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This demonstrates that our OR-Name syntax is wrong,
which wasn't noticed yet as it's not used in the AD-Schema.
I noticed it by installing the Exchange-Schema on a Samba DC.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14936
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jan 11 22:03:03 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
inet_pton expects "struct in_addr" or "struct in6_addr" as destination
pointer. It does not fill in a struct
sockaddr_storage. interpret_string_addr() takes care of this.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jan 10 11:47:34 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
This first gets the clock_gettime_mono() value, converts to an NTTIME (as
this is what is stored in the dos attribute EA), then mixes in 8 bits of
randomness shifted up by 55 bits to cope with poor resolution clocks to
avoid duplicate inodes.
Using 8 bits of randomness on top of an NTTIME gives us around 114
years headroom. We can now guarentee returning a itime-based
fileid in a normal share (storing dos attributes in an EA).
Remove knownfail.d/fileid-unique
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14928
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Jan 8 06:35:22 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
smb2.fileid_unique.fileid_unique
smb2.fileid_unique.fileid_unique-dir
Create 100 files or directories as fast as we can
against a "normal" share, then read info on them
and ensure (a) top bit is set (generated from itime)
and (b) uniqueness across all generated objects
(checks poor timestamp resolution doesn't create
duplicate fileids).
This shows that even on ext4, this is enough to
cause duplicate fileids to be returned.
Add knownfail.d/fileid-unique
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14928
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Remove knownfail: selftest/knownfail.d/list_servers
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14939
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Autobuild-User(master): Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jan 6 11:50:32 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14932
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jan 4 20:57:41 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
This demonstrates that an invalid av_pair in NTLMv2_CLIENT_CHALLENGE
should result in NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER at the NTLMSSP layer.
This is different from the netr_LogonSamLogon*() case, where it is
ignored instead.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14932
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Windows doesn't complain about invalid av_pair blobs,
we need to do the same.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14932
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
A netapp diag tool uses a NTLMv2_CLIENT_CHALLENGE with invalid bytes
as av_pair blob. Which is supposed to be ignored by DCs.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14932
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
commit d0062d312c introduced
SMBC_ENCRYPTLEVEL_DEFAULT as default, but the logic to enforce
signing wasn't adjusted, so we required smb signing by default.
That broke guest authentication for libsmbclient using applications.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14935
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Dec 27 16:38:11 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
This demonstrates the problem with guest access being rejected
by default.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14935
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
guest authentication is an old school concept,
so we should make sure it also works with SMB1.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14935
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This must be done before doing POSIX calls on a connection.
Remove the final entry in knownfail.d/posix_infolevel_fails
samba3.smbtorture_s3.plain.POSIX-BLOCKING-LOCK.smbtorture\(nt4_dc_smb1\)
And remove the file knownfail.d/posix_infolevel_fails itself.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Dec 11 12:03:36 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
Remove the following entries in knownfail.d/posix_infolevel_fails.
samba3.blackbox.acl_xattr.NT1.nt_affects_posix.*
samba3.blackbox.acl_xattr.NT1.nt_affects_chown.*
samba3.blackbox.acl_xattr.NT1.nt_affects_chgrp.*
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Remove the following entry in knownfail.d/posix_infolevel_fails.
samba3.blackbox.inherit_owner.*.NT1.*verify.*unix\ owner.*
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Cope with the minor difference in wildcard search return when
we're actually using SMB1+POSIX on the server (SMB1+POSIX treats
all directory search paths as wildcards).
Remove the following entries in knownfail.d/posix_infolevel_fails.
samba3.unix.info2.info2\(nt4_dc_smb1\)
samba3.unix.info2.info2\(ad_dc_smb1\)
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Remove the following entry in knownfail.d/posix_infolevel_fails.
^samba3.raw.search.one\ file\ search.*
from knownfail.d/posix_infolevel_fails
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Add knownfail file
knownfail.d/posix_infolevel_fails
for tests that don't currently negotiate
SMB1+POSIX before using SMB1+POSIX calls.
