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Direct leak of 68 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7f4f39cdc03f in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xdc03f) (BuildId: 3e1694ad218c99a8b1b69231666a27df63cf19d0)
#1 0x7f4f36fbe427 in malloc_ ../../source3/lib/util_malloc.c:38
#2 0x7f4f394b5e19 in pdb_generate_sam_sid ../../source3/passdb/machine_sid.c:90
#3 0x7f4f394b5e19 in get_global_sam_sid ../../source3/passdb/machine_sid.c:211
#4 0x7f4f394af366 in secrets_store_domain_sid ../../source3/passdb/machine_account_secrets.c:143
#5 0x7f4f394b5eb5 in pdb_generate_sam_sid ../../source3/passdb/machine_sid.c:110
#6 0x7f4f394b5eb5 in get_global_sam_sid ../../source3/passdb/machine_sid.c:211
#7 0x7f4f394af366 in secrets_store_domain_sid ../../source3/passdb/machine_account_secrets.c:143
#8 0x557a1f11d62c in net_setlocalsid ../../source3/utils/net.c:416
#9 0x557a1f1c9972 in net_run_function ../../source3/utils/net_util.c:464
#10 0x557a1f121129 in main ../../source3/utils/net.c:1372
#11 0x7f4f34c281af in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jan 23 14:30:58 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
Indirect leak of 291 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7fd77b6dc03f in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xdc03f) (BuildId: 3e1694ad218c99a8b1b69231666a27df63cf19d0)
#1 0x7fd77b094bc2 in __talloc_with_prefix ../../lib/talloc/talloc.c:783
#2 0x7fd77b096034 in __talloc ../../lib/talloc/talloc.c:825
#3 0x7fd77b096034 in __talloc_strlendup ../../lib/talloc/talloc.c:2454
#4 0x7fd77b096034 in talloc_strdup ../../lib/talloc/talloc.c:2470
#5 0x7fd779996633 in add_string_to_array ../../lib/util/util_strlist.c:504
#6 0x7fd77b10c754 in ads_create_machine_acct ../../source3/libads/ldap.c:2662
#7 0x7fd77b46705f in libnet_join_precreate_machine_acct ../../source3/libnet/libnet_join.c:390
#8 0x7fd77b46705f in libnet_DomainJoin ../../source3/libnet/libnet_join.c:2852
#9 0x7fd77b46705f in libnet_Join ../../source3/libnet/libnet_join.c:3036
#10 0x55fb9788d91a in net_ads_join ../../source3/utils/net_ads.c:1853
#11 0x55fb9793ab86 in net_join ../../source3/utils/net_join.c:45
#12 0x55fb9793084f in net_run_function ../../source3/utils/net_util.c:454
#13 0x55fb97889859 in main ../../source3/utils/net.c:1372
#14 0x7fd7768281af in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
On systems without /proc/fd support this avoid the expensive chdir()
logic in non_widelink_open(). open_file_ntcreate() already passes
dirfsp and atname to reopen_from_fsp(), it was just missed in the
conversion.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15549
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jan 22 12:00:56 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
Existing caller passes NULL, no change in behaviour. Prepares for
replacing symlink_target_below_conn() in open.c.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15549
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Moves creating the symlink target path via symlink_target_path() to the
caller. This prepares for using this in non_widelink_open(), where it will
replace symlink_target_below_conn() with the same functionality.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15549
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
This will be used in CI to have a gitlab runner without all modern Linux
features we make use of as part of path processing:
- O_PATH
- openat2() with RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS
- somehow safely reopen an O_PATH file handle
That gives what a classix UNIX like AIX or Solaris offers feature wise.
Other OSes support other combinations of those features, but we leave the
exersize of possibly adding more runners supporting those combinations to the
reader.
The following list shows which features are available and used by Samba on a few
OSes:
| O_PATH | RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS | Safe reopen | CI covered
--------|----------------|---------------------|----------------------------
| Supported Used | Supported Used | Supported Used |
============================================================================
Linux | + + | + + | + + | +
FreeBSD | + + | + [1] - | + [2] - | -
AIX | - - | - - | - - | +
[1] via open() flag O_RESOLVE_BENEATH
[2] via open() flag O_EMPTY_PATH
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15549
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
We used to log the following message for both adding and dropping
capability:
DBG_INFO("added capability %d\n", capability);
For better clarity indicate the change as "added" or "dropped"
based on available functional arguments.
Signed-off-by: Anoop C S <anoopcs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Anoop C S <anoopcs@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Jan 20 18:43:10 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
Commit e07f8901ec95aab8c36965000de185d99e642644 broke handling of NT4 domains
which lack a DNS domain names. As the dns_name is NULL, talloc_steal(dns_name)
returns NULL, which causes _wbint_ListTrustedDomains to return
NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY.
To make things worse, at that point the new struct netr_DomainTrust is not yet
initialized correctly and the "out->count = n + 1" already increased the array
counter at the start of the loop without initializing it.
