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popt1.19 fixes a leak that exposes a use as free,
make sure we duplicate return of poptGetArg if
poptFreeContext is called before we use it.
==5325== Invalid read of size 1
==5325== at 0x4849782: strlen (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4859E1C: talloc_strdup (talloc.c:2470)
==5325== by 0x48C0D37: talloc_sub_basic (substitute.c:303)
==5325== by 0x4894B98: lp_load_ex (loadparm.c:4004)
==5325== by 0x489529E: lp_load_with_registry_shares (loadparm.c:4237)
==5325== by 0x10ABD7: main (test_lp_load.c:98)
==5325== Address 0x72da8b0 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 20 free'd
==5325== at 0x484617B: free (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4B8F8B8: poptResetContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x4B905D4: poptFreeContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x10AB8E: main (test_lp_load.c:90)
==5325== Block was alloc'd at
==5325== at 0x48437B4: malloc (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4B912EE: poptGetNextOpt (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x10AB49: main (test_lp_load.c:74)
==5325==
==5325== Invalid read of size 1
==5325== at 0x4849794: strlen (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4859E1C: talloc_strdup (talloc.c:2470)
==5325== by 0x48C0D37: talloc_sub_basic (substitute.c:303)
==5325== by 0x4894B98: lp_load_ex (loadparm.c:4004)
==5325== by 0x489529E: lp_load_with_registry_shares (loadparm.c:4237)
==5325== by 0x10ABD7: main (test_lp_load.c:98)
==5325== Address 0x72da8b1 is 1 bytes inside a block of size 20 free'd
==5325== at 0x484617B: free (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4B8F8B8: poptResetContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x4B905D4: poptFreeContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x10AB8E: main (test_lp_load.c:90)
==5325== Block was alloc'd at
==5325== at 0x48437B4: malloc (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4B912EE: poptGetNextOpt (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x10AB49: main (test_lp_load.c:74)
==5325==
==5325== Invalid read of size 8
==5325== at 0x484D3AE: memmove (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4859DC2: __talloc_strlendup (talloc.c:2457)
==5325== by 0x4859E32: talloc_strdup (talloc.c:2470)
==5325== by 0x48C0D37: talloc_sub_basic (substitute.c:303)
==5325== by 0x4894B98: lp_load_ex (loadparm.c:4004)
==5325== by 0x489529E: lp_load_with_registry_shares (loadparm.c:4237)
==5325== by 0x10ABD7: main (test_lp_load.c:98)
==5325== Address 0x72da8b0 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 20 free'd
==5325== at 0x484617B: free (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4B8F8B8: poptResetContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x4B905D4: poptFreeContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x10AB8E: main (test_lp_load.c:90)
==5325== Block was alloc'd at
==5325== at 0x48437B4: malloc (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4B912EE: poptGetNextOpt (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x10AB49: main (test_lp_load.c:74)
==5325==
==5325== Invalid read of size 2
==5325== at 0x484D400: memmove (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4859DC2: __talloc_strlendup (talloc.c:2457)
==5325== by 0x4859E32: talloc_strdup (talloc.c:2470)
==5325== by 0x48C0D37: talloc_sub_basic (substitute.c:303)
==5325== by 0x4894B98: lp_load_ex (loadparm.c:4004)
==5325== by 0x489529E: lp_load_with_registry_shares (loadparm.c:4237)
==5325== by 0x10ABD7: main (test_lp_load.c:98)
==5325== Address 0x72da8c0 is 16 bytes inside a block of size 20 free'd
==5325== at 0x484617B: free (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4B8F8B8: poptResetContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x4B905D4: poptFreeContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x10AB8E: main (test_lp_load.c:90)
==5325== Block was alloc'd at
==5325== at 0x48437B4: malloc (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4B912EE: poptGetNextOpt (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x10AB49: main (test_lp_load.c:74)
==5325==
==5325== Invalid read of size 1
==5325== at 0x484D430: memmove (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4859DC2: __talloc_strlendup (talloc.c:2457)
==5325== by 0x4859E32: talloc_strdup (talloc.c:2470)
==5325== by 0x48C0D37: talloc_sub_basic (substitute.c:303)
==5325== by 0x4894B98: lp_load_ex (loadparm.c:4004)
==5325== by 0x489529E: lp_load_with_registry_shares (loadparm.c:4237)
==5325== by 0x10ABD7: main (test_lp_load.c:98)
==5325== Address 0x72da8c2 is 18 bytes inside a block of size 20 free'd
==5325== at 0x484617B: free (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4B8F8B8: poptResetContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x4B905D4: poptFreeContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x10AB8E: main (test_lp_load.c:90)
==5325== Block was alloc'd at
==5325== at 0x48437B4: malloc (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4B912EE: poptGetNextOpt (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x10AB49: main (test_lp_load.c:74)
==5325==
==5325== Invalid read of size 1
