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On a cluster we need to use the ctdb controlled database and not
a local secrets.tdb...
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15714
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Martin Schwenke <martin@meltin.net>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Sep 20 05:54:43 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
(cherry picked from commit f9ee4db2ba74e4f1f1b6d6f32082e5b0fe60f9b9)
This will allow doing tests and make sure using anonymous credentials
doesn't cause false positive results...
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15714
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Martin Schwenke <martin@meltin.net>
(cherry picked from commit ab3fc1595c0a2e0aa3719cc2fe4684e9a0a2f9d8)
When inherting permissions on the created stream, we call into the VFS to fetch
the streams security descriptor via inherit_access_posix_acl() ->
copy_access_posix_acl() -> SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_SET_FD() passing the stream fsp which
triggers the assert SMB_ASSERT(!fsp_is_alternate_stream(fsp)) in
vfswrap_sys_acl_set_fd() in vfs_default.
Just passing the base fsp to the VFS fixes this.
vfs_streams_depot which *does use* distinct backend filesystem files for the
streams, currently does not apply permissions to the stream files at all, so the
incomplete behaviour of vfs_streams_depot is not affected by this change.
If in the future someone want to fix this defficiency in vfs_streams_depot, the
module code can use fsp->stream_fsp to base decisions in VFS ops whether the
module should carry out some action.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15695
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Sep 2 08:55:28 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
(cherry picked from commit ecb8a99a2c7ba36f9adc50ef13cd8465a0c49b19)
Autobuild-User(v4-21-test): Jule Anger <janger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-21-test): Mon Sep 9 08:29:43 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15696
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Aug 13 22:29:28 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
(cherry picked from commit 4df1bfd07012dd3d2d2921281e6d6e309303b88d)
Autobuild-User(v4-21-test): Jule Anger <janger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-21-test): Tue Aug 20 09:04:48 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
This shows that all compound related requests should get
NT_STATUS_NETWORK_SESSION_EXPIRED.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15696
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit f6009aa73b9234df1e6ab689de322487ad1394ed)
In standalone setups we use the PAM stack to verify
the plaintext authentication, so we need to pass it
down...
There are still production systems out there
(legacy audio/video recording systems...)
using this.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9705
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Jul 17 11:17:54 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
Updating things like the bad pwd count should not clear the
stored LM HASH with 'lanman auth = no'.
This allows testing with 'lanman auth = no' and 'lanman auth = yes'.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9705
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This demonstrates that we currently have problems with
plaintext and lanman authentication. In both domain member
and standalone setups.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9705
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
We burn arguments to all unknown options containing "pass" (e.g.
"--passionate=false") in case they are a password option, but is bad
in the case where the unknown option takes no argument but the next
option *is* a password (like "--overpass --password2 barney". In that
case "--password2" would be burnt and not "barney".
The burning behaviour doesn't change with this commit, but users will now
see an error message explaining that the option was unknown. This is not
so much aimed at end users -- for who an invalid option will hopefully
lead to --help like output -- but to developers who add a new "pass"
option.
This also slightly speeds up the processing of known password options,
which is a little bit important because we are in a race to replace the
command line in /proc before an attacker sees it.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15674
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Douglas Bagnall <dbagnall@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Jul 10 06:28:08 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
This is the long form of -U in samba-tool.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
We have more secret arguments, like --client-password, --adminpass,
so we are going to use an allowlist for options containing 'pass', but
we don't want to burn the likes of --group=passionfruit.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15674
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
We weren't treating "--password secret" the same as "--password=secret",
which sometimes led to secrets not being redacted.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15674
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
We only turn desired into off in the NT4 domain member case.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15666
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Jun 19 10:17:28 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
This shows that they are ignored for machine accounts as domain member.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15666
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
If the configuration is reloaded strings and string lists
in recycle_config_data could become stale pointers
leading to segmentation faults...
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15659
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Martin Schwenke <martin@meltin.net>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Forcing a reload of the smb.conf option values means the pointer learned
in vfs_recycle_connect() become stale.
This will be reverted at the end of the patset again.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15659
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Martin Schwenke <martin@meltin.net>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
If a client for whatever reason calls FSCTL_SRV_COPYCHUNK[_WRITE] without
FSCTL_SRV_REQUEST_RESUME_KEY, we call vfswrap_offload_write_send
before vfswrap_offload_read_send.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15664
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jun 17 18:02:27 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
This patch also removes known fail for existing test
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15435
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jun 11 19:31:40 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
On master attempting to chdir into a nested dfs link
e.g. cd dfslink (works)
cd dfslink/another_dfslink (fails)
[1] Add a test for this scenario (nested chdir)
[2] Add test for enumerating a dfs link in root of dfs share
[3] Add a test to check case insensitive chdir into dfs link on widelink
enabled share
Add knownfails for tests 1 and 3
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15435
Remove knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15662
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jun 11 17:00:38 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
We do this by telling the Domain Functional Level upgrade code that
this is a new install.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This assures us that the new provision sets the value by default.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
If the client does not have permissions to update the record,
but the record already has the data the update tries to apply,
it's a no-op that should result in success instead of failing.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13019
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jun 6 03:18:16 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
This means we no longer generate strange errors/warnings
in the Windows event log nor in the nsupdate -g output.
Note: this is a only difference between gss-tsig and
the legacy gss.microsoft.com algorithms.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13019
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This demonstrates that access_denied is only generated if the client
really generates a change in the database.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13019
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Also test using the additional record in the answers section.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13019
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Failed DNS updates just echo the request flaged as response,
all other elements are unchanged.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13019
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jun 4 17:39:21 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
With the source3/ based clilist.c, we can't test all infolevels where
this matters (see callers of get_dirent_ea_size()). But porting the
source4 based all-infolevel search code into source3/libsmb or doing
this one the reparse point test in the source4 infrastructure to me
seems like a lot of effort for moderate gain.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Change levels tested from 1 - 3 to 1 - 4 for NETLOGON_CONTROL_SET_DBFLAG
This change triggers a core dump in the server and so we add a knownfail
here. Following commit will fix (and remove known fail)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15465
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
I have captures where a client tries smb3 encryption on an anonymous session,
we used to allow that before commit da7dcc443f45d07d9963df9daae458fbdd991a47
was released with samba-4.15.0rc1.
Testing against Windows Server 2022 revealed that anonymous signing is always
allowed (with the session key derived from 16 zero bytes) and
anonymous encryption is allowed after one authenticated session setup on
the tcp connection.
https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15412
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
These demonstrate how anonymous encryption and signing work.
They pass against Windows 2022 as ad dc.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15412
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>