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samba-mirror/source4/kdc/pac-glue.c
Jelmer Vernooij 890485bd17 heimdal: Cope with newer Heimdal versions accepting a keyset argument to
hdb_enctype2key.

Autobuild-User: Jelmer Vernooij <jelmer@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Mon May  7 18:33:10 CEST 2012 on sn-devel-104
2012-05-07 18:33:10 +02:00

503 lines
13 KiB
C

/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
PAC Glue between Samba and the KDC
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "../libds/common/flags.h"
#include <ldb.h>
#include "auth/auth.h"
#include "auth/auth_sam_reply.h"
#include "kdc/kdc-glue.h"
#include "kdc/pac-glue.h"
#include "param/param.h"
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_krb5pac.h"
#include "libcli/security/security.h"
#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
#include "auth/kerberos/pac_utils.h"
static
NTSTATUS samba_get_logon_info_pac_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct auth_user_info_dc *info,
DATA_BLOB *pac_data)
{
struct netr_SamInfo3 *info3;
union PAC_INFO pac_info;
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
ZERO_STRUCT(pac_info);
nt_status = auth_convert_user_info_dc_saminfo3(mem_ctx, info, &info3);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DEBUG(1, ("Getting Samba info failed: %s\n",
nt_errstr(nt_status)));
return nt_status;
}
pac_info.logon_info.info = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct PAC_LOGON_INFO);
if (!pac_info.logon_info.info) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
pac_info.logon_info.info->info3 = *info3;
ndr_err = ndr_push_union_blob(pac_data, mem_ctx, &pac_info,
PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO,
(ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_INFO);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
DEBUG(1, ("PAC (presig) push failed: %s\n",
nt_errstr(nt_status)));
return nt_status;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
krb5_error_code samba_make_krb5_pac(krb5_context context,
DATA_BLOB *pac_blob,
DATA_BLOB *deleg_blob,
krb5_pac *pac)
{
krb5_data pac_data;
krb5_data deleg_data;
krb5_error_code ret;
/* The user account may be set not to want the PAC */
if (!pac_blob) {
return 0;
}
ret = krb5_data_copy(&pac_data, pac_blob->data, pac_blob->length);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
ZERO_STRUCT(deleg_data);
if (deleg_blob) {
ret = krb5_data_copy(&deleg_data,
deleg_blob->data,
deleg_blob->length);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_data_free(&pac_data);
return ret;
}
}
ret = krb5_pac_init(context, pac);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_data_free(&pac_data);
krb5_data_free(&deleg_data);
return ret;
}
ret = krb5_pac_add_buffer(context, *pac, PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO, &pac_data);
krb5_data_free(&pac_data);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_data_free(&deleg_data);
return ret;
}
if (deleg_blob) {
ret = krb5_pac_add_buffer(context, *pac,
PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION,
&deleg_data);
krb5_data_free(&deleg_data);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
}
return ret;
}
bool samba_princ_needs_pac(struct hdb_entry_ex *princ)
{
struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(princ->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
uint32_t userAccountControl;
/* The service account may be set not to want the PAC */
userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(p->msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
if (userAccountControl & UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
/* Was the krbtgt in this DB (ie, should we check the incoming signature) and was it an RODC */
int samba_krbtgt_is_in_db(struct hdb_entry_ex *princ, bool *is_in_db, bool *is_untrusted)
{
NTSTATUS status;
struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(princ->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
int rodc_krbtgt_number, trust_direction;
uint32_t rid;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
if (!mem_ctx) {
return ENOMEM;
}
trust_direction = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(p->msg, "trustDirection", 0);
if (trust_direction != 0) {
/* Domain trust - we cannot check the sig, but we trust it for a correct PAC
This is exactly where we should flag for SID
validation when we do inter-foreest trusts
*/
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
*is_untrusted = false;
*is_in_db = false;
return 0;
}
/* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
* virtue of being that particular RID */
status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return EINVAL;
}
rodc_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(p->msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
if (p->kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number == 0) {
if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
*is_untrusted = false;
*is_in_db = true;
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return 0;
} else if (rodc_krbtgt_number != -1) {
*is_in_db = true;
*is_untrusted = true;
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return 0;
}
} else if ((rid != DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) && (rodc_krbtgt_number == p->kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number)) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
*is_untrusted = false;
*is_in_db = true;
return 0;
} else if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
/* krbtgt viewed from an RODC */
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
*is_untrusted = false;
*is_in_db = false;
return 0;
}
/* Another RODC */
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
*is_untrusted = true;
*is_in_db = false;
return 0;
}
NTSTATUS samba_kdc_get_pac_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct hdb_entry_ex *client,
DATA_BLOB **_pac_blob)
{
struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(client->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc;
DATA_BLOB *pac_blob;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
/* The user account may be set not to want the PAC */
if ( ! samba_princ_needs_pac(client)) {
*_pac_blob = NULL;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
pac_blob = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB);
if (!pac_blob) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
nt_status = authsam_make_user_info_dc(mem_ctx, p->kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
lpcfg_netbios_name(p->kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx),
lpcfg_sam_name(p->kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx),
p->realm_dn,
p->msg,
data_blob(NULL, 0),
data_blob(NULL, 0),
&user_info_dc);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Getting user info for PAC failed: %s\n",
