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This will simplify further changes.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13418
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1ef145d9d72d847055f6aba8a0070b3e1cfdabbc)
This will simplify further changes.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13418
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 738b52eb0856c8fcdbb8589e8061bcc14700c23a)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13418
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 70a306d0bd6806d1fd00d45e3d8cc70c73d09f79)
This will simplify further changes.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13418
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 42e69a86ca583e3cb20c63b9c6930b4b3425485d)
This will simplify further changes.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13418
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 966c7febaf0245516481bde924ea6cd738eeb78b)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13418
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit f81771c8593327e058b9cb4330d7e77083df3ea9)
This will be used to fix missing <SID=> components in future.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13418
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit bb9c9e49a5e82f19626cb1b12ec9189fff5114e8)
This demonstrates the bug, that happens when the primaryGroupID
of a user is changed.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13418
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 364ed537e0bcb3a97cae0f2d1ff72de9423ce0e6)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 60131b4452d43b3792e7f27a4190c88e7aabb1b4)
This was already allocated in source4/dsdb/samdb/samdb.h with
commit 22208f52e6096fbe9413b8ff339d9446851e0874.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0189f23f5bda263c7462366ee16b2fe4bcda0119)
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13642
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6f022e61597994bc032e61876f24150d7acb3fc2)
Add the 'reveal_internals' controls when performing objectclass-based
checks of mandatory attributes. This prevents the extended_dn DSDB
module from suppressing attributes that point to deleted (i.e.
non-existent/expunged) objects.
This ensures that, when modifying an object (and often not even
touching the mandatory attribute) that the fact that an attribute is a
DN, and the DN target is deleted, that the schema check will still pass.
Otherwise a fromServer pointing at a dead server can cause failures,
i.e. you can't modify the affected object at all, because the DSDB
thinks a mandatory attribute is missing.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13621
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 4092b369aeeb7058d78b8d6f41dbbc6d69203ecc)
The fromServer attribute is slightly unique, in that it's a DN (similar
to a one-way link), but it is also a mandatory attribute.
Currently, if fromServer gets a bad value (i.e. a dead server that has
been expunged), the DSDB rejects any attempts to modify the associated
nTDSConnection object (regardless of whether or not you're actually
changing the fromServer attribute).
This patch adds a test-case that demonstrates how the DB can get into
such a state.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13621
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit dec3eda1f74f5bf7ea91c1be3d5dfd832e9672b9)
Signed-off-by: David Mulder <dmulder@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4c7348e44d10ca519dd1322fd40b12c69e17a8e6)
Back-ported as a dependency required for:
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13621
This testcase demonstrates that the AppleDouble conversion in vfs_fruit
doesn't correctly convert the FinderInfo data from the AppleDouble file
to a stream.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13649
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8b9728480f6ab22da0831400796f3c39ec543df8)
This reproduces the problem we have with expired encrypted sessions.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13624
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 01b868455c9bae309d1ca7ddad54077fc5d7f4b1)
Since scavenging is implemented the samba_dnsupdate command always updates all
dns records required by the dc. This is not needed if dns zone scavenging
is not enabled.
This avoids the repeating TSIG error messages:
# samba_dnsupdate --option='dns zone scavenging = yes' 2>&1 | uniq -c
29 ; TSIG error with server: tsig verify failure
1 Failed update of 29 entries
# echo ${PIPESTATUS[0]}
29
# samba_dnsupdate --option='dns zone scavenging = no' 2>&1 | uniq -c
# echo ${PIPESTATUS[0]}
0
Note that this results in about 60 lines in the log file,
which triggered every 10 minutes ("dnsupdate:name interval=600" is the default).
This restores the behavior before 8ef42d4dab4dfaf5ad225b33f7748914f14dcd8c,
if "dns zone scavenging" is not switched on (which is still the default).
