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This includes user_principal_name and dns_domain_name.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We need to take care of extra sids in level 3 and 6!
And level 6 also includes user_principal_name and dns_domain_name.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
For a Samba server that uses a non-AD KDC this message is triggered on
every new connection. Change the log level from warning/1 to a more
appropriate notice/5.
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Enforcement of SMB signing is done at the SMB layer.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11850
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
It doesn't make any sense to allow other auth levels.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11749
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
We now detect a MsvAvTimestamp in target info as indication
of the server to support NTLMSSP_MIC in the AUTH_MESSAGE.
If the client uses NTLMv2 we provide
NTLMSSP_AVFLAG_MIC_IN_AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE and valid MIC.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11644
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
We now include a MsvAvTimestamp in our target info as indication
for the client to include a NTLMSSP_MIC in the AUTH_MESSAGE.
If the client uses NTLMv2 we check NTLMSSP_AVFLAG_MIC_IN_AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE
and require a valid MIC.
This is still disabled if the "map to guest" feature is used.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11644
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
If we clear CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH and we should also clear the lm_response buffer
and don't send it over the net.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11644
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
[MS-SPNG] requires the NTLMSSP RC4 states to be reset after
the SPNEGO exchange with mechListMic verification (new_spnego).
The 'reset_full' parameter is needed to support the broken
behavior that windows only resets the RC4 states but not the
sequence numbers. Which means this functionality is completely
useless... But we want to work against all windows versions...
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11644
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
It's important to check if got the GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN and if the caller
wanted it.
The caller may only asked for GENSEC_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY which implicitly
negotiates NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN, which might indicate GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN
to the SPNEGO glue code.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11644
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
[MS-SPNG] requires the NTLMSSP RC4 states to be reset after
the SPNEGO exchange with mechListMic verification (new_spnego).
This provides the infrastructure for this feature.
The 'reset_full' parameter is needed to support the broken
behavior that windows only resets the RC4 states but not the
sequence numbers. Which means this functionality is completely
useless... But we want to work against all windows versions...
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11644
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
This used to work more or less before, but only for krb5 with the
server finishing first.
With NTLMSSP and new_spnego the client will finish first.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11644
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
New servers response with SPNEGO_REQUEST_MIC instead of
SPNEGO_ACCEPT_INCOMPLETE to a downgrade.
With just KRB5 and NTLMSSP this doesn't happen, but we
want to be prepared for the future.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11644
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Even for SMB where the server provides its mech list,
the client needs to remember its own mech list for the
mechListMIC calculation.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11644
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
ntlmssp_handle_neg_flags() can only disable flags, but not
set them. All supported flags are set at start time.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11644
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
man smb.conf says "client ntlmv2 auth = yes" the default disables,
"client lanman auth = yes":
...
Likewise, if the client ntlmv2 auth parameter is enabled, then only NTLMv2
logins will be attempted.
...
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11644
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
We now give an error when required flags are missing.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11644
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
In future we can do a more fine granted negotiation
and assert specific security features.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11644
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
ops->auth_type == 0, means the backend doesn't support DCERPC.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
This is now handled by GENSEC_FEATURE_LDAP_STYLE.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We want also work against old Samba servers which didn't had
GENSEC_FEATURE_LDAP_STYLE we negotiate SEAL too. We may remove this in a few
years. As all servers should support GENSEC_FEATURE_LDAP_STYLE by then.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
We need to handle NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN as
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL if GENSEC_FEATURE_LDAP_STYLE
is requested.
This works arround a bug in Windows, which allow signed only
messages using NTLMSSP and LDAP.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
This will be used for LDAP connections and may trigger
backend specific behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
We already set NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION in
gensec_ntlmssp_server_start(), so it's always
set in chal_flags.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
This matches a modern Windows client.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
We don't set NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM_{DOMAIN,WORKSTATION}_SUPPLIED anyway.