Later when NDR-pushing the result in dcesrv_call_dispatch_local(), the ndr_push() can
crash when accesssing the ununitialized values:
2023-12-08T14:07:42.759691+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: ===============================================================
2023-12-08T14:07:42.759702+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: INTERNAL ERROR: Signal 11: Segmentation fault in winbindd (wb[ADDOMAIN]) (domain child [ADDOMAIN]) pid 157227 (4.20.0pre1-DEVELOPERBUILD)
2023-12-08T14:07:42.759712+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: If you are running a recent Samba version, and if you think this problem is not yet fixed in the latest versions, please consider reporting this bug, see https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/Bug_Reporting
2023-12-08T14:07:42.759723+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: ===============================================================
2023-12-08T14:07:42.759730+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: PANIC (pid 157227): Signal 11: Segmentation fault in 4.20.0pre1-DEVELOPERBUILD
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: BACKTRACE: 36 stack frames:
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #0 bin/shared/private/libgenrand-samba4.so(log_stack_trace+0x1f) [0x7f1396acd441]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #1 bin/shared/private/libgenrand-samba4.so(smb_panic_log+0x20f) [0x7f1396acd3d5]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #2 bin/shared/private/libgenrand-samba4.so(smb_panic+0x18) [0x7f1396acd3f0]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #3 bin/shared/private/libgenrand-samba4.so(+0x2eb5) [0x7f1396acceb5]
92023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #4 bin/shared/private/libgenrand-samba4.so(+0x2eca) [0x7f1396acceca]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #5 /lib64/libc.so.6(+0x3dbb0) [0x7f139687abb0]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #6 bin/shared/private/libsamba-security-samba4.so(ndr_push_dom_sid2+0x2a) [0x7f13977e5437]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #7 bin/shared/libndr-standard.so.0(ndr_push_netr_DomainTrust+0x4ad) [0x7f1396deb64c]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #8 bin/shared/libndr-standard.so.0(ndr_push_netr_DomainTrustList+0x204) [0x7f1396dec7a9]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #9 bin/shared/private/libndr-samba4.so(+0x239bf9) [0x7f1397639bf9]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #10 winbindd: domain child [ADDOMAIN](winbind__op_ndr_push+0x5a) [0x55741e6857a8]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #11 bin/shared/libdcerpc-server-core.so.0(dcesrv_call_dispatch_local+0x49b) [0x7f1397be6219]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #12 winbindd: domain child [ADDOMAIN](winbindd_dual_ndrcmd+0x375) [0x55741e67a204]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #13 winbindd: domain child [ADDOMAIN](+0x9cf0d) [0x55741e674f0d]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #14 winbindd: domain child [ADDOMAIN](+0x9f792) [0x55741e677792]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #15 bin/shared/private/libtevent-samba4.so(tevent_common_invoke_fd_handler+0x121) [0x7f139802f816]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #16 bin/shared/private/libtevent-samba4.so(+0x19cef) [0x7f139803bcef]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #17 bin/shared/private/libtevent-samba4.so(+0x1a3dc) [0x7f139803c3dc]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #18 bin/shared/private/libtevent-samba4.so(+0x15b52) [0x7f1398037b52]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #19 bin/shared/private/libtevent-samba4.so(_tevent_loop_once+0x113) [0x7f139802e1db]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #20 winbindd: domain child [ADDOMAIN](+0xa03ca) [0x55741e6783ca]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #21 winbindd: domain child [ADDOMAIN](+0x9ba9c) [0x55741e673a9c]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #22 bin/shared/private/libtevent-samba4.so(_tevent_req_notify_callback+0xba) [0x7f139803194a]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #23 bin/shared/private/libtevent-samba4.so(+0xfadb) [0x7f1398031adb]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #24 bin/shared/private/libtevent-samba4.so(_tevent_req_done+0x25) [0x7f1398031b07]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #25 bin/shared/private/libtevent-samba4.so(+0xf125) [0x7f1398031125]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #26 bin/shared/private/libtevent-samba4.so(+0xe9cf) [0x7f13980309cf]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #27 bin/shared/private/libtevent-samba4.so(tevent_common_invoke_immediate_handler+0x207) [0x7f1398030343]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #28 bin/shared/private/libtevent-samba4.so(tevent_common_loop_immediate+0x37) [0x7f13980304b5]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #29 bin/shared/private/libtevent-samba4.so(+0x1a332) [0x7f139803c332]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #30 bin/shared/private/libtevent-samba4.so(+0x15b52) [0x7f1398037b52]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #31 bin/shared/private/libtevent-samba4.so(_tevent_loop_once+0x113) [0x7f139802e1db]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #32 winbindd: domain child [ADDOMAIN](main+0x1689) [0x55741e6b210a]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #33 /lib64/libc.so.6(+0x27b8a) [0x7f1396864b8a]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #34 /lib64/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x8b) [0x7f1396864c4b]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760443+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: #35 winbindd: domain child [ADDOMAIN](_start+0x25) [0x55741e63a045]
2023-12-08T14:07:42.760685+00:00 localadmember.addom.samba.example.com log.winbindd[157227]: smb_panic(): calling panic action [cd /data/git/samba/scratch3 && /data/git/samba/scratch3/selftest/gdb_backtrace 157227 ./bin/winbindd]
Deferring assignment of r->out.domains->array and r->out.domains->count to the
end of the function ensures we don't return inconsistent state in case of an
error.
