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This of course allows for fine-grained knownfails.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The examples in the canonical list are already in the form that
Windows and Samba will use for that SD. We check the round trip.
The examples in the non-canonical list will change in a round trip, so
we also give the string we think they should end up as. These have
been checked on Windows.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The test will fail right now because it makes round trip assertions.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is because in ceetain places we compare strings rather than security
descriptors.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We don't see this happening on Windows.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
These occur canonically when the indentifier authority is > 2^32, but
also are accepted by Windows for any number.
There is a tricky case with an "O:" or "G:" SID that is immediately
followed by a "D:" dacl, because the "D" looks like a hex digit. When
we detect this we need to subtract one from the length.
We also need to do look out for trailing garbage. This was not an
issue before because any string caught by the strspn(...,
"-0123456789") would be either rejected or fully comsumed by
dom_sid_parse_talloc(), but with hex digits, a string like
"S-1-1-2x0xabcxxx-X" would be successfully parsed as "S-1-1-2", and
the "x0xabcxxx-X" would be skipped over. That's why we switch to using
dom_sid_parse_endp(), so we can compare the consumed length to the
expected length.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
previously a string could have anything in it, so long as every second
character was ':'.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Following Windows, the numbers that would be octal (e.g. "0123") are
converted to decimal by skipping over the zeros.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
By using an ldb.Dn as an intermediary, we get to see which SIDs
Samba thinks are OK but Windows thinks are bad.
It is things like "S-0-5-32-579".
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
As a way of testing the interpretation of a SID string in a remote
server, we search on the base DN "<SID=x>" where x is a non-existent
or malformed SID.
On Windows some or all malformed SIDs are detected before the search
begins, resulting in a complaint about DN syntax rather than one about
missing objects.
From this we can get a picture of what Windows considers to be
a proper SID in this context.
Samba does not make a distinction here, always returning NO_SUCH_OBJECT.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The Samba side is aspirational -- what we actually do is generally
worse. However the Windows behaviour in these cases seems more
surprising still, and seems to be neither documented nor used.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The reason the existing tests send the SID over the wire as SDDL for
defaultSecurityDescriptor is it is one of the few ways to force the
server to reckon with a SID-string as a SID. At least, that's the case
with Windows. In Samba we make no effort to decode the SDDL until it
comes to the time of creating an object, at which point we don't notice
the difference between bad SDDL and missing SDDL.
So here we add a set of dynamic tests that push the strings through our
SDDL parsing code. This doesn't tell us very much more, but it is very
quick and sort of confirms that the other tests are on the right track.
To run against Windows without also running the internal Samba tests,
add `SAMBA_SID_STRINGS_SKIP_LOCAL=1` to your environment variables.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We are mostly testing edge cases around the handling of numeric
limits.
These tests are based on ground truth established by running them
against Windows.
Many fail against Samba, because the defaulSecurityDescriptor
attribute is not validated at the time it is set while on Windows it
is.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We don't care about the exact time of the test, just that we
disambiguate between different runs (each run leaves an immutable scar
on the target server).
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This fixes setting veto files to '.*' to not list hidden files and
directories starting with a dot.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15360
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Apr 19 22:30:19 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
streams_depot hands us absolute paths with : filename components
instead of having set smb_fname_in->stream_name.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15358
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Apr 17 18:11:07 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
See the next patch, we assert in shadow_copy2_openat() over paths
passed in from shadow_copy2
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15358
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
If a test fails an assertion, and later calls torture_skip() to skip
part of the test, the TORTURE_SKIP result will overwrite the
TORTURE_FAIL result, and the overall outcome will be successful.
To avoid this, we now arrange possible outcomes in order of priority,
and ensure we always keep the higher priority one.
This reveals some failing tests.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
The problem is when checking for vetoed names on the last path component in
openat_pathref_fsp_case_insensitive() we return
NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND. The in the caller
filename_convert_dirfsp_nosymlink() this is treated as the "file creation case"
causing filename_convert_dirfsp_nosymlink() to return NT_STATUS_OK.
