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with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct.
Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over
all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in
gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab.
I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce
the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to
track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE
support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for
merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but
I've started to address some of that).
This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current
heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification.
On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by
checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these
right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and
torture test validate this behaviour.
One thing doesn't work with this patch:
- the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems
broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break
apart the gss_wrap interface.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit a3aba57c00)
that the logon_time field in the pac must match the authtime field in the ticket we
gave the client in the AS-REP (and thus also the authtime field in the ticket we get
back in the TGS-REQ).
Many thanks to Andrew Bartlett for his patience in showing me the
basic ropes of all this code! This was a joint effort.
(This used to be commit 7bee374b3f)
If we ever get problems with the kerberos code, it should show up as a
different signature in this PAC.
This involved returning more data from the pac functions, so changed
some callers and split up some functions.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit d514a74912)
now push/pull a sample PAC, and still have the same byte buffer.
(Metze set up the string code, and probably already has a similar
patch).
Unfortunetly win2k3 still doesn't like what we provide, but every step helps.
Also use data_blob_const() when we are just wrapping data for API
reasons.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit e7c8076fc1)
(I have included the krbtgt key from my test network).
It turns out the krbtgt signature is over the 16 (or whatever,
enc-type dependent) bytes of the signature, not the entire structure.
Also do not even try to use Kerberos or GSSAPI on an IP address, it
will only fail.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 3b9558e82f)
LOGON_INFO
LOGON_NAME
SRV_CHECKSUM
KDC_CHECKSUM
- w2k3 also don't use the groupmembership array with rids
it uses the othersids array
metze
(This used to be commit 2286fad27d)
- move to handmodified pull/push code for PAC_BUFFER
to get the _ndr_size field and the subcontext size right
- after looking closely to the sample w2k3 PAC in our torture test (and some more in my archive)
I found out that the first uint32 before the netr_SamInfo3 was also a pointer,
(and we passed a NULL pointer there before, so I think that was the reason why the windows clients doesn't want our PAC)
w2k3 uses this for unique pointers:
ptr = ndr->ptr_count * 4;
ptr |= 0x00020000;
ndr->ptr_count;
- do one more pull/push round with the sample PAC
metze
(This used to be commit 0eee179415)
much closer.
This changes PIDL to allow a subcontext to have a pad8 flag, saying to
pad behind to an 8 byte boundary. This is the only way I can explain
the 4 trainling zeros in the signature struct.
Far more importantly, the PAC code is now under self-test, both in
creating/parsing our own PAC, but also a PAC from my win2k3 server.
This required changing auth_anonymous, because I wanted to reuse the
anonymous 'server_info' generation code.
I'm still having trouble with PIDL, particulary as surrounds value(),
but I'll follow up on the list.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 50a54bf4e9)
We now generate the PAC, and can verifiy both our own PAC and the PAC
from Win2k3.
This commit adds the PAC generation code, spits out the code to get
the information we need from the NETLOGON server back into a auth/
helper function, and adds a number of glue functions.
In the process of building the PAC generation code, some hints in the
Microsoft PAC specification shed light on other parts of the code, and
the updates to samr.idl and netlogon.idl come from those hints.
Also in this commit:
The Heimdal build package has been split up, so as to only link the
KDC with smbd, not the client utils.
To enable the PAC to be veified with gensec_krb5 (which isn't quite
dead yet), the keyblock has been passed back to the calling layer.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit e2015671c2)
the 'PAC', required for interopability with Active Directory.
This is still a cludge, as it doesn't handle different encryption
types, but that should be fairly easy to fix (needs PIDL/IDL changes).
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 690cfc44ce)
keys appear at the end of the PAC, which I feel is deliberate (it
makes this much easier).
I still can't make it work, but I'm sure we are closer.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 6f0e1c80ae)
'mock GSSAPI'.
Many thanks to Luke Howard for the work he has done on Heimdal for
XAD, to provide the right API hooks in GSSAPI.
Next step is to verify the signatures, and to build the PAC for the
KDC end.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 2e82743c98)
