IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO GET AN ACCOUNT, please write an
email to Administrator. User accounts are meant only to access repo
and report issues and/or generate pull requests.
This is a purpose-specific Git hosting for
BaseALT
projects. Thank you for your understanding!
Только зарегистрированные пользователи имеют доступ к сервису!
Для получения аккаунта, обратитесь к администратору.
samba_kdc_[trust_]message2entry() always starts with
ZERO_STRUCTP(entry_ex) and cleans up on error with
sdb_free_entry(entry_ex), leaving a cleared structure again.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14054
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Both layers are owned by us so there's no need for an void
pointer.
This simplifies the code a lot and allows further cleanups.
Eventually we can remove sdb_entry_ex and only use sdb_entry,
as Heimdal also removed hdb_entry_ex.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
It will only ever point to an sdb_entry_ex
and becomes a stale pointer fast, as
sdb_free_entry() called before any talloc_free()
can happen (with a destructor still set).
Note the talloc parent of samba_kdc_entry
is the samba_kdc_db_context longterm context.
The next commits will fill samba_kdc_entry_destructor
with logic again, but for now remove the unused code.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
It's basically the same as free_sdb_entry(), but the next
step will make free_sdb_entry() private.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is much clearer than doing it in sdb_free_entry() already.
It also simplifies the next cleanups.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
It seems we need to take a closer look at the
memory hierachy of the sdb_entry related code.
I'll check that during the next commits,
but for now just remove use the unused hook.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is not related to the kvno of the key,
the mkvno tells the HDB layer that the keys need to
be decrypted with a master key (with the given [m]kvno).
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Even if the msDS-KeyVersionNumber of the main krbtgt
account if larger than 65535, we need to have
the 16 upper bits all zero in order to avoid
mixing the keys with an RODC.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14951
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Accounts in the Protected Users group acting as clients lack support for
the RC4 encryption type. TGTs issued to such accounts have a lifetime
restricted to four hours, and are unable to be proxied or forwarded.
To determine at lookup time whether a client account is a member of
Protected Users, we now also create an auth_user_info_dc structure when
creating the database entry for an AS-REQ, rather than only when
creating a PAC for a TGT, or when recreating the PAC from an RODC-issued
TGT.
This means that the user's groups are now expanded even for AS-REQs that
result in an error (such as a PREAUTH_REQUIRED error), but this is
required to be able to correctly determine the account's available
encryption types, which are needed soon after fetching the user account.
Currently, the TGT lifetime may exceed four hours (for Heimdal
specifically). This may happen if PKINIT is used, and either the
pkinit_max_life_from_cert_extension option is TRUE and
pkinit_max_life_bound is greater than four hours, or
pkinit_max_life_from_cert is greater than four hours.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
The resulting user_info_dc is kept in the 'samba_kdc_entry' structure,
so it can be reused between calls.
This allows us to simplify samba_kdc_get_pac_blobs(), as it no longer
need to return a user_info_dc structure.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This fixes the rpc.samr test because we no longer specify an LM hash
to the DSDB layer only to have it rejected by password_hash.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
We no longer use the old NT and LM hash as proof of performing a
password change, and this removes the privileged status of these
attributes.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This returns the API for password changes via (eg) kpasswd to the
previous design as at 7eebcebbab8f62935bd1d5460e58b0a8f2cc30e8
where a control but no partiuclar values were specified.
This avoids the issues that were attempted to be addressed between
7eebcebbab8f62935bd1d5460e58b0a8f2cc30e8 and 786c41b0954b541518d1096019e1ce7ca11e5e98
by still keeping the ACL check from 23bd3a74176be4a1f8d6d70b148ababee397cf8c.
The purpose of this change is to move away from the NT hash (unicodePwd) being
the primary password in Samba, to allow installations to operate without this
unsalted hash.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This is for MIT Kerberos >= 1.20.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This is for MIT Kerberos <= 1.19
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
CID 1502873: Control flow issues (NO_EFFECT)
>>> This greater-than-or-equal-to-zero comparison of an unsigned value is always
true. "el->num_values >= 0U".
This is probably just a paranoia check as num_values should be set to at least
1 if the we have an LDAP entry.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
The ret variable is just used to set the error message for logging.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Otherwise useful information gets lost while converting
from NTSTATUS to krb5_error and back to NTSTATUS again.
E.g. NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED would be audited as
NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15015
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Cases to handle KDC_AUTH_EVENT_VALIDATED_LONG_TERM_KEY and
KDC_AUTH_EVENT_PREAUTH_SUCCEEDED were removed in:
commit 791be84c3eecb95e03611458e2305bae272ba267
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed Mar 2 10:10:08 2022 +1300
s4:kdc: hdb_samba4_audit() is only called once per request
Normally these auth event types are overwritten with the
KDC_AUTH_EVENT_CLIENT_AUTHORIZED event type, but if a client passes the
pre-authentication check, and happens to fail the client access check
(e.g. because the account is disabled), we get error messages of the
form:
hdb_samba4_audit: Unhandled hdb_auth_status=9 => INTERNAL_ERROR
To avoid such errors, use the error code provided in the request
structure to obtain a relevant status code in cases not handled
explicitly.
For unexpected values we return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC
in order to hopefully prevent success. And within make test
we panic in order let a ci run fail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15015
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The call to sdb_free_entry() was forgotten.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15000
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Mar 11 11:05:55 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
mapped_state is completely irrelevant for audit logging and
will also be removed in the next commits.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13879
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The most important case is that we still have a previous
password cached at the RODC and the inbound replication
hasn't wiped the cache yet and we also haven't triggered
a new replication yet.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14865
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
NOTE: This commit finally works again!
This aligns us with the following Heimdal change:
commit 11d8a053f50c88256b4d49c7e482c2eb8f6bde33
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
AuthorDate: Thu Feb 24 18:27:09 2022 +0100
Commit: Luke Howard <lukeh@padl.com>
CommitDate: Thu Mar 3 09:58:48 2022 +1100
kdc-plugin: also pass astgs_request_t to the pac related functions
This is more consistent and allows the pac hooks to be more flexible.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14865
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This just implements a call in the MIT KDB shim layer. It will be used in the
next commits in the KDB plugin.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Allow delegation to any target if we have delegations set up, but the target is
not specified.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
