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‘user_info_dc->sids’ must live for at least as long as ‘user_info_dc’,
or a use-after-free may result.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
It is up to the caller to choose if it wants to clean up the user_info_dc
memory early, we do so only in the KDC as was allocated on a context
provided to samba_kdc_update_pac_blob(), whereas auth_winbind uses
a locally managed tevent state as the memory context.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Feb 8 01:05:47 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
Heretofore we have treated the primary group SID specially, storing it
in a fixed position as the second element of the user_info_dc->sids
array, and filtering out other copies in the PAC_LOGON_INFO base
structure. This filtering has made it difficult to distinguish between
the case where the primary group is a universal or global group, located
in the base RIDs, and the case where it is a domain-local group, missing
from the base RIDs; especially since the attributes of a domain-local
primary group are lost by being stored in the PAC. Domain-local primary
groups are normally disallowed by Windows, but are allowed by Samba, and
so it is reasonable to support them with at least some measure of
consistency.
The second element of user_info_dc->sids is still reserved for the
primary group's SID, but we no longer filter out any other copies in the
array. The first two elements are no more than the SIDs of the user and
the primary group respectively; and the remaining SIDs are as if taken
without modification from arrays of SIDs in the PAC. user_info_dc->sids
should therefore become a more faithful representation of the SIDs in
the PAC. After adding resource SIDs to it with
dsdb_expand_resource_groups(), we should have a result that more closely
and in more cases matches that of Windows.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
These constants allow one to tell at a glance what search operation is
being performed.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The combination MANDATORY | ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT | ENABLED is very
commonly used, and introducing a shorter alias for it makes the code
clearer.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Besides the NETLOGON_GUEST bit indicating whether the user has been
authenticated, we now carry all of the other bits as well. This lets us
match Windows' behaviour of simply passing these bits through to an
updated PAC when processing a TGS-REQ.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Group expansion, performed in dsdb_expand_nested_groups(), now
incorporates a check of the type of each group. Those that are resource
groups receive the SE_GROUP_RESOURCE bit in the attributes which are now
carried alongside each group SID.
Whereas before, in auth_convert_user_info_dc_sambaseinfo() and
auth_convert_user_info_dc_saminfo6(), we invariantly used the flag
combination SE_GROUP_MANDATORY | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT |
SE_GROUP_ENABLED to set attributes in the PAC, we now take the correct
attributes from user_info_dc.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
These variables are not important to protect against a race with
and a double-read can easily be avoided by moving them up the file
a little.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
By bringing this function inline it can then be split out in a
subsequent commit.
Based on work by Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
authsam_calculate_lastlogon_sync_interval() is split out of authsam_update_lastlogon_timestamp()
Based on work by Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Ensure that the bad password count is incremented atomically,
and that the successful logon accounting data is updated atomically.
Use bad password indicator (in a distinct TDB) to determine if to open a transaction
We open a transaction when we have seen the hint that this user
has recorded a bad password. This allows us to avoid always
needing one, while not missing a possible lockout.
We also go back and get a transation if we did not take out
one out but we chose to do a write (eg for lastLogonTimestamp)
Based on patches by Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
As is, this is pointless, as we need a transaction to make this
any less of a race, but this provides the steps towards that goal.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
To ensure that the bad password count is incremented atomically,
and that the successful logon accounting data is updated atomically,
without always opening a transaction, we will need to make a note
of all bad and successful passwords in a side-DB outside the
transaction lock.
This provides the functions needed for that and hooks them in
(future commits will handle errors and use the results).
Based on patches by Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This field may be used to convey whether we were provided with a TGT or
a non-TGT. We ensure both structures are zeroed out to avoid incorrect
results being produced by an uninitialised field.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15047
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15049
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This means Samba will essentially ignore this attribute, not even attempting
to read it from the AD DC sam.ldb
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Mar 6 04:30:22 UTC 2019 on sn-devel-144
In a typical user login query, the code tries to work out the PSO 2-3
times - once for the msDS-ResultantPSO attribute, and then again for the
msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed & msDS-UserPasswordExpiryTimeComputed
constructed attributes.
The PSO calculation is reasonably expensive, mostly due to the nested
groups calculation. If we've already constructed the msDS-ResultantPSO
attribute, then we can save ourselves extra work by just re-fetching the
result directly, rather than expanding the nested groups again from
scratch.
The previous patch improves efficiency when there are no PSOs in the
system. This should improve the case where there are PSOs that apply to
the users. (Unfortunately, it won't help where there are some PSOs in
the system, but no PSO applies to the user being queried).
Also updated sam.c so the msDS-ResultantPSO gets calculated first,
before the other constructed attributes.
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Garming Sam <garming@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed May 23 10:09:11 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
If a PSO applies to a user, use its lockOutThreshold/Duration settings
instead of the domain setting. When we lookup a user, we now include the
msDS-ResultantPSO attribute. If the attribute is present for a user,
then we lookup the corresponding PSO object to get the lockOutThreshold/
Duration settings.
Note: This is not quite enough to make the PSO lockout tests pass, as
msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed is still constructed based on the
domain lockoutDuration setting rather than the PSO.
Updating the password_hash.c code properly will be done in a subsequent
commit.
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue May 22 02:42:32 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
This allows you to forward bad password count resets to 0. Currently,
there is a missing access check for the RODC to ensure it only applies
to cached users (msDS-Allowed-Password-Replication-Group).
(further patches still need to address forcing a RWDC contact)
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We rely on the other SAM modules to increment the badPwdCount locally,
but we must reset to 0 if the remote sends a success (to override our
failure).
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
