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sizeof(data_val) is the size of the pointer. This might well be 8 bytes
where the string is only 4 bytes long
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ira Cooper <ira@samba.org>
sizeof(data_val) is the size of the pointer. This might well be 8 bytes
where the string is only 4 bytes long
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ira Cooper <ira@samba.org>
sizeof(data_val) is the size of the pointer. This might well be 8 bytes
where the string is only 4 bytes long
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ira Cooper <ira@samba.org>
"module" has already been dereferenced by ldb_module_get_private(module)
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ira Cooper <ira@samba.org>
Test what upgrades work when there is another lease already held,
in addition to the lease to be upgraded.
The summary of the behaviour is this:
-------------------------------------
If we have two leases (lease1 and lease2) on the same file,
then attempt to upgrade lease1 results in a change if and only
if the requested lease state:
- is valid,
- is strictly a superset of lease1, and
- can held together with lease2.
In that case, the resuling lease state of the upgraded lease1
is the state requested in the upgrade. lease2 is not broken
and remains unchanged.
Note that this contrasts the case of directly opening with
an initial requested lease state, in which case you get that
portion of the requested state that can be shared with the
already existing leases (or the states that they get broken to).
Signed-off-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Nov 11 18:04:47 CET 2013 on sn-devel-104
The summary of the behaviour is this:
-------------------------------------
An uncontended lease upgrade results in a change
if and only if the requested lease state is
- valid, and
- strictly a superset of the lease state already held.
In that case the resulting lease state is the one
requested in the upgrade.
Signed-off-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
If the tls key is not owned by root or has not mode 0600 samba will not
start up.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10234
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Björn Baumbach <bb@sernet.de>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Nov 11 13:07:16 CET 2013 on sn-devel-104
If we haven't allocated the smbsrv_session then we should not free it.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Nov 7 18:58:44 CET 2013 on sn-devel-104
Checks against a file with attribute READONLY, and
a security descriptor denying WRITE_DATA access.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@suse.de>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Nov 4 23:10:10 CET 2013 on sn-devel-104
This is a little benchmark test excercising parallel directory renames. With
lots of open files directory renames get pretty slow against some SMB server
implementations.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
As described in MS-ATDS 3.1.1.5.2.8.
Signed-off-by: Nadezhda Ivanova <nivanova@symas.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Nadezhda Ivanova <nivanova@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sun Nov 3 16:17:30 CET 2013 on sn-devel-104
We had a warning about the enum being defined in the parameter list:
warning: ‘enum credentials_obtained’ declared inside parameter list
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Patou <mat@matws.net>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlet <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Matthieu Patou <mat@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sun Oct 27 02:25:47 CET 2013 on sn-devel-104
Check that FSCTL_SRV_COPYCHUNK_WRITE succeeds when the copy-chunk target
is opened with SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_WRITE only.
Signed-off-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Oct 25 22:48:59 CEST 2013 on sn-devel-104
Restore and backup privileges are not relevant to ldap
access checks, and the TakeOwnership privilege should
grant write_owner right
Signed-off-by: Nadezhda Ivanova <nivanova@symas.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Oct 24 16:15:50 CEST 2013 on sn-devel-104
smbd broke to none twice. Make sure this won't happen again :-)
This used to happen before the MSG_SMB_BREAK_RESPONSE merge. In
process_oplock_break_message we did not call remove_oplock, which would
have prevented this.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Oct 23 14:06:13 CEST 2013 on sn-devel-104
The level we have to break to depends on the create disposition of the
second opener. If it's overwriting, break to none. If it's not, break
to level2.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This is what Windows does in this case, we don't survive that. We break
to LEVEL2 here. Fixes and more precise test to follow.
We don't survive this anymore. Re-enable later.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
cli_credentials_set_netlogon_creds() should only be used directly before
a DCERPC bind in order to pass the session information to the
gensec layer.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This avoids the use of dcerpc_smb_tree(), which is a layer violation.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We can directly use smb_raw_open() to open a handle to a named pipe.
This avoids the need for the layer violation functions
dcerpc_smb_tree() and dcerpc_smb_fnum().
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We now use smbXcli_conn_is_connected() and
dcerpc_binding_handle_is_connected() to verify only the dcerpc layer
got an error. The expected error is EIO mapped to NT_STATUS_IO_DEVICE_ERROR.
NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE should only be visible at the SMB layer,
but we keep this as allowed return value for now, until
the dcerpc layer is fixed.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Some code uses the low level smbXcli_session structure instead of
the smbcli_session structure and doesn't 'see' updates to the
smbcli_session structure.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This attempts reauth with invalid creds, hence
triggering the error path in the reauth code.
This invalidates the session and subsequente requests
on that connection fail.
https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10208
Signed-off-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Oct 15 22:50:27 CEST 2013 on sn-devel-104
With FAKE_LEVEL_II_OPLOCKS around we did not grant LEVEL2 after
a NO_OPLOCK file got written to. Windows does grant LEVEL2 in this
case. With the have_level2_oplocks in brlocks.tdb we can now grant LEVEL2
in this case as well.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
According to [MS-SAMR] 3.1.5.7 Delete Pattern we should not allow deletion
of security objects with RID < 1000. This patch will prevent deletion of
well-known accounts and groups.
Signed-off-by: Nadezhda Ivanova <nivanova@symas.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Nadezhda Ivanova <nivanova@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Oct 14 13:31:50 CEST 2013 on sn-devel-104
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sun Oct 13 17:58:23 CEST 2013 on sn-devel-104
If delete_on_close is set, there is no oplock break. Check that.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
If delete_on_close is set, there is no oplock break. Check that.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
