third one is the name
retrieved from get_real_filename_at(). The last two
calls may have demangled the client given name into
a veto'ed path on the filesystem.
Remove knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15143
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Aug 16 08:26:54 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
Shows we currently don't look at smb.conf veto files parameter
when opening a file or directory. Checks multi-component paths.
Also checks veto files that might be hidden behind a mangled
name.
Add knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15143
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
When using vfs_streams_xattr, for a pathref handle of a stream the system fd
will be a fake fd created by pipe() in vfs_fake_fd().
For the following callchain we wrongly pass a stream fsp to
SMB_VFS_FGET_NT_ACL():
SMB_VFS_CREATE_FILE(..., "file:stream", ...)
=> open_file():
if (open_fd):
-> taking the else branch:
-> smbd_check_access_rights_fsp(stream_fsp)
-> SMB_VFS_FGET_NT_ACL(stream_fsp)
This is obviously wrong and can lead to strange permission errors when using
vfs_acl_xattr:
in vfs_acl_xattr we will try to read the stored ACL by calling
fgetxattr(fake-fd) which of course faild with EBADF. Now unfortunately the
vfs_acl_xattr code ignores the specific error and handles this as if there was
no ACL stored and subsequently runs the code to synthesize a default ACL
according to the setting of "acl:default acl style".
As the correct access check for streams has already been carried out by calling
check_base_file_access() from create_file_unixpath(), the above problem is not
a security issue: it can only lead to "decreased" permissions resulting in
unexpected ACCESS_DENIED errors.
The fix is obviously going to be calling
smbd_check_access_rights_fsp(stream_fsp->base_fsp).
This test verifies that deleting a file works when the stored NT ACL grants
DELETE_FILE while the basic POSIX permissions (used in the acl_xattr fallback
code) do not.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15126
MR: https://gitlab.com/samba-team/samba/-/merge_requests/2643
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
If the message changes the sAMAccountName, we'll check dNSHostName and
servicePrincipalName values against the new value of sAMAccountName,
rather than the account's current value. Similarly, if the message
changes the dNSHostName, we'll check servicePrincipalName values against
the new dNSHostName. This allows setting more than one of these
attributes simultaneously with validated write rights.
We now pass 'struct ldb_val' to acl_validate_spn_value() instead of
simple strings. Previously, we were relying on the data inside 'struct
ldb_val' having a terminating zero byte, even though this is not
guaranteed.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14833
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This allows us to perform validation on a client-specified dNSHostName
value, to ensure that it matches the sAMAccountName.
We might not have any rights to modify the account, so pass the control
FORCE_ALLOW_VALIDATED_DNS_HOSTNAME_SPN_WRITE which allows us to perform
a validated write to dNSHostName and servicePrincipalName (and
unvalidated writes to other attributes, such as operatingSystem).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14833
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Even when there is no old DNS hostname present.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14833
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This check is not exhaustive (it does not check the suffix of the
dNSHostName), and should be covered by a validated write check in
acl_modify().
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14833
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Test that the value is properly validated, and that it can be set
regardless of rights on the account.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14833
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Fixes the raw.write.bad-write test.
NB. We need the two (==0) changes in source3/smbd/smb2_reply.c
as the gcc optimizer now knows that the return from
smbreq_bufrem() can never be less than zero.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15085
Remove knownfail.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jule Anger <janger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Jul 27 11:46:46 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
Since this principal goes through the samba_kdc_fetch_server() path,
setting the canonicalisation flag would cause the principal to be
replaced with the sAMAccountName; this meant requests to
kadmin/changepw@REALM would result in a ticket to krbtgt@REALM. Now we
properly handle canonicalisation for the kadmin/changepw principal.
View with 'git show -b'.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15047
Pair-Programmed-With: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
LDB_FLAG_MOD_* values are not actually flags, and the previous
comparison was equivalent to
(el->flags & LDB_FLAG_MOD_MASK) == 0
which is only true if none of the LDB_FLAG_MOD_* values are set, so we
would not successfully return if the element was a DELETE. Correct the
expression to what it was intended to be.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15009
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
If an account has an SPN that requires Write Property to set, we should
still be able to delete it with just Validated Write.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15009
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
A Mac SMB server returns an all zero handle and an empty path if Spotlight is
disabled on a share. We must return the exact same error return in order to
trigger client-side searching.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15086
pcap: https://www.samba.org/~slow/pcaps/mac-bigsur-smbserver-spotlight-disabled.pcapng.gz
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jul 12 15:42:52 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
To allow for the NT hash not being stored when NTLM authentication is
disabled, we use the AES256 key instead for verification against the
other packages if the unicodePwd attribute is not present.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We now allow this to be via the ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 hash instead
which allows us to decouple Samba from the unsalted NT hash for
organisations that are willing to take this step (for user accounts).
