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The bad password count is supposed to limit the number of failed login attempt a user can make before being temporarily locked out, but race conditions between processes have allowed determined attackers to make many more than the specified number of attempts. This is especially bad on constrained or overcommitted hardware. To fix this, once a bad password is detected, we reload the sam account information under a user-specific mutex, ensuring we have an up to date bad password count. Discovered by Nathaniel W. Turner. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611 Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> |
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.. | ||
auth_builtin.c | ||
auth_generic.c | ||
auth_ntlmssp.c | ||
auth_sam.c | ||
auth_samba4.c | ||
auth_unix.c | ||
auth_util.c | ||
auth_winbind.c | ||
auth.c | ||
check_samsec.c | ||
pampass.c | ||
pass_check.c | ||
proto.h | ||
server_info_sam.c | ||
server_info.c | ||
token_util.c | ||
user_info.c | ||
user_krb5.c | ||
user_util.c | ||
wscript_build |