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even if the tgt session key uses different hmac.
Per [MS-SFU] 2.2.1 PA-FOR-USER the checksum is
always HMAC_MD5, and that's what windows 7 client
and MIT client send.
In heimdal both the client and kdc use the checksum of
the tgt key instead and therefore work with each other
but windows and MIT clients fail against heimdal KDC.
Windows KDC allows either checksum (HMAC_MD5 or from
tgt) so we should do the same to support all clients.
Signed-off-by: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jun 11 02:48:58 UTC 2020 on sn-devel-184
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13685
Signed-off-by: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue May 14 11:45:13 UTC 2019 on sn-devel-184
This changes behaviour flagged as being for Java 1.6. My hope is that this does not
set f.canonicalize
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
This reverts commit 20dc68050d.
Tests (the krb5.kdc testsuite) show this behaviour is incorrect.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
This is not a general purpose profiling solution, but these JSON logs are already being
generated and stored, so this is worth adding.
Some administrators are very keen to know how long authentication
takes, particularly due to long replication transactions in other
processes.
This complements a similar patch set to log the transaction duration.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Thanks to Doug Nazar <nazard@nazar.ca> for spotting this!
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12986
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
(cherry picked from heimdal commit a79b59ba27070a015479e8d981b7e685dbe34310)
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12986
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from heimdal commit 19f9fdbcea11013cf13ac72c416f161ee55dee2b)
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Aug 28 15:10:54 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144
We now pass on the original client name and the client address to allow
consistent audit logging in Samba across multiple protocols.
We use config->db[0] to find the first database to record incorrect
users.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This helps ensure we know these are NULL until set
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
This allows PAC_CRENDENTIAL_INFO to be added to the PAC
when using PKINIT. In that case PAC_CRENDENTIAL_INFO contains
an encrypted PAC_CRENDENTIAL_DATA.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11441
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is already fixed in upstream heimdal.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11441
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Without the enc data, Windows clients will perform two AS-REQ causing the password
lockout count to increase by two instead of one.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11539
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jul 5 10:52:32 CEST 2016 on sn-devel-144
The folks at heimdal didn't like the patch in
commit 6379737b7d and insisted
that kvno should remain unsigned internally, even though it is
encoded as signed in packets. This patch reverts some of the
unsigned->signed changes in that commit, and resolves conversion
issues - in order to be aligned with upstream Heimdal.
Signed-off-by: Uri Simchoni <uri@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue May 24 03:00:39 CEST 2016 on sn-devel-144
This patch changes the encoding/decoding of kvno (key version number)
in blobs and packets to signed integer, for compatibility with Windows.
Reportedly, MIT Kerberos does the same.
This patch effectively reverts commit 1124c4872dfb81bec9c4b527b8927ca35e39a599
in the heimdal tree.
According to the Kerberos spec (RFC 4120 5.2.9), the kvno field
in encrypted data object is an unsigned integer that fits in
32 bits. The Heimdal Kerberos component bundled with Samba
conforms to this. However, Windows deviates from the standard
and encodes kvno as a signed integer, and this creates
interoperability issues.
ASN.1 DER has no special encoding for unsigned integer. A 32-bit
unsigned integer is encoded as a signed integer, so while a signed
32-bit integer (covering the range of -0x80000000..0x7fffffff) is
encoded using up to 4 bytes, an unsigned integer (covering
0..0xffffffff) could require 5 bytes.
Normally, kvno for a given account starts at 1 and increments on
password changes. Kerberos defined this as unsigned because there's
no meaning for negative version numbers, so the standard writers figured
4 billion versions is better than 2 billion. It was not
expected for a kvno to really go past 0x7fffffff and the disctinction
usually does not matter. However, RODCs use kvnos which
have the most-significant bit set.
In Active Directory, RODCs have a private secret for the krbtgt,
because the assumption is that the RODC is less secure, and
recovering the domain krbtgt secret from the RODC would compromise
the security of the entire domain. The kvno field is being used
to identify the private krbtgt account that owns the key - the
upper 16 bits are the RODC id, and the lower 16 bits identify
the key version number for this specific RODC. It's common to
have an RODC id greater than 0x8000, and therefore to have a
kvno larger than 0x7fffffff, which would be DER-encoded using
5 bytes.
