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55607 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Ralph Boehme
edf661e40b CVE-2021-44142: libadouble: harden parsing code
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14914

Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2022-01-30 14:08:00 +01:00
Ralph Boehme
ffa40d4acb CVE-2021-44142: libadouble: add basic cmocka tests
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14914

Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
[slow@samba.org: conflict due to missing test in selftest/tests.py]
2022-01-30 14:08:00 +01:00
Ralph Boehme
b3b76222cf CVE-2021-44142: libadouble: harden ad_unpack_xattrs()
This ensures ad_unpack_xattrs() is only called for an ad_type of ADOUBLE_RSRC,
which is used for parsing ._ AppleDouble sidecar files, and the buffer
ad->ad_data is AD_XATTR_MAX_HDR_SIZE bytes large which is a prerequisite for all
buffer out-of-bounds access checks in ad_unpack_xattrs().

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14914

Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2022-01-30 14:08:00 +01:00
Ralph Boehme
9eba87ce4b CVE-2021-44142: smbd: add Netatalk xattr used by vfs_fruit to the list of private Samba xattrs
This is an internal xattr that should not be user visible.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14914

Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
[slow@samba.org: conflict due to changed includes in source3/smbd/trans2.c]
2022-01-30 14:08:00 +01:00
Ralph Boehme
57d9afe5d7 CVE-2021-44142: libadouble: add defines for icon lengths
From https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1740.txt

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14914

Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2022-01-30 14:07:59 +01:00
Jeremy Allison
9c2e3c72c0 s3: smbd: Fix mkdir race condition allows share escape in Samba 4.13.X and below: CVE-2021-43566
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13979

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
2022-01-08 11:38:19 +01:00
Ralph Boehme
1e27b820df CVE-2020-25717: s3-auth: fix MIT Realm regression
This looks like a regression introduced by the recent security fixes. This
commit should hopefully fixes it.

As a quick solution it might be possible to use the username map script based on
the example in https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14901#c0. We're not
sure this behaves identical, but it might work in the standalone server case.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14922

Reported-at: https://lists.samba.org/archive/samba/2021-November/238720.html

Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1e61de8306604a0d3858342df8a1d2412d8d418b)
2021-12-08 16:01:10 +00:00
Andrew Bartlett
105c6a15ef CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: Fallback to a SID/UID based mapping if the named based lookup fails
Before the CVE-2020-25717 fixes we had a fallback from
getpwnam('DOMAIN\user') to getpwnam('user') which was very dangerous and
unpredictable.

Now we do the fallback based on sid_to_uid() followed by
getpwuid() on the returned uid.

This obsoletes 'username map [script]' based workaround adviced
for CVE-2020-25717, when nss_winbindd is not used or
idmap_nss is actually used.

In future we may decide to prefer or only do the SID/UID based
lookup, but for now we want to keep this unchanged as much as possible.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14901

Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

[metze@samba.org moved the new logic into the fallback codepath only
 in order to avoid behavior changes as much as possible]
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>

Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Nov 15 19:01:56 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184

(cherry picked from commit 0a546be05295a7e4a552f9f4f0c74aeb2e9a0d6e)

Autobuild-User(v4-13-test): Jule Anger <janger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-13-test): Wed Nov 17 15:50:53 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
2021-11-17 15:50:53 +00:00
Stefan Metzmacher
a6eddc3bd7 CVE-2020-25727: idmap_nss: verify that the name of the sid belongs to the configured domain
We already check the sid belongs to the domain, but checking the name
too feels better and make it easier to understand.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14901

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit bfd093648b4af51d104096c0cb3535e8706671e5)
2021-11-17 14:35:14 +00:00
Alexander Bokovoy
fadf496345 IPA DC: add missing checks
When introducing FreeIPA support, two places were forgotten:

 - schannel gensec module needs to be aware of IPA DC
 - _lsa_QueryInfoPolicy should treat IPA DC as PDC

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14903

Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>

Autobuild-User(master): Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Nov 13 07:01:26 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184

(cherry picked from commit c69b66f649c1d47a7367f7efe25b8df32369a3a5)

Autobuild-User(v4-13-test): Jule Anger <janger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-13-test): Mon Nov 15 15:33:17 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
2021-11-15 15:33:17 +00:00
Stefan Metzmacher
b7158d4ce8 s3:winbindd: fix "allow trusted domains = no" regression
add_trusted_domain() should only reject domains
based on is_allowed_domain(), which now also
checks "allow trusted domains = no", if we don't
have an explicit trust to the domain (SEC_CHAN_NULL).

