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Windows doesn't have any CA data set on the certificate.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Nov 17 19:52:33 CET 2015 on sn-devel-104
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Nov 6 13:43:45 CET 2015 on sn-devel-104
This way we avoid quoting problems in user's DNs
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Sep 1 23:49:14 CEST 2015 on sn-devel-104
This patch fixes an issue where NetApp filers joined to a
Samba/ADDC cannot resolve SIDs. Without this patch the issue
can only be avoided by setting "allow nt4 crypto = yes" in smb.conf.
The issue is triggered by NetApp filers in three steps:
1. The client calls netr_ServerReqChallenge to set up challenge tokens
2. Next it calls netr_ServerAuthenticate2 with NETLOGON_NEG_STRONG_KEYS
set to 0. Native AD and Samba respond to this with
NT_STATUS_DOWNGRADE_DETECTED. At this point Samba throws away
the challenge token negotiated in the first step.
3. Next the client calls netr_ServerAuthenticate2 again, this time with
NETLOGON_NEG_STRONG_KEYS set to 1.
Samba returns NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED as it has lost track
of the challenge and denies logon with the message
No challenge requested by client [CLNT1/CLNT1$], cannot authenticate
Git commit 321ebc99b5 introduced
a workaround for a different but related issue. This patch makes a minor
adjustment to that commit to delay flushing the cached challenge until
it's clear that we are not in a NT_STATUS_DOWNGRADE_DETECTED
situation.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11291
Signed-off-by: Arvid Requate <requate@univention.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Aug 6 20:29:04 CEST 2015 on sn-devel-104
This should only work on a forest root domain controller and a forest function
level >= 2003.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This collects the whole information about the local forest,
including all domains and defined top level names (uPNSuffixes and
msDS-SPNSuffixes).
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We redirect this to remote DC as netr_GetForestTrustInformation() via an IRPC
call to winbindd.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We pass NETLOGON_CONTROL_{REDISCOVER,TC_QUERY,TC_VERIFY,CHANGE_PASSWORD} to
winbindd and do the hard work there, while we answer NETLOGON_CONTROL_QUERY
directly.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This means we return mostly the same error codes as a Windows
and also normalize the given information before storing.
Storing is now done within a transaction in order to avoid races
and inconsistent values.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We need to make sure a trusted domain has 'flatName', 'trustPartner'
and 'securityIdentifier' values, which are unique.
Otherwise other code will get INTERNAL_DB_CORRUPTION errors.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
It needs to pass 'name' as 'netbios_name' and also 'dns_name'.
flatName and trustPartner have the same value for downlevel trusts.
And both are required.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We just need to call dcesrv_netr_ServerGetTrustInfo() and ignore trust_info.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
For domain trusts we need to extract NL_PASSWORD_VERSION from the password
buffer.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
For trust account we need to store version number provided by the client.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is simplified by using DCERPC_AUTH_PAD_LENGTH() and changes the behaviour
so that we will use no padding if the stub_length is already aligned
to DCERPC_AUTH_PAD_ALIGNMENT (16 bytes).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11061
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Don't send plaintext on the wire because of an internal error...
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11061
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The sig_size could differ depending on the aligment/padding.
So should use the same alignment as we use for the payload.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This matches other forwarded calls
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Fixes bug:
https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11236
Based on code from Julien Kerihuel <j.kerihuel@openchange.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Apr 25 02:43:22 CEST 2015 on sn-devel-104
leaked_storage: Variable pk going out of scope leaks the storage it points to.
On failure get_pk_from_raw_keypair_params function should free up
the private key (pk) it allocates internally.
Signed-off-by: Rajesh Joseph <rjoseph@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ira Cooper <ira@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Apr 2 19:38:22 CEST 2015 on sn-devel-104
The number of current and previous elements need to match and we have to
fill TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NONE if needed.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
We now check the requested access mask in OpenPolicy*()
and return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED if the request is not granted.
E.g. validating a domain trust via the Windows gui requires this
in order prompt the user for the credentials. Otherwise
we fail any other call with ACCESS_DENIED later and the
gui just displays a strange error message.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
We still grant all access in the access_mask, but we don't check the
mask at all yet...
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
'default' is already handled in an earlier switch statement,
so this won't be reached but avoids a warning.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
This avoids bad decrypts from falling down to later code and getting
the error code wrong, by strictly requiring the NDR parse to use all the
data. A bad decyrpt is very unlikely to get the length correct, and
so fall down to the other checks.
This should fix:
UNEXPECTED(failure): samba4.rpc.backupkey with seal.backupkey.server_wrap_decrypt_wrong_r2(ad_dc_ntvfs)
REASON: Exception: Exception: ../source4/torture/rpc/backupkey.c:1926: r.out.result was WERR_INVALID_ACCESS, expected WERR_INVALID_PARAM: decrypt should fail with WERR_INVALID_PARAM
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11174
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan (metze) Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
The gcrypt link will be disabled if gnutls is > 3.0.0
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11135
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