==5325== at 0x4849782: strlen (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4859E1C: talloc_strdup (talloc.c:2470)
==5325== by 0x4B3B74B: add_to_file_list (loadparm.c:1023)
==5325== by 0x4894BD4: lp_load_ex (loadparm.c:4011)
==5325== by 0x489529E: lp_load_with_registry_shares (loadparm.c:4237)
==5325== by 0x10ABD7: main (test_lp_load.c:98)
==5325== Address 0x72da8b0 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 20 free'd
==5325== at 0x484617B: free (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4B8F8B8: poptResetContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x4B905D4: poptFreeContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x10AB8E: main (test_lp_load.c:90)
==5325== Block was alloc'd at
==5325== at 0x48437B4: malloc (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4B912EE: poptGetNextOpt (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x10AB49: main (test_lp_load.c:74)
==5325==
==5325== Invalid read of size 1
==5325== at 0x4849794: strlen (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4859E1C: talloc_strdup (talloc.c:2470)
==5325== by 0x4B3B74B: add_to_file_list (loadparm.c:1023)
==5325== by 0x4894BD4: lp_load_ex (loadparm.c:4011)
==5325== by 0x489529E: lp_load_with_registry_shares (loadparm.c:4237)
==5325== by 0x10ABD7: main (test_lp_load.c:98)
==5325== Address 0x72da8b1 is 1 bytes inside a block of size 20 free'd
==5325== at 0x484617B: free (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4B8F8B8: poptResetContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x4B905D4: poptFreeContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x10AB8E: main (test_lp_load.c:90)
==5325== Block was alloc'd at
==5325== at 0x48437B4: malloc (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4B912EE: poptGetNextOpt (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x10AB49: main (test_lp_load.c:74)
==5325==
==5325== Invalid read of size 8
==5325== at 0x484D3AE: memmove (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4859DC2: __talloc_strlendup (talloc.c:2457)
==5325== by 0x4859E32: talloc_strdup (talloc.c:2470)
==5325== by 0x4B3B74B: add_to_file_list (loadparm.c:1023)
==5325== by 0x4894BD4: lp_load_ex (loadparm.c:4011)
==5325== by 0x489529E: lp_load_with_registry_shares (loadparm.c:4237)
==5325== by 0x10ABD7: main (test_lp_load.c:98)
==5325== Address 0x72da8b0 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 20 free'd
==5325== at 0x484617B: free (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4B8F8B8: poptResetContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x4B905D4: poptFreeContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x10AB8E: main (test_lp_load.c:90)
==5325== Block was alloc'd at
==5325== at 0x48437B4: malloc (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4B912EE: poptGetNextOpt (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x10AB49: main (test_lp_load.c:74)
==5325==
==5325== Invalid read of size 2
==5325== at 0x484D400: memmove (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4859DC2: __talloc_strlendup (talloc.c:2457)
==5325== by 0x4859E32: talloc_strdup (talloc.c:2470)
==5325== by 0x4B3B74B: add_to_file_list (loadparm.c:1023)
==5325== by 0x4894BD4: lp_load_ex (loadparm.c:4011)
==5325== by 0x489529E: lp_load_with_registry_shares (loadparm.c:4237)
==5325== by 0x10ABD7: main (test_lp_load.c:98)
==5325== Address 0x72da8c0 is 16 bytes inside a block of size 20 free'd
==5325== at 0x484617B: free (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4B8F8B8: poptResetContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x4B905D4: poptFreeContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x10AB8E: main (test_lp_load.c:90)
==5325== Block was alloc'd at
==5325== at 0x48437B4: malloc (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4B912EE: poptGetNextOpt (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x10AB49: main (test_lp_load.c:74)
==5325==
==5325== Invalid read of size 1
==5325== at 0x484D430: memmove (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4859DC2: __talloc_strlendup (talloc.c:2457)
==5325== by 0x4859E32: talloc_strdup (talloc.c:2470)
==5325== by 0x4B3B74B: add_to_file_list (loadparm.c:1023)
==5325== by 0x4894BD4: lp_load_ex (loadparm.c:4011)
==5325== by 0x489529E: lp_load_with_registry_shares (loadparm.c:4237)
==5325== by 0x10ABD7: main (test_lp_load.c:98)
==5325== Address 0x72da8c2 is 18 bytes inside a block of size 20 free'd
==5325== at 0x484617B: free (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4B8F8B8: poptResetContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x4B905D4: poptFreeContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x10AB8E: main (test_lp_load.c:90)
==5325== Block was alloc'd at
==5325== at 0x48437B4: malloc (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==5325== by 0x4B912EE: poptGetNextOpt (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==5325== by 0x10AB49: main (test_lp_load.c:74)
==5325==
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15205
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit ff003fc87b8164610dfd6572347c05308c4b2fd7)
popt1.19 fixes a leak that exposes a use as free,
make sure we duplicate return of poptGetArg if
poptFreeContext is called before we use it.
