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samba-mirror/source4/heimdal/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
Andrew Bartlett ddee603b5e heimdal/gssapi: Allow a NULL authenticator
Some non-GSSAPI implementations that instead try to create compatible packets by wrapping krb5_mk_req()
can trigger a NULL authenticator here.  Assume this to be equvilent to specifying an all-zero
channel bindings and some reasonable (fixed) flags.

This was seen in the wild, with a Huawei Unified Storage System S5500 V3 against the AD DC

Original patch by Andrew Bartlett, restructured by Douglas Bagnall

Cherry-picked from upstream GIT 0a5de96d72cdea9e465412d7dba1e5d13e53dc09
which is the merge of https://github.com/heimdal/heimdal/pull/134

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11425
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
2015-08-05 06:39:19 +02:00

935 lines
22 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (c) 1997 - 2006 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
* (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "gsskrb5_locl.h"
HEIMDAL_MUTEX gssapi_keytab_mutex = HEIMDAL_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
krb5_keytab _gsskrb5_keytab;
static krb5_error_code
validate_keytab(krb5_context context, const char *name, krb5_keytab *id)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, name, id);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = krb5_kt_have_content(context, *id);
if (ret) {
krb5_kt_close(context, *id);
*id = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
OM_uint32
_gsskrb5_register_acceptor_identity(OM_uint32 *min_stat, const char *identity)
{
krb5_context context;
krb5_error_code ret;
*min_stat = 0;
ret = _gsskrb5_init(&context);
if(ret)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_lock(&gssapi_keytab_mutex);
if(_gsskrb5_keytab != NULL) {
krb5_kt_close(context, _gsskrb5_keytab);
_gsskrb5_keytab = NULL;
}
if (identity == NULL) {
ret = krb5_kt_default(context, &_gsskrb5_keytab);
} else {
/*
* First check if we can the keytab as is and if it has content...
*/
ret = validate_keytab(context, identity, &_gsskrb5_keytab);
/*
* if it doesn't, lets prepend FILE: and try again
*/
if (ret) {
char *p = NULL;
ret = asprintf(&p, "FILE:%s", identity);
if(ret < 0 || p == NULL) {
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&gssapi_keytab_mutex);
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
ret = validate_keytab(context, p, &_gsskrb5_keytab);
free(p);
}
}
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&gssapi_keytab_mutex);
if(ret) {
*min_stat = ret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
void
_gsskrb5i_is_cfx(krb5_context context, gsskrb5_ctx ctx, int acceptor)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_keyblock *key;
if (acceptor) {
if (ctx->auth_context->local_subkey)
key = ctx->auth_context->local_subkey;
else
key = ctx->auth_context->remote_subkey;
} else {
if (ctx->auth_context->remote_subkey)
key = ctx->auth_context->remote_subkey;
else
key = ctx->auth_context->local_subkey;
}
if (key == NULL)
key = ctx->auth_context->keyblock;
if (key == NULL)
return;
switch (key->keytype) {
case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
case ETYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5:
case ETYPE_OLD_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
case ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5:
case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56:
break;
default :
ctx->more_flags |= IS_CFX;
if ((acceptor && ctx->auth_context->local_subkey) ||
(!acceptor && ctx->auth_context->remote_subkey))
ctx->more_flags |= ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY;
break;
}
if (ctx->crypto)
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, ctx->crypto);
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &ctx->crypto);
}
static OM_uint32
gsskrb5_accept_delegated_token
(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
gsskrb5_ctx ctx,
krb5_context context,
gss_cred_id_t * delegated_cred_handle
)
{
krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
krb5_error_code kret;
int32_t ac_flags, ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
*minor_status = 0;
/* XXX Create a new delegated_cred_handle? */
if (delegated_cred_handle == NULL) {
kret = krb5_cc_default (context, &ccache);
} else {
*delegated_cred_handle = NULL;
kret = krb5_cc_new_unique (context, krb5_cc_type_memory,
NULL, &ccache);
}
if (kret) {
ctx->flags &= ~GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG;
goto out;
}
kret = krb5_cc_initialize(context, ccache, ctx->source);
