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- NTLM2 support in the server
- KEY_EXCH support in the server
- variable length session keys.
In detail:
- NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing
domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade).
* This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' *
(This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may
well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password
changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of
NTLM2 on RPC pipes.)
This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we
must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm
being changed. This also needs to be turned off for
'security=server', which does not support this.
- KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key
actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being
the shared-secret directly or indirectly.
- As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem
needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the
backend.
- There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation.
- The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii.
Don't make an ascii version ever.
- The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We
have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded
to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes
long, when the krb5 login uses DES.
* This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. *
- Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of
misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This
should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues.
- Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when
passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate)
REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures...
the schannel code, but I've included that anyway. :-)
This patch revives the client-side NTLMSSP support for RPC named pipes
in Samba, and cleans up the client and server schannel code. The use of the
new code is enabled by the 'sign', 'seal' and 'schannel' commands in
rpcclient.
The aim was to prove that our separate NTLMSSP client library actually
implements NTLMSSP signing and sealing as per Microsoft's NTLMv1 implementation,
in the hope that knowing this will assist us in correctly implementing
NTLMSSP signing for SMB packets. (Still not yet functional)
This patch replaces the NTLMSSP implementation in rpc_client/cli_pipe.c with
calls to libsmb/ntlmssp.c. In the process, we have gained the ability to
use the more secure NT password, and the ability to sign-only, instead of
having to seal the pipe connection. (Previously we were limited to sealing,
and could only use the LM-password derived key).
Our new client-side NTLMSSP code also needed alteration to cope with our
comparatively simple server-side implementation. A future step is to replace
it with calls to the same NTLMSSP library.
Also included in this patch is the schannel 'sign only' patch I submitted to
the team earlier. While not enabled (and not functional, at this stage) the
work in this patch makes the code paths *much* easier to follow. I have also
included similar hooks in rpccleint to allow the use of schannel on *any* pipe.
rpcclient now defaults to not using schannel (or any other extra per-pipe
authenticiation) for any connection. The 'schannel' command enables schannel
for all pipes until disabled.
This code is also much more secure than the previous code, as changes to our
cli_pipe routines ensure that the authentication footer cannot be removed
by an attacker, and more error states are correctly handled.
(The same needs to be done to our server)
Andrew Bartlett
A much better SMB signing module, that allows for mulitple signing algorithms
and correctly backs down from signing when the server cannot sign the reply.
This also attempts to enable SMB signing on NTLMSSP connections, but I don't
know what NTLMSSP flags to set yet.
This would allow 'client use signing' to be set by default, for server
compatability. (A seperate option value should be provided for mandetory
signing, which would not back down).
Andrew Bartlett
- new kerberos code, allowing the account to change it's own password
without special SD settings required
- NTLMSSP client code, now seperated from cliconnect.c
- NTLMv2 client code
- SMB signing fixes
Andrew Bartlett
- NTLMSSP over SPENGO (sesssion-setup-and-x) cleanup and code refactor.
- also consequential changes to the NTLMSSP and SPNEGO parsing functions
- and the client code that uses the same functions
- Add ntlm_auth, a NTLMSSP authentication interface for use by applications
like Squid and Apache.
- also consquential changes to use common code for base64 encode/decode.
- Winbind changes to support ntlm_auth (I don't want this program to need
to read smb.conf, instead getting all it's details over the pipe).
- nmbd changes for fstrcat() instead of fstrcpy().
Andrew Bartlett
This tries to extract our server-side code out of sessetup.c, and into a more
general lib. I hope this is only a temporay resting place - I indend to
refactor it again into an auth-subsystem independent lib, using callbacks.
Move some of our our NTLMSSP #defines into a new file, and add two that I found
in the COMsource docs - we seem to have a double-up, but I've verified from
traces that the NTLMSSP_TARGET_TYPE_{DOMAIN,SERVER} is real.
This code also copes with ASCII clients - not that we will ever see any here,
but I hope to use this for HTTP, were we can get them. Win2k authenticates
fine under forced ASCII, btw.
Tested with Win2k, NTLMv2 and Samba's smbclient.
Andrew Bartlett