This matches modern Windows clients.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
This matches a modern Windows client.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION only indicates the existence of the version
information in the packet.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
This can used in order to use the WINBINDD_CCACHE_NTLMAUTH
code of winbindd to do NTLMSSP authentication with a cached
password.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
These can be used to implement the winbindd side of
the WINBINDD_CCACHE_NTLMAUTH call.
It can properly get the initial NEGOTIATE messages
injected if available.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
This is a hack in order to temporary export the server domain
from NTLMSSP through the gensec stack.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We do that for all other gensec_security_by_*() functions already.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is a hack in order to temporary implement something like:
gensec_ntlmssp_server_domain(), which may be used within spnego.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This changes pycredentials to use talloc.BaseObject() just like the PIDL output
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
We can call pytalloc_reference() and avoid having this in the header file
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
This type should not be used directly, it should have been made private
to pytalloc
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
This is necessary because it has public headers.
Signed-off-by: Jelmer Vernooij <jelmer@jelmer.uk>
Reviewed-By: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-By: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jelmer Vernooij <jelmer@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Jan 13 07:47:04 CET 2016 on sn-devel-144
We don't need the full power of NTSTATUS here. This was the only
NTSTATUS in asn1.h, so I think it's worth removing it.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Sharpe <rsharpe@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Aug 25 21:45:18 CEST 2015 on sn-devel-104
We should always pass down the saltPrincipal to smb_krb5_update_keytab()
function.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
When dealing with Kerberos, we cannot consider credentials anonymous
if credentials were obtained properly.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11265
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan (metze) Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Jul 15 16:32:55 CEST 2015 on sn-devel-104
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Jun 24 13:37:02 CEST 2015 on sn-devel-104
These make use of gss_[un]wrap_iov[_length]() where required and support
header signing.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We want to set GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN and GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL based on the given
auth_level and should not have GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL if
DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY is desired.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11061
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
gensec_sig_size() also requires GENSEC_FEATURE_DCE_STYLE if
GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL is negotiated.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
source4/rpc_server/dcerpc_server.c:dcesrv_request() calls gensec_have_feature().
Codenomicon found a code path that allows the client to send a
request that calls into this function without ever having set
up security. So call->conn->auth_state.gensec_security exists
(gensec has been initialized when the RPC pipe is set up)
but call->conn->auth_state.gensec_security->ops has not been
initialized. We dereference the NULL pointer and crash.
An alternate way to fix this would be to create a new
public bool gensec_initialized(() function and call that
inside dcesrv_request() instead of doing a null
check on call->conn->auth_state.gensec_security,
but that's a more invasive fix we can add later.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11341
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue May 19 13:42:32 CEST 2015 on sn-devel-104
On a host without a talloc.h, this caused the build to fail
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Mar 19 18:01:09 CET 2015 on sn-devel-104
Packet traces showing such servers are found in the bug this fixes:
https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10016
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
This is required to set the previous trust account password.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
The machine and trust accounts it's important to retry
netr_Authenticate3() with the previous (old) nt_hash.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
This ensures that if an enterprise principal is used, we do the
comparison properly
This matters as in the enterprise case, which can be triggered by MIT
kinit -E, does not use canonicalization, and so the enterprise name,
with the @ in it, is in the logon name.
Otherwise, we get errors like:
Name in PAC [TESTALLOWED@WIN2012R2] does not match principal name in ticket
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11142
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Different gcc versions complain at different places
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Mar 3 13:14:53 CET 2015 on sn-devel-104
Guenther
Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jan 26 19:56:57 CET 2015 on sn-devel-104
We need a way to initialize the cli_credentials from the raw utf16 blob,
which might not be completely valid utf16, which means the conversion
from CH_UTF16MUNGED to CH_UTF8 might loose information.
This would result in an invalid nt_hash, when we convert back
from CH_UTF8 to CH_UTF16LE.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11016
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Even with CRED_MUST_USE_KERBEROS we should keep the DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL
backend arround, this can only be specified explicitely by the caller
and cli_credentials_get_netlogon_creds() != NULL is the strong indication
that the caller is using DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL *now*.
With trusts against AD domain we can reliable use kerberos and netlogon
secure channel for authentication.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