(History checking is limited to the last three passwords only, as
ntPwdHistory is limited to NT hash values, and the PrimaryKerberosCtr4
package only stores three sets of keys.)
Since we don't store a salt per-key, but only a single salt, the check
will fail for a previous password if the account was renamed prior to a
newer password being set.
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
vfs_fruit passes a synthetic filename here where smb_fname->fsp==NULL
when configured to use "fruit:resource = stream" so we need to use
synthetic_pathref() to get an fsp on the smb_fname->base_name
in order to call SMB_VFS_FREMOVEXATTR().
This is the same change we already use in streams_xattr_renameat()
and streams_xattr_stat(), the other pathname operations we implement
here.
Remove knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15099
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jun 20 14:24:20 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
since 4cc4938a28 do_list seems
to deal with non dfs root path, hence we need to resolve the
path before calling cli_unlink.
Also remove the knownfail
We additionally have to also remove the fallback to remove 'file3'
int the smbcacls_dfs_propagate_inherit.teardown as the deltree
that happens in the baseclass now succeeds.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15100
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Jun 17 17:12:07 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
deltree of a file on a DFS share results in NT_STATUS_OBJECT_PATH_NOT_FOUND
Addionally add a knownfail for this (to be removed in subsequent patch
to fix bug)
We also need to add a knownfail (which will not be removed) for the
new test which will fail in smb1 envs
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15100
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
since 4cc4938a28 do_list seems
to deal with non dfs root path, hence we need to resolve the
path before calling cli_unlink.
Also remove the knownfail
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15100
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
del of a file on a DFS share results in NT_STATUS_OBJECT_PATH_NOT_FOUND
Addionally add a knownfail (will be removed in following patch to
fix the bug)
We also need to add a knownfail (which will not be removed) for the
new test which will fail in smb1 envs
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15100
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
If we don't tell dns_common_replace() the old timestamp, it will
think the node is static because the timestamp is 0.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15040
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
There is one knownfail, where it seems an smb.conf like
log file = foo
log level = 2 tdb:2@baa ldb:3
will send the ldb logs to 'baa' instead of 'foo' (i.e., the last
opened log file, rather than the default log file).
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Document this new behavior. Remove knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15098
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Sometimes we really do need to redirect output to stderr
e.g. when using the tar command to output the archive to stdout
we don't want debug or cmdline status messages straying into stdout.
was removed with commit: e4474ac0a5
remove known fail for the test
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15075
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Autobuild-User(master): Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue May 24 10:29:27 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
Add new test to ensure smbclient is writing to stderr (with '-E')
Add knownfail for this test (will be removed when issue is fixed in
later commit)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15075
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
This patch has two flaws: First, it does not cover api_RNetShareEnum()
for SMB1, and the second one is: To make this elegant, we would have
to restructure our share handling. It is really only listing shares
for which we have to pull in everything from smb.conf, registry,
usershares and potentially printers. What we should do is modify our
loadparm handling to only load share definitions on demand and for
listing shares handle all the potential sources specially. Add code
that walks the registry shares without adding them to our services
list and so on.
This patch is the quick&dirty way to fix the bug, the alternative
would be weeks or more. And hopefully nobody notices the SMB1
problem...
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15062
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed May 18 17:42:20 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
A simple degenerate case for our compressor has been a large number of
repeated bytes that will match the maximum length (~64k) at all 8192
search positions, 8191 of which searches are in vain because the
matches are not of greater length than the first one.
Here we recognise the inevitable and reduce runtime proportionately.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz.
REF: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=47428
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Douglas Bagnall <dbagnall@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue May 17 23:11:21 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
We get *very* slow when long runs of the bytes are the same. On this
laptop the test takes 18s; with the next commit it will be 0.006s.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This mirrors the behaviour of lzxpress_compress, which "encodes" an
empty string as an empty string.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Empty strings and trailing flag blocks.
(found with Honggfuzz and a round-trip fuzzer that aborts if the
strings differ).