==4407== Invalid read of size 1
==4407== at 0x146263: main (rpcclient.c:1262)
==4407== Address 0x7b67cd0 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 10 free'd
==4407== at 0x484617B: free (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==4407== by 0x5B2E8B8: poptResetContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==4407== by 0x5B2F5D4: poptFreeContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==4407== by 0x146227: main (rpcclient.c:1251)
==4407== Block was alloc'd at
==4407== at 0x48437B4: malloc (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==4407== by 0x5B302EE: poptGetNextOpt (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==4407== by 0x1461BC: main (rpcclient.c:1219)
==4407==
==4407== Invalid read of size 1
==4407== at 0x14627D: main (rpcclient.c:1263)
==4407== Address 0x7b67cd0 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 10 free'd
==4407== at 0x484617B: free (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==4407== by 0x5B2E8B8: poptResetContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==4407== by 0x5B2F5D4: poptFreeContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==4407== by 0x146227: main (rpcclient.c:1251)
==4407== Block was alloc'd at
==4407== at 0x48437B4: malloc (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==4407== by 0x5B302EE: poptGetNextOpt (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==4407== by 0x1461BC: main (rpcclient.c:1219)
==4407==
==4407== Invalid read of size 1
==4407== at 0x4849782: strlen (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==4407== by 0x4980E1C: talloc_strdup (talloc.c:2470)
==4407== by 0x488CD96: dcerpc_parse_binding (binding.c:320)
==4407== by 0x1462B1: main (rpcclient.c:1267)
==4407== Address 0x7b67cd0 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 10 free'd
==4407== at 0x484617B: free (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==4407== by 0x5B2E8B8: poptResetContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==4407== by 0x5B2F5D4: poptFreeContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==4407== by 0x146227: main (rpcclient.c:1251)
==4407== Block was alloc'd at
==4407== at 0x48437B4: malloc (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==4407== by 0x5B302EE: poptGetNextOpt (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==4407== by 0x1461BC: main (rpcclient.c:1219)
==4407==
==4407== Invalid read of size 1
==4407== at 0x4849794: strlen (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==4407== by 0x4980E1C: talloc_strdup (talloc.c:2470)
==4407== by 0x488CD96: dcerpc_parse_binding (binding.c:320)
==4407== by 0x1462B1: main (rpcclient.c:1267)
==4407== Address 0x7b67cd1 is 1 bytes inside a block of size 10 free'd
==4407== at 0x484617B: free (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==4407== by 0x5B2E8B8: poptResetContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==4407== by 0x5B2F5D4: poptFreeContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==4407== by 0x146227: main (rpcclient.c:1251)
==4407== Block was alloc'd at
==4407== at 0x48437B4: malloc (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==4407== by 0x5B302EE: poptGetNextOpt (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==4407== by 0x1461BC: main (rpcclient.c:1219)
==4407==
==4407== Invalid read of size 8
==4407== at 0x484D3AE: memmove (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==4407== by 0x4980DC2: __talloc_strlendup (talloc.c:2457)
==4407== by 0x4980E32: talloc_strdup (talloc.c:2470)
==4407== by 0x488CD96: dcerpc_parse_binding (binding.c:320)
==4407== by 0x1462B1: main (rpcclient.c:1267)
==4407== Address 0x7b67cd0 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 10 free'd
==4407== at 0x484617B: free (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==4407== by 0x5B2E8B8: poptResetContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==4407== by 0x5B2F5D4: poptFreeContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==4407== by 0x146227: main (rpcclient.c:1251)
==4407== Block was alloc'd at
==4407== at 0x48437B4: malloc (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==4407== by 0x5B302EE: poptGetNextOpt (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==4407== by 0x1461BC: main (rpcclient.c:1219)
==4407==
==4407== Invalid read of size 1
==4407== at 0x484D430: memmove (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==4407== by 0x4980DC2: __talloc_strlendup (talloc.c:2457)
==4407== by 0x4980E32: talloc_strdup (talloc.c:2470)