Windows encodes kvno as signed integer - basically taking the
32 bits and treating them as a signed integer rather than an
unsigned integer. This means that in Windows a kvno can
always be encoded using 4 bytes, and Windows DCs reject a kvno
encoded using more than 4 bytes without even generating an error
response (the DC assumes it's an attack).
Heimdal re-encodes the TGT when it creates a TGS request. Obviously
it cannot decode and encode the encrypted parts but it does re-encode
the plain parts, which include the kvno. That leads to a 5-byte
kvno in the TGS request, which is rejected without an error
response.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11900
Signed-off-by: Uri Simchoni <uri@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat May 7 21:14:21 CEST 2016 on sn-devel-144
This allows testing keytabs with service tickets. Windows KDCs allow
this as well.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
A backend can return this if asked with HDB_F_GET_CLIENT|HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ
for a KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL record or for HDB_F_GET_SERVER | HDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ.
entry_ex->entry.principal->realm needs to return the real realm of the principal
(or at least a the realm of the next cross-realm trust hop).
This is needed to route enterprise principals between AD domain trusts.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is not DRSUAPI specific, it works for all 3 part principals.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This got removed between draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals-11.txt
and the final rfc6806.txt.
The number 133 was reassigned to PA-FX-COOKIE in rfc6113.txt.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
This change ensures that our RODC will correctly proxy when asked to provide
a ticket for a service or user where the keys are not on this RODC.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Pair-programmed-with: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The value of this commit to Samba is to continue to match Heimdal's
upstream code in this area. Because we set HDB_CAP_F_HANDLE_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL
there is no runtime difference.
(commit message by Andrew Bartlett)
Cherry-pick of Heimdal commit 9aa7883ff2efb3e0a60016c9090c577acfd0779f
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The useful change in Samba from this commit is that we gain
validation of the enterprise principal name.
(commit message by Andrew Bartlett)
Cherry-pick of Heimdal commit c76ec8ec6a507a6f34ca80c11e5297146acff83f
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is needed to match Windows behaviour for NTLM logins.
Andrew Bartlett
Change-Id: I142de19b480cd6499d6f7f025f655e220558d54c
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Change-Id: I3c306d1516aa569549f5f024fe1fff2d4f2abefc
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Change-Id: I49695cc4ae0dd0b02034e5411b277882ec5f5f44
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
The checking of the KDC signature is more complex than it looks, it may be of a different
enc type to that which the ticket is encrypted with, and may even be prefixed
with the RODC number.
This is better handled in the plugin which can easily look up the DB for the
correct key to verify this with, and can also quickly determine if this is
an interdomain trust, which we cannot verify the PAC for.
Andrew Bartlett
This handles referrals for SPNs of the form
E3514235-4B06-11D1-AB04-00C04FC2DCD2/NTDSGUID/REALM, which are
used during DRS replication when we don't know the dnsHostName of the
target DC (which we don't know until the first replication from that
DC completes).
We use the 3rd part of the SPN directly as the realm name in the
referral.
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
commit "heimdal Add support for extracting a particular KVNO from the database"
(f469fc6d4922d796f5c61bf43e3efc018e37b680 in heimdal/master
and 9b5e304cce in samba/master)
changed the windc_plugin interface, so we need to change the
version number.
metze
This way we can compare the already canonicalized principals,
while still passing the client specified target principal down
to the backend specific constrained_delegation() hook.
metze
This fixes Win2003 domain logons against Samba4, which need a
canonicalised reply, and helpfully do set that flag.
Specifically, they need that realm in krbtgt/realm@realm that these
both match exactly in the reply.
Andrew Bartlett
Autobuild-User: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Thu Feb 17 06:40:53 CET 2011 on sn-devel-104
By checking the client principal here, we compare the realm based on
the normalised realm, but do so early enough to validate the PAC (and
regenerate it if required).
Andrew Bartlett