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
If indic_bit == 0, the shift amount of 32 - indic_bit == 32 will equal
the width of a 32-bit integer type, and these shifts will invoke
undefined behaviour, which is likely to cause incorrect output. Fix this
by not shifting a 32-bit integer type by 32 bits or more.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Previously, we were setting this to the wrong value and overwriting
existing output data.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Previously, we were setting this to the wrong value and overwriting
existing output data.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Matt Suiche <msuiche@comae.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
MS-XCA contains examples, and we should at least get those right.
Signed-off-by: Matt Suiche <msuiche@comae.com>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The user account should not exist if account creation failed.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
If newuser() or newcomputer() create an account over LDAP, and an
attempt to modify it (e.g. to change the password) fails, ensure that we
properly clean up the account. If we are connected over LDAP, we won't
have transactions to clean things up for us.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Ensure that we do not end up with half-created accounts.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: David Mulder <dmulder@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue May 10 20:05:48 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
Advanced configuration for Certifcate Auto
Enrollment is stored on the sysvol, and needs
to be parsed/used when provided.
Signed-off-by: David Mulder <dmulder@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue May 3 21:48:57 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
Adds advanced configuration to the testing of
certificate auto enrollment. Currently fails.
Signed-off-by: David Mulder <dmulder@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Remove knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15042
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Apr 29 15:50:21 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
Passes against Windows. Shows that Windows allows a durable handle
on a leased open for READ_ATTRUBUTES only (a stat open).
Mark as knownfail for now.
NB. Not sure why we are testing smb2.durable-open against ad_dc
as that provisioning has "smb2 leases = no" which precludes
granting durable handles. Not changing for this bug but this
should be looked at in future.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15042
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Because the KDC does not limit protocol transition (S4U2Self), two new
well-known SIDs are available to give this control to the resource
administrator. These SIDs identify whether protocol transition (S4U2Self) has
occurred, and can be used with standard access control lists to grant or limit
access as needed.
See
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/kerberos/kerberos-constrained-delegation-overview
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Apr 13 13:54:27 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
We should make sure that we use NTLMSSP or Kerberos consistently
for the tests and don't mix them.
We're also much stricter and symmetric_difference() to
check if the sets are actually the same.
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15041
Signed-off-by: Pavel Filipenský <pfilipen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Apr 7 09:49:44 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15041
Signed-off-by: Pavel Filipenský <pfilipen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
RN: shadow_copy2 fails listing snapshotted dirs with shadow:fixinodes
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15035
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Mar 31 18:47:42 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
If doing an SMB_VFS_FSTAT() returning onto the stat struct stored in the fsp,
we must call vfs_stat_fsp() as this preserves the iflags.
This is the last SMB_VFS_FSTAT that uses fsp->fsp_name->st, so
remove knownfail.d/durable-v2-setinfo
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15022
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Mar 24 17:21:29 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
This is an implementation of a test written by Apple for their
client. Currently fails to reconnect due to btime being overwritten
incorrectly in the SMB2 setinfo path.
Add knownfail.d/durable-v2-setinfo
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15022
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Remove knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15023
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Mar 22 17:48:25 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
We currently allow setting the delete on close bit for
a directory containing only explicitly hidden/vetoed files
in the case where "delete veto files = yes" *and*
"delete veto files = no". For the "delete veto files = no"
case we should be denying setting the delete on close bit
when the client tries to set it (that's the only time Windows
looks at the bit and returns an error to the user). We
already do the in the dangling symlink case, we just
missed it in the !is_visible_fsp() case.
Mark SMB2-DEL-ON-CLOSE-NONWRITE-DELETE-NO as knownfail
for now.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15023
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
This allows default security groups that have been added since Windows
Server 2008 R2, such as Protected Users, to be created in pre-existing
domains. An error message is generated if a group already exists with
the same name, DN, or SID.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Test that we can add the special Protected Users group, and that we get
an appropriate error message when attempting to add it a second time.
We add these tests here so that we can make use of an old provision that
does not already have the Protected Users group added.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
We also move the authentication to after checking whether the user is
protected, so that if a user in the Protected Users group tries to
authenticate with a wrong password, the bag password count is not
incremented and the account is not locked out. This does not match
MS-APDS, but matches the behaviour of Windows.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
We want to disable SAMR password changes for Protected Users, but need
to ensure that other methods of changing the password still work.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Test that NTLM and SAMR password changes cannot be used for Protected
Users, and that lockouts are not triggered for attempting to use them.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Change the values to match those used by Windows.