==4407== by 0x488CD96: dcerpc_parse_binding (binding.c:320)
==4407== by 0x1462B1: main (rpcclient.c:1267)
==4407== Address 0x7b67cd8 is 8 bytes inside a block of size 10 free'd
==4407== at 0x484617B: free (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==4407== by 0x5B2E8B8: poptResetContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==4407== by 0x5B2F5D4: poptFreeContext (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==4407== by 0x146227: main (rpcclient.c:1251)
==4407== Block was alloc'd at
==4407== at 0x48437B4: malloc (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==4407== by 0x5B302EE: poptGetNextOpt (in /usr/lib64/libpopt.so.0.0.2)
==4407== by 0x1461BC: main (rpcclient.c:1219)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15205
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit d26d3d9bff61f796c9c9ab54990ea078f575ab1e)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15182
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit a7fba3ff5996330158d3cc6bc24746a59492b690)
For type == ADOUBLE_META, fio->fake_fd is true so
writes are already synchronous, just call tevent_req_post().
For type == ADOUBLE_RSRC we know we are configured
with FRUIT_RSRC_ADFILE (because fruit_must_handle_aio_stream()
returned true), so we can just call SMB_VFS_NEXT_FSYNC_SEND()
after replacing fsp with fio->ad_fsp.
Remove knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15182
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 35c637f2e6c671acf8fb9c2a67774bd5e74dd7d0)
This shows we currently hang when sending an SMB2_OP_FLUSH on
an AFP_Resource fork.
Adds knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15182
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1b8a8732848169c632af12b7c2b4cd3ee73be244)
If we get NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND from smb2srv_client_connection_{pass,drop}()
we should just keep the connection and overwrite the stale record in
smbXsrv_client_global.tdb. It's basically a race with serverid_exists()
and a process that doesn't cleanly teardown.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15200
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5d66d5b84f87267243dcd5223210906ce589af91)
This will simplify the following changes...
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15200
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8c8d8cf01e01c2726d03fa1c81e0ce9992ee736c)
dbwrap_watched_watch_send() should typically be the last thing to call
before the db record is unlocked, as it's not that easy to undo.
In future we want to recover from smb2srv_client_connection_{pass,drop}()
returning NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND and it would add complexity if
would need to undo dbwrap_watched_watch_send() at that point.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15200
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 56c597bc2b29dc3e555f737ba189f521d0e31e8c)
DBG_WARNING() already adds the function name as prefix.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15200
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit acb3d821deaf06faa16f6428682ecdb02babeb98)
If we hit a race, when a client disconnects the connection after the initial
SMB2 Negotiate request, before the connection is completely passed to
process serving the given client guid, the temporary smbd which accepted the
new connection may already detected the disconnect and exitted before
the long term smbd servicing the client guid was able to send the
MSG_SMBXSRV_CONNECTION_PASSED message.
The result was a log message like this:
smbXsrv_client_connection_pass_loop: smb2srv_client_connection_passed() failed => NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
and all connections belonging to the client guid were dropped,
because we called exit_server_cleanly().
Now we ignore NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND from
smb2srv_client_connection_passed() and let the normal
event loop detect the broken connection, so that only
that connection is terminated (not the whole smbd process).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15200
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 636ec45c93ad040ba70296aa543884c145b3e789)
Special handling of O_CREAT flag in SMB_VFS_OPENAT code path was the
only option to ensure correctness due to a bug in libgfapi as detailed
in issue #3838[1] from GlusterFS upstream. This has been fixed recently
so that O_CREAT is handled correctly within glfs_openat() enbaling us to
remove the corresponding special case from vfs_gluster_openat().