nt_errstr(nt_status)));
return nt_status;
}
nt_status = samba_get_logon_info_pac_blob(mem_ctx, user_info_dc, pac_blob);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Building PAC failed: %s\n",
nt_errstr(nt_status)));
return nt_status;
}
*_pac_blob = pac_blob;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
NTSTATUS samba_kdc_update_pac_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_context context,
const krb5_pac pac, DATA_BLOB *pac_blob,
struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *pac_srv_sig,
struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *pac_kdc_sig)
{
struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc;
krb5_error_code ret;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
ret = kerberos_pac_to_user_info_dc(mem_ctx, pac,
context, &user_info_dc, pac_srv_sig, pac_kdc_sig);
if (ret) {
return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
}
nt_status = samba_get_logon_info_pac_blob(mem_ctx,
user_info_dc, pac_blob);
return nt_status;
}
NTSTATUS samba_kdc_update_delegation_info_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_context context,
const krb5_pac pac,
const krb5_principal server_principal,
const krb5_principal proxy_principal,
DATA_BLOB *new_blob)
{
krb5_data old_data;
DATA_BLOB old_blob;
krb5_error_code ret;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
union PAC_INFO info;
struct PAC_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION _d;
struct PAC_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION *d = NULL;
char *server = NULL;
char *proxy = NULL;
uint32_t i;
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
ret = krb5_pac_get_buffer(context, pac, PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION, &old_data);
if (ret == ENOENT) {
ZERO_STRUCT(old_data);
} else if (ret) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
}
old_blob.length = old_data.length;
old_blob.data = (uint8_t *)old_data.data;
ZERO_STRUCT(info);
if (old_blob.length > 0) {
ndr_err = ndr_pull_union_blob(&old_blob, mem_ctx,
&info, PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION,
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_PAC_INFO);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
krb5_data_free(&old_data);
nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
DEBUG(0,("can't parse the PAC LOGON_INFO: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return nt_status;
}
} else {
ZERO_STRUCT(_d);
info.constrained_delegation.info = &_d;
}
krb5_data_free(&old_data);
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, server_principal, &server);
if (ret) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, proxy_principal,
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &proxy);
if (ret) {
SAFE_FREE(server);
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
d = info.constrained_delegation.info;
i = d->num_transited_services;
d->proxy_target.string = server;
d->transited_services = talloc_realloc(mem_ctx, d->transited_services,
struct lsa_String, i + 1);
d->transited_services[i].string = proxy;
d->num_transited_services = i + 1;
ndr_err = ndr_push_union_blob(new_blob, mem_ctx,
&info, PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION,
(ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_INFO);
SAFE_FREE(server);
SAFE_FREE(proxy);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
krb5_data_free(&old_data);
nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
DEBUG(0,("can't parse the PAC LOGON_INFO: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return nt_status;
}
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/* this function allocates 'data' using malloc.
* The caller is responsible for freeing it */
void samba_kdc_build_edata_reply(NTSTATUS nt_status, DATA_BLOB *e_data)
{
PA_DATA pa;
unsigned char *buf;
size_t len;
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
if (!e_data)
return;
pa.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PW_SALT;
pa.padata_value.length = 12;
pa.padata_value.data = malloc(pa.padata_value.length);
if (!pa.padata_value.data) {
e_data->length = 0;
e_data->data = NULL;
return;
}
SIVAL(pa.padata_value.data, 0, NT_STATUS_V(nt_status));
SIVAL(pa.padata_value.data, 4, 0);
SIVAL(pa.padata_value.data, 8, 1);
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_DATA, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
free(pa.padata_value.data);
e_data->data = buf;
e_data->length = len;
return;
}
/* function to map policy errors */
krb5_error_code samba_kdc_map_policy_err(NTSTATUS nt_status)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_MUST_CHANGE))
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_EXPIRED))
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_EXPIRED))
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED))
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_LOGON_HOURS))
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT))
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_WORKSTATION))
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
else
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
return ret;
}
/* Given a kdc entry, consult the account_ok routine in auth/auth_sam.c
* for consistency */
NTSTATUS samba_kdc_check_client_access(struct samba_kdc_entry *kdc_entry,
const char *client_name,
const char *workstation,
bool password_change)
{
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
tmp_ctx = talloc_named(NULL, 0, "samba_kdc_check_client_access");
if (!tmp_ctx) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/* we allow all kinds of trusts here */
nt_status = authsam_account_ok(tmp_ctx,
kdc_entry->kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
MSV1_0_ALLOW_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT |
MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT,
kdc_entry->realm_dn, kdc_entry->msg,
workstation, client_name,
true, password_change);
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return nt_status;
}
int kdc_check_pac(krb5_context context,
DATA_BLOB srv_sig,
struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *kdc_sig,
hdb_entry_ex *ent)
{
krb5_enctype etype;
int ret;
krb5_keyblock keyblock;
Key *key;
if (kdc_sig->type == CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5) {
etype = ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5;
} else {
ret = krb5_cksumtype_to_enctype(context,
kdc_sig->type,
&etype);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
}
#if HDB_ENCTYPE2KEY_TAKES_KEYSET
ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &ent->entry, NULL, etype, &key);
#else
ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &ent->entry, etype, &key);
#endif
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
keyblock = key->key;
return check_pac_checksum(srv_sig, kdc_sig,
context, &keyblock);
}