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This changes auth_serversupplied_info into the IDL-defined struct
auth_user_info_dc. This then in turn contains a struct
auth_user_info, which is the only part of the structure that is
mainted into the struct session_info.
The idea here is to avoid keeping the incomplete results of the
authentication (such as session keys, lists of SID memberships etc) in
a namespace where it may be confused for the finalised results.
Andrew Barltett
This both checks that the levels make sense, and they match what they
should be based on in the DB.
Andrew Bartlett
Autobuild-User: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Wed Feb 2 06:09:53 CET 2011 on sn-devel-104
The issue here is that when the samdb calls were removed, this call
relied on going back to the top of the module stack, so as to re-enter
the rootDSE search handler. It makes more sense to check the @ROOTDSE
record directly, and therefore not to invoke the search() handler
during the init.
Andrew Bartlett
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Tue Jan 25 13:09:41 CET 2011 on sn-devel-104
LSA object classes are protected on both LDAP add and LDAP modify
operations, so I've refactored the previous check in the objectclass LDB
module only for LDAP adds in a new one in the objectclass_attrs LDB
module for both adds and modifies.
This is the result of the investigations done by Hongwei Sun and I in
the last months.
Interestingly these protection mechansim doesn't apply on LDAP deletes!
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This makes everything reference a server_info->sids list, which is now
a struct dom_sid *, not a struct dom_sid **. This is in keeping with
the other sid lists in the security_token etc.
In the process, I also tidy up the talloc tree (move more structures
under their logical parents) and check for some possible overflows in
situations with a pathological number of sids.
Andrew Bartlett
This confirms that the groups obtained from a Kerberos PAC match those
that a manual search of a target LDAP server would reveal.
This should allow mixing of a KDC specified by krb5.conf to test Samba
or Windows alternatly.
Andrew Bartlett
Autobuild-User: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Wed Jan 19 13:13:48 CET 2011 on sn-devel-104
Use the temporary list unless we have at least the three main
"namingContexts" from the rootDSE available (Default, Configuration, Schema -
these are mandatory on all AD deployments!).
This bug has been discovered by Nadya in relation with her SD work.
Autobuild-User: Matthias Dieter Wallnöfer <mdw@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Sat Jan 15 19:01:11 CET 2011 on sn-devel-104
The LSA object creation protection changed to the trusted/untrusted
connection model.
Autobuild-User: Matthias Dieter Wallnöfer <mdw@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Fri Jan 14 19:30:52 CET 2011 on sn-devel-104
"UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE" is only added automatically if no "userAccountControl" flags
are set on LDAP add operations.
Autobuild-User: Matthias Dieter Wallnöfer <mdw@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Fri Jan 14 18:29:07 CET 2011 on sn-devel-104
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User: Andrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Fri Jan 14 07:23:31 CET 2011 on sn-devel-104
this avoids using a multi-part extended DN in a search that hits the
check in extended_dn_in
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
this DN we have came from an extended DN search, which means it may
have multiple extended components. We need to minimise the DN before
AD will accept it
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
this checks that the number of extended components in a DN is valid,
to match MS AD behaviour. We need to do this to ensure that our tools
don't try to do operations that will be invalid when used against MS
servers
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Test setting spn on RWDC, RODC and regular computer object.
Autobuild-User: Nadezhda Ivanova <nivanova@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Wed Dec 22 12:20:24 CET 2010 on sn-devel-104
If this right is granted to a user, they may modify the SPN of an object with some value restrictions
serviceName can be set only if the object is a DC, and then only to the default domain and netbios name, or ntds_guid._msdsc_.forest_domain. If the serviceType is GC, only to the forest root domain. If the serviceType is ldap, then to forest_domain or netbiosname.
InstanceType can be samAccountName or dnsHostName.
We now just do or do not call into LDB based on some flags.
This means there may be some more link time dependencies, but we seem
to deal with those better now.
Andrew Bartlett
This version reverts changes from commit b974966cc2b4d0b5b0d83206070b5f7c5c6495d1
and is what Matthieu Patou had commited in d784ecec555a3d9737e6f4b3894f27904d2b833c
with added reference to the schema cache.
I think referencing schema here is the right thing to be done
as thus we garantee that schema cache will stay in memory
for the time our function is executed
Autobuild-User: Kamen Mazdrashki <kamenim@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Mon Dec 20 12:01:53 CET 2010 on sn-devel-104