if (kret) {
ctx->flags &= ~GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG;
goto out;
}
krb5_auth_con_removeflags(context,
ctx->auth_context,
KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME,
&ac_flags);
kret = krb5_rd_cred2(context,
ctx->auth_context,
ccache,
&ctx->fwd_data);
krb5_auth_con_setflags(context,
ctx->auth_context,
ac_flags);
if (kret) {
ctx->flags &= ~GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG;
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor_status = kret;
goto out;
}
if (delegated_cred_handle) {
gsskrb5_cred handle;
ret = _gsskrb5_krb5_import_cred(minor_status,
ccache,
NULL,
NULL,
delegated_cred_handle);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto out;
handle = (gsskrb5_cred) *delegated_cred_handle;
handle->cred_flags |= GSS_CF_DESTROY_CRED_ON_RELEASE;
krb5_cc_close(context, ccache);
ccache = NULL;
}
out:
if (ccache) {
/* Don't destroy the default cred cache */
if (delegated_cred_handle == NULL)
krb5_cc_close(context, ccache);
else
krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache);
}
return ret;
}
static OM_uint32
gsskrb5_acceptor_ready(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
gsskrb5_ctx ctx,
krb5_context context,
gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
int32_t seq_number;
int is_cfx = 0;
krb5_auth_con_getremoteseqnumber (context,
ctx->auth_context,
&seq_number);
_gsskrb5i_is_cfx(context, ctx, 1);
is_cfx = (ctx->more_flags & IS_CFX);
ret = _gssapi_msg_order_create(minor_status,
&ctx->order,
_gssapi_msg_order_f(ctx->flags),
seq_number, 0, is_cfx);
if (ret)
return ret;
/*
* If requested, set local sequence num to remote sequence if this
* isn't a mutual authentication context
*/
if (!(ctx->flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) && _gssapi_msg_order_f(ctx->flags)) {
krb5_auth_con_setlocalseqnumber(context,
ctx->auth_context,
seq_number);
}
/*
* We should handle the delegation ticket, in case it's there
*/
if (ctx->fwd_data.length > 0 && (ctx->flags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG)) {
ret = gsskrb5_accept_delegated_token(minor_status,
ctx,
context,
delegated_cred_handle);
if (ret)
return ret;
} else {
/* Well, looks like it wasn't there after all */
ctx->flags &= ~GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG;
}
ctx->state = ACCEPTOR_READY;
ctx->more_flags |= OPEN;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
static OM_uint32
send_error_token(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
krb5_context context,
krb5_error_code kret,
krb5_principal server,
krb5_data *indata,
gss_buffer_t output_token)
{
krb5_principal ap_req_server = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_data outbuf;
/* this e_data value encodes KERB_AP_ERR_TYPE_SKEW_RECOVERY which
tells windows to try again with the corrected timestamp. See
[MS-KILE] 2.2.1 KERB-ERROR-DATA */
krb5_data e_data = { 7, rk_UNCONST("\x30\x05\xa1\x03\x02\x01\x02") };
/* build server from request if the acceptor had not selected one */
if (server == NULL) {
AP_REQ ap_req;
ret = krb5_decode_ap_req(context, indata, &ap_req);
if (ret) {
*minor_status = ret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
&ap_req_server,
ap_req.ticket.sname,
ap_req.ticket.realm);
free_AP_REQ(&ap_req);
if (ret) {
*minor_status = ret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
server = ap_req_server;
}
ret = krb5_mk_error(context, kret, NULL, &e_data, NULL,
server, NULL, NULL, &outbuf);
if (ap_req_server)
krb5_free_principal(context, ap_req_server);
if (ret) {
*minor_status = ret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
ret = _gsskrb5_encapsulate(minor_status,
&outbuf,
output_token,
"\x03\x00",
GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM);
krb5_data_free (&outbuf);
if (ret)
return ret;
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
}
static OM_uint32
gsskrb5_acceptor_start(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
gsskrb5_ctx ctx,
krb5_context context,
const gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle,
const gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer,
const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
gss_name_t * src_name,
gss_OID * mech_type,
gss_buffer_t output_token,
OM_uint32 * ret_flags,
OM_uint32 * time_rec,
gss_cred_id_t * delegated_cred_handle)
{
krb5_error_code kret;
OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
krb5_data indata;
krb5_flags ap_options;
krb5_keytab keytab = NULL;
int is_cfx = 0;
const gsskrb5_cred acceptor_cred = (gsskrb5_cred)acceptor_cred_handle;
/*
* We may, or may not, have an escapsulation.
