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Log details of the remote machine when bad credentials received.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This matches a Windows Server, at least if it is itself a
DC of the forest root and the requested domain is the local domain of the DC.
Both constraints are true on a Samba AD DC, as we don't really support
trusts yet.
Pair-Programmed-With: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Jun 9 17:06:04 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144
We eliminate a small race between GUID -> DN and ensure RODC can only
reset bad password count on accounts it is allowed to cache locally.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This allows you to forward bad password count resets to 0. Currently,
there is a missing access check for the RODC to ensure it only applies
to cached users (msDS-Allowed-Password-Replication-Group).
(further patches still need to address forcing a RWDC contact)
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This will allow the authentication log to indicate clearly how the password was
supplied to the server.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Pair-Programmed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
This will allow the logging code to make clear which protocol an authentication was for.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Pair-Programmed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
This will allow a very verbose JSON line to be logged that others can audit from in the future
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Pair-Programmed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
This will allow the NETLOGON server in the AD DC to declare that it does not use
handles, and so allow some more flexibility with association groups
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This allows the netlogon server to be moved into a multi-process model
while still supporting clients that use a challenge from a different
network connection.
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Dec 14 20:12:14 CET 2016 on sn-devel-144
This patch fixes an issue where NetApp filers joined to a
Samba/ADDC cannot resolve SIDs. Without this patch the issue
can only be avoided by setting "allow nt4 crypto = yes" in smb.conf.
The issue is triggered by NetApp filers in three steps:
1. The client calls netr_ServerReqChallenge to set up challenge tokens
2. Next it calls netr_ServerAuthenticate2 with NETLOGON_NEG_STRONG_KEYS
set to 0. Native AD and Samba respond to this with
NT_STATUS_DOWNGRADE_DETECTED. At this point Samba throws away
the challenge token negotiated in the first step.
3. Next the client calls netr_ServerAuthenticate2 again, this time with
NETLOGON_NEG_STRONG_KEYS set to 1.
Samba returns NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED as it has lost track
of the challenge and denies logon with the message
No challenge requested by client [CLNT1/CLNT1$], cannot authenticate
Git commit 321ebc99b5a00f82265aee741a48aa84b214d6e8 introduced
a workaround for a different but related issue. This patch makes a minor
adjustment to that commit to delay flushing the cached challenge until
it's clear that we are not in a NT_STATUS_DOWNGRADE_DETECTED
situation.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11291
Signed-off-by: Arvid Requate <requate@univention.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Aug 6 20:29:04 CEST 2015 on sn-devel-104
This should only work on a forest root domain controller and a forest function
level >= 2003.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This collects the whole information about the local forest,
including all domains and defined top level names (uPNSuffixes and
msDS-SPNSuffixes).
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We redirect this to remote DC as netr_GetForestTrustInformation() via an IRPC
call to winbindd.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We pass NETLOGON_CONTROL_{REDISCOVER,TC_QUERY,TC_VERIFY,CHANGE_PASSWORD} to
winbindd and do the hard work there, while we answer NETLOGON_CONTROL_QUERY
directly.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We just need to call dcesrv_netr_ServerGetTrustInfo() and ignore trust_info.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
For domain trusts we need to extract NL_PASSWORD_VERSION from the password
buffer.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
For trust account we need to store version number provided by the client.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We should return the our ip address the client is connected too.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Change-Id: I3bc283b6fab4326131084d1abb89cb486af7b35a
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Sep 1 02:58:46 CEST 2014 on sn-devel-104
Some clients call netr_ServerReqChallenge() and netr_ServerAuthenticate3()
on different connections. This works against Windows DCs as they
have a global challenge table.
A VMware provisioning task for Windows VMs seemy to rely on this behavior.
As a fallback we're storing the challenge in a global memcache with a fixed
size. This should allow these strange clients to work against a
Samba AD DC.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10723
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
This indicates that we're using nested event loops...
Andrew Bartlett
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Change-Id: I4dcc7bf3c624612980e53b6119a60989fc2ea3b6
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This seems to be the best choke point to check for locked out
accounts, as aside from the KDC, all the password authentication and
change callers use it.
Andrew Bartlett
Change-Id: I0f21a79697cb8b08ef639445bd05a896a2c9ee1b
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jan 7 16:53:31 CET 2014 on sn-devel-104
We need to bit-wise AND the client and server flags.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
As netlogon is handled by the samdb now,
the corresponding functions should live there as well.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Nadezhda Ivanova <nivanova@symas.com>
