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Removing the explicit notice about ldb in order to
have the same content in all copies of dlinklist.h
in the next commits.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Prefer epoll_create1(2) over epoll_create(2) and
always require the former to use epoll(7) interface,
thus saving extra fcntl(2) call to set FD_CLOEXEC.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dantipov@cloudlinux.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Prefer epoll_create1(2) over epoll_create(2) and
always require the former to use epoll(7) interface.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dantipov@cloudlinux.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
* Remove remaining, but broken python2 support
* Spelling fixes
* python: Safely clear structure members
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Rob van der Linde <rob@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Jul 19 04:29:15 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
Signed-off-by: Rob van der Linde <rob@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Rob van der Linde <rob@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Rob van der Linde <rob@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
* samba-tool sites list
* samba-tool sites view
* samba-tool sites subnet list
* samba-tool sites subnet view
Signed-off-by: Rob van der Linde <rob@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Rob van der Linde <rob@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
If this patch is applied, and an environment variable is set, all
access_check calls will be recorded as seeds for
fuzz_security_token_vs_descriptor. See the patch for details.
You probably will never want to apply this patch, but it is here just
in case.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This of course doesn't exercise the object tree or default SID code,
but it still covers a lot to the *_ds access_check functions.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The token and descriptor are stored in NDR format; for this purpose we
add a new IDL struct containing this pair (along with a desired access
mask).
An upcoming commit will show how to collect seeds for this fuzzer.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This fuzzer parses SDDL into a security descriptor and runs an access
check on it using a known security token. This is purely for crash
detection -- we don't know enough to assert whether the check should
succeed or not.
The seed strings used are compatible with those of fuzz_sddl_parse --
anything found by fuzz_sddl_parse is worth trying as a seed here, and
vice versa.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Some clients (e.g. an exchange server) check operatingSystemVersion
in order to check if a domain controller is new enough.
So we better use a value matching the dc functional level.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Some clients (e.g. an exchange server) check operatingSystemVersion
in order to check if a domain controller is new enough.
So we better use a value matching the dc functional level.
While we also fixed operatingSystem[Version] at provision time,
we do it also in dsdb_check_and_update_fl() in order to
handle old provisions and systems joined to an existing domain.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
[MS-RPRN] 7 Appendix B: Product Behavior contains information
about the products and their announced versions.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9612
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Jul 19 02:41:25 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
These are useful to keep around for other purposes.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9612
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is to adapt to Heimdal:
commit 3c4548025c0a239ff580e7974939185eadf1856b
Author: Nicolas Williams <nico@twosigma.com>
Date: Sun Jun 4 22:54:03 2023 -0500
hdb: Add auth-data-reqd flag
NOTE: This commit finally works again!
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is to adapt to Heimdal:
commit 997916e3f67d70bb52674829615c50455918fbb3
Author: Taylor R Campbell <campbell+heimdal@mumble.net>
Date: Sun May 28 20:34:34 2023 +0000
krb5: Make heimdal_version and heimdal_long_version const.
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON’T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON’T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
When PK-INIT is performed, check that the buffer is as expected and
contains the correct NT hash.
The PK-INIT tests now pass against Windows Server 2019.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14985
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
To run these tests standalone, you will need the certificate and private
key of the Certificate Authority. These can be specified together in the
same file with the environment variable CA_CERT, or the private key may
be specified in its own file with CA_PRIVATE_KEY.
If either of these files are encrypted, you can specify the password in
the environment variable CA_PASS.
These tests create a new certificate for the user account, signed with
the private key of the Certificate Authority. We negotiate the reply key
with either of the public-key and Diffie-Hellman PK-INIT variants, and
use the reply key to decrypt the enc-part in the response. We also check
that the KDC’s signatures are valid.
Most of the failures with the Heimdal KDC are due to the wrong nonce
being returned in the reply compared to Windows, which issue is simple
enough to correct.
An example command line for manual testing against Windows:
SMB_CONF_PATH=ad_dc.conf KRB5_CONFIG=krb5.conf SERVICE_USERNAME=win2k19-dc.example.com ADMIN_USERNAME=Administrator ADMIN_PASSWORD=locDCpass ADMIN_KVNO=1 FOR_USER=Administrator USERNAME=Administrator PASSWORD=locDCpass DC_SERVER=win2k19-dc.example.com SERVER=win2k19-dc.example.com DOMAIN=example REALM=example.com PYTHONPATH=bin/python STRICT_CHECKING=1 FAST_SUPPORT=1 CLAIMS_SUPPORT=1 COMPOUND_ID_SUPPORT=1 TKT_SIG_SUPPORT=1 FULL_SIG_SUPPORT=1 GNUTLS_PBKDF2_SUPPORT=1 EXPECT_PAC=1 EXPECT_EXTRA_PAC_BUFFERS=1 CHECK_CNAME=1 CHECK_PADATA=1 KADMIN_IS_TGS=0 FORCED_RC4=1 DEFAULT_ETYPES=36 CA_CERT=./win2k19-ca.pfx CA_PASS=1234 python3 python/samba/tests/krb5/pkinit_tests.py
To set up windows for this I first installed an Certificate Authority with an Enterprise CA.
Then I exported the private key and certificate of the CA:
1. go into the Certification Authority snap-in for the relevant computer,
2. right-clicking the CA
3. clicking ‘All Tasks’ → ‘Back up CA...’
4. and exporting the private key and CA certificate.
(I downloaded the resulting file via smbclient).
After setting up an Enterprise CA, I also needed to edit the domain
controller GPO to enable auto-enrollment, otherwise Windows would
refuse to accept as legitimate any certificates provided by the client.
That can be done by first enabling the policy:
‘Computer Configuration/Policies/Windows Settings/Security Settings/Public Key Policies/Certificate Services Client — Auto-Enrollment’,
and then ticking both ‘Renew expired certificates…’ and ‘Update certificates…’)
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Add and use some methods to calculate the highest supported AES and RC4
encryption types, respectively.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