Verified with PowerShell commands of the form:
New-Object Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier ER
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
We get the server to decode the SDDL by putting the SID strings in the
defaultSecurityDescriptor of a new class and making an object of that
class. We then check that the resulting SID is what we expect.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This is simple, explainable and secure.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Mar 17 02:47:13 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
RAP is SMB1, the password change routine requires LM hashes and so everything
here is going away or has now gone, so remove the test.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This fixes the rpc.samr test because we no longer specify an LM hash
to the DSDB layer only to have it rejected by password_hash.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
The removal of LM hash storage changes the expected metadata.
We do not need to track these values exactly to prove the
behaviour here.
This is not due to the changes in password_hash directly, which in
update_final_msg() sets DSDB_FLAG_INTERNAL_FORCE_META_DATA to force
a push out of the removed attribute to the replication state.
However at the stage of a subsequent LDAP Delete there is no longer
a lmPwdHistory nor dBCSPwd attribute, in the directory, so there is
no subsequent version bump to remove them when building a tombstone.
Samba's behaviour is different to that seen by Metze on windows 2022,
where he sees dBCSPwd removed (for the no LM store case) but
lmPwdHistory kept. We in Samba choose to differ, not storing an
ambiguous LM hsitory (of "" values likely), so allowing any version
for these two attributes is the sensible choice.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
We no longer generate nor store the LM hash in the Samba AD DC.
This adds much to the knownfail, some future commits will trim this
back down by making the tests understand that the server will not
support or store the LM hash.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This fixes the regressions against KDCs without FAST support.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15002
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15005
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Mar 11 18:06:47 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
authenticate_ldap_simple_bind*() needs to pass the
result of the cracknames operation into the auth stack
as user_info->client.{account,domain}_name, because
user_info->client.{account,domain}_name is also used
when forwarding the request via netrLogonSamLogon*
to a remote server, for exactly that the values are
also used in order to map a AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN into
AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE, where the NTLMv2 response
contains the account and domain names passed in the
netr_IdentityInfo value.
Otherwise it would not be possible to forward the
LDAP simple bind authentication request to a remote
DC.
Currently this only applies to an RODC that forwards
the request to an RWDC.
But note that LDAP simple binds (as on Windows) only
work for users in the DCs forest, as the DsCrackNames
need to work and it can't work for users of remote
forests. I tested that in a DC of a forest root domain,
if rejected the LDAP simple bind against a different forest,
but allowed it for a users of a child domain in the
same forest. The NTLMSSP bind worked in both cases.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13879
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Mar 10 04:10:54 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
mapped_state is a special hack for authenticate_ldap_simple_bind_send()
in order to avoid some additional work in authsam_check_password_internals()
This doesn't apply here. We should also handle wbinfo -a
authentication UPN names, e.g. administrator@DOMAIN,
even if the account belongs to the local sam.
With this change the behavior is consistent also locally on DCs and
also an RODC can handle these requests locally for cached accounts.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13879
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15003
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
When winbindd forwards wbinfo -a via netrLogonSamLogon* to a remote
DC work fine for upn names, e.g. administrator@DOMAIN.
But it currently fails locally on a DC against the local sam.
For the RODC only work because it forwards the request to
an RWDC.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13879
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15003
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13879
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Using != AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE is not the correct indication
due to the local mappings from AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN via
AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH to AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE.
It means an LDAP simble bind will now honour
'old password allowed period'.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13879
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15001
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The commit "99d1f1fa10d smbd: Remove unused "struct connections_key"" removes
also the assignment of information to connections_data, which are needed to list
shares.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14999
Signed-off-by: Jule Anger <janger@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jule Anger <janger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Mar 7 15:27:48 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
rpcclient SERVER -c 'dfsenum 5' dumps core
Signed-off-by: Pavel Filipenský <pfilipen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Mar 7 00:00:32 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
Signed-off-by: Pavel Filipenský <pfilipen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
If a VFS module fails SMB_VFS_GETXATTRAT_SEND/RECV with ENOSYS like currently
vfs_shadow_copy2 or any other module that uses
vfs_not_implemented_getxattrat_send() the ENOSYS error that
vfs_not_implemented_getxattrat_send() sets gets mapped to
NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED by map_nt_error_from_unix().
Unfortunately when checking whether the async SMB_VFS_GETXATTRAT_SEND() failed
and to determine if the sync fallback should be triggered, we currently only
check for NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED which is the error we get when "store dos
attributes" is disabled.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14957
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Verifies async-dosmode sync fallback works with shadow_copy2 which returns
ENOSYS for SMB_VFS_GET_DOS_ATTRIBUTES_SEND().
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14957
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
We now return INVALID_PARAMETER when trying to open a
different file with a duplicate lease key on the same
(non-dynamic) share. This will enable us to pass another
Windows test suite leases test.