We use at least SEC_CHAN_LOCAL for local domains like
BUILTIN.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14899

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>

Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Nov 10 11:21:31 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184

(cherry picked from commit a7f6c60cb037b4bc9eee276236539b8282213935)

Autobuild-User(v4-13-test): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-13-test): Thu Nov 11 10:37:06 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
2021-11-11 10:37:06 +00:00
Stefan Metzmacher
721e40dd37 CVE-2016-2124: s3:libsmb: don't fallback to non spnego authentication if we require kerberos
We should not send NTLM[v2] nor plaintext data on the wire if the user
asked for kerberos only.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12444

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
2021-11-08 10:52:13 +01:00
Volker Lendecke
4a89389195 CVE-2021-23192 librpc: Remove the gensec dependency from library dcerpc-binding
This means yet another library, but having to depend on gensec just
for dcerpc_parse_binding() and basic packet parsing seems like a bit
overkill to me.

Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>

Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Apr  6 23:33:14 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14875

(cherry picked from commit 4d3b6506d30e4bf302f832493dad00a83b73d370)
2021-11-08 10:52:13 +01:00
Volker Lendecke
83a9fb52f3 CVE-2021-23192 rpc: Give dcerpc_util.c its own header
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14875

(cherry picked from commit 8945d99758d8bedd374f1c51304b87a6cf10498c)
2021-11-08 10:52:13 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
ef4df24b47 CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: simplify make_session_info_krb5() by removing unused arguments
This is only ever be called in standalone mode with an MIT realm,
so we don't have a PAC/info3 structure.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-08 10:52:11 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
27d719174b CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: simplify get_user_from_kerberos_info() by removing the unused logon_info argument
This code is only every called in standalone mode on a MIT realm,
it means we never have a PAC and we also don't have winbindd arround.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-08 10:52:11 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
9f807fdd8d CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: let auth3_generate_session_info_pac() reject a PAC in standalone mode
We should be strict in standalone mode, that we only support MIT realms
without a PAC in order to keep the code sane.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-08 10:52:11 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
a152f36b05 CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: let auth3_generate_session_info_pac() delegate everything to make_server_info_wbcAuthUserInfo()
This consolidates the code paths used for NTLMSSP and Kerberos!

I checked what we were already doing for NTLMSSP, which is this:

a) source3/auth/auth_winbind.c calls wbcAuthenticateUserEx()
b) as a domain member we require a valid response from winbindd,
   otherwise we'll return NT_STATUS_NO_LOGON_SERVERS
c) we call make_server_info_wbcAuthUserInfo(), which internally
   calls make_server_info_info3()
d) auth_check_ntlm_password() calls
   smb_pam_accountcheck(unix_username, rhost), where rhost
   is only an ipv4 or ipv6 address (without reverse dns lookup)
e) from auth3_check_password_send/auth3_check_password_recv()
   server_returned_info will be passed to auth3_generate_session_info(),
   triggered by gensec_session_info(), which means we'll call into
   create_local_token() in order to transform auth_serversupplied_info
   into auth_session_info.

For Kerberos gensec_session_info() will call
auth3_generate_session_info_pac() via the gensec_generate_session_info_pac()
helper function. The current logic is this:

a) gensec_generate_session_info_pac() is the function that
   evaluates the 'gensec:require_pac', which defaulted to 'no'
   before.
b) auth3_generate_session_info_pac() called
   wbcAuthenticateUserEx() in order to pass the PAC blob
   to winbindd, but only to prime its cache, e.g. netsamlogon cache
   and others. Most failures were just ignored.
c) If the PAC blob is available, it extracted the PAC_LOGON_INFO
   from it.
d) Then we called the horrible get_user_from_kerberos_info() function:
   - It uses a first part of the tickets principal name (before the @)
     as username and combines that with the 'logon_info->base.logon_domain'
     if the logon_info (PAC) is present.
   - As a fallback without a PAC it's tries to ask winbindd for a mapping
     from realm to netbios domain name.
   - Finally is falls back to using the realm as netbios domain name
   With this information is builds 'userdomain+winbind_separator+useraccount'
   and calls map_username() followed by smb_getpwnam() with create=true,
   Note this is similar to the make_server_info_info3() => check_account()
   => smb_getpwnam() logic under 3.
   - It also calls smb_pam_accountcheck(), but may pass the reverse DNS lookup name
     instead of the ip address as rhost.
   - It does some MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_UID logic and auto creates the
     guest account.
e) We called create_info3_from_pac_logon_info()
f) make_session_info_krb5() calls gets called and triggers this:
   - If get_user_from_kerberos_info() mapped to guest, it calls
     make_server_info_guest()
   - If create_info3_from_pac_logon_info() created a info3 from logon_info,
     it calls make_server_info_info3()
   - Without a PAC it tries pdb_getsampwnam()/make_server_info_sam() with
     a fallback to make_server_info_pw()
   From there it calls create_local_token()

I tried to change auth3_generate_session_info_pac() to behave similar
to auth_winbind.c together with auth3_generate_session_info() as
a domain member, as we now rely on a PAC:

a) As domain member we require a PAC and always call wbcAuthenticateUserEx()
   and require a valid response!
b) we call make_server_info_wbcAuthUserInfo(), which internally
   calls make_server_info_info3(). Note make_server_info_info3()
   handles MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_UID and make_server_info_guest()
   internally.
c) Similar to auth_check_ntlm_password() we now call
   smb_pam_accountcheck(unix_username, rhost), where rhost
   is only an ipv4 or ipv6 address (without reverse dns lookup)
d) From there it calls create_local_token()

As standalone server (in an MIT realm) we continue
with the already existing code logic, which works without a PAC:
a) we keep smb_getpwnam() with create=true logic as it
   also requires an explicit 'add user script' option.
b) In the following commits we assert that there's
   actually no PAC in this mode, which means we can
   remove unused and confusing code.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14646
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-08 10:52:11 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
131d5ceb9d CVE-2020-25717: s3:ntlm_auth: let ntlm_auth_generate_session_info_pac() base the name on the PAC LOGON_INFO only
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-08 10:52:11 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
9f73360e17 CVE-2020-25717: s3:ntlm_auth: fix memory leaks in ntlm_auth_generate_session_info_pac()
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-08 10:52:11 +01:00
Alexander Bokovoy
39cf01d0d2 CVE-2020-25717: Add FreeIPA domain controller role
As we want to reduce use of 'classic domain controller' role but FreeIPA
relies on it internally, add a separate role to mark FreeIPA domain
controller role.

It means that role won't result in ROLE_STANDALONE.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-08 10:52:10 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
e8e0bea9b3 CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: don't let create_local_token depend on !winbind_ping()
We always require a running winbindd on a domain member, so
we should better fail a request instead of silently alter
the behaviour, which results in a different unix token, just
because winbindd might be restarted.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-08 10:52:10 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
b0031f5318 CVE-2020-25717: s3:lib: add lp_allow_trusted_domains() logic to is_allowed_domain()
is_allowed_domain() is a central place we already use to
trigger NT_STATUS_AUTHENTICATION_FIREWALL_FAILED, so
we can add additional logic there.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-08 10:52:10 +01:00
Ralph Boehme
844faf2f0a CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: remove fallbacks in smb_getpwnam()
So far we tried getpwnam("DOMAIN\account") first and
always did a fallback to getpwnam("account") completely
ignoring the domain part, this just causes problems
as we mix "DOMAIN1\account", "DOMAIN2\account",
and "account"!

As we require a running winbindd for domain member setups
we should no longer do a fallback to just "account" for
users served by winbindd!

For users of the local SAM don't use this code path,
as check_sam_security() doesn't call check_account().

The only case where smb_getpwnam("account") happens is
when map_username() via ("username map [script]")  mapped
"DOMAIN\account" to something without '\', but that is
explicitly desired by the admin.

Note: use 'git show -w'

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-08 10:52:10 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
d079628a43 CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: no longer let check_account() autocreate local users
So far we autocreated local user accounts based on just the
account_name (just ignoring any domain part).

