IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO GET AN ACCOUNT, please write an
email to Administrator. User accounts are meant only to access repo
and report issues and/or generate pull requests.
This is a purpose-specific Git hosting for
BaseALT
projects. Thank you for your understanding!
Только зарегистрированные пользователи имеют доступ к сервису!
Для получения аккаунта, обратитесь к администратору.
This allows the optimized checksum->verify() function to be used.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
A different version has gone upstream, fixing the problem
elsewhere.
Signed-off-by: Uri Simchoni <uri@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Uri Simchoni <uri@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Oct 3 11:12:29 CEST 2016 on sn-devel-144
When reading configuration file, keep an extra copy of
the encryption types, and use this when resetting the
encryption types to default.
GSSAPI always resets the enctypes to default before obtaining
a TGS, because the enctypes might have previously altered,
so this prevents changing the etypes from the configured ones
to the full set of supported etypes.
The same patch has gone into upstream heimdal as commit
a3bece1. It is a different solution to the problem fixed
here by commit 1f90983, so this commit will be reverted next
to keep compatibility with uptream.
Signed-off-by: Uri Simchoni <uri@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
If the KDC requires a password change kinit will ask after the initial
authentication for a new password. After the password has been changed
it does reauthentication and for that it needs to use the new password
we just set.
It is needed for the a new kpasswd service test.
This is already fixed upstream with:
911c99375741281adae305f6ec3a3317023eba3e
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
The function krb5_get_init_creds_opt_get_error() is deprecated and
krb5_init_creds_init() and krb5_init_creds_get_error() should be used
now.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This patch removes part of what's categorized in the code as
"hideous glue", which causes Heimdal to ignore krb5.conf
encryption types, and instead use either the application-
supplied values or the default compile-time values.
Signed-off-by: Uri Simchoni <uri@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
This allows PAC_CRENDENTIAL_INFO to be added to the PAC
when using PKINIT. In that case PAC_CRENDENTIAL_INFO contains
an encrypted PAC_CRENDENTIAL_DATA.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11441
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is already fixed in upstream heimdal.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11441
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
A caller may want to specify an explicit order of PAC elements,
e.g. the PAC_UPN_DNS_INFO element should be placed after the PAC_LOGON_NAME
element.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11441
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is commit 7cd40a610569d5e54ebe323672794fb6415b5dac in heimdal master.
Without the enc data, Windows clients will perform two AS-REQ causing the password
lockout count to increase by two instead of one.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11539
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jul 5 10:52:32 CEST 2016 on sn-devel-144
The folks at heimdal didn't like the patch in
commit 6379737b7d and insisted
that kvno should remain unsigned internally, even though it is
encoded as signed in packets. This patch reverts some of the
unsigned->signed changes in that commit, and resolves conversion
issues - in order to be aligned with upstream Heimdal.
Signed-off-by: Uri Simchoni <uri@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue May 24 03:00:39 CEST 2016 on sn-devel-144
This patch changes the encoding/decoding of kvno (key version number)
in blobs and packets to signed integer, for compatibility with Windows.
Reportedly, MIT Kerberos does the same.
This patch effectively reverts commit 1124c4872dfb81bec9c4b527b8927ca35e39a599
in the heimdal tree.
According to the Kerberos spec (RFC 4120 5.2.9), the kvno field
in encrypted data object is an unsigned integer that fits in
32 bits. The Heimdal Kerberos component bundled with Samba
conforms to this. However, Windows deviates from the standard
and encodes kvno as a signed integer, and this creates
interoperability issues.
ASN.1 DER has no special encoding for unsigned integer. A 32-bit
unsigned integer is encoded as a signed integer, so while a signed
32-bit integer (covering the range of -0x80000000..0x7fffffff) is
encoded using up to 4 bytes, an unsigned integer (covering
0..0xffffffff) could require 5 bytes.
Normally, kvno for a given account starts at 1 and increments on
password changes. Kerberos defined this as unsigned because there's
no meaning for negative version numbers, so the standard writers figured
4 billion versions is better than 2 billion. It was not
expected for a kvno to really go past 0x7fffffff and the disctinction
usually does not matter. However, RODCs use kvnos which
have the most-significant bit set.
In Active Directory, RODCs have a private secret for the krbtgt,
because the assumption is that the RODC is less secure, and
recovering the domain krbtgt secret from the RODC would compromise
the security of the entire domain. The kvno field is being used
to identify the private krbtgt account that owns the key - the
upper 16 bits are the RODC id, and the lower 16 bits identify
the key version number for this specific RODC. It's common to
have an RODC id greater than 0x8000, and therefore to have a
kvno larger than 0x7fffffff, which would be DER-encoded using
5 bytes.
Windows encodes kvno as signed integer - basically taking the
32 bits and treating them as a signed integer rather than an
unsigned integer. This means that in Windows a kvno can
always be encoded using 4 bytes, and Windows DCs reject a kvno
encoded using more than 4 bytes without even generating an error
response (the DC assumes it's an attack).
