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We use secrets_{prepare,failed,defer,finish}_password_change() to make
the process more robust.
Even if we just just verified the current password with the DC
it can still happen that the remote password change will fail.
If a server has the RefusePasswordChange=1 under
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\Parameters,
it will reject NetrServerPasswordSet2() with NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD.
This results in a successful local change, but a failing remote change,
which means the domain membership is broken (as we don't fallback to
the previous password for ntlmssp nor kerberos yet).
An (at least Samba) RODC will also reject a password change,
see https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12773.
Even with this change we still have open problems, e.g. if the password was
changed, but we didn't get the servers response. In order to fix that we need
to use only netlogon and lsa over unprotected transports, just using schannel
authentication (which supports the fallback to the old password).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12782
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 40c42af11f)
Even in the case where only the password is known to the server, we should
try to leave a valid authentication behind.
We have better ways to indentify which password worked than only using
the current one.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12782
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit d60404b032)
This way the caller can pass more than 2 hashes and can only
know which hash was used for a successful connection.
We allow up to 4 hashes (next, current, old, older).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12782
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit ddd7ac68cc)
We should notice problems as early as possible, it makes no
sense to keep things working for a while and later find out
the we lost our trust relationship with our domain.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12262
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit a287754168)
Instead of having every 2nd byte as '\0' in the utf16 password,
because the utf8 form is based on an ascii subset, we convert
the random buffer from CH_UTF16MUNGED to CH_UTF8.
This way we have a random but valid utf8 string,
which is almost like what Windows is doing.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
We should maintain current and previous passwords on both sides of the trust,
which mean we need to pass our view of the new version to the remote DC.
This avoid problems with replication delays and make sure the kvno
for cross-realm tickets is in sync.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Using pdb_get_trust_credentials() works for all kind of trusts
and gives us much more details regarding the credentials.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
SEC_CHAN_DNS_DOMAIN trusts use longer passwords, Windows uses 240 UTF16 bytes.
Some trustAttribute flags may also make impact on the length on Windows,
but we could be better if we know that the remote domain is an AD domain.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
If this fails we can still fallback to the old password...
Before trying the password change we verify the dc knows our current password.
This should make the password changes much more robust.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
secrets_fetch_machine_password() sets pwd to point to memdup()'d (and thus
malloc()'d) memory. This memory should be freed before we go out of scope.
Change-Id: I07e575819c309fa5b85627dce2eb969bc720ce4e
Coverity-Id: 1168001
Reviewed-by: Ira Cooper <ira@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Jose A. Rivera <jarrpa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Feb 22 00:58:23 CET 2014 on sn-devel-104
This protects the password change using a domain specific g_lock,
so multiple parts 'net rpc', 'rpcclient', 'winbindd', 'wbinfo --change-secret'
even on multiple cluster nodes doesn't race anymore.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
There is no reason this can't be a normal constant string in the
loadparm system, now that we have lp_set_cmdline() to handle overrides
correctly.
Andrew Bartlett
This matches the structure that new code is being written to,
and removes one more of the old-style named structures, and
the need to know that is is just an alias for struct dom_sid.
Andrew Bartlett
Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
smbd just crashed on me: In a debug message I called a routine preparing a
string that itself used debug_ctx. The outer routine also used it after the
inner routine had returned. It was still referencing the talloc context
that the outer debug_ctx() had given us, which the inner DEBUG had already
freed.
This commit is mostly to cope with the removal of SamOemHash (replaced
by arcfour_crypt()) and other collisions (such as changed function
arguments compared to Samba3).
We still provide creds_hash3 until Samba3 uses the credentials code in
netlogon server
Andrew Bartlett
