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Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Swen Schillig <swen@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Aug 3 22:21:04 UTC 2020 on sn-devel-184
the "I" flag for unsigned int has been available since Python 2.3
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This has been unused since before
762e7e1dff in 2003.
Found by callcatcher
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
To avoid warning above produced by using
-Wcast-function-type we;
+ ensure PyCFunctions of type METH_NOARGS defined dummy arg
+ ensure PyCFunctions of type METH_KEYWORDS use PY_DISCARD_FUNC_SIG
macro
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
The new string conversion wrappers detect and flag errors
which occured during the string to integer conversion.
Those modifications required an update of the callees
error checks.
Signed-off-by: Swen Schillig <swen@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Use a temporary struct as a return value to make the compiler catch all
callers. If we just changed bool->ssize_t, this would just generate a
warning. struct sid_parse_ret will go away in the next commit
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Deny ACEs must always be evaluated against explicitly granted rights
from previous ACEs.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13812
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
We basically must process the Owner Rights ACEs as any other ACE wrt to the
order of adding granted permissions and checking denied permissions. According
to MS-DTYP 2.5.3.2 Owner Rights ACEs must be evaluated in the main loop over
the ACEs in an ACL and the corresponding access_mask must be directly applied
to bits_remaining. We currently defer this to after the loop over the ACEs in
ACL, this is wrong.
We just have to do some initial magic to determine if an ACL contains and
Owner Rights ACEs, and in case it doesn't we grant SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC |
SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL at the *beginning*. MS-DTYP:
-- the owner of an object is always granted READ_CONTROL and WRITE_DAC.
CALL SidInToken(Token, SecurityDescriptor.Owner, PrincipalSelfSubst)
IF SidInToken returns True THEN
IF DACL does not contain ACEs from object owner THEN
Remove READ_CONTROL and WRITE_DAC from RemainingAccess
Set GrantedAccess to GrantedAccess or READ_CONTROL or WRITE_OWNER
END IF
END IF
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13812
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
In order to detect an value overflow error during
the string to integer conversion with strtoul/strtoull,
the errno variable must be set to zero before the execution and
checked after the conversion is performed. This is achieved by
using the wrapper function strtoul_err and strtoull_err.
Signed-off-by: Swen Schillig <swen@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
This was missing in 44590c1b70.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13812
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Feb 28 19:18:16 UTC 2019 on sn-devel-144
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Dec 12 22:18:52 CET 2018 on sn-devel-144
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12164
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: David Mulder <dmulder@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Nov 3 00:23:31 CET 2018 on sn-devel-144
This is modeled after server_id_str_buf, which as an API to me is easier to
use: I can rely on the compiler to get the buffer size right.
It is designed to violate README.Coding's "Make use of helper variables", but
as this API is simple enough and the output should never be a surprise at all,
I think that's worth it.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Nov 2 20:11:11 CET 2018 on sn-devel-144
An 'Object Access Allowed' ACE that assigned 'Control Access' (CR)
rights to a specific attribute would not actually grant access.
What was happening was the remaining_access mask for the object_tree
nodes would be Read Property (RP) + Control Access (CR). The ACE mapped
to the schemaIDGUID for a given attribute, which would end up being a
child node in the tree. So the CR bit was cleared for a child node, but
not the rest of the tree. We would then check the user had the RP access
right, which it did. However, the RP right was cleared for another node
in the tree, which still had the CR bit set in its remaining_access
bitmap, so Samba would not grant access.
Generally, the remaining_access only ever has one bit set, which means
this isn't a problem normally. However, in the Control Access case there
are 2 separate bits being checked, i.e. RP + CR.
One option to fix this problem would be to clear the remaining_access
for the tree instead of just the node. However, the Windows spec is
actually pretty clear on this: if the ACE has a CR right present, then
you can stop any further access checks.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reading the spec and then reading the code makes sense, but we could
comment the code more so it makes sense on its own.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Object-specific access checks refer to a specific section of the
MS-ADTS, and the code closely matches the spec. We need to extend this
logic to properly handle the Control-Access Right (CR), so it makes
sense to split the logic out into its own function.
This patch just moves the code, and should not alter the logic (apart
from ading in the boolean grant_access return variable.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13434
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Commit e2c9ad93cb removed the last caller
of this.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed May 9 19:18:44 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Mar 16 19:47:15 CET 2018 on sn-devel-144
Looks surprising, but this does save bytes if you look at the object with
"size".
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
This message shows up a lot at level 6 for no particularly good reason
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reported and proposed fix by Shilpa K <shilpa.krishnareddy@gmail.com>.
When processing DENY ACE entries for owner rights SIDs (S-1-3-4) the
code OR's in the deny access mask bits without taking into account if
they were being requested in the requested access mask.
E.g. The current logic has:
An ACL containining:
[0] SID: S-1-3-4
TYPE: DENY
MASK: WRITE_DATA
[1] SID: S-1-3-4
TYPE: ALLOW
MASK: ALLOW_ALL
prohibits an open request by the owner for READ_DATA - even though this
is explicitly allowed.
Furthermore a non-canonical ACL containing:
[0] SID: User SID 1-5-21-something
TYPE: ALLOW
MASK: READ_DATA
[1] SID: S-1-3-4
TYPE: DENY
MASK: READ_DATA
[2] SID: User SID 1-5-21-something
TYPE: ALLOW
MASK: WRITE_DATA
prohibits an open request by the owner for READ_DATA|WRITE_DATA - even
though READ_DATA is explicitly allowed in ACE no 0 and is thus already
filtered out of the "access-still-needed" mask when the deny ACE no 1 is
evaluated.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12466
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
