IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO GET AN ACCOUNT, please write an
email to Administrator. User accounts are meant only to access repo
and report issues and/or generate pull requests.
This is a purpose-specific Git hosting for
BaseALT
projects. Thank you for your understanding!
Только зарегистрированные пользователи имеют доступ к сервису!
Для получения аккаунта, обратитесь к администратору.
Pair-Programmed-With: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Only put session_info to the session->global context if we use it.
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Don't enforce it but only announce ENCRYPT_DATA, using the
encryption_desired flag in session setup.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11372
Signed-off-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Nonce code was terminating connections where xconn->smb2.server.cipher == 0.
If no negotiated cipher (smb2.server.cipher is zero) set nonce_high_max to zero.
smb2_get_new_nonce() returns NT_STATUS_ENCRYPTION_FAILED if it is ever called with
session->nonce_high_max == 0.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11300
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reuse of nonces with AES-CCM and AES-GCM leads to catastrophic failure,
so make sure the server drops the connection if that ever happens.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11300
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri May 29 22:38:50 CEST 2015 on sn-devel-104
This protects the full connection setup including
a posteriori verification of the negotiate messages,
by signing the final session setup response with a signing key
derived from the preauth hash and the authentication session key.
Pair-Programmed-With: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
The cleanup of a failing session setup is now handled in
smbd_smb2_session_setup_wrap_*().
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11182
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
The wrapper calls smbXsrv_session_shutdown_send/recv() in case of an error,
this makes sure a failing reauth shuts down the session like an explicit logoff.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11182
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Even though the MS-SMB2 spec says so, Windows doesn't behave
like this.
This reverts commit 1cea6e5b6f.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: "Stefan (metze) Metzmacher" <metze@samba.org>
Bug 11103: - Samba does not set the required flags in the SMB2/SMB3 Negotiate Protocol Response when signing required by client
https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11103
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
If signing is not required we should not require it for reauthentication.
Windows clients would otherwise fail to reauthenticate.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10958
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
SMB 3.10 and later won't have SMB2_CAP_ENCRYPTION anymore.
xconn->smb2.server.cipher == 0 is the indication that we don't support encryption on the connection.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
For the continuation of a SMB2 SessionSetup we already have the
smb2req->session (with NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED).
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Sep 8 09:52:23 CEST 2014 on sn-devel-104
This is the time of the last reauth.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
We should use stuff relative to the current request.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
We need to use the connection that is used by the current request.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
This prepares the structures for multi-channel support.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10344
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
When a session is invalidated then we must also ensure it isn't used in
any pending requests being processed.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10208
Authentication error in smb2 session reauth invalidates
the session. In this case the session must in contrast
to successful session setup requests be torn down and live
no longer than the request.
The talloc move of the session from the global session
table to the request ensures that the session setup
reply can still be correctly signed, but subsequent
requests on the connection don't find a session any more.
Pair-Programmed-With: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
retrieve the server connection from the smbXsrv_session argument instead.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
This reverts commit dfd3c31a3f.
As Metze pointed out:
From MS-SMB2 section 2.2.4:
SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_ENABLED
When set, indicates that security signatures are enabled
on the server. The server MUST set this bit, and the client MUST return
STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE if the flag is missing.
I'll submit a documentation bug to fix#9222 that way.
Still sign if client request is signed, just don't negotiate it in
negprot or sessionsetup.
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Oct 3 00:59:42 CEST 2012 on sn-devel-104
Ensure we know after the destructor fires we're never going to
look at this again.
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Sep 12 03:00:21 CEST 2012 on sn-devel-104
Only sconn->smb1.sessions.next_vuid remains as uint16_t,
so that we do not generate larger values yet.
metze
Autobuild-User: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Wed Jun 6 12:07:33 CEST 2012 on sn-devel-104
This just adds smbd_smb2_session_setup_send/recv as wrapper to
the sync smbd_smb2_session_setup function.
This will allow us to change to top level code to work async,
then we can have a 2nd step where we remove the sync
smbd_smb2_session_setup function.
metze
This will help later if we have to handle a SMB2TreeDisconnect different
compared to a SMB2SessionLogoff and a TCPDisconnect.
metze
Autobuild-User: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Thu Mar 15 21:56:09 CET 2012 on sn-devel-104
This is possible because the s3 gensec modules are started as
normal gensec modules, so we do not need a wrapper any more.
Andrew Bartlett
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This makes the long term owner of this memory more clear. So far only the
clear cases have been moved from NULL however.
Andrew Bartlett
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This function handles more than NTLMSSP now, at least when we are an AD DC
and so changing the name may avoid some confusion in the future.
Andrew Bartlett
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
not only if the session should be signed
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Wed Sep 21 11:00:09 CEST 2011 on sn-devel-104
This avoids having the same check in 3 different parts of the code
Andrew Bartlett
Autobuild-User: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Wed Aug 3 12:45:04 CEST 2011 on sn-devel-104
There is no longer any theft of memory as the underlying routines now
produce a new auth_session_info for this caller, allocating it
on the supplied memory context.
Andrew Bartlett
This tests if the auth_generic_start() hook is available on the auth
context during the negprot, and if so it uses auth_generic_start() to
hook to GENSEC to handle the full SPNEGO blob.
Andrew Bartlett
Signed-off-by: Andrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org>
Rather than passing this value around the callers, and eventually
setting it in register_existing_vuid(), we simply pass it to
create_local_token(). This also removes the need for
auth_ntlmssp_get_username().
Andrew Bartlett
Signed-off-by: Andrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org>
This helps map on to the GENSEC semantics better, and ensures that the
full set of desired features are set before the mechanism starts.
Andrew Bartlett
Signed-off-by: Andrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org>
This is changed so that the callers ask for the additional flags
that they need, starting with no additional flags.
This helps to create a proper abstraction layer in
ntlmssp_wrap/auth_ntlmssp.
Andrew Bartlett
Signed-off-by: Andrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org>
This means we no longer need two different map to guest functions
and have consistent logic with fewer layering violations.
Andrew Bartlett
Signed-off-by: Andrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org>
Instead, we base our guest calculations on the presence or absense of the
authenticated users group in the token, ensuring that we have only
one canonical source of this important piece of authorization data
Andrew Bartlett
Signed-off-by: Andrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org>