We now behave the same as Windows10.
Remove knownfail.d/smb2-lease-duplicateopen
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14737
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: David Mulder <dmulder@suse.com>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Feb 18 20:12:12 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
Checks we return INVALID_PARAMETER when trying to open a
different file with a duplicate lease key on the same share.
Checked against Windows10. Currently fails against smbd
so add knownfail.d/smb2-lease-duplicateopen
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14737
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: David Mulder <dmulder@suse.com>
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14971
Signed-off-by: Pavel Filipenský <pfilipen@redhat.com>
Pair-Programmed-With: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Feb 10 22:09:06 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14971
Signed-off-by: Pavel Filipenský <pfilipen@redhat.com>
Pair-Programmed-With: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This fixes a use-after-free in smb_full_audit_create_file() when
calling SMB_VFS_CREATE_FILE with fsp->fsp_name as smb_fname.
create_file_unixpath() has this comment:
* This is really subtle. If someone passes in an smb_fname
* where smb_fname actually is taken from fsp->fsp_name, then
* the lifetime of these objects is meant to be the same.
so it seems legitimate to call CREATE_FILE this way.
When CREATE_FILE runs into an error, create_file_unixpath() does a
file_free, which also takes fsp->fsp_name with
it. smb_full_audit_create_file() wants to log the failure including
the smb_fname after NEXT_CREATE_FILE has exited, but this will then
use the already free'ed data.
Fix by only doing the file_free() on an fsp that
create_file_unixpath() created itself.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Feb 10 19:11:33 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
Run vfstest with this vfstest.cmd under valgrind and you'll see what
happens. Exact explanation a few patches further down...
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Strips off any DFS prefix from the target if passed in.
Remove knownfail selftest/knownfail.d/msdfs-rename.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14169
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Feb 4 12:02:36 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
We fail this on SMB2 for a subtle reason.
Our client code called from smbclient only sets the SMB2_HDR_FLAG_DFS flag
in the outgoing packet on the SMB2_CREATE call, and SMB2 rename does the
following operations:
SMB2_CREATE(src_path) // We set SMB2_HDR_FLAG_DFS here for a MSDFS share.
SMB2_SETINFO: SMB2_FILE_RENAME_INFO(dst_path). // We don't set SMB2_HDR_FLAG_DFS
However, from smbclient, dst_path is a MSDFS path but we don't set the flag,
so even though the rename code inside smbd will cope with a MSDFS path
(as used in the SMB1 SMBmv call) it fails as the correct flag isn't set.
Add knownfail selftest/knownfail.d/msdfs-rename.
Note we need to add the new test to "selftest/knownfail.d/smb1-tests"
as test_smbclient_s3.sh is run against the (ad_member|nt4_member)
environments first using NT1 (SMB1) protocol and then using SMB3,
but the (ad_member|nt4_member) environments don't support SMB1.
Seems a bit strange to me, but all the other SMB1 tests inside
test_smbclient_s3.sh have already been added to "selftest/knownfail.d/smb1-tests"
so just go with the test environment.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14169
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
We pass this already as the cmd_hardlink in smbclient doesn't
do the DFS path conversion on the hardlink target. But it's
good to have the test.
Note we need to add the new test to "selftest/knownfail.d/smb1-tests"
as test_smbclient_s3.sh is run against the (ad_member|nt4_member)
environments first using NT1 (SMB1) protocol and then using SMB3,
but the (ad_member|nt4_member) environments don't support SMB1.
Seems a bit strange to me, but all the other SMB1 tests inside
test_smbclient_s3.sh have already been added to "selftest/knownfail.d/smb1-tests"
so just go with the test environment.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14169
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Identical change as used in cli_unlink(), cli_mkdir(), cli_rmdir()
cli_chkpath() to ensure SMB2 calls correctly set raw_status for
libsmbclient uses.
Remove knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14938
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Feb 2 21:50:31 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
We need to take SMB1+POSIX into account here and do an LSTAT if it's
a POSIX name.
Remove knownfail.d/posix_sylink_rename
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14911
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jan 31 16:26:26 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
If filename_convert() fails to convert the path, we never call
check_name(). This means we can return an incorrect error code
(NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED) if we ran into a symlink that points
outside the share to a non-readable directory. We need to make
sure in this case we always call check_name().
Remove knownfail.d/symlink_traversal.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14911
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
NT_STATUS_OBJECT_PATH_NOT_FOUND for a path component failure.
NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND for a terminal component failure.
Remove:
samba3.blackbox.test_symlink_traversal.SMB1.posix
samba3.blackbox.smbclient_s3.*.Ensure\ widelinks\ are\ restricted\(.*\)
samba3.blackbox.smbclient_s3.*.follow\ symlinks\ \=\ no\(.*\)
in knownfail.d/symlink_traversal as we now pass these. Only one more fix
remaining to get rid of knownfail.d/symlink_traversal completely.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14911
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Matches the error return from openat_pathref_fsp().
NT_STATUS_OBJECT_PATH_NOT_FOUND is for a bad component in a path, not
a bad terminal symlink.
Remove knownfail.d/simple_posix_open, we now pass.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14911
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Trying to open a symlink as a terminal component should return
NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND, not NT_STATUS_OBJECT_PATH_NOT_FOUND.
Mark as knownfail.d/simple_posix_open until we fix the server.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14911
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
For SMB1/2/3 (minus posix) we need to treat bad symlinks
as though they don't exist.
Add to knwownfail.d/symlink_traversal
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14911
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
If an added SPN already exists on an object, we still want to check the
rest of the element values for conflicts.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14950
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This test currently fails, as re-adding an SPN means that later checks
do not run.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14950
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
It went wrong in 366f8cf090
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Jan 26 12:39:52 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
This actually reveals that ndr_push_string() for TargetName="" was
failing before because it resulted in 1 byte for a subcontext with
TargetLen=0.
This is fixed now and we no longer expect ndrdump to exit with 1.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14956
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jan 24 16:18:34 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
convert_string_talloc_handle() tries to play an the safe side
and always returns a null terminated array.
But for NDR we need to be correct on the wire...
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14956
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
convert_string_talloc() never returns a string with len=0 and always
implies zero termination byte(s).
For ndr_push_string this is unexpected as we need to be compatible on
the wire and push 0 bytes for an empty string.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14956
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This makes it much easier to detect differences in the given and
generated buffers.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14956
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
The cleanup using dump_data_block16() fixed the space handling.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14956
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This simplifies the logic a lot for me.
It also fixes some corner cases regarding whitespaces in the
output, that's why we have to mark a few tests as knownfail,
they will be fixed in the next commit.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14956
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
The Heimdal upgrade brings the new feature of FAST, allowing more tests to pass.
However it causes a regression in FL2003 for the returned salt format in
the AS-REP, but FL 2003 has not been the default since Samba 4.2 as AES
keys are much stronger and should be preferred.
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This is a strange one, it uses DN_BINARY in the drsuapi
representation, while the binary part must be 0 bytes.
and the LDAP/ldb representation is a plain DN (without 'B:').
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
This demonstrates that our OR-Name syntax is wrong,
which wasn't noticed yet as it's not used in the AD-Schema.
I noticed it by installing the Exchange-Schema on a Samba DC.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14936
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jan 11 22:03:03 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
inet_pton expects "struct in_addr" or "struct in6_addr" as destination
pointer. It does not fill in a struct
sockaddr_storage. interpret_string_addr() takes care of this.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jan 10 11:47:34 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
This first gets the clock_gettime_mono() value, converts to an NTTIME (as
this is what is stored in the dos attribute EA), then mixes in 8 bits of
randomness shifted up by 55 bits to cope with poor resolution clocks to
avoid duplicate inodes.
Using 8 bits of randomness on top of an NTTIME gives us around 114
years headroom. We can now guarentee returning a itime-based
fileid in a normal share (storing dos attributes in an EA).
Remove knownfail.d/fileid-unique
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14928
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Jan 8 06:35:22 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
smb2.fileid_unique.fileid_unique
smb2.fileid_unique.fileid_unique-dir
Create 100 files or directories as fast as we can
against a "normal" share, then read info on them
and ensure (a) top bit is set (generated from itime)
and (b) uniqueness across all generated objects
(checks poor timestamp resolution doesn't create
duplicate fileids).
This shows that even on ext4, this is enough to
cause duplicate fileids to be returned.
Add knownfail.d/fileid-unique
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14928
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Remove knownfail: selftest/knownfail.d/list_servers
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14939
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Autobuild-User(master): Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jan 6 11:50:32 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14932
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jan 4 20:57:41 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
This demonstrates that an invalid av_pair in NTLMv2_CLIENT_CHALLENGE
should result in NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER at the NTLMSSP layer.