This only happens via a possible 'add user script',
which is not typically defined on domain members
and on NT4 DCs local users already exist in the
local passdb anyway.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-08 10:52:10 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
885fe6e31b CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: we should not try to autocreate the guest account
We should avoid autocreation of users as much as possible.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-08 10:52:10 +01:00
Samuel Cabrero
ce47a81eb5 CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: Check minimum domain uid
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>

[abartlet@samba.org Removed knownfail on advice from metze]
2021-11-08 10:52:10 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
c703f7a564 CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: let auth3_generate_session_info_pac() forward the low level errors
Mapping everything to ACCESS_DENIED makes it hard to debug problems,
which may happen because of our more restrictive behaviour in future.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-08 10:52:10 +01:00
Samuel Cabrero
b9d8f8025b CVE-2020-25717: loadparm: Add new parameter "min domain uid"
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

[abartlet@samba.org Backported from master/4.15 due to
 conflicts with other new parameters]
2021-11-08 10:52:10 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
8a946f2758 CVE-2020-25717: s3:auth: start with authoritative = 1
This is not strictly needed, but makes it easier to audit
that we don't miss important places.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-08 10:52:10 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
9b977f5051 CVE-2020-25717: s3:rpcclient: start with authoritative = 1
This is not strictly needed, but makes it easier to audit
that we don't miss important places.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-08 10:52:10 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
04ca59a512 CVE-2020-25717: s3:torture: start with authoritative = 1
This is not strictly needed, but makes it easier to audit
that we don't miss important places.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-08 10:52:10 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
25fd512f63 CVE-2020-25717: s3:ntlm_auth: start with authoritative = 1
This is not strictly needed, but makes it easier to audit
that we don't miss important places.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-08 10:52:10 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
5966f8c2d4 CVE-2020-25717: s3:winbindd: make sure we default to r->out.authoritative = true
We need to make sure that temporary failures don't trigger a fallback
to the local SAM that silently ignores the domain name part for users.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2021-11-08 10:52:10 +01:00
Volker Lendecke
d7a295b97e CVE-2020-25717 auth: Simplify DEBUG statements in make_auth3_context_for_ntlm()
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

(cherry picked from commit 8536bf7fce41c43bbed25f7ed4ce5775a1b9c0d5)
2021-11-08 10:52:09 +01:00
Volker Lendecke
ad4192e815 CVE-2020-25717 auth3: Simplify check_samba4_security()
First set up "server_info" in a local variable and once it's fully set
up, assign it to the out parameter "pserver_info".

Pointer dereferencing obfuscates the code for me.

Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

(cherry picked from commit 062a0c14c6ee0b74e7619af73747df59c5e67672)
2021-11-08 10:52:09 +01:00
Björn Jacke
031fc79834 CVE-2020-25717 auth_generic: fix empty initializer compile warning
Signed-off-by: Bjoern Jacke <bjacke@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

(cherry picked from commit cce4e8012c5eafb6d98111b92923d748d72d077b)
2021-11-08 10:52:09 +01:00
Alexander Bokovoy
654b09ec8b CVE-2020-25717 lookup_name: allow lookup names prefixed with DNS forest root for FreeIPA DC
In FreeIPA deployment with active Global Catalog service, when a two-way
trust to Active Directory forest is established, Windows systems can
look up FreeIPA users and groups. When using a security tab in Windows
Explorer on AD side, a lookup over a trusted forest might come as
realm\name instead of NetBIOS domain name:

--------------------------------------------------------------------
[2020/01/13 11:12:39.859134,  1, pid=33253, effective(1732401004, 1732401004), real(1732401004, 0), class=rpc_parse] ../../librpc/ndr/ndr.c:471(ndr_print_function_debug)
       lsa_LookupNames3: struct lsa_LookupNames3
          in: struct lsa_LookupNames3
              handle                   : *
                  handle: struct policy_handle
                      handle_type              : 0x00000000 (0)
                      uuid                     : 0000000e-0000-0000-1c5e-a750e5810000
              num_names                : 0x00000001 (1)
              names: ARRAY(1)
                  names: struct lsa_String
                      length                   : 0x001e (30)
                      size                     : 0x0020 (32)
                      string                   : *
                          string                   : 'ipa.test\admins'
              sids                     : *
                  sids: struct lsa_TransSidArray3
                      count                    : 0x00000000 (0)
                      sids                     : NULL
              level                    : LSA_LOOKUP_NAMES_UPLEVEL_TRUSTS_ONLY2 (6)
              count                    : *
                  count                    : 0x00000000 (0)
              lookup_options           : LSA_LOOKUP_OPTION_SEARCH_ISOLATED_NAMES (0)
              client_revision          : LSA_CLIENT_REVISION_2 (2)
--------------------------------------------------------------------

