IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO GET AN ACCOUNT, please write an
email to Administrator. User accounts are meant only to access repo
and report issues and/or generate pull requests.
This is a purpose-specific Git hosting for
BaseALT
projects. Thank you for your understanding!
Только зарегистрированные пользователи имеют доступ к сервису!
Для получения аккаунта, обратитесь к администратору.
Use security_descriptor_copy() instead, which is also provided by
libcli.
Signed-off-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
When the ID returned is ID_TYPE_BOTH we must *always* add it as both
a user and a group, not just in the owning case. Otherwise DENY
entries are not correctly processed.
Confirmed by the reporter as fixing the problem.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10196
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
Fix for ACL problem - not accepting DENY. Code was checking for pointer and not for content.
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Sep 21 05:24:07 CEST 2013 on sn-devel-104
When 6adc7dad96 removed the calls to
lp_security_mask/lp_force_security_mode/lp_dir_security_mask/lp_force_dir_security_mode
these calls were replaced with lp_create_mask() and lp_dir_mask()
The issue is that while lp_security_mask() and lp_dir_security_mask defaulted to
0777, the replacement calls did not. This changes behaviour, and incorrectly
prevents a posix mode being specified by the client from being applied to
the disk in the non-ACL enabled case.
Andrew Bartlett
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
The mask/mode parameters should only apply to a situation with only
pure posix permissions.
Once we are dealing with ACLs and inheritance, we need to do it correctly.
This fixes bug #9462: Users can not be given write permissions any more by default
Signed-off-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Reviewed by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Get rid of a large chunk of unused code.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Dec 4 11:59:30 CET 2012 on sn-devel-104
Not caught by make test as it's an extreme edge case for strange
incoming ACLs. I only found this as I'm making raw.acls and smb2.acls
pass against 3.6.x and 4.0.0 with acl_xattr mapped onto a POSIX backend.
An incoming inheritable ACE entry containing only one permission,
WRITE_DATA maps into a POSIX owner perm of "-w-", which violates
the principle that the owner of a file/directory can always read.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Nov 15 19:52:52 CET 2012 on sn-devel-104
NT4 is long dead, and we should not change which ACL we return based
on what we think the client is. The reason we should not do this, is
that if we are using vfs_acl_xattr then the hash will break if we do.
Additionally, it would require that the python VFS interface set the
global remote_arch to fake up being a modern client.
This instead seems cleaner and removes untested code (the tests are
updated to then handle the results of the modern codepath).
The supporting 'acl compatability' parameter is also removed.
Andrew Bartlett
Reviewed by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Internally change the implementation to use SMB_VFS_GET_NT_ACL()
instead of SMB_VFS_FGET_NT_ACL() with a faked-up file struct.
Andrew Bartlett
Reviewed by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Nov 10 20:25:48 CET 2012 on sn-devel-104
This simply linearlises the SMB_ACL_T (default and access acl for
directories) and the file owner, group and mode into a blob.
It will be useful for an improved vfs_acl_common.c that uses this sets
that, rather than the hash of the NT ACL, in the xattr
This will in turn insulate the stored hash from changes in the ACL
mapping.
Andrew Bartlett
This makes it clear which context the returned SD is allocated on, as
a number of callers do not want it on talloc_tos().
As the ACL transformation allocates and then no longer needs a great
deal of memory, a talloc_stackframe() call is used to contain the
memory that is not returned further up the stack.
Andrew Bartlett
This changes from allocation on NULL to allocation on the supplied
memory context.
Currently that supplied context is talloc_tos() at the the final consumer of
the ACL.
Andrew Bartlett
they are different so should go through a mapping function. Ensure this is so.
Practically this does not matter, as for user permissions the mapping
function is an identity, and the extra bits we may add are ignored
anyway, but this makes the intent clear.
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Oct 6 03:04:14 CEST 2012 on sn-devel-104
This will allow us to remove the struct smb_acl_t manipuations from the VFS layer,
which will be reduced to handling the get/set functions.
Andrew Bartlett
This will allow us to remove the struct smb_acl_t manipuations from the VFS layer,
which will be reduced to handling the get/set functions.
Andrew Bartlett
This will allow us to remove the struct smb_acl_t manipuations from the VFS layer,
which will be reduced to handling the get/set functions.
Andrew Bartlett
This will allow us to remove the struct smb_acl_t manipuations from the VFS layer,
which will be reduced to handling the get/set functions.
Andrew Bartlett
This will allow us to remove the struct smb_acl_t manipuations from the VFS layer,
which will be reduced to handling the get/set functions.
Andrew Bartlett
This will allow us to remove the struct smb_acl_t manipuations from the VFS layer,
which will be reduced to handling the get/set functions.
Andrew Bartlett
This will allow us to remove the struct smb_acl_t manipuations from the VFS layer,
which will be reduced to handling the get/set functions.
Andrew Bartlett
This will allow us to remove the struct smb_acl_t manipuations from the VFS layer,
which will be reduced to handling the get/set functions.
Andrew Bartlett
This will allow us to remove the struct smb_acl_t manipuations from the VFS layer,
which will be reduced to handling the get/set functions.
Andrew Bartlett
This will allow us to remove the struct smb_acl_t manipuations from the VFS layer,
which will be reduced to handling the get/set functions.
Andrew Bartlett
This will allow us to remove the struct smb_acl_t manipuations from the VFS layer,
which will be reduced to handling the get/set functions.
Andrew Bartlett
This will allow us to remove the struct smb_acl_t manipuations from the VFS layer,
which will be reduced to handling the get/set functions.
Andrew Bartlett
This will allow us to remove the struct smb_acl_t manipuations from the VFS layer,
which will be reduced to handling the get/set functions.
Andrew Bartlett
This will allow us to remove the struct smb_acl_t manipuations from the VFS layer,
which will be reduced to handling the get/set functions.
Andrew Bartlett
As the test for a valid posix ACL is based on the unix uid/gid only appearing once in the ACL
the merge process also needs to be UID/GID based.
This is a problem when we have multiple builtin groups mapped to the same POSIX group
as happens in a Samba4 provision.
Andrew Bartlett
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
This is consistent with the rest of Samba which uses this structure to represent
a unix uid or gid.
World values remain represented by the owner_type being WORLD_ACE in the containing
structure. A -1 value is filled in to the unixid.id in the same way the .world value
was initialised in the union.
Andrew Bartlett
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
When a user owns a file, but does not have specific permissions on that file, we need to
make up the user permissions. This change ensures that the first thing that we do
is to look up the SID, and confirm it is a user. Then, we avoid the getpwnam()
and directly create the token via the SID.
Andrew Bartlett
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