Also, r->out.domains is already set by the NDR layer, no need to create and
assign a struct netr_DomainTrustList object.
Using talloc_move() ensures we don't leave dangling pointers. Better to crash
reliably on accessing NULL, then accessing some unknown memory via a wild
pointer. As talloc_move() can't fail, there's no need to check the return value.
And using a struct initializer ensures all members are properly initialized.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15533
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Jan 20 14:23:51 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
This allows reloading trust info on an NT4 DC without restarting winbindd.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15533
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This applies the same logic we already added in
06601b3a9293db35feda1b033fa864dc1a764164 for AD DCs wrt to IPC authentication
when running as an NT4 DC in cm_prepare_connection(). Similarily adjust the
check in cm_connect_lsa() added in 3e17a3b7cd4083299037ba9377931bea792b2d18 and
in cm_connect_netlogon_transport() added by
532a14dc684e7a6d8c584d5671a4ebbad00aa4fc for cm_connect_netlogon_transport().
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15533
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This was broken by ea071d278a614f17b5417d3ff98e1b8d1fd8970d. I guess the whole
opt_user_specified dance should be ripped out, but that's a fix for another day.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15533
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Browsing files or download files from samba server, smbd would check user's
id to decide whether this user could access these files, by lookup user's
information from the password file (e.g. /usr/local/samba/private/smbpasswd).
smbd might goes through startsmbfilepwent(), this api calls [f]chmod() to
make sure the password file has valid permissions 0600.
Consider a scenario: we are doing a read performance benchmark about
downloading a bunch of files (e.g. a thousand files) from a samba server,
monitoring file system i/o activities counters, and expecting that should
be only read operations on file system because this is just downloading, no
uploading is involved. But actually found that still write operations on file
system, because smbd lookup user and always reset 0600 permissions on password
file while access each file, it makes dirty pages (inode modification) in ram,
later triggered a kernel journal daemon to sync dirty pages into back storage
(e.g. ext3 kjournald, or ext4 jbd2).
This looks like not friendly for read performance benchmark if it happened on
an entry-level systems with much less memory and limited computation power,
because dirty pages syncing in the meantime slows down read performance.
This patch adds fstat() before [f]chmod(), it would check whether password
file has valid permissions 0600 or not. If 0600 smbd would bypass [f]chmod()
to avoid making dirty pages on file systems. If not 0600 smbd would warn and
go through [f]chmod() to set valid permissions 0600 to password file as
earlier days.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15555
Signed-off-by: Jones Syue <jonessyue@qnap.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jan 18 10:28:19 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
The synthetic_pathref() call in shadow_copy2_get_real_filename_at()
fails if shadow:snapdir is set outside of the share root, it creates
an absolute path and non_widelink_open() blocks that.
We don't need shadow_copy2_get_real_filename_at() anymore because the
dirfsp already points at the correct directory in the snapshot
directory. So get_real_filename_full_scan_at() just works fine.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15556
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jan 16 19:44:53 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
This was broken by c9c3d4312d7281904fc back in 2009 already.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12421
Signed-off-by: Bjoern Jacke <bjacke@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
There is no PDB backend supporting this.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jan 9 14:17:40 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
This is useful for some scripting examples and debugging...
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This makes if easier to see how tcp connections belong
to a session or client_guid.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This is very useful for debugging...
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This will allow smbstatus --json to dump more details.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
client_guid as well as local and remote address help a lot
for debugging...
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This is better than NT_STATUS_USER_SESSION_DELETED, as it means the
client can keep it's session alive. Otherwise a windows client believes
the whole session is gone and all other channels are invalid.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
We can announce the ip of the current connection even if it's
a moveable cluster address... as the client is already connected to it.
This change means in a typical ctdb cluster, where we only have public
addresses, the client can at least have more than one multichannel'ed
connection to the public ip.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Doing the previous version access checks and semantics at the SMB
layer means we can simplify the shadow_copy2 and remove the kludge.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13688
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jan 8 16:58:26 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
Now that check_any_access_fsp() is broadly used consistently to
restrict access for all modifying operations, we can add a check for
previous versions to check_any_access_fsp() and it gets enforced
consistently.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13688
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Replaces the direct access to fsp->access_mask with a call to
check_any_access_fsp() which allows doing additional checks if needed.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13688
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