[1] https://github.com/gluster/glusterfs/issues/3838
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15192
Signed-off-by: Anoop C S <anoopcs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Oct 6 08:34:56 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
(cherry picked from commit 9a8bc67f4a5e4afecd648523f43a8e97584fcfd0)
Autobuild-User(v4-17-test): Jule Anger <janger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-17-test): Fri Oct 7 09:59:55 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
Samba 4.5 and earlier will fail to do GET_ANC correctly and will not
replicate non-critical parents of objects with isCriticalSystemObject=TRUE
when DRSUAPI_DRS_CRITICAL_ONLY is set.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15189
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15189
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit bff2bc9c7d69ec2fbe9339c2353a0a846182f1ea)
The chgdcpass server now emulates older verions of Samba that
fail to implement DRSUAPI_DRS_GET_ANC correctly and totally fails to support
DRSUAPI_DRS_GET_TGT.
We now show this is in effect by the fact that tests now fail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15189
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15189
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit b0bbc94d4124d63b1d5a35ccbc88ffd51d520ba0)
This emulates older verions of Samba that fail to implement
DRSUAPI_DRS_GET_ANC correctly and totally fails to support
DRSUAPI_DRS_GET_TGT.
This will allow testing of a client-side fallback, allowing migration
from sites that run very old Samba versions over DRSUAPI (currently
the only option is to attempt an in-place upgrade).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15189
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15189
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 314bc44fa9b8fc99c80bfcfff71f2cec67bbda36)
This test, compared with the direct to RPC tests, will succeed, then fail once the
server is changed to emulate Samba 4.5 and and again succeed once the python code
changes to allow skipping the DRSUAPI_DRS_CRITICAL_ONLY step
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15189
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15189
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 7ff743d65dcf27ffe0c6861720e8ce531bfa378d)
The chgdcpass environment will emulate older verions of Samba
that fail to implement DRSUAPI_DRS_GET_ANC correctly and
totally fails to support DRSUAPI_DRS_GET_TGT.
This will allow testing of a client-side fallback, allowing migration
from sites that run very old Samba versions over DRSUAPI (currently
the only option is to attempt an in-place upgrade).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15189
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15189
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 62b426243f4eaa4978c249b6e6ce90d35aeaefe4)
In several places we end a test by deleting a number of files and
directories, but we do it rather haphazardly with unintentionally
differing error handling. For example, in some tests we currently have
something like:
try:
shutil.rmtree(os.path.join(self.tempdir, "a"))
os.remove(os.path.join(self.tempdir, "b"))
shutil.rmtree(os.path.join(self.tempdir, "c"))
except Exception:
pass
where if, for example, the removal of "b" fails, the removal of "c" will
not be attempted. That will result in the tearDown method raising an
exception, and we're no better off. If the above code is replaced with
self.rm_files('b')
self.rm_dirs('a', 'c')
the failure to remove 'b' will cause a test error, *unless* the failure
was due to a FileNotFoundError (a.k.a. an OSError with errno ENOENT),
in which case we ignore it, as was probably the original intention.
If on the other hand, we have
self.rm_files('b', must_exist=True)
self.rm_dirs('a', 'c')
then the FileNotFoundError causes a failure (not an error).
