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This is because commit f893cf85cc
changed the security token in secuirty.idl, and bumping the version
was missed.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
In the next commit, we shall replace the 'authenticated' field of
named_pipe_auth_req_info.info5.session_info.session_info.info with a
more general 'user_flags' field.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This will serve as a check to make sure that in particular a SAMR
client is really root. This is for example used in get_user_info_18()
handing out a machine password.
The unix domain sockets for NCACN_NP can only be contacted by root,
the "np\" subdirectory for those sockets is root/root 0700.
Connecting to such a socket is done in two situations: First, local
real root processes connecting and smbd on behalf of SMB clients
connecting to \\pipe\name, smbd does become_root() there. Via the
named_pipe_auth_req_info4 smbd hands over the SMB session information
that the RPC server blindly trusts. The session information (i.e. the
NT token) is heavily influenced by external sources like the KDC. It
is highly unlikely that we get a system token via SMB, but who knows,
this is information not fully controlled by smbd.
This is where this additional field in named_pipe_auth_req_info5 makes
a difference: This field is set to NCACN_NP by smbd's code, not
directly controlled by the clients. Other clients directly connecting
to a socket in "np\" is root anyway (only smbd can do become_root())
and can set this field to NCALRPC.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Once RPC services are done by individual processes, we need to avoid
recursion between processes:
Any RPC server process will be able to serve multiple client requests
simultaneously, but each request is served in a single-threaded
blocking manner.
For example the netlogon RPC service needs to ask samr for
something. The netlogon->samr connection will initially be handled by
a central dispatcher assigning clients to processes. This dispatcher
needs to know that this connection can't end up in the same process
that originated the request.
With this flag an RPC client can request a samr server process that
exclusively serves its own requests and that will not serve anybody
else while serving netlogon.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Callers might want the full picture. We need to make
named_pipe_auth_req_info4 public for that.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
While these names may have been clear, much of Samba uses
remote_address and local_address, and this difference has hidden bugs.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Pair-Programmed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
This changes the structure being used to convey the current user state
from the netlogon-derived 'netr_SamInfo3' structure to a purpose-built
structure that matches the internals of the Samba auth subsystem and
contains the final group list, as well as the final privilege set and
session key.
These previously had to be re-created on the server side of the pipe
each time.
Andrew Bartlett
Signed-off-by: Andrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org>