Heimdal re-encodes the TGT when it creates a TGS request. Obviously
it cannot decode and encode the encrypted parts but it does re-encode
the plain parts, which include the kvno. That leads to a 5-byte
kvno in the TGS request, which is rejected without an error
response.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11900
Signed-off-by: Uri Simchoni <uri@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat May 7 21:14:21 CEST 2016 on sn-devel-144
This allows testing keytabs with service tickets. Windows KDCs allow
this as well.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <rb@sernet.de>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Mar 10 03:33:46 CET 2016 on sn-devel-144
make memcmp() compare the name1 and name2 value instead of comparing
name1 with itself.
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ira Cooper <ira@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Thanks to GCC6 -Wmisleading-indentation.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Mar 3 16:21:52 CET 2016 on sn-devel-144
Some non-GSSAPI implementations that instead try to create compatible packets by wrapping krb5_mk_req()
can trigger a NULL authenticator here. Assume this to be equvilent to specifying an all-zero
channel bindings and some reasonable (fixed) flags.
This was seen in the wild, with a Huawei Unified Storage System S5500 V3 against the AD DC
Original patch by Andrew Bartlett, restructured by Douglas Bagnall
Cherry-picked from upstream GIT 0a5de96d72cdea9e465412d7dba1e5d13e53dc09
which is the merge of https://github.com/heimdal/heimdal/pull/134
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11425
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
A backend can return this if asked with HDB_F_GET_CLIENT|HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ
for a KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL record or for HDB_F_GET_SERVER | HDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ.
entry_ex->entry.principal->realm needs to return the real realm of the principal
(or at least a the realm of the next cross-realm trust hop).
This is needed to route enterprise principals between AD domain trusts.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is not DRSUAPI specific, it works for all 3 part principals.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This gives the caller the ability to skip the client_name
and only provide client_realm. This is required for
KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM messages.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
An AS-REQ with an enterprise principal will always directed to a kdc of the local
(default) realm. The KDC directs the client into the direction of the
final realm. See rfc6806.txt.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Pair-Programmed-With: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Now it matches _gk_unwrap_iov() and _gk_wrap_iov_length().
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
When sending a Kerberos request, if at least one of the available
KDCs repeatedly replies with an error response of
KRB5KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE, and all other KDCs, if there are any,
do not reply at all or cannot be contacted, then the code repeatedly
retries to send the request in an endless loop.
This is fixed in upstream (post 1.5 branch) heimdal but the code
there is vastly refactored, so this is an independent fix to the issue.
Signed-off-by: Uri Simchoni <urisimchoni@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Jun 17 02:34:31 CEST 2015 on sn-devel-104
FreeIPA can generate tickets with a client principal of
'host/hostname.example.com'.
verify_logonname() should just verify the principal name
in the PAC_LOGON_NAME is the same as the principal of
the client principal (without realm) of the ticket.
Samba commit b7cc8c1187
break this. We try to compare ['host']['hostname.example.com']
with ['host/hostname.example.com]' (as we interpret it as enterprise principal)
this fail if we don't compare them as strings.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11142
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
tmp.data is uninitialized in the fwrite call
Hopefully I don't create a problem here: If tmp.data is supposed to be randomly
set, I think the right fix would have been to explicitly call a random function
initializing it.
<jra@samba.org>
------------------------------------------------------------
I have looked through the code carefully. Your fix is safe.
The first entry in the replay file created in krb5_rc_initialize()
is only used to store the 'krb5_deltat auth_lifespan' value, the
associated data[16] value is never looked at. (Look at the
code in krb5_rc_store() and krb5_rc_get_lifespan() to confirm).
Only subsequent data[16] values are checked with memcmp.
------------------------------------------------------------
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
An ENTERPRISE principal should result in 'administrator@S4XDOM.BASE'
instead of 'administrator\@S4XDOM.BASE'.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11142
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
This got removed between draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals-11.txt
and the final rfc6806.txt.
The number 133 was reassigned to PA-FX-COOKIE in rfc6113.txt.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
This got removed between draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals-11.txt
and the final rfc6806.txt.
The number 133 was reassigned to PA-FX-COOKIE in rfc6113.txt.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
This got removed between draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals-11.txt
and the final rfc6806.txt.
The number 133 was reassigned to PA-FX-COOKIE in rfc6113.txt.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
I think Coverity is right here: Before the preceding call to
krb5_make_principal we already krb5_free_principal(ctx, tmp_creds.server)
without wiping out tmp_creds.server. The call to krb5_make_principal only
stores something fresh when it also returns 0 a.k.a. success.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Mar 6 17:38:09 CET 2015 on sn-devel-104
Different gcc versions complain at different places
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Mar 3 13:14:53 CET 2015 on sn-devel-104
This change ensures that our RODC will correctly proxy when asked to provide
a ticket for a service or user where the keys are not on this RODC.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Pair-programmed-with: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The value of this commit to Samba is to continue to match Heimdal's
upstream code in this area. Because we set HDB_CAP_F_HANDLE_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL
there is no runtime difference.
(commit message by Andrew Bartlett)
Cherry-pick of Heimdal commit 9aa7883ff2efb3e0a60016c9090c577acfd0779f
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The useful change in Samba from this commit is that we gain
validation of the enterprise principal name.
(commit message by Andrew Bartlett)
Cherry-pick of Heimdal commit c76ec8ec6a507a6f34ca80c11e5297146acff83f
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>