*/
ret = _gsskrb5_decapsulate (minor_status,
input_token_buffer,
&indata,
"\x01\x00",
GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM);
if (ret) {
/* Assume that there is no OID wrapping. */
indata.length = input_token_buffer->length;
indata.data = input_token_buffer->value;
}
/*
* We need to get our keytab
*/
if (acceptor_cred == NULL) {
if (_gsskrb5_keytab != NULL)
keytab = _gsskrb5_keytab;
} else if (acceptor_cred->keytab != NULL) {
keytab = acceptor_cred->keytab;
}
/*
* We need to check the ticket and create the AP-REP packet
*/
{
krb5_rd_req_in_ctx in = NULL;
krb5_rd_req_out_ctx out = NULL;
krb5_principal server = NULL;
if (acceptor_cred)
server = acceptor_cred->principal;
kret = krb5_rd_req_in_ctx_alloc(context, &in);
if (kret == 0)
kret = krb5_rd_req_in_set_keytab(context, in, keytab);
if (kret) {
if (in)
krb5_rd_req_in_ctx_free(context, in);
*minor_status = kret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
kret = krb5_rd_req_ctx(context,
&ctx->auth_context,
&indata,
server,
in, &out);
krb5_rd_req_in_ctx_free(context, in);
if (kret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW || kret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV) {
/*
* No reply in non-MUTUAL mode, but we don't know that its
* non-MUTUAL mode yet, thats inside the 8003 checksum, so
* lets only send the error token on clock skew, that
* limit when send error token for non-MUTUAL.
*/
return send_error_token(minor_status, context, kret,
server, &indata, output_token);
} else if (kret) {
*minor_status = kret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
/*
* we need to remember some data on the context_handle.
*/
kret = krb5_rd_req_out_get_ap_req_options(context, out,
&ap_options);
if (kret == 0)
kret = krb5_rd_req_out_get_ticket(context, out,
&ctx->ticket);
if (kret == 0)
kret = krb5_rd_req_out_get_keyblock(context, out,
&ctx->service_keyblock);
ctx->lifetime = ctx->ticket->ticket.endtime;
krb5_rd_req_out_ctx_free(context, out);
if (kret) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor_status = kret;
return ret;
}
}
/*
* We need to copy the principal names to the context and the
* calling layer.
*/
kret = krb5_copy_principal(context,
ctx->ticket->client,
&ctx->source);
if (kret) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor_status = kret;
}
kret = krb5_copy_principal(context,
ctx->ticket->server,
&ctx->target);
if (kret) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor_status = kret;
return ret;
}
/*
* We need to setup some compat stuff, this assumes that
* context_handle->target is already set.
*/
ret = _gss_DES3_get_mic_compat(minor_status, ctx, context);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (src_name != NULL) {
kret = krb5_copy_principal (context,
ctx->ticket->client,
(gsskrb5_name*)src_name);
if (kret) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor_status = kret;
return ret;
}
}
/*
* We need to get the flags out of the 8003 checksum.
*/
{
krb5_authenticator authenticator;
kret = krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator(context,
ctx->auth_context,
&authenticator);
if(kret) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor_status = kret;
return ret;
}
if (authenticator->cksum != NULL
&& authenticator->cksum->cksumtype == CKSUMTYPE_GSSAPI) {
ret = _gsskrb5_verify_8003_checksum(minor_status,
input_chan_bindings,
authenticator->cksum,
&ctx->flags,
&ctx->fwd_data);
krb5_free_authenticator(context, &authenticator);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
} else {
if (authenticator->cksum != NULL) {
krb5_crypto crypto;
kret = krb5_crypto_init(context,
ctx->auth_context->keyblock,
0, &crypto);
if(kret) {
krb5_free_authenticator(context, &authenticator);
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor_status = kret;
return ret;
}
/*
* Windows accepts Samba3's use of a kerberos, rather than
* GSSAPI checksum here
*/
kret = krb5_verify_checksum(context,
crypto, KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM, NULL, 0,
authenticator->cksum);
krb5_free_authenticator(context, &authenticator);
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
if(kret) {
ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
*minor_status = kret;
return ret;
}
}
/*
* If there is no checksum or a kerberos checksum (which Windows
* and Samba accept), we use the ap_options to guess the mutual
* flag.
