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This simplifies the code for getting the credentials of the target
service.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The client_as_etypes parameter previously indicated which etypes we
thought the client supported. In practice, this was rarely specified, so
we simply assumed that all three main enctypes were supported.
Now that we have removed this parameter, rewrite the etype-info padata
checking code to be simpler, and no longer to contain loops.
Use get_default_enctypes() to determine which enctypes are supported.
For tests that inherit from KDCBaseTest, this is based on the domain
functional level, and will be more correct for tests that previously
passed in client_as_etypes=None.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
If the domain uses functional level 2003, calling get_tgt() would
request an AES256-encrypted ticket. The KDC would respond to that
request with incorrect etype-info, and were it not for many tests lying
(via client_as_etypes) about what etypes were supported, those tests
would fail pointlessly.
As this behaviour is not what get_tgt() is intended to test, we now only
request etypes that are actually supported.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
There's no need to get a connection to SamDB if we already have the
domain functional level.
connect_kdc() in lockout_tests.py is one place where we already have the
domain functional level, but deliberately drop our SamDB connection. If
we need to call get_default_enctypes(), that shouldn't cause us to try
to connect again.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
TicketDecryptionKey_from_creds() is a simpler way to create the key.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The 'etype' field in a Kerberos request is ordered. Make this fact
clearer by using a tuple or an array to represent etypes rather than a
set.
get_default_enctypes() now returns encryption types in order of
strength. As a consequence, the encryption type chosen by the MIT KDC
matches up with that chosen by Windows, and more tests begin to pass.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Levels NetlogonValidationSamInfo2 and NetlogonValidationSamInfo4 behave
as might be expected, so we pass those tests. NetlogonValidationSamInfo
returns no resource groups and doesn't set the NETLOGON_EXTRA_SIDS flag,
and we fail its test.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This lets us check the groups that are returned.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We'll want to test various levels to ensure they all behave as expected.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We'll want to make use of it in the group tests.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Primary groups are handled differently from normal groups of which a
user is simply a member. Of particular note is the case where a
domain-local group is made a primary group; a case normally disallowed
by Windows, but not by Samba. Therefore we want tests for it.
Our testing framework must be able to set the user's primary group, and
to clean up afterwards; to set the primary group RID of a PAC; and to
check that the primary group RID is as expected in the PAC returned to
us.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The combination MANDATORY | ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT | ENABLED is very
commonly used, and introducing a shorter alias for it makes the code
clearer.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This lets us test what happens in TGS-REQ exchanges to the KDC, when the
flags and resource groups are simply passed through into the new PAC,
regardless of what value the flags hold.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This lets us test what happens when the flags in the PAC, such as
NETLOGON_RESOURCE_GROUPS, are given "interesting" values.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Crucially, in these tests the user's domain and its SID are different
from our domain and its SID. These tests will assert that in such a case
resource groups are added to the PAC and handled correctly.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This lets us simulate a ticket of a user from another domain.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Change some of the attributes in TGS-REQ PACs to ensure they are handled
correctly.
Add a test of a PAC containing resource SIDs for a service without
resource SID compression support, ensuring the SIDs are correctly
removed.
Add a Samba 4.17 compatibility test for a service with resource SID
compression support.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
As part of mitigations of CVE-2022-37966, we no longer regard the
msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes attribute of the KDC when determining its
supported encryption types. Thus, these tests that try to disable SID
compression support by setting this attribute run to no purpose.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
If SID compression support is disabled for a created account,
msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes will be set to a value that includes the
RESOURCE_SID_COMPRESSION_DISABLED bit, but no actual encryption type
bits. Since stricter encryption type handling was introduced to address
CVE-2022-37966, this combination has been interpreted as an expression
of no encryption type support, and trying to make a Kerberos request to
a service with such a combination of bits will fail with
ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP.
To allow us to make Kerberos requests to test service accounts again, we
must set some actual encryption type bits.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We can now remove our existing decompression implementation in Python.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jan 10 21:18:01 UTC 2023 on sn-devel-184
This allows the tests to be executed without an explicit
PYTHONPATH="bin/python".
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Dec 13 14:06:14 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
In order to allow better upgrades we need the default value for smb.conf to the
same even if the effective default value of the software changes in future.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This tests work out the difference between
- msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes value or it's default
- software defined extra flags for DC accounts
- accounts with only an nt hash being stored
- the resulting value in the KRB5_PADATA_SUPPORTED_ETYPES announcement
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13135
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This will allow us to create tests accounts with only an nt4 hash
stored, without any aes keys.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This shows that changes around RC4 encryption types do not break older
functional levels where only RC4 keys are available.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK is a flag introduced for by Microsoft in this CVE
to indicate that additionally, AES session keys are available.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Extend the RC4 Protected Users tests to use different preauth etypes.
This helps test the nuances of the new expected behaviour and allows the
tests to continue passing.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15231
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
The KDC should leave the choice of ticket encryption type up to the
target service, and admit no influence from the client.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This lets us select the encryption types we claim to support in the
request body.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We will use it for testing our handling of encryption types.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This makes it easier to test against a server that is not accessible via DNS.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
In which we make AS and TGS requests and verify the SIDs we expect are
returned in the PAC.
Example command to test against Windows Server 2019 functional level
2016 with FAST enabled:
ADMIN_USERNAME=Administrator ADMIN_PASSWORD=locDCpass1 \
CLAIMS_SUPPORT=1 COMPOUND_ID_SUPPORT=1 DC_SERVER=ADDC.EXAMPLE.COM \
DOMAIN=EXAMPLE EXPECT_PAC=1 FAST_SUPPORT=1 KRB5_CONFIG=krb5.conf \
PYTHONPATH=bin/python REALM=EXAMPLE.COM SERVER=ADDC.EXAMPLE.COM \
SKIP_INVALID=1 SMB_CONF_PATH=smb.conf STRICT_CHECKING=1 \
TKT_SIG_SUPPORT=1 python3 python/samba/tests/krb5/group_tests.py
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Nov 8 03:37:37 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
We can now verify attributes of SIDs and the PAC locations in which SIDs
are placed. We also gain the ability to assert that no SIDs are present
in the PAC other than the ones we expect.
We lighten somewhat the requirement that no duplicates are present among
the SIDs, as such a situation may arise even with Windows, especially if
group types are changed. For example, if a Universal group containing a
user is changed to a Domain-Local group in between an AS-REQ and a
TGS-REQ, the group's SID will be added to the PAC once for each request.
We only verify that there are no exact duplicates (SID, attributes, and
PAC location all being identical).
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
As well as passing in a single 'str', we can now choose to pass a
collection of member DN strings.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This will be useful for testing the handling of Domain-Local groups.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
It's not an encryption type bit, so we should ignore it here.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This demonstrates the behaviour of Windows 11 22H2 over Kerberos,
which changed to use a year 9999 date for a forever timetime in
tickets.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15197
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Oct 20 05:00:23 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
Windows 11 22H2 performs such requests, with year 9999.
The test fails with KDC_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY on older
Heimdal versions, which are unable to verify a checksum
over the modified request body (due to a re-encoding failure).
REF: https://github.com/heimdal/heimdal/issues/1011
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15197
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
