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there is SYS_utimes syscall defined at compile time in glibc-kernheaders but
it is available on 2.6 kernels only. Therefore, we can't rely on syscall at
compile time but have to check that behaviour during program execution. An easy
workaround is to have replacement for utimes() implemented within our wrapper and
do not rely on syscall at all. Thus, if REPLACE_UTIME is defined already (by packager),
skip these syscall shortcuts.
(This used to be commit e278e2e6e0)
This protocol looks rather like SMTP headers/LDAP:
NT-Domain: TESTWG
Username: abartlet
...
Password: foo
Challenge-response passwords are in hexideciaml, while any 'plain'
string can be base64 encoded when like this:
Password:: Zm9vCg==
(the :: indicates it, just like LDAP - I hope)
The protocol is not final, so it is #ifdef DEVELOPER for now (so
nobody starts to rely on it until I'm happy), but we may as well get
this into subversion.
My intention is to use this to power the next version of my
PPP/ntlm_auth plugin, and hopefully entice a FreeRadius plugin out of
the woods.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 8efdd957ba)
the main ntlm_auth program.
It quite possibly should belong in smbtorture, but relies on the
winbind client for now.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 6e1b7a8848)
this variable to 'user_session_key', where possible. The command line
parameter is currently unchanged).
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit da4177209d)
all authentication to members of this particular group.
Also implement an option to allow ntlm_auth to get 'squashed' error codes,
which are safer to communicate to remote network clients.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit eb1c1b5eb0)
For a (very) long time, we have had a bug in Samba were an NTLMv2-only
PDC would fail, because it converted the password into NTLM format for
checking.
This patch performs the direct comparison required for interactive
logons to function in this situation. It also removes the 'auth flags', which
simply where not ever used.
Natrually, this plays with the size of structures, so rebuild, rebuild
rebuild...
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 9598593bcf)
Winbind tickets expired. We now check the expiration time, and acquire
new tickets. We couln't rely on renewing them, because if we didn't get
a request before they expired, we wouldn't have renewed them. Also, there
is a one-week limit in MS on renewal life, so new tickets would have been
needed after a week anyway. Default is 10 hours, so we should only be
acquiring them that often, unless the configuration on the DC is changed (and
the minimum is 1 hour).
(This used to be commit c2436c433a)
boolean parameter that allows broken iconv conversions to work. Gets rid of the
nasty errno checks in mangle_hash2 and check_path_syntax and allows correct
return code checking.
Jeremy.
(This used to be commit 7b96765c23)
domains, this patch ensures that we always use the ADS backend when
security=ADS, and the remote server is capable.
The routines used for this behaviour have been upgraded to modern Samba
codeing standards.
This is a change in behaviour for mixed mode domains, and if the trusted
domain cannot be reached with our current krb5.conf file, we will show
that domain as disconnected.
This is in line with existing behaviour for native mode domains, and for
our primary domain.
As a consequence of testing this patch, I found that our kerberos error
handling was well below par - we would often throw away useful error
values. These changes move more routines to ADS_STATUS to return
kerberos errors.
Also found when valgrinding the setup, fix a few memory leaks.
While sniffing the resultant connections, I noticed we would query our
list of trusted domains twice - so I have reworked some of the code to
avoid that.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 7c34de8096)
Instead of returning a name in DOMAIN\user format, we now return it in the
same way that nsswtich does - following the rules of 'winbind use default
domain', in the correct case and with the correct seperator.
This should help sites who are using Squid or the new SASL code I'm working
on, to match back to their unix usernames.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 7a3a5a6361)
subsystem into a seperate file - ntlm_check.c.
This allows us to call these routines from ntlm_auth. The purpose of this
exercise is to allow ntlm_auth (when operating as an NTLMSSP server) to
avoid talking to winbind. This should allow for easier debugging.
ntlm_auth itself has been reorgainised, so as to share more code between
the SPNEGO-wrapped and 'raw' NTLMSSP modes. A new 'client' NTLMSSP mode
has been added, for use with a Cyrus-SASL module I am writing (based on vl's
work)
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 48315e8fd2)
The next move will be to remove our password checking code from the SAM
authentication backend, and into a file where other parts of samba can use
it.
The ntlm_auth changes provide for better use of common code.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 2375abfa00)
- NTLM2 support in the server
- KEY_EXCH support in the server
- variable length session keys.
In detail:
- NTLM2 is an extension of NTLMv1, that is compatible with existing
domain controllers (unlike NTLMv2, which requires a DC upgrade).
* This is known as 'NTLMv2 session security' *
(This is not yet implemented on the RPC pipes however, so there may
well still be issues for PDC setups, particuarly around password
changes. We do not fully understand the sign/seal implications of
NTLM2 on RPC pipes.)