Avoiding the message from happening at all is subject for more debugging,
most likely they are caused by bugs in 'nsupdate -g' (from the bind package).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13605
Pair-programmed-with: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Björn Baumbach <bb@sernet.de>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Salt principal for the interdomain trust is krbtgt/DOMAIN@REALM where
DOMAIN is the sAMAccountName without the dollar sign ($)
The salt principal for the BLA$ user object was generated wrong.
dn: CN=bla.base,CN=System,DC=w4edom-l4,DC=base
securityIdentifier: S-1-5-21-4053568372-2049667917-3384589010
trustDirection: 3
trustPartner: bla.base
trustPosixOffset: -2147483648
trustType: 2
trustAttributes: 8
flatName: BLA
dn: CN=BLA$,CN=Users,DC=w4edom-l4,DC=base
userAccountControl: 2080
primaryGroupID: 513
objectSid: S-1-5-21-278041429-3399921908-1452754838-1597
accountExpires: 9223372036854775807
sAMAccountName: BLA$
sAMAccountType: 805306370
pwdLastSet: 131485652467995000
The salt stored by Windows in the package_PrimaryKerberosBlob
(within supplementalCredentials) seems to be
'W4EDOM-L4.BASEkrbtgtBLA' for the above trust
and Samba stores 'W4EDOM-L4.BASEBLA$'.
While the salt used when building the keys from
trustAuthOutgoing/trustAuthIncoming is
'W4EDOM-L4.BASEkrbtgtBLA.BASE', which we handle correct.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13539
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Sep 5 03:57:22 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
(cherry picked from commit f3e349bebc443133fdbe4e14b148ca8db8237060)
Autobuild-User(v4-9-test): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-9-test): Wed Sep 5 15:40:53 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
To test it, add a blackbox test that ensures we pass a keytab-based
authentication with the trust user account for a trusted domain.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13539
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7df505298f71432d5adbcffccde8f97c117a57a6)
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13549
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5508024a861e7c85e6c837552ad142aa1d5e8eca)
No change besides reformatting the list to one entry per line.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13549
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3255822f75163cb38e53f634a5c6b03d46bfaff1)
It's much safer than having uninitialized memory when we hit an error
case.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11517
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit ef0b489ad0d93199e08415dd895da5cfe2d1c11a)
The logic for constructing the values for our own primary domain differs
from the values of trusted domains. In order to make the code easier to
understand we have a new fill_our_one_domain_info() helper that
only takes care of our primary domain.
The cleanup for the trust case will follow in a separate commit.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11517
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 61333f7787d78e3ec5c7bd2874d5a0f1f536275a)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11517
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0e442e094240abbf79aaca00a9d1a053a200a7e8)
This is similar to dsdb_trust_xref_tdo_info(), but will also work
if we ever support more than one domain in our forest.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11517
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit c1b0ac95db5c6112d90356c7ada8c3d445e9b668)
We should not overwrite it within the function.
Currently it doesn't matter as we don't have multiple domains
within our forest, but that will change in future.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11517
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit f5f96f558b499770cdeb3d38998167a387e058b9)
This makes sure we don't treat trusted domains in the same way we treat
our primary domain.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11517
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit d5dd8fdc647d6a202c5da0451d395116c2cd92b9)
This is better that generating a segfault while dereferencing a NULL
pointer later.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11517
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit dffc182c6943d21513d8db9f6cf66bdc09206b17)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13584
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Aug 21 02:33:05 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
(cherry picked from commit ec3c37ee53f21d8c0e80b1d3b3d7e95a4ac8e0bc)
Autobuild-User(v4-9-test): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-9-test): Thu Aug 23 14:28:49 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13204
Signed-off-by: Anoop C S <anoopcs@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6a7f11746c9cc3cdc5307e540bdd1f3f10fed05b)
This regression was introduced in Samba 4.7 by bug 12842 and in
master git commit eb2e77970e41c1cb62c041877565e939c78ff52d.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13552
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
The acl_read.c code contains a special case to allow dirsync to
work-around having insufficient access rights. We had a concern that
the dirsync module could leak sensitive information for deleted objects.
This patch adds a test-case to prove whether or not this is happening.
The new test case is similar to the existing dirsync test except:
- We make the confidential attribute also preserve-on-delete, so it
hangs around for deleted objcts. Because the attributes now persist
across test case runs, I've used a different attribute to normal.