If we are running as a DC and PASSDB supports returning domain info
(pdb_get_domain_info() returns a valid structure), check domain of the
name in lookup_name() against DNS forest name and allow the request to
be done against the primary domain. This corresponds to FreeIPA's use of
Samba as a DC. For normal domain members a realm-based lookup falls back
to a lookup over to its own domain controller with the help of winbindd.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

Autobuild-User(master): Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Nov 11 10:59:01 UTC 2020 on sn-devel-184

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

(cherry picked from commit 31c703766fd2b89737826fb7e9a707f0622bb8cd)
2021-11-08 10:52:09 +01:00
Alexander Bokovoy
eb4123b5ca CVE-2020-25717 auth_sam: use pdb_get_domain_info to look up DNS forest information
When Samba is used as a part of FreeIPA domain controller, Windows
clients for a trusted AD forest may try to authenticate (perform logon
operation) as a REALM\name user account.

Fix auth_sam plugins to accept DNS forest name if we are running on a DC
with PASSDB module providing domain information (e.g. pdb_get_domain_info()
returning non-NULL structure). Right now, only FreeIPA or Samba AD DC
PASSDB backends return this information but Samba AD DC configuration is
explicitly ignored by the two auth_sam (strict and netlogon3) modules.

Detailed logs below:

[2020/11/11 09:23:53.281296,  1, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=rpc_parse] ../../librpc/ndr/ndr.c:482(ndr_print_function_debug)
       netr_LogonSamLogonWithFlags: struct netr_LogonSamLogonWithFlags
          in: struct netr_LogonSamLogonWithFlags
              server_name              : *
                  server_name              : '\\master.ipa.test'
              computer_name            : *
                  computer_name            : 'AD1'
              credential               : *
                  credential: struct netr_Authenticator
                      cred: struct netr_Credential
                          data                     : 529f4b087c5f6546
                      timestamp                : Wed Nov 11 09:23:55 AM 2020 UTC
              return_authenticator     : *
                  return_authenticator: struct netr_Authenticator
                      cred: struct netr_Credential
                          data                     : 204f28f622010000
                      timestamp                : Fri May  2 06:37:50 AM 1986 UTC
              logon_level              : NetlogonNetworkTransitiveInformation (6)
              logon                    : *
                  logon                    : union netr_LogonLevel(case 6)
                  network                  : *
                      network: struct netr_NetworkInfo
                          identity_info: struct netr_IdentityInfo
                              domain_name: struct lsa_String
                                  length                   : 0x0010 (16)
                                  size                     : 0x01fe (510)
                                  string                   : *
                                      string                   : 'IPA.TEST'
                              parameter_control        : 0x00002ae0 (10976)
                                     0: MSV1_0_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED
                                     0: MSV1_0_UPDATE_LOGON_STATISTICS
                                     0: MSV1_0_RETURN_USER_PARAMETERS
                                     0: MSV1_0_DONT_TRY_GUEST_ACCOUNT
                                     1: MSV1_0_ALLOW_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT
                                     1: MSV1_0_RETURN_PASSWORD_EXPIRY
                                     1: MSV1_0_USE_CLIENT_CHALLENGE
                                     0: MSV1_0_TRY_GUEST_ACCOUNT_ONLY
                                     1: MSV1_0_RETURN_PROFILE_PATH
                                     0: MSV1_0_TRY_SPECIFIED_DOMAIN_ONLY
                                     1: MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT
                                     0: MSV1_0_DISABLE_PERSONAL_FALLBACK
                                     1: MSV1_0_ALLOW_FORCE_GUEST
                                     0: MSV1_0_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD_SUPPLIED
                                     0: MSV1_0_USE_DOMAIN_FOR_ROUTING_ONLY
                                     0: MSV1_0_ALLOW_MSVCHAPV2
                                     0: MSV1_0_S4U2SELF
                                     0: MSV1_0_CHECK_LOGONHOURS_FOR_S4U
                                     0: MSV1_0_SUBAUTHENTICATION_DLL_EX
                              logon_id                 : 0x0000000000884ef2 (8933106)