This requires modifications to our authentication subsystem, as we
must handle the 'challege' input into the challenge-response algorithm
being changed. This also needs to be turned off for
'security=server', which does not support this.
- KEY_EXCH is another 'security' mechanism, whereby the session key
actually used by the server is sent by the client, rather than being
the shared-secret directly or indirectly.
- As both these methods change the session key, the auth subsystem
needed to be changed, to 'override' session keys provided by the
backend.
- There has also been a major overhaul of the NTLMSSP subsystem, to merge the 'client' and 'server' functions, so they both operate on a single structure. This should help the SPNEGO implementation.
- The 'names blob' in NTLMSSP is always in unicode - never in ascii.
Don't make an ascii version ever.
- The other big change is to allow variable length session keys. We
have always assumed that session keys are 16 bytes long - and padded
to this length if shorter. However, Kerberos session keys are 8 bytes
long, when the krb5 login uses DES.
* This fix allows SMB signging on machines not yet running MIT KRB5 1.3.1. *
- Add better DEBUG() messages to ntlm_auth, warning administrators of
misconfigurations that prevent access to the privileged pipe. This
should help reduce some of the 'it just doesn't work' issues.
- Fix data_blob_talloc() to behave the same way data_blob() does when
passed a NULL data pointer. (just allocate)
REMEMBER to make clean after this commit - I have changed plenty of data structures...
(This used to be commit f3bbc87b0d)
same ads_verify_ticket routine that smbd uses, so in the current state
we have to be have the host password in secrets.tdb instead of the
keytab. This means we have to be an ADS member, but it's a start.
Volker
(This used to be commit dc2d2ad467)
and workstation to utf8 before sending the winbindd request. Also, don't
continue when the call to pull_utf8() fails but rather return a winbind
error. (This is what was causing the crash)
(This used to be commit ca1c463360)
to pstr_sprintf() and fstr_sprintf() to try to standardize.
lots of snprintf() calls were using len-1; some were using
len. At least this helps to be consistent.
(This used to be commit 9f835b85dd)
* remove idmap_XX_to_XX calls from smbd. Move back to the
the winbind_XXX and local_XXX calls used in 2.2
* all uid/gid allocation must involve winbindd now
* move flags field around in winbindd_request struct
* add WBFLAG_QUERY_ONLY option to winbindd_sid_to_[ug]id()
to prevent automatic allocation for unknown SIDs
* add 'winbind trusted domains only' parameter to force a domain member
server to use matching users names from /etc/passwd for its domain
(needed for domain member of a Samba domain)
* rename 'idmap only' to 'enable rid algorithm' for better clarity
(defaults to "yes")
code has been tested on
* domain member of native mode 2k domain
* ads domain member of native mode 2k domain
* domain member of NT4 domain
* domain member of Samba domain
* Samba PDC running winbindd with trusts
Logons tested using 2k clients and smbclient as domain users
and trusted users. Tested both 'winbind trusted domains only = [yes|no]'
This will be a long week of changes. The next item on the list is
winbindd_passdb.c & machine trust accounts not in /etc/passwd (done
via winbindd_passdb)
(This used to be commit 8266dffab4)
that is now possible to, for example, load a module which contains
an auth method into a binary without the auth/ subsystem built in.
(This used to be commit 74d9ecfe2d)
With big thanks to tpot for the ethereal disector, and for the base code
behind this, we now fully support NTLMv2 as a client.
In particular, we support it with direct domain logons (tested with ntlm_auth
--diagnostics), with 'old style' session setups, and with NTLMSSP.
In fact, for NTLMSSP we recycle one of the parts of the server's reply directly...
(we might need to parse for unicode issues later).
In particular, a Win2k domain controller now supplies us with a session key
for this password, which means that doman joins, and non-spnego SMB signing
are now supported with NTLMv2!
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 9f6a26769d)
- auth with ntlmv2 and lmv2 but deliberately break the ntlmv2 hash
- auth with ntlmv2 and lmv2 but deliberately break the lmv2 hash
- auth with ntlm and lm but deliberately break the ntlm hash
- auth with ntlm and lm but deliberately break the lm hash
My theory is that the NTLM or NTLMv2 field must be correct and if it is,
it doesn't matter what the value of the LM or LMv2 field is.
Fixed cosmetic test name display bug.
(This used to be commit 5dcde9451b)
Our NTLMv2 client code needs work, becouse we don't get the session key for
any of the NTLMv2 stuff...
Also test some of the more 'odd' auth cases - like putting the NT password
into the LM feild.
Clean up some static globals into static locals.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 62f0acc991)
