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We need to take the value from the msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes
attribute and only take the default if there's no value or
if the value is 0.
For krbtgt and DC accounts we need to force support for
ARCFOUR-HMAC-MD5 and AES encryption types and add the related bits
in addtition. (Note for krbtgt msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes is
completely ignored the hardcoded value is the default, so there's
no AES256-SK for krbtgt).
For UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY on the account we reset
the value to 0, these accounts are in fact disabled completely,
as they always result in KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP.
Then we try to get all encryption keys marked in
supported_enctypes, and the available_enctypes
is a reduced set depending on what keys are
actually stored in the database.
We select the supported session key enctypes by the available
keys and in addition based on AES256-SK as well as the
"kdc force enable rc4 weak session keys" option.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13135
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This tests work out the difference between
- msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes value or it's default
- software defined extra flags for DC accounts
- accounts with only an nt hash being stored
- the resulting value in the KRB5_PADATA_SUPPORTED_ETYPES announcement
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13135
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK is a flag introduced for by Microsoft in this
CVE to indicate that additionally, AES session keys are available. We
set the etypes available for session keys depending on the encryption
types that are supported by the principal.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15219
Pair-Programmed-With: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This shows that changes around RC4 encryption types do not break older
functional levels where only RC4 keys are available.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK is a flag introduced for by Microsoft in this CVE
to indicate that additionally, AES session keys are available.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Extend the RC4 Protected Users tests to use different preauth etypes.
This helps test the nuances of the new expected behaviour and allows the
tests to continue passing.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15231
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
The KDC should leave the choice of ticket encryption type up to the
target service, and admit no influence from the client.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
In which we make AS and TGS requests and verify the SIDs we expect are
returned in the PAC.
Example command to test against Windows Server 2019 functional level
2016 with FAST enabled:
ADMIN_USERNAME=Administrator ADMIN_PASSWORD=locDCpass1 \
CLAIMS_SUPPORT=1 COMPOUND_ID_SUPPORT=1 DC_SERVER=ADDC.EXAMPLE.COM \
DOMAIN=EXAMPLE EXPECT_PAC=1 FAST_SUPPORT=1 KRB5_CONFIG=krb5.conf \
PYTHONPATH=bin/python REALM=EXAMPLE.COM SERVER=ADDC.EXAMPLE.COM \
SKIP_INVALID=1 SMB_CONF_PATH=smb.conf STRICT_CHECKING=1 \
TKT_SIG_SUPPORT=1 python3 python/samba/tests/krb5/group_tests.py
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Nov 8 03:37:37 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
The error code may be NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT, which we use in
preference to NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Ensure that the bad password count is incremented atomically,
and that the successful logon accounting data is updated atomically.
Use bad password indicator (in a distinct TDB) to determine if to open a transaction
We open a transaction when we have seen the hint that this user
has recorded a bad password. This allows us to avoid always
needing one, while not missing a possible lockout.
We also go back and get a transation if we did not take out
one out but we chose to do a write (eg for lastLogonTimestamp)
Based on patches by Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Based on tests originally written by Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Sep 9 01:11:05 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
If TGTs can be used as kpasswd tickets, the two-minute lifetime of a
authentic kpasswd ticket may be bypassed. Furthermore, kpasswd tickets
are not supposed to be cached, but using this flaw, a stolen credentials
cache containing a TGT may be used to change that account's password,
and thus is made more valuable to an attacker.
Since all TGTs should be issued with a REQUESTER_SID PAC buffer, and
service tickets without it, we assert the absence of this buffer to
ensure we're not accepting a TGT.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15047
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15049
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
To ensure that, when decrypting the kpasswd ticket, we look up the
correct principal and don't trust the sname from the ticket, we should
pass the principal name of the kpasswd service into krb5_rd_req_ctx().
However, gensec_krb5_update_internal() will pass in NULL unless the
principal in our credentials is CRED_SPECIFIED.
At present, our principal will be considered obtained as CRED_SMB_CONF
(from the cli_credentials_set_conf() a few lines up), so we explicitly
set the realm again, but this time as CRED_SPECIFIED. Now the value of
server_in_keytab that we provide to smb_krb5_rd_req_decoded() will not
be NULL.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15074
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
We would only compare the first 'n' characters, where 'n' is the length
of the principal component string, so 'k@REALM' would erroneously be
considered equal to 'krbtgt@REALM'.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15047
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
We should not be able to use krb@REALM instead of krbtgt@REALM.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15047
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This matches the behaviour of Windows.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15047
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
The error_data we create already has an explicit length, and should not
be zero-terminated, so we omit the trailing null byte. Previously,
Heimdal builds would leave a superfluous trailing null byte on error
strings, while MIT builds would omit the final character.
The two bytes added to the string's length are for the prepended error
code.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15047
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15049
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15074
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
There is no need to specify the enctype and it isn't supported by MIT Kerberos
anyway.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Mar 25 21:54:11 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
We also move the authentication to after checking whether the user is
protected, so that if a user in the Protected Users group tries to
authenticate with a wrong password, the bag password count is not
incremented and the account is not locked out. This does not match
MS-APDS, but matches the behaviour of Windows.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Accounts in the Protected Users group acting as clients lack support for
the RC4 encryption type. TGTs issued to such accounts have a lifetime
restricted to four hours, and are unable to be proxied or forwarded.
To determine at lookup time whether a client account is a member of
Protected Users, we now also create an auth_user_info_dc structure when
creating the database entry for an AS-REQ, rather than only when
creating a PAC for a TGT, or when recreating the PAC from an RODC-issued
TGT.
This means that the user's groups are now expanded even for AS-REQs that
result in an error (such as a PREAUTH_REQUIRED error), but this is
required to be able to correctly determine the account's available
encryption types, which are needed soon after fetching the user account.
Currently, the TGT lifetime may exceed four hours (for Heimdal
specifically). This may happen if PKINIT is used, and either the
pkinit_max_life_from_cert_extension option is TRUE and
pkinit_max_life_bound is greater than four hours, or
pkinit_max_life_from_cert is greater than four hours.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Allow delegation to any target if we have delegations set up, but the target is
not specified.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Pair-Programmed-With: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This also addresses CVE-2020-17049.
MIT Kerberos 1.20 is in pre-release state at the time writing this commit. It
will be released in autumn 2022. We need to support MIT Kerberos 1.19 till
enough distributions have been released with MIT Kerberos 1.20.
Pair-Programmed-With: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
The Heimdal upgrade brings the new feature of FAST, allowing more tests to pass.
However it causes a regression in FL2003 for the returned salt format in
the AS-REP, but FL 2003 has not been the default since Samba 4.2 as AES
keys are much stronger and should be preferred.
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Padding this buffer to a multiple of 8 bytes allows the PAC buffer
padding to match Windows.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This flag should be ignored and the FAST armor key used instead.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Dec 7 04:54:35 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
Using a SPN should only be permitted if it is also a UPN, and is not an
enterprise principal.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