*/
ctx->flags = GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG;
if (ap_options & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED)
ctx->flags |= GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG;
}
}
if(ctx->flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) {
krb5_data outbuf;
int use_subkey = 0;
_gsskrb5i_is_cfx(context, ctx, 1);
is_cfx = (ctx->more_flags & IS_CFX);
if (is_cfx || (ap_options & AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY)) {
use_subkey = 1;
} else {
krb5_keyblock *rkey;
/*
* If there is a initiator subkey, copy that to acceptor
* subkey to match Windows behavior
*/
kret = krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey(context,
ctx->auth_context,
&rkey);
if (kret == 0) {
kret = krb5_auth_con_setlocalsubkey(context,
ctx->auth_context,
rkey);
if (kret == 0)
use_subkey = 1;
krb5_free_keyblock(context, rkey);
}
}
if (use_subkey) {
ctx->more_flags |= ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY;
krb5_auth_con_addflags(context, ctx->auth_context,
KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_USE_SUBKEY,
NULL);
}
kret = krb5_mk_rep(context,
ctx->auth_context,
&outbuf);
if (kret) {
*minor_status = kret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
if (IS_DCE_STYLE(ctx)) {
output_token->length = outbuf.length;
output_token->value = outbuf.data;
} else {
ret = _gsskrb5_encapsulate(minor_status,
&outbuf,
output_token,
"\x02\x00",
GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM);
krb5_data_free (&outbuf);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
}
ctx->flags |= GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG;
/* Remember the flags */
ctx->lifetime = ctx->ticket->ticket.endtime;
ctx->more_flags |= OPEN;
if (mech_type)
*mech_type = GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM;
if (time_rec) {
ret = _gsskrb5_lifetime_left(minor_status,
context,
ctx->lifetime,
time_rec);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
}
/*
* When GSS_C_DCE_STYLE is in use, we need ask for a AP-REP from
* the client.
*/
if (IS_DCE_STYLE(ctx)) {
/*
* Return flags to caller, but we haven't processed
* delgations yet
*/
if (ret_flags)
*ret_flags = (ctx->flags & ~GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG);
ctx->state = ACCEPTOR_WAIT_FOR_DCESTYLE;
return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
}
ret = gsskrb5_acceptor_ready(minor_status, ctx, context,
delegated_cred_handle);
if (ret_flags)
*ret_flags = ctx->flags;
return ret;
}
static OM_uint32
acceptor_wait_for_dcestyle(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
gsskrb5_ctx ctx,
krb5_context context,
const gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle,
const gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer,
const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
gss_name_t * src_name,
gss_OID * mech_type,
gss_buffer_t output_token,
OM_uint32 * ret_flags,
OM_uint32 * time_rec,
gss_cred_id_t * delegated_cred_handle)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
krb5_error_code kret;
krb5_data inbuf;
int32_t r_seq_number, l_seq_number;
/*
* We know it's GSS_C_DCE_STYLE so we don't need to decapsulate the AP_REP
*/
inbuf.length = input_token_buffer->length;
inbuf.data = input_token_buffer->value;
/*
* We need to remeber the old remote seq_number, then check if the
* client has replied with our local seq_number, and then reset
* the remote seq_number to the old value
*/
{
kret = krb5_auth_con_getlocalseqnumber(context,
ctx->auth_context,
&l_seq_number);
if (kret) {
*minor_status = kret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
kret = krb5_auth_con_getremoteseqnumber(context,
ctx->auth_context,
&r_seq_number);
if (kret) {
*minor_status = kret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
kret = krb5_auth_con_setremoteseqnumber(context,
ctx->auth_context,
l_seq_number);
if (kret) {
*minor_status = kret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
}
/*
* We need to verify the AP_REP, but we need to flag that this is
* DCE_STYLE, so don't check the timestamps this time, but put the
* flag DO_TIME back afterward.