This is different from the netr_LogonSamLogon*() case, where it is
ignored instead.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14932
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Windows doesn't complain about invalid av_pair blobs,
we need to do the same.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14932
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
A netapp diag tool uses a NTLMv2_CLIENT_CHALLENGE with invalid bytes
as av_pair blob. Which is supposed to be ignored by DCs.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14932
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
commit d0062d312c introduced
SMBC_ENCRYPTLEVEL_DEFAULT as default, but the logic to enforce
signing wasn't adjusted, so we required smb signing by default.
That broke guest authentication for libsmbclient using applications.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14935
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Dec 27 16:38:11 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
This demonstrates the problem with guest access being rejected
by default.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14935
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
guest authentication is an old school concept,
so we should make sure it also works with SMB1.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14935
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This must be done before doing POSIX calls on a connection.
Remove the final entry in knownfail.d/posix_infolevel_fails
samba3.smbtorture_s3.plain.POSIX-BLOCKING-LOCK.smbtorture\(nt4_dc_smb1\)
And remove the file knownfail.d/posix_infolevel_fails itself.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Dec 11 12:03:36 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
Remove the following entries in knownfail.d/posix_infolevel_fails.
samba3.blackbox.acl_xattr.NT1.nt_affects_posix.*
samba3.blackbox.acl_xattr.NT1.nt_affects_chown.*
samba3.blackbox.acl_xattr.NT1.nt_affects_chgrp.*
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Remove the following entry in knownfail.d/posix_infolevel_fails.
samba3.blackbox.inherit_owner.*.NT1.*verify.*unix\ owner.*
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Cope with the minor difference in wildcard search return when
we're actually using SMB1+POSIX on the server (SMB1+POSIX treats
all directory search paths as wildcards).
Remove the following entries in knownfail.d/posix_infolevel_fails.
samba3.unix.info2.info2\(nt4_dc_smb1\)
samba3.unix.info2.info2\(ad_dc_smb1\)
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Remove the following entry in knownfail.d/posix_infolevel_fails.
^samba3.raw.search.one\ file\ search.*
from knownfail.d/posix_infolevel_fails
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Add knownfail file
knownfail.d/posix_infolevel_fails
for tests that don't currently negotiate
SMB1+POSIX before using SMB1+POSIX calls.
These are:
samba3.smbtorture_s3.plain.POSIX-BLOCKING-LOCK.smbtorture\(nt4_dc_smb1\)
samba3.blackbox.acl_xattr.NT1.nt_affects_posix.*
samba3.blackbox.acl_xattr.NT1.nt_affects_chown.*
samba3.blackbox.acl_xattr.NT1.nt_affects_chgrp.*
samba3.blackbox.inherit_owner.*.NT1.*verify.*unix\ owner.*
samba3.unix.info2.info2\(nt4_dc_smb1\)
samba3.unix.info2.info2\(ad_dc_smb1\)
samba3.raw.search.one\ file\ search.*
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
These are rpcd_* binaries.
rpcd_classic collects everything that's not specific
Changes the epmapper to read the epmdb.tdb, which will make the
epmapper tests non-bisectable until the switch is done.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Dec 7 04:54:35 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14912
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Dec 2 14:49:35 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
We should not fail this just because the user doesn't have
permissions on the share root.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14788
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Dec 1 11:51:50 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
Demonstrate that smbd fails FSCTL_QUERY_NETWORK_INTERFACE_INFO
only because the user doesn't have permissions on the share root.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14788
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
smbd_smb2_request_process_ioctl() already detailed checks for file_ids,
which not reached before.
.allow_invalid_fileid = true was only used for SMB2_OP_IOCTL.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14788
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
An invalid file id for FSCTL_QUERY_NETWORK_INTERFACE_INFO gives
INVALID_PARAMETER instead of FILE_CLOSED.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14788
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
We should not send more data than the client requested.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14788
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
It seems that we currently don't have BUFFER_TOO_SMALL handling
for FSCTL/IOCTL calls.
FSCTL_QUERY_NETWORK_INTERFACE_INFO is just an easy example
to demonstrate it.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14788
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
We should not fail this just because the user doesn't have permissions
on the share root.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14788
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Demonstrate that smbd fails FSCTL_VALIDATE_NEGOTIATE_INFO
only because the user doesn't have permissions on the share root.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14788
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
The LDB filter processing is where the time is spent in the LDB stack
but the timeout event will not get run while this is ongoing, so we
must confirm we have not yet timed out manually.
RN: Ensure that the LDB request has not timed out during filter processing
as the LDAP server MaxQueryDuration is otherwise not honoured.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14694
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
We allow a timeout of 2x over to avoid this being a flapping test.
