IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO GET AN ACCOUNT, please write an
email to Administrator. User accounts are meant only to access repo
and report issues and/or generate pull requests.
This is a purpose-specific Git hosting for
BaseALT
projects. Thank you for your understanding!
Только зарегистрированные пользователи имеют доступ к сервису!
Для получения аккаунта, обратитесь к администратору.
In order to allow better upgrades we need the default value for smb.conf to the
same even if the effective default value of the software changes in future.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We need to take the value from the msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes
attribute and only take the default if there's no value or
if the value is 0.
For krbtgt and DC accounts we need to force support for
ARCFOUR-HMAC-MD5 and AES encryption types and add the related bits
in addtition. (Note for krbtgt msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes is
completely ignored the hardcoded value is the default, so there's
no AES256-SK for krbtgt).
For UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY on the account we reset
the value to 0, these accounts are in fact disabled completely,
as they always result in KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP.
Then we try to get all encryption keys marked in
supported_enctypes, and the available_enctypes
is a reduced set depending on what keys are
actually stored in the database.
We select the supported session key enctypes by the available
keys and in addition based on AES256-SK as well as the
"kdc force enable rc4 weak session keys" option.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13135
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
As part of matching the behaviour of Windows, assume that trust objects
support AES256, but not RC4, if not specified otherwise.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15219
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK is a flag introduced for by Microsoft in this
CVE to indicate that additionally, AES session keys are available. We
set the etypes available for session keys depending on the encryption
types that are supported by the principal.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15219
Pair-Programmed-With: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This shows that changes around RC4 encryption types do not break older
functional levels where only RC4 keys are available.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK is a flag introduced for by Microsoft in this CVE
to indicate that additionally, AES session keys are available.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15231
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
The KDC should leave the choice of ticket encryption type up to the
target service, and admit no influence from the client.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
By default we'll now require schannel connections with
privacy/sealing/encryption.
But we allow exceptions for specific computer/trust accounts.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15260
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
It's enough to warn the admin once per connection.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
We'll soon add some additional contraints in dcesrv_netr_check_schannel(),
which are also required for dcesrv_netr_LogonSamLogonEx().
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This will allow us to reuse the function in other places.
As it will also get some additional checks soon.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This allows the admin to notice what's wrong in order to adjust the
configuration if required.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This makes it more flexible when we change the global default to
'reject md5 servers = yes'.
'allow nt4 crypto = no' is already the default.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
We'll soon make it possible to use 'reject md5 servers:CLIENTACCOUNT$ = no',
which means we'll need use the account name from our SAM.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
We'll soon make it possible to use 'reject md5 servers:CLIENTACCOUNT$ = no',
which means we'll need the downgrade detection in more places.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
For generic tests we should use the best available features.
And AES will be required by default soon.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
In order to avoid generating useless debug messages during make test,
we will use 'CVE_2020_1472:warn_about_unused_debug_level = 3'
and 'CVE_2020_1472:error_debug_level = 2' in order to avoid schannel warnings.
Review with: git show -w
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This will simplify the following changes.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This will simplify the following changes.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This will simplify the following changes.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This will simplify the following changes.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This was spawned by https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13472 back
then. Samba implement this correctly, just add this test found in the attic.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Dec 10 00:07:09 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
This one renames one file per iteration and can also be used to torture any
directory caching the server may employ.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
This is used by performance tests that don't want to measure network latency but
fileserver IO latency.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
- create file with ARCHIVE
- open file with ARCHIVE+HIDDEN+...
- check DOS attrs are still only ARCHIVE from the initial create
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
commit 55b2f247f9 already remove a few of these,
but a few remained.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Mainly so I can go
make bin/test_lzxpress_plain && bin/test_lzxpress_plain
valgrind bin/test_lzxpress_plain
rr bin/test_lzxpress_plain
rr replay
in a tight loop.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
We are going to add more tests for lib/compression, and they can't all
be called "testsuite.c".
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
The protocol allows the last read in a related compound to be split
off and possibly go async (and smbd soon will do this). If the
last read is split off, then the padding is different. By sending
3 reads and checking the padding on the 2nd read, we cope with
the smbd change and are still correctly checking the padding
on a compound related read.
Do this for the stream filename compound padding test.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
The protocol allows the last read in a related compound to be split
off and possibly go async (and smbd soon will do this). If the
last read is split off, then the padding is different. By sending
3 reads and checking the padding on the 2nd read, we cope with
the smbd change and are still correctly checking the padding
on a compound related read.
Do this for the base filename compound padding test.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
The timer for the timeout_cb() handler was created on a memory context
which doesn't get freed, so the timer was still valid when running
the next test and fired there. It was then writing into random memory
leading to segfaults.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Dec 1 15:03:19 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
We pass the stack variable 'req' to dcerpc_winbind_SendToSam_r_send(),
so we need to make sure the runtime of the subreq in not longer
than the stack variable.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15253
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>