(Technically, the dirsync search expressions are now specific enough
that the regular attribute could be used, but it would make things
quite fragile if someone tried to add a new test case).
- To handle searching for deleted objects, the search expressions are
now more complicated. Currently dirsync adds an extra-filter to the
'!' searches to exclude deleted objects, i.e. samaccountname matches
the test-objects AND the object is not deleted. We now extend this to
include deleted objects with lastKnownParent equal to the test OU.
The search expression matches either case so that we can use the same
expression throughout the test (regardless of whether the object is
deleted yet or not).
This test proves that the dirsync corner-case does not actually leak
sensitive information on Samba. This is due to a bug in the dirsync
code - when the buggy line is removed, this new test promptly fails.
Test also passes against Windows.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
A user that doesn't have access to view an attribute can still guess the
attribute's value via repeated LDAP searches. This affects confidential
attributes, as well as ACLs applied to an object/attribute to deny
access.
Currently the code will hide objects if the attribute filter contains an
attribute they are not authorized to see. However, the code still
returns objects as results if confidential attribute is in the search
expression itself, but not in the attribute filter.
To fix this problem we have to check the access rights on the attributes
in the search-tree, as well as the attributes returned in the message.
Points of note:
- I've preserved the existing dirsync logic (the dirsync module code
suppresses the result as long as the replPropertyMetaData attribute is
removed). However, there doesn't appear to be any test that highlights
that this functionality is required for dirsync.
- To avoid this fix breaking the acl.py tests, we need to still permit
searches like 'objectClass=*', even though we don't have Read Property
access rights for the objectClass attribute. The logic that Windows
uses does not appear to be clearly documented, so I've made a best
guess that seems to mirror Windows behaviour.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
This better reflects the special case we're making for dirsync, and gets
rid of a 'if-else' clause.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Flip the dirsync check (to avoid a double negative), and use a helper
boolean variable.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
So we can re-use the same logic laster for checking the search-ops.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
It is perfectly legal to search LDAP for an attribute that is not part
of the schema. That part of the query should simply not match.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Currently Samba is a bit disclosive with LDB_OP_PRESENT (i.e.
attribute=*) searches compared to Windows.
All the acl.py tests are based on objectClass=* searches, where Windows
will happily tell a user about objects they have List Contents rights,
but not Read Property rights for. However, if you change the attribute
being searched for, suddenly the objects are no longer visible on
Windows (whereas they are on Samba).
This is a problem, because Samba can tell you about which objects have
confidential attributes, which in itself could be disclosive.
This patch adds a acl.py test-case that highlights this behaviour. The
test passes against Windows but fails against Samba.
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Adds tests that assert that a confidential attribute cannot be guessed
by an unprivileged user through wildcard DB searches.
The tests basically consist of a set of DB searches/assertions that
get run for:
- basic searches against a confidential attribute
- confidential attributes that get overridden by giving access to the
user via an ACE (run against a variety of ACEs)
- protecting a non-confidential attribute via an ACL that denies read-
access (run against a variety of ACEs)
- querying confidential attributes via the dirsync controls
These tests all pass when run against a Windows Dc and all fail against
a Samba DC.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
The current position in the dns name was not advanced past the '.'
character
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Jul 20 04:40:31 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
(cherry picked from commit cef1b31cd1f33074e8ab6de52aa0fb74e9b57a9f)
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13535
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 725319743f1f2de934cbde477ca84430f5b2b4b4)
Windows Server 1709 defaults to SMB2 and does not have SMB1 enabled.
When establishing trust, samba-tool does not specify SMB protocol
version and fail by default.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13308
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4422f7382aad3090cb959ade030a02bf4fef81ac)
This can be used to create a connection up to a negotiated
smbXcli_conn.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13308
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit e4910f35eab008a41cfcac3d97b3647c721ac679)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5188454bdce80f6e2bfc45deca18bd1b7289a7a6)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13308
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit ca000d8901e6acb8a7c59d26d4f75c9d92bafece)
It will just do the session setup and tree connect steps.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13308
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit f20e607c15b4c8ae56ade5d7e68d832542a2cd5e)