                              account_name: struct lsa_String
                                  length                   : 0x000e (14)
                                  size                     : 0x000e (14)
                                  string                   : *
                                      string                   : 'idmuser'
                              workstation: struct lsa_String
                                  length                   : 0x0000 (0)
                                  size                     : 0x0000 (0)
                                  string                   : *
                                      string                   : ''
                         challenge                : 417207867bd33c74
                          nt: struct netr_ChallengeResponse
                              length                   : 0x00c0 (192)
                              size                     : 0x00c0 (192)
                              data                     : *
                                  data: ARRAY(192)
  [0000] A5 24 62 6E 31 DF 69 66   9E DC 54 D6 63 4C D6 2F   .$bn1.if ..T.cL./
  [0010] 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00   50 37 D7 60 0C B8 D6 01   ........ P7.`....
  [0020] 15 1B 38 4F 47 95 4D 62   00 00 00 00 02 00 0E 00   ..8OG.Mb ........
  [0030] 57 00 49 00 4E 00 32 00   30 00 31 00 36 00 01 00   W.I.N.2. 0.1.6...
  [0040] 06 00 41 00 44 00 31 00   04 00 18 00 77 00 69 00   ..A.D.1. ....w.i.
  [0050] 6E 00 32 00 30 00 31 00   36 00 2E 00 74 00 65 00   n.2.0.1. 6...t.e.
  [0060] 73 00 74 00 03 00 20 00   61 00 64 00 31 00 2E 00   s.t... . a.d.1...
  [0070] 77 00 69 00 6E 00 32 00   30 00 31 00 36 00 2E 00   w.i.n.2. 0.1.6...
  [0080] 74 00 65 00 73 00 74 00   05 00 18 00 77 00 69 00   t.e.s.t. ....w.i.
  [0090] 6E 00 32 00 30 00 31 00   36 00 2E 00 74 00 65 00   n.2.0.1. 6...t.e.
  [00A0] 73 00 74 00 07 00 08 00   50 37 D7 60 0C B8 D6 01   s.t..... P7.`....
  [00B0] 06 00 04 00 02 00 00 00   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ........ ........
                          lm: struct netr_ChallengeResponse
                              length                   : 0x0018 (24)
                              size                     : 0x0018 (24)
                              data                     : *
                                  data                     : 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
              validation_level         : 0x0006 (6)
              flags                    : *
                  flags                    : 0x00000000 (0)
                         0: NETLOGON_SAMLOGON_FLAG_PASS_TO_FOREST_ROOT
                         0: NETLOGON_SAMLOGON_FLAG_PASS_CROSS_FOREST_HOP
                         0: NETLOGON_SAMLOGON_FLAG_RODC_TO_OTHER_DOMAIN
                         0: NETLOGON_SAMLOGON_FLAG_RODC_NTLM_REQUEST

In such case checks for a workgroup name will not match the DNS forest
name used in the username specification:

[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283055,  3, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth.c:200(auth_check_ntlm_password)
  check_ntlm_password:  Checking password for unmapped user [IPA.TEST]\[idmuser]@[] with the new password interface
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283073,  3, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth.c:203(auth_check_ntlm_password)
  check_ntlm_password:  mapped user is: [IPA.TEST]\[idmuser]@[]
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283082, 10, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth.c:213(auth_check_ntlm_password)
  check_ntlm_password: auth_context challenge created by fixed
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283091, 10, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth.c:216(auth_check_ntlm_password)
  challenge is:
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283099,  5, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0)] ../../lib/util/util.c:678(dump_data)
  [0000] 41 72 07 86 7B D3 3C 74                             Ar..{.<t
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283113, 10, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth_sam.c:209(auth_sam_netlogon3_auth)
  auth_sam_netlogon3_auth: Check auth for: [IPA.TEST]\[idmuser]
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283123,  5, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth_sam.c:234(auth_sam_netlogon3_auth)
  auth_sam_netlogon3_auth: IPA.TEST is not our domain name (DC for IPA)
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283131, 10, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth.c:249(auth_check_ntlm_password)
  auth_check_ntlm_password: sam_netlogon3 had nothing to say

and overall authentication attempt will fail: auth_winbind will complain
that this domain is not a trusted one and refuse operating on it:

[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283784, 10, pid=42663, effective(0, 0), real(0, 0), class=winbind] ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd.c:742(process_request_send)
  process_request_send: process_request: Handling async request smbd(42677):PAM_AUTH_CRAP
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283796,  3, pid=42663, effective(0, 0), real(0, 0), class=winbind] ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd_pam_auth_crap.c:110(winbindd_pam_auth_crap_send)
  [42677]: pam auth crap domain: [IPA.TEST] user: idmuser
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283810,  3, pid=42663, effective(0, 0), real(0, 0), class=winbind] ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd_pam.c:409(find_auth_domain)
  Authentication for domain [IPA.TEST] refused as it is not a trusted domain
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283825, 10, pid=42663, effective(0, 0), real(0, 0), class=winbind] ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd.c:810(process_request_done)
  process_request_done: [smbd(42677):PAM_AUTH_CRAP]: NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283844, 10, pid=42663, effective(0, 0), real(0, 0), class=winbind] ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd.c:855(process_request_written)
  process_request_written: [smbd(42677):PAM_AUTH_CRAP]: delivered response to client

Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

(cherry picked from commit 2a8b672652dcbcf55ec59be537773d76f0f14d0a)
2021-11-08 10:52:09 +01:00
Ralph Boehme
4a39d8a161 CVE-2020-25717 winbind: ensure wb_parent_idmap_setup_send() gets called in winbindd_allocate_uid_send()
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14804
RN: winbindd can crash because idmap child state is not fully initialized

Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>

Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Sep  2 15:20:06 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184

(cherry picked from commit d0f6d54354b02f5591706814fbd1e4844788fdfa)

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

(cherry picked from commit 446f89510f2e55a551e2975a6cbf01c6a023ba0c)
2021-11-08 10:52:09 +01:00
Ralph Boehme
4a68c748e4 CVE-2020-25717 winbindd: call wb_parent_idmap_setup_send() in wb_queryuser_send()
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14804

Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 39c2ec72cb77945c3eb611fb1d7d7e9aad52bdfd)

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

(cherry picked from commit 7d1dd87a6538f8c7f1e4938b0ff52cbd231fff90)
2021-11-08 10:52:09 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
4925a110c4 CVE-2020-25717 s3:idmap_hash: reliable return ID_TYPE_BOTH
idmap_hash used to bounce back the requested type,
which was ID_TYPE_UID, ID_TYPE_GID or ID_TYPE_NOT_SPECIFIED
before as the winbindd parent always used a lookupsids.
When the lookupsids failed because of an unknown domain,
the idmap child weren't requested at all and the caller
sees ID_TYPE_NOT_SPECIFIED.

This module should have supported ID_TYPE_BOTH since
samba-4.1.0, similar to idmap_rid and idmap_autorid.

Now that the winbindd parent will pass ID_TYPE_BOTH in order to
indicate that the domain exists, it's better to always return
ID_TYPE_BOTH instead of a random mix of ID_TYPE_UID, ID_TYPE_GID
or ID_TYPE_BOTH. In order to request a type_hint it will return
ID_REQUIRE_TYPE for ID_TYPE_NOT_SPECIFIED, which means that
the parent at least assures that the domain sid exists.
And the caller still gets ID_TYPE_NOT_SPECIFIED if the
domain doesn't exist.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14539

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Jan 22 11:32:46 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184

(cherry picked from commit d8339056eef2845805f573bd8b0f3323370ecc8f)
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>

Autobuild-User(v4-14-test): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-14-test): Wed Jan 27 17:06:51 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

(cherry picked from commit 99673b77b069674a6145552eb870de8829dfa503)
2021-11-08 10:52:09 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
bd12ce56f0 CVE-2020-25717 wb_sids2xids: defer/skip wb_lookupsids* unless we get ID_TYPE_WB_REQUIRE_TYPE
We try to give a valid hint for predefined sids and
pass ID_TYPE_BOTH as a hint that the domain part of the sid is valid.