In order to correctly distinguish between the cases
1) file doesn't exist, we may be creating it, return
2) a vetoed a file
we need 2) to return a more specific error to
filename_convert_dirfsp_nosymlink(). I've chosen NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID
which gets mapped to the appropriate errror NT_STATUS_OBJECT_PATH_NOT_FOUND or
NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND depending on which path component was vetoed.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15143
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Apr 6 23:03:50 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
We get the realm we use for authentication needs to
the realm belonging to the username we use.
We derive the username from c->creds, so we need to
do the same for the realm.
Otherwise we try to authenticate as the wrong user.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15323
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This reproduces a regression with
'net ads search -P --server server.of.trusted.domain'
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15323
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Rob van der Linde <rob@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Apr 6 01:33:05 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
This demonstrates that the server did not detect CVE-2023-0922
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Rob van der Linde <rob@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This early return would mistakenly allow an unprivileged user to delete
the dNSHostName attribute by making an LDAP modify request with no
values. We should no longer allow this.
Add or replace operations with no values and no privileges are
disallowed.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15276
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15276
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Add a hook, acl_redact_msg_for_filter(), in the aclread module, that
marks inaccessible any message elements used by an LDAP search filter
that the user has no right to access. Make the various ldb_match_*()
functions check whether message elements are accessible, and refuse to
match any that are not. Remaining message elements, not mentioned in the
search filter, are checked in aclread_callback(), and any inaccessible
elements are removed at this point.
Certain attributes, namely objectClass, distinguishedName, name, and
objectGUID, are always present, and hence the presence of said
attributes is always allowed to be checked in a search filter. This
corresponds with the behaviour of Windows.
Further, we unconditionally allow the attributes isDeleted and
isRecycled in a check for presence or equality. Windows is not known to
make this special exception, but it seems mostly harmless, and should
mitigate the performance impact on searches made by the show_deleted
module.
As a result of all these changes, our behaviour regarding confidential
attributes happens to match Windows more closely. For the test in
confidential_attr.py, we can now model our attribute handling with
DC_MODE_RETURN_ALL, which corresponds to the behaviour exhibited by
Windows.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15270
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The smbget utility doesn't use the common command line parser, so it
doesn't support paring of DOMAIN/user or user@realm.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15345
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We should not overwrite the "rc=1" initialization with the tdb_check
retval. This will lead to tdb_validate_child() returning 0 even when
validate_fn() found invalid entries.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14789
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Remove knownfail for posix path handling of case/reserved char
Signed-off-by: David Mulder <dmulder@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
We now create a client claims blob and add it to the PAC.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
More of these tests now pass against Windows. They still don't quite all
pass, but that's something to fix for another day.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Added delete protected test to known fail as Samba doesn't seem to enforce this yet.
Signed-off-by: Rob van der Linde <rob@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Remove knownfail on SMB1-DFS-SEARCH-PATHS, as we now
pass it with the new SMB1 remove DFS paths before pathname processing
changes.
Note, we still fail:
smb1.SMB1-DFS-PATHS.smbtorture\(fileserver_smb1\)
smb1.SMB1-DFS-OPERATIONS.smbtorture\(fileserver_smb1\)
even with the new SMB1 remove DFS paths before pathname
processing as those tests test *very* specific Windows behaviors. We now
pass many more of the individual internal tests, but
in order to pass them all completely I need to add
specific --with-sambaserver checks to avoid some
of the Windows DFS SMB1 insanity (error messages).
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Mar 31 06:07:01 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
In smb2, smb1req->flags2 now never uses FLAGS2_DFS_PATHNAMES,
ucf_flags never has UCF_DFS_PATHNAME, and all calls to check_path_syntax_smb2()
pass "false" in this is_dfs parameter.
Remove all knownfails for smb2.SMB2-DFS* tests.
Now I can clean up check_path_syntax_smb2() and add
an assertion into filename_convert_dirfsp_nosymlink() that
UCF_DFS_PATHNAME is *NEVER* set in the ucf_flags for an
SMB2 connection.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Even if the client claims it's a DFS pathname. Matches what Windows does if it gets
a DFS pathname on a non-DFS share.
Remove samba3.smbtorture_s3.smb2.SMB2-NON-DFS-SHARE.smbtorture\(fileserver\)
test knownfail.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