We take a little bit of care to stay within self.tempdir, to protect
test authors who accidentally write something like `self.rm_dirs('/')`.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15191
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15189
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2359741b2854a8de9d151fe189be80a4bd087ff9)
Example valgrind output:
==22502== 22,747,002 bytes in 21,049 blocks are possibly lost in loss record 1,075 of 1,075
==22502== at 0x4C29F73: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:309)
==22502== by 0x11D7089C: _talloc_pooled_object (in /usr/lib64/libtalloc.so.2.1.16)
==22502== by 0x9027834: tcopy_passwd (in /usr/lib64/libsmbconf.so.0)
==22502== by 0x6A1E1A3: pdb_copy_sam_account (in /usr/lib64/libsamba-passdb.so.0.27.2)
==22502== by 0x6A28AB7: pdb_getsampwnam (in /usr/lib64/libsamba-passdb.so.0.27.2)
==22502== by 0x65D0BC4: check_sam_security (in /usr/lib64/samba/libauth-samba4.so)
==22502== by 0x65C70F0: ??? (in /usr/lib64/samba/libauth-samba4.so)
==22502== by 0x65C781A: auth_check_ntlm_password (in /usr/lib64/samba/libauth-samba4.so)
==22502== by 0x14E464: ??? (in /usr/sbin/winbindd)
==22502== by 0x151CED: winbind_dual_SamLogon (in /usr/sbin/winbindd)
==22502== by 0x152072: winbindd_dual_pam_auth_crap (in /usr/sbin/winbindd)
==22502== by 0x167DE0: ??? (in /usr/sbin/winbindd)
==22502== by 0x12F29B12: tevent_common_invoke_fd_handler (in /usr/lib64/libtevent.so.0.9.39)
==22502== by 0x12F30086: ??? (in /usr/lib64/libtevent.so.0.9.39)
==22502== by 0x12F2E056: ??? (in /usr/lib64/libtevent.so.0.9.39)
==22502== by 0x12F2925C: _tevent_loop_once (in /usr/lib64/libtevent.so.0.9.39)
==22502== by 0x16A243: ??? (in /usr/sbin/winbindd)
==22502== by 0x16AA04: ??? (in /usr/sbin/winbindd)
==22502== by 0x12F29F68: tevent_common_invoke_immediate_handler (in /usr/lib64/libtevent.so.0.9.39)
==22502== by 0x12F29F8F: tevent_common_loop_immediate (in /usr/lib64/libtevent.so.0.9.39)
==22502== by 0x12F2FE3C: ??? (in /usr/lib64/libtevent.so.0.9.39)
==22502== by 0x12F2E056: ??? (in /usr/lib64/libtevent.so.0.9.39)
==22502== by 0x12F2925C: _tevent_loop_once (in /usr/lib64/libtevent.so.0.9.39)
==22502== by 0x12F4C7: main (in /usr/sbin/winbindd)
You can find one for each string in pdb_copy_sam_account(), in total
this already has 67 MB in total for this valgrind run.
pdb_getsampwnam() -> memcache_add_talloc(NULL, PDB_GETPWSID_CACHE, ...)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15169
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Sep 16 20:30:31 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
(cherry picked from commit 9ef2f7345f0d387567fca598cc7008af95598903)
The function smbd_server_connection_terminate_done() does not free subreq
which is allocated in smbXsrv_connection_shutdown_send, this can be a
memory leakage if multi-channel is enabled.
Suggested fix by haihua yang <hhyangdev@gmail.com>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15174
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Autobuild-User(master): Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Sep 23 09:51:20 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
(cherry picked from commit b600b0c8d9690cb5eeded1e5925c8e667c11af04)
In addition to b954d181cd2 we should also protect against timestamps
before the epoch.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15151
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Sep 23 06:50:17 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
(cherry picked from commit f6b391e04a4d5974b908f4f375bd2876083aa7b2)
gpfs_set_times as of August 2020 stores 32-bit unsigned tv_sec. We
should not silently garble time stamps but reject the attempt to set
an out-of-range timestamp.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15151
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit b954d181cd25d9029d3c222e8d97fe7a3b0b2400)
The bad password count is supposed to limit the number of failed login
attempt a user can make before being temporarily locked out, but race
conditions between processes have allowed determined attackers to make
many more than the specified number of attempts. This is especially
bad on constrained or overcommitted hardware.
To fix this, once a bad password is detected, we reload the sam account
information under a user-specific mutex, ensuring we have an up to
date bad password count.
We also update the bad password count if the password is wrong, which we
did not previously do.