In most cases the idmap child/backend does not require a type_hint
as mappings already exist.

This is a speed up as we no longer need to contact a domain controller.

It's also possible to accept kerberos authentication without reaching
out to a domain controller at all (if the idmap backend doesn't need a
hint).

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14539

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>

Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Oct 23 04:47:26 UTC 2020 on sn-devel-184

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

(cherry picked from commit 54b4d2d3cb307019a260d15c6e6b4a3fb7fc337c)
2021-11-08 10:52:09 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
04e10a8431 CVE-2020-25717 winbindd: allow idmap backends to mark entries with ID_[TYPE_WB_]REQUIRE_TYPE
This must only be used between winbindd parent and child!
It must not leak into outside world.

Some backends require ID_TYPE_UID or ID_TYPE_GID as type_hint,
while others may only need ID_TYPE_BOTH in order to validate that
the domain exists.

This will allow us to skip the wb_lookupsids_send/recv in the winbindd parent
in future and only do that on demand.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14539

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

(cherry picked from commit 493f5d6b078e0b0f80d1ef25043e2834cb4fcb87)
2021-11-08 10:52:09 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
ed1542b9f3 CVE-2020-25717 wb_sids2xids: build state->idmap_doms based on wb_parent_idmap_config
In future we'll try to avoid wb_lookupsids_send() and only call
it if needed.

The domain name passed should be only relevant to find the correct
idmap backend, and these should all be available in
wb_parent_idmap_config as it was created before the idmap child was forked.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14539

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

(cherry picked from commit c55f4f37589130a0d8952489da175bbcf53f6748)
2021-11-08 10:52:09 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
69c53f9c31 CVE-2020-25717 wb_sids2xids: fill cache as soon as possible
After adding entries to the cache we can mark them
as filled from the cache by setting its domain_index
to UINT32_MAX.

This will allow further changes to fill the results
into state->all_ids in steps.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14539

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

(cherry picked from commit 3f4626ea6d235470195918b77af35ac2cfeb227c)
2021-11-08 10:52:09 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
0ec6beec7d CVE-2020-25717 wb_sids2xids: directly use state->all_ids to collect results
In order to translate the indexes from state->lookup_sids[]
for wb_lookupsids_send/recv() and state->map_ids.ids[]
for dcerpc_wbint_Sids2UnixIDs_send/recv() back to
state->all_ids.ids[] or state->sids[] we have state->tmp_idx[].

This simplifies wb_sids2xids_recv() a lot and make further
restructuring much easier.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14539

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

(cherry picked from commit 374acc2e5fcc3c4b40f41906d0349499e3304841)
2021-11-08 10:52:09 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
ed76640361 CVE-2020-25717 wb_sids2xids: change 'i' to 'li' in wb_sids2xids_lookupsids_done()
With all the indexes we have into various array, this makes clear
'li' is the index into the state->lookup_sids array.

This makes the following changes easier to review.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14539

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

(cherry picked from commit 19c8b6a8b188e45a6342a3d1308085800388a38e)
2021-11-08 10:52:09 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
ab4f028db0 CVE-2020-25717 wb_sids2xids: refactor wb_sids2xids_done() a bit
Here we don't change the logic.

It will make the following changes easier.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14539

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

(cherry picked from commit cda61f592a0b33d36da8da9b6837312396cceec4)
2021-11-08 10:52:09 +01:00
Stefan Metzmacher
5e4491e845 CVE-2020-25717 wb_sids2xids: inline wb_sids2xids_extract_for_domain_index() into wb_sids2xids_next_sids2unix()
Instead of re-creating the dom_ids element,
we just use a pre-allocated map_ids_in array.

This is a bit tricky as we need to use map_ids_out as a copy of
map_ids_in, because the _ids argument of dcerpc_wbint_Sids2UnixIDs_send()
in [in,out], which means that _ids->ids is changed between
dcerpc_wbint_Sids2UnixIDs_send() and dcerpc_wbint_Sids2UnixIDs_recv()!

If the domain doesn't need any mappings, we'll move to the next domain
early, for now this can't happend but it will in future.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14539

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556

(cherry picked from commit f6bb0ed21f82f2cf1f238f9f00cd049ecf8673af)
2021-11-08 10:52:09 +01:00