These are:
samba3.smbtorture_s3.plain.POSIX-BLOCKING-LOCK.smbtorture\(nt4_dc_smb1\)
samba3.blackbox.acl_xattr.NT1.nt_affects_posix.*
samba3.blackbox.acl_xattr.NT1.nt_affects_chown.*
samba3.blackbox.acl_xattr.NT1.nt_affects_chgrp.*
samba3.blackbox.inherit_owner.*.NT1.*verify.*unix\ owner.*
samba3.unix.info2.info2\(nt4_dc_smb1\)
samba3.unix.info2.info2\(ad_dc_smb1\)
samba3.raw.search.one\ file\ search.*
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
These are rpcd_* binaries.
rpcd_classic collects everything that's not specific
Changes the epmapper to read the epmdb.tdb, which will make the
epmapper tests non-bisectable until the switch is done.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Dec 7 04:54:35 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14912
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Dec 2 14:49:35 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
We should not fail this just because the user doesn't have
permissions on the share root.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14788
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Dec 1 11:51:50 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
Demonstrate that smbd fails FSCTL_QUERY_NETWORK_INTERFACE_INFO
only because the user doesn't have permissions on the share root.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14788
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
smbd_smb2_request_process_ioctl() already detailed checks for file_ids,
which not reached before.
.allow_invalid_fileid = true was only used for SMB2_OP_IOCTL.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14788
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
An invalid file id for FSCTL_QUERY_NETWORK_INTERFACE_INFO gives
INVALID_PARAMETER instead of FILE_CLOSED.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14788
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
We should not send more data than the client requested.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14788
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
It seems that we currently don't have BUFFER_TOO_SMALL handling
for FSCTL/IOCTL calls.
FSCTL_QUERY_NETWORK_INTERFACE_INFO is just an easy example
to demonstrate it.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14788
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
We should not fail this just because the user doesn't have permissions
on the share root.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14788
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Demonstrate that smbd fails FSCTL_VALIDATE_NEGOTIATE_INFO
only because the user doesn't have permissions on the share root.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14788
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
The LDB filter processing is where the time is spent in the LDB stack
but the timeout event will not get run while this is ongoing, so we
must confirm we have not yet timed out manually.
RN: Ensure that the LDB request has not timed out during filter processing
as the LDAP server MaxQueryDuration is otherwise not honoured.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14694
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
We allow a timeout of 2x over to avoid this being a flapping test.
Samba is not very accurate on the timeout, which is not otherwise an
issue but makes this test fail sometimes.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14694
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14908
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Nov 17 18:29:09 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
Before the CVE-2020-25717 fixes we had a fallback from
getpwnam('DOMAIN\user') to getpwnam('user') which was very dangerous and
unpredictable.
Now we do the fallback based on sid_to_uid() followed by
getpwuid() on the returned uid.
This obsoletes 'username map [script]' based workaround adviced
for CVE-2020-25717, when nss_winbindd is not used or
idmap_nss is actually used.
In future we may decide to prefer or only do the SID/UID based
lookup, but for now we want to keep this unchanged as much as possible.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14901
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
[metze@samba.org moved the new logic into the fallback codepath only
in order to avoid behavior changes as much as possible]
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Nov 15 19:01:56 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14901
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
[metze@samba.org removed unused tests for a feature that
was removed before merging]
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This avoids a crash that's triggered by windows clients using
DsCrackNames across multiple connections within an association group
on the same DsBind context(policy) handle.
It also improves the auditing for the dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system() case.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This adds a reproducer for an invalid memory access, when
using the context handle from DsBind across multiple connections
within an association group.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
All other fragments blindly inherit it.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14875
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14564
If one of the objectClass checks passed, samldb_add() could return
through one of the samldb_fill_*() functions and skip the
servicePrincipalName uniqueness checking.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
If the structural objectclass is allowed to change, then the restrictions
locking an object to remaining a user or computer will not be enforcable.
Likewise other LDAP inheritance rules, which allow only certain
child objects can be bypassed, which can in turn allow creation of
(unprivileged) users where only DNS objects were expected.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14753
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14889
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
