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This patch is still incomplete in that winbindd does not walk
the the trusted domains to lookup unqualified names here.
Apart from that this fix should be pretty much complete.
Michael
(This used to be commit f7efc0eca9)
As it breaks all tests which try to join a new machine account.
So more testing is needed...
metze
This reverts commit dd320c0924.
(This used to be commit cccb80b7b7)
get_trust_pw() just now computes the md4 hash of the result of
get_trust_pw_clear() if that was successful. As a last resort,
in the non-trusted-domain-situation, get_trust_pw() now tries to
directly obtain the hashed version of the password out of secrets.tdb.
Michael
(This used to be commit 4562342eb8)
into a new function secrets_fetch_trust_account_password_legacy() that
does only try to obtain the hashed version of the machine password directly
from secrets.tdb.
Michael
(This used to be commit 91da12b751)
Up to now each caller used its own logic.
This eliminates code paths where there was a special treatment
of the following situation: the domain given is not our workgroup
(i.e. our own domain) and we are not a DC (i.e. it is not a typical
trusted domain situation). In situation the given domain name was
previously used as the machine account name, resulting in an account
name of DOMAIN\\DOMAIN$, which does not seem very reasonable to me.
get_trust_pw would not have obtained a password in this situation
anyways.
I hope I have not missed an important point here!
Michael
(This used to be commit 6ced4a7f88)
secrets_store_trust_account_password() and trust_password_delete()
are the write access functions to the SECRETS/$MACHINE.ACC/domain keys
in secrets.tdb, the md4 hashed machine passwords. These are not used
any more: Current code always writes the clear text password.
Michael
(This used to be commit 4788fe3924)
This is a first patch aimed at fixing bug #4801.
It is still incomplete in that winbindd does not walk
the the trusted domains to lookup unqualified names here.
Apart from that this fix should be pretty much complete.
Michael
(This used to be commit dd320c0924)
New size calculation logic in tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack()
and tdb_sid_pack() used accumulated sizes as successive offsets
to buffer pointer.
Michael
(This used to be commit 9c24713b40)
The point is doing the following associations:
- non discardable state data (all TDB files that may need to be backed
up) go to statedir
- shared data (codepage stuff) go to codepagedir
The patch *does not change* the default location for these
directories. So, there is no behaviour change when applying it.
The main change is for samba developers who have to think when dealing
with files that previously pertained to libdir whether they:
- go in statedir
- go in codepagedir
- stay in libdir
(This used to be commit d6cdbfd875)
bugs in various places whilst doing this (places that assumed
BOOL == int). I also need to fix the Samba4 pidl generation
(next checkin).
Jeremy.
(This used to be commit f35a266b3c)
passdb backend = ldapsam.
Along with reproducing the functionality of the secrets.tdb
code, I have prepared the handling of the previous trust password
(in case we are contacting a dc which does not yet know of a recent
password change). This information has still to be propagated
to the outside, but this requires a change of the api and also
a change of the secrets.tdb code.
Michael
(This used to be commit 6c3c20e6c4)
> Here's the problem I hit:
>
> getgrnam("foo") -> nscd -> NSS -> winbindd ->
> winbindd_passdb.c:nam_to_sid() -> lookup_global_sam_name() ->
> getgrnam("foo") -> nscd -> ....
>
> This is in the SAMBA_3_0 specifically but in theory could happen
> SAMBA_3_0_25 (or 26) for an unknown group.
>
> The attached patch passes down enough state for the
> name_to_sid() call to be able to determine the originating
> winbindd cmd that came into the parent. So we can avoid
> making more NSS calls if the original call came in trough NSS
> so we don't deadlock ? But you should still service
> lookupname() calls which are needed for example when
> doing the token access checks for a "valid groups" from
> smb.conf.
>
> I've got this in testing now. The problem has shown up with the
> DsProvider on OS X and with nscd on SOlaris and Linux.
(This used to be commit bcc8a3290a)