Derived from a similar patch to source3/auth/check_samsec.c by
Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Sep 13 00:08:07 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
(cherry picked from commit 8ae0c38d54f065915e927bbfe1b656400a79eb13)
Autobuild-User(v4-17-test): Jule Anger <janger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-17-test): Mon Sep 19 05:03:03 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
Now samr_set_password_aes() just returns the new password in a similar
manner to check_oem_password(). This simplifies the logic for the
following change to recheck whether the account is locked out, and to
update the bad password count.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1d869a2a666cfada1495d891021de6c2b8567a96)
All of its callers, where necessary, take out a transaction covering the
entire password set or change operation, so a transaction is no longer
needed here.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7981cba87e3a7256b12bfc5fdd89b136c12979ff)
Now the initial account search is performed under the transaction,
ensuring the overall password change is atomic. We set DSDB_SESSION_INFO
to drop our privileges to those of the user before we perform the actual
password change, and restore them afterwards if we need to update the
bad password count.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit fcabcb326d385c1e1daaa8dae9820e33a3868f56)
We don't (and shouldn't) need system prvileges to perform the password
change, so drop to the privileges of the user by setting
DSDB_SESSION_INFO. We need to reuse the same sam_ctx: creating a new one
with only user privileges would not work, because any database
modifications would be blocked by the transaction taken out on the
original context.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit f74f92aea164af40d9177b332778a76d7ecabcbd)
This helps the bad password and audit log handling code as it
allows assumptions to be made about the attributes found in
the variable "msg", such as that DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN
was used.
This ensures we can re-search on the DN via the embedded GUID,
which in in turn rename-proof.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit fabbea25310a31c0409b1c11eaced39bd8cde8dd)
This ensures these calls are not optimised away.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1258746ba85b8702628f95a19aba9afea96eab8b)
Signed-off-by: Pavel Filipenský <pfilipensky@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8564380346ace981b957bb8464f2ecf007032062)
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6edf88f5c40421b9881666a2e78038ea9c547c24)
Panic if memset_s() fails.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 03a50d8f7d872b6ef701d1207061c88b73d171bb)
The bad password count is supposed to limit the number of failed login
attempt a user can make before being temporarily locked out, but race
conditions between processes have allowed determined attackers to make
many more than the specified number of attempts. This is especially
bad on constrained or overcommitted hardware.
To fix this, once a bad password is detected, we reload the sam account
information under a user-specific mutex, ensuring we have an up to
date bad password count.
Derived from a similar patch to source3/auth/check_samsec.c by
Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 65c473d4a53fc8a22a0d531aff45203ea3a4d99b)
The bad password count is supposed to limit the number of failed login
attempt a user can make before being temporarily locked out, but race
conditions between processes have allowed determined attackers to make
many more than the specified number of attempts. This is especially
bad on constrained or overcommitted hardware.
To fix this, once a bad password is detected, we reload the sam account
information under a user-specific mutex, ensuring we have an up to
date bad password count.
Discovered by Nathaniel W. Turner.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8587734bf989aeaafa9d09d78d0f381caf52d285)
This may return an error if we find the account is locked out.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 268ea7bef5af4b9c8a02f4f5856113ff0664d9e8)
If the account has been locked out in the meantime (indicated by
NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT), we should return the appropriate error
code.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit a268a1a0e304d0702469e4ac146d8af5e7384c39)
If the account has been locked out in the meantime (indicated by
NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT), we should return the appropriate error
code.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit bdfc9d96f8fe5070ab8a189bbf42ccb7e77afb73)
[jsutton@samba.org Fixed knownfail conflicts due to not having claims
tests]
If we find that the user has been locked out sometime during the request
(due to a race), we will now return an error code.
Note that we cannot avoid the MIT KDC aspect of the issue by checking
the return status of mit_samba_zero_bad_password_count(), because
kdb_vftabl::audit_as_req() returning void means we cannot pass on the
result.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit b1e740896ebae14ba64250da2f718e1d707e9eed)
This simplifies the code for the following commit.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2b593c34c4f5cb82440b940766e53626c1cbec5b)
We reread the account details inside the transaction in case the account
has been locked out in the meantime. If it has, we return the
appropriate error code.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 96479747bdb5bc5f33d903085f5f69793f369e3a)
Previously, there was a gap between calling dsdb_update_bad_pwd_count()
and dsdb_module_modify() where no transaction was in effect. Another
process could slip in and modify badPwdCount, only for our update to
immediately overwrite it. Doing the update inside the transaction will
help for the following commit when we make it atomic.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit a65147a9e98ead70869cdfa20ffcc9c167dbf535)
The error code may be NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT, which we use in
preference to NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit d8a862cb811489abb67d4cf3a7fbd83d05c7e5cb)
These variables are not important to protect against a race with
and a double-read can easily be avoided by moving them up the file
a little.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit b5f78b7b895a6b92cfdc9221b18d67ab18bc2a24)
