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As a server only try the mechs the client proposed
and only call gensec_update() with the optimistic token
for the first mech in the list.
If the server doesn't support the first mech we pick the
first one in the clients list we also support.
That's how w2k8r2 works.
metze
Autobuild-User: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Tue Dec 14 16:50:50 CET 2010 on sn-devel-104
The practice of returning only NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER hasn't
helped our users to debug problems effectivly, and so we now return
more errors and try and give a more useful debug message when then
happen.
Andrew Bartlett
this converts all callers that use the Samba4 loadparm lp_ calling
convention to use the lpcfg_ prefix.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This allows for the rare case where the caller knows the target
principal. The check for lp_client_use_spnego_principal() is moved to
the spengo code to make this work.
Andrew Bartlett
There are still a few tidyups of old FSF addresses to come (in both s3
and s4). More commits soon.
(This used to be commit fcf38a38ac691abd0fa51b89dc951a08e89fdafa)
this happens because we send 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2 before 1.2.840.48018.1.2.2
in the negTokenInit. And w2k's spnego code redirects us to use 1.2.840.48018.1.2.2
and then we start the our spnego engine with 1.2.840.48018.1.2.2 and in the then following
negTokenTarg w2k don't send the supportedMech (which means it aggrees in what we've choosen)
metze
(This used to be commit 5af5488593991ab4a2a8e17d38501ad9ec539020)
Break up auth/auth.h not to include the world.
Add credentials_krb5.h with the kerberos dependent prototypes.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 2b569c42e0fbb596ea82484d0e1cb22e193037b9)
backend (if it chooses to implement it), or the GENSEC socket code.
This is to allow us to handle DIGEST-MD5 across to cyrus-sasl.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 0a098006b431f4aa48632a27ca08e9adca8d9609)
contexts from the application layer into the socket layer.
This improves a number of correctness aspects, as we now allow LDAP
packets to cross multiple SASL packets. It should also make it much
easier to write async LDAP tests from windows clients, as they use SASL
by default. It is also vital to allowing OpenLDAP clients to use GSSAPI
against Samba4, as it negotiates a rather small SASL buffer size.
This patch mirrors the earlier work done to move TLS into the socket
layer.
Unusual in this pstch is the extra read callback argument I take. As
SASL is a layer on top of a socket, it is entirely possible for the
SASL layer to drain a socket dry, but for the caller not to have read
all the decrypted data. This would leave the system without an event
to restart the read (as the socket is dry).
As such, I re-invoke the read handler from a timed callback, which
should trigger on the next running of the event loop. I believe that
the TLS code does require a similar callback.
In trying to understand why this is required, imagine a SASL-encrypted
LDAP packet in the following formation:
+-----------------+---------------------+
| SASL Packet #1 | SASL Packet #2 |
----------------------------------------+
| LDAP Packet #1 | LDAP Packet #2 |
----------------------------------------+
In the old code, this was illegal, but it is perfectly standard
SASL-encrypted LDAP. Without the callback, we would read and process
the first LDAP packet, and the SASL code would have read the second SASL
packet (to decrypt enough data for the LDAP packet), and no data would
remain on the socket.
Without data on the socket, read events stop. That is why I add timed
events, until the SASL buffer is drained.
Another approach would be to add a hack to the event system, to have it
pretend there remained data to read off the network (but that is ugly).
In improving the code, to handle more real-world cases, I've been able
to remove almost all the special-cases in the testnonblock code. The
only special case is that we must use a deterministic partial packet
when calling send, rather than a random length. (1 + n/2). This is
needed because of the way the SASL and TLS code works, and the 'resend
on failure' requirements.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 5d7c9c12cb2b39673172a357092b80cd814850b0)
This tries to ensure that when we are a client, we cope with mechs
(like GSSAPI) that only abort (unknown server) at first runtime.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit cb5d18c6190fa1809478aeb60e352cb93c4214f6)
From here we can add tests to Samba for kerberos, forcing it on and
off. In the process, I also remove the dependency of credentials on
GENSEC.
This also picks up on the idea of bringing 'set_boolean' into general
code from jpeach's cifsdd patch.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 1ac7976ea6e3ad6184c911de5df624c44e7c5228)
We still have Win2000 issues, but now we correctly handle the case
where NTLMSSP is chosen as an authentication mech, but the OID list
still contains Kerberos as a later option.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit dc2b2c33f89b84bd221c9009750a22ff42fc462d)
GENSEC mechansims. This will allow a machine join to an NT4 domain to
avoid even trying kerberos, or a sensitive operation to require it.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 11c7a89e523f85afd728d5e5f03bb084dc620244)
the client doesn't guess correctly on the mech to use. It must back
off and try the mech the server selected from the list.
I'm not particularly attached to our SPNEGO parser, so while I can't
easily use the SPNEGO application logic in Heimdal, I'm going to look
closely at using the asn1 routines to avoid some pain here.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 929217387449270b60c3f825dca3b3cae5a4f9d1)
Samba to use the target principal name supplied in the mechTokenMIC of
an SPNEGO negTokenInit.
This isn't a great idea for security reasons, but is how Samba3 behaves,
and allows kerberos to function more often in some environments. It is
only available for CIFS session setups, due to the ordering of the
exchange.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit f6a645644127ae695a9f7288e0a469f2eb7f3066)
data to be signed/sealed. We can use this to split the data from the
signature portion of the resultant wrapped packet.
This required merging the gsskrb5_wrap_size patch from
lorikeet-heimdal, and fixes AES encrption issues on DCE/RPC (we no
longer use a static 45 byte value).
This fixes one of the krb5 issues in my list.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit e4f2afc34362953f56a026b66ae1aea81e9db104)