*/
{
krb5_ap_rep_enc_part *repl;
int32_t auth_flags;
krb5_auth_con_removeflags(context,
ctx->auth_context,
KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME,
&auth_flags);
kret = krb5_rd_rep(context, ctx->auth_context, &inbuf, &repl);
if (kret) {
*minor_status = kret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part(context, repl);
krb5_auth_con_setflags(context, ctx->auth_context, auth_flags);
}
/* We need to check the liftime */
{
OM_uint32 lifetime_rec;
ret = _gsskrb5_lifetime_left(minor_status,
context,
ctx->lifetime,
&lifetime_rec);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
if (lifetime_rec == 0) {
return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
}
if (time_rec) *time_rec = lifetime_rec;
}
/* We need to give the caller the flags which are in use */
if (ret_flags) *ret_flags = ctx->flags;
if (src_name) {
kret = krb5_copy_principal(context,
ctx->source,
(gsskrb5_name*)src_name);
if (kret) {
*minor_status = kret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
}
/*
* After the krb5_rd_rep() the remote and local seq_number should
* be the same, because the client just replies the seq_number
* from our AP-REP in its AP-REP, but then the client uses the
* seq_number from its AP-REQ for GSS_wrap()
*/
{
int32_t tmp_r_seq_number, tmp_l_seq_number;
kret = krb5_auth_con_getremoteseqnumber(context,
ctx->auth_context,
&tmp_r_seq_number);
if (kret) {
*minor_status = kret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
kret = krb5_auth_con_getlocalseqnumber(context,
ctx->auth_context,
&tmp_l_seq_number);
if (kret) {
*minor_status = kret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
/*
* Here we check if the client has responsed with our local seq_number,
*/
if (tmp_r_seq_number != tmp_l_seq_number) {
return GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN;
}
}
/*
* We need to reset the remote seq_number, because the client will use,
* the old one for the GSS_wrap() calls
*/
{
kret = krb5_auth_con_setremoteseqnumber(context,
ctx->auth_context,
r_seq_number);
if (kret) {
*minor_status = kret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
}
return gsskrb5_acceptor_ready(minor_status, ctx, context,
delegated_cred_handle);
}
OM_uint32 GSSAPI_CALLCONV
_gsskrb5_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle,
const gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle,
const gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer,
const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
gss_name_t * src_name,
gss_OID * mech_type,
gss_buffer_t output_token,
OM_uint32 * ret_flags,
OM_uint32 * time_rec,
gss_cred_id_t * delegated_cred_handle)
{
krb5_context context;
OM_uint32 ret;
gsskrb5_ctx ctx;
GSSAPI_KRB5_INIT(&context);
output_token->length = 0;
output_token->value = NULL;
if (src_name != NULL)
*src_name = NULL;
if (mech_type)
*mech_type = GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM;
if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
ret = _gsskrb5_create_ctx(minor_status,
context_handle,
context,
input_chan_bindings,
ACCEPTOR_START);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
ctx = (gsskrb5_ctx)*context_handle;
/*
* TODO: check the channel_bindings
* (above just sets them to krb5 layer)
*/
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_lock(&ctx->ctx_id_mutex);
switch (ctx->state) {
case ACCEPTOR_START:
ret = gsskrb5_acceptor_start(minor_status,
ctx,
context,
acceptor_cred_handle,
input_token_buffer,
input_chan_bindings,
src_name,
mech_type,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec,
delegated_cred_handle);
break;
case ACCEPTOR_WAIT_FOR_DCESTYLE:
ret = acceptor_wait_for_dcestyle(minor_status,
ctx,
context,
acceptor_cred_handle,
input_token_buffer,
input_chan_bindings,
src_name,
mech_type,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec,
delegated_cred_handle);
break;
case ACCEPTOR_READY:
/*
* If we get there, the caller have called
* gss_accept_sec_context() one time too many.
*/
ret = GSS_S_BAD_STATUS;
break;
default:
/* TODO: is this correct here? --metze */
ret = GSS_S_BAD_STATUS;
break;
}
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->ctx_id_mutex);
if (GSS_ERROR(ret)) {
OM_uint32 min2;
_gsskrb5_delete_sec_context(&min2, context_handle, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
}
return ret;
}