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server_exit does an internal tree disconnect which requires a chdir to
the share directory. In case the file system encountered a problem and
the chdir call returns an error, this triggers a SERVER_EXIT_ABNORMAL
which in turn results in a panic and a coredump. As the log already
indicates the problem (chdir returned an error), avoid the
SERVER_EXIT_ABNORMAL in this case and not trigger a coredump.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13189
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Dec 16 01:56:06 CET 2017 on sn-devel-144
This is marked as knownfail for quite some time.
I don't think such a test is a reason to the 'auth methods' option.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Only tests with "nfs4:mode = simple" as mode special is supposed to be
broken anyway and simple is recommended.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
This is the current default, just make it explicit. A subsequent commit
will bump the default to 4.1.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
We only open the underlying file if the open access mode contains
FILE_READ_DATA|FILE_WRITE_DATA|FILE_APPEND_DATA|FILE_EXECUTE
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
This changes the way ACL inheritance is achieved in this
module.
Previously the module recursed to the next parent directory until the
share root was reached or a directory with an ACL xattr. If the share
root didn't contain an ACL xattr either a default ACL would be used.
This commit removed this recursive scanning and replaces it with the
same mechanism used by vfs_acl_xattr: by setting "inherit acls = yes"
just let smbd do the heavy lefting and inheritance.
For any file without ACL xattr we still synthesize a default ACL,
leveraging the existing default ACL function used by vfs_acl_xattr.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
All the other subtests in samba3.raw.acls.create_file|dir pass with
nfs4acl_xattr, it's just the subtest that tries to set the owner which
fails with everything else then acl_xattr.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
There are already some existing ntlm_auth tests, so the new tests I've
added make things a bit confusing. Also, ntlmdisabled probably better
reflects the specific case we're trying to test.
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This is so that we test the source4 case as well. Currently the only
testenv with NTLM disabled is ktest, and that only exercises the source3
code.
I've tried to support the new test environment with minimal changes to the
Samba4.pm setup code.
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
We still need a full routing table including all upn suffixes,
but this is a start to support NTLM authentication using user@REALM
against structed domains.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This adds support for trusted domains to the auth stack on AD DCs.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
There are two pieces: Test access with different sharemodes through SMB
and verify access, and also provide tests that can be used with file
systems enforcing share modes outside of Samba.
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Jul 26 09:30:31 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144
This adds support for DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_USER_PRINCIPAL and
DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_SERVICE_PRINCIPAL as desired formats.
This also causes the test in cracknames.py to no longer fail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12842
Signed-off-by: Bob Campbell <bobcampbell@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jul 24 11:10:26 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144
This fails due the bug, which causes the related test in
drsuapi_cracknames.c to flap. It also fails due to us not yet supporting
DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_USER_PRINCIPAL or
DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_SERVICE_PRINCIPAL.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12842
Signed-off-by: Bob Campbell <bobcampbell@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
When NTLM is disabled, the server should reject NTLM-based password
changes. Changing the password is a bit complicated from python, but
because the server should reject the password change outright with
NTLM_BLOCKED, the test doesn't actually need to provide valid
credentials.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11923
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Jul 21 13:54:35 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144
This allows us to prove that "ntlm auth = disabled" works
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11923
The NETLOGON server is only needed when the classic/NT4 DC is enabled
and has been the source of security issues in the past. Therefore
reduce the attack surface.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
We eliminate a small race between GUID -> DN and ensure RODC can only
reset bad password count on accounts it is allowed to cache locally.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This requires as a pre-requisite that the auth stack is not run twice.
We remove the knownfail introduced in the earlier patch.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
pdbtest.s4winbind no longer is applicable without a live NETLOGON
connection.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This test passes against Windows 2016 but currently fails against Samba
for some reason. The test does the following:
1. A stat open on a file, then
2. a second open with a RWH-lease request
Windows grants a RWH-lease in step 2, while Samba only grants a
R-lease. Go figure...
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sun May 28 18:52:52 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144
The challenge parameter was being treated as a string rather than as a
data blob. This was causing intermittent seg faults. Removed the
server_timestamp parameter as it's not currently used.
Unable to produce a test case to reliably replicate the failure.
However auth_log_samlogon does flap
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Changes to virtualCryptSHA256 and virtualCryptSHA512 attributes.
The values are now calculated as follows:
1) If a value exists in 'Primary:userPassword' with
the specified number of rounds it is returned.
2) If 'Primary:CLEARTEXT, or 'Primary:SambaGPG' with
'--decrypt-samba-gpg'. Calculate a hash with the specified number of rounds
3) Return the first {CRYPT} value in 'Primary:userPassword' with a
matching algorithm
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Tests to ensure that precomputed SHA256 and SHA512 hashes in
'supplementalCredentials Primary:userPassword' are used correctly in the
calculation of virtualCryptSHA256 and virtualCryptSHA512
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Generate sha256 and sha512 password hashes and store them in
supplementalCredentials
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Add tests to verify the generation and storage of sha256 and sha512
password hashes in suplementalCredentials Primary:userPassword
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Allow the number of rounds to be specified when calculating the
virtualCryptSHA256 and virtualCryptSHA512 attributes.
i.e. --attributes="virtualCryptSHA256;rounds=3000" will calculate the
hash using 3,000 rounds.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Add tests to for the new rounds option for the virtualCryptSHA256 and
virtualCryptSHA512 attributes.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Add new virtualWDigest attributes, these return the hashes stored in
supplementalCredentials Primary:WDigest, in a form suitable for
htdigest authentication
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Add tests for the new virtualWDigest attributes, these return the hashes
stored in supplementalCredentials Primary:WDigest in a form suitable for
use with htdigest authentication.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Fix the null pointer dereference in smbd, introduced in the auth logging
changes.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Apr 28 07:18:54 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144
Test case to replicate null pointer dereference in smbd, introduced in
the auth logging changes.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Prior to this, the modification of lockoutTime triggered referrals.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
In this scenario, both the login server and the verification server are
the RODC. This tests that a user is locked out correctly once the
lockout limit is reached and they are also unlocked correctly when the
lockout time period expires.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This tests password fallback to RWDC in preloaded and non-preloaded
cases. It also tests some basic scenarios around what things are
replicated between the two DCs.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Pair-programmed-with: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Previously, you could add or delete and cause replication conflicts on
an RODC. Modifies are already partly restricted in repl_meta_data and
have more specific requirements, so they cannot be handled here.
We still differ against Windows for modifies of non-replicated
attributes over LDAP.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Pair-programmed-with: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12008
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Pair-programmed-with: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12008
The cracknames call is done in the "sam" backend now.
In order to support trusted domains correctly, the backends
need to get the raw values from the client.
This is the important change in order to no longer
silently map users from trusted domains to local users.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2976
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12709
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This shows that NTLM authentication is currently completely broken
on an DCs of AD domains with trusts.
Currently we completely ignore the client provided domain
and try to authenticate against the username in our local sam.ldb.
If the same username/password combination exists in both domains,
the user of the trusted domain silenty impersonates the user
of the local domain.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2976
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12709
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