Samba is not very accurate on the timeout, which is not otherwise an
issue but makes this test fail sometimes.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14694
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14908
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Nov 17 18:29:09 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
Before the CVE-2020-25717 fixes we had a fallback from
getpwnam('DOMAIN\user') to getpwnam('user') which was very dangerous and
unpredictable.
Now we do the fallback based on sid_to_uid() followed by
getpwuid() on the returned uid.
This obsoletes 'username map [script]' based workaround adviced
for CVE-2020-25717, when nss_winbindd is not used or
idmap_nss is actually used.
In future we may decide to prefer or only do the SID/UID based
lookup, but for now we want to keep this unchanged as much as possible.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14901
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
[metze@samba.org moved the new logic into the fallback codepath only
in order to avoid behavior changes as much as possible]
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Nov 15 19:01:56 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14901
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
[metze@samba.org removed unused tests for a feature that
was removed before merging]
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This avoids a crash that's triggered by windows clients using
DsCrackNames across multiple connections within an association group
on the same DsBind context(policy) handle.
It also improves the auditing for the dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system() case.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This adds a reproducer for an invalid memory access, when
using the context handle from DsBind across multiple connections
within an association group.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
All other fragments blindly inherit it.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14875
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
If one of the objectClass checks passed, samldb_add() could return
through one of the samldb_fill_*() functions and skip the
servicePrincipalName uniqueness checking.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
If the structural objectclass is allowed to change, then the restrictions
locking an object to remaining a user or computer will not be enforcable.
Likewise other LDAP inheritance rules, which allow only certain
child objects can be bypassed, which can in turn allow creation of
(unprivileged) users where only DNS objects were expected.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14753
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14889
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Not only should it not be possible to add a servicePrincipalName that
is already present in the domain, it should not be possible to add one
that is implied by an entry in sPNMappings, unless the user is adding
an alias to another SPN and has rights to alter that one.
For example, with the default sPNMappings, cifs/ is an alias pointing to
host/, meaning if there is no cifs/example.com SPN, the host/example.com
one will be used instead. A user can add the cifs/example.com SPN only
if they can also change the host/example.com one (because adding the
cifs/ effectively changes the host/). The reverse is refused in all cases,
unless they happen to be on the same object. That is, if there is a
cifs/example.com SPN, there is no way to add host/example.com elsewhere.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This only for the real account name, not the account name implicit in
a UPN. It doesn't matter if a UPN implies an illegal sAMAccountName,
since that is not going to conflict with a real one.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We already know duplicate sAMAccountNames and UserPrincipalNames are bad,
but we also have to check against the values these imply in each other.
For example, imagine users with SAM account names "Alice" and "Bob" in
the realm "example.com". If they do not have explicit UPNs, by the logic
of MS-ADTS 5.1.1.1.1 they use the implict UPNs "alice@example.com" and
"bob@example.com", respectively. If Bob's UPN gets set to
"alice@example.com", it will clash with Alice's implicit one.
Therefore we refuse to allow a UPN that implies an existing SAM account
name and vice versa.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Because the sam account name + the dns host name is used as the
default user principal name, we need to check for collisions between
these. Fixes are coming in upcoming patches.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We need to have the SPNs there before someone else nabs them, which
makes the re-provisioned old releases different from the reference
versions that we keep for this comparison.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, leaving SPNs unclaimed is
dangerous, as someone else could grab them first. Secondly, in some
circumstances (self join) we try to add a DNS/ SPN a little bit later
in provision. Under the rules we are introducing for CVE-2020-25722,
this will make our later attempts to add HOST/ fail.
This causes a few errors in samba4.blackbox.dbcheck.* tests, which
assert that revivified old domains match stored reference versions.
Now they don't, because they have servicePrincipalNames.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Thankfully we are aleady in a loop over all the message elements in
acl_modify() so this is an easy and safe change to make.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14876
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Validate Writes and Control Access Rights only grant access if the
object is of the type listed in the Right's appliesTo attribute. For
example, even though a Validated-SPN access may be granted to a user
object in the SD, it should only pass if the object is of class
computer This patch enforces the appliesTo attribute classes for
access checks from within the ldb stack.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14832
Signed-off-by: Nadezhda Ivanova <nivanova@symas.com>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Validate Writes and Control Access Rights should only grant access if the
object is of the type listed in the Right's appliesTo attribute.
Tests to verify this behavior
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14832
Signed-off-by: Nadezhda Ivanova <nivanova@symas.com>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
