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samba-mirror/source4/libcli/auth/ntlmssp_sign.c
Andrew Bartlett dc9f55dbec r1294: A nice, large, commit...
This implements gensec for Samba's server side, and brings gensec up
to the standards of a full subsystem.

This means that use of the subsystem is by gensec_* functions, not
function pointers in structures (this is internal).  This causes
changes in all the existing gensec users.

Our RPC server no longer contains it's own generalised security
scheme, and now calls gensec directly.

Gensec has also taken over the role of auth/auth_ntlmssp.c

An important part of gensec, is the output of the 'session_info'
struct.  This is now reference counted, so that we can correctly free
it when a pipe is closed, no matter if it was inherited, or created by
per-pipe authentication.

The schannel code is reworked, to be in the same file for client and
server.

ntlm_auth is reworked to use gensec.

The major problem with this code is the way it relies on subsystem
auto-initialisation.  The primary reason for this commit now.is to
allow these problems to be looked at, and fixed.

There are problems with the new code:
- I've tested it with smbtorture, but currently don't have VMware and
  valgrind working (this I'll fix soon).
- The SPNEGO code is client-only at this point.
- We still do not do kerberos.

Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit 07fd885fd4)
2007-10-10 12:56:49 -05:00

460 lines
13 KiB
C

/*
* Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
* Version 3.0
* NTLMSSP Signing routines
* Copyright (C) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 1996-2001
* Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2003
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation,
* Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#define CLI_SIGN "session key to client-to-server signing key magic constant"
#define CLI_SEAL "session key to client-to-server sealing key magic constant"
#define SRV_SIGN "session key to server-to-client signing key magic constant"
#define SRV_SEAL "session key to server-to-client sealing key magic constant"
static void NTLMSSPcalc_ap(uint8_t *hash, uint8_t *data, int len)
{
uint8_t index_i = hash[256];
uint8_t index_j = hash[257];
int ind;
for (ind = 0; ind < len; ind++)
{
uint8_t tc;
uint8_t t;
index_i++;
index_j += hash[index_i];
tc = hash[index_i];
hash[index_i] = hash[index_j];
hash[index_j] = tc;
t = hash[index_i] + hash[index_j];
data[ind] = data[ind] ^ hash[t];
}
hash[256] = index_i;
hash[257] = index_j;
}
static void calc_hash(uint8_t hash[258], const uint8 *key, size_t key_len)
{
uint8_t j = 0;
int ind;
for (ind = 0; ind < 256; ind++)
{
hash[ind] = (uint8_t)ind;
}
for (ind = 0; ind < 256; ind++)
{
uint8_t tc;
j += (hash[ind] + key[ind%key_len]);
tc = hash[ind];
hash[ind] = hash[j];
hash[j] = tc;
}
hash[256] = 0;
hash[257] = 0;
}
/**
* Some notes on then NTLM2 code:
*
* This code works correctly for the sealing part of the problem. If
* we disable the check for valid client signatures, then we see that
* the output of a rpcecho 'sinkdata' at smbd is correct. We get the
* valid data, and it is validly decrypted.
*
* This means that the quantity of data passing though the RC4 sealing
* pad is correct.
*
* This code also correctly matches test values that I have obtained,
* claiming to be the correct output of NTLM2 signature generation.
*
*/
static void calc_ntlmv2_key(uint8_t subkey[16],
DATA_BLOB session_key,
const char *constant)
{
struct MD5Context ctx3;
MD5Init(&ctx3);
MD5Update(&ctx3, session_key.data, session_key.length);
MD5Update(&ctx3, constant, strlen(constant)+1);
MD5Final(subkey, &ctx3);
}
enum ntlmssp_direction {
NTLMSSP_SEND,
NTLMSSP_RECEIVE
};
static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_make_packet_signature(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
TALLOC_CTX *sig_mem_ctx,
const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
enum ntlmssp_direction direction,
DATA_BLOB *sig)
{
if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2) {
HMACMD5Context ctx;
uint8_t seq_num[4];
uint8_t digest[16];
SIVAL(seq_num, 0, ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_seq_num);
switch (direction) {
case NTLMSSP_SEND:
hmac_md5_init_limK_to_64(ntlmssp_state->send_sign_key,
sizeof(ntlmssp_state->send_sign_key), &ctx);
break;
case NTLMSSP_RECEIVE:
hmac_md5_init_limK_to_64(ntlmssp_state->recv_sign_key,
sizeof(ntlmssp_state->recv_sign_key), &ctx);
break;
}
hmac_md5_update(seq_num, 4, &ctx);
hmac_md5_update(data, length, &ctx);
hmac_md5_final(digest, &ctx);
if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH) {
switch (direction) {
case NTLMSSP_SEND:
NTLMSSPcalc_ap(ntlmssp_state->send_seal_hash, digest, 8);
break;
case NTLMSSP_RECEIVE:
NTLMSSPcalc_ap(ntlmssp_state->recv_seal_hash, digest, 8);
break;
}
}
*sig = data_blob_talloc(sig_mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
SIVAL(sig->data, 0, NTLMSSP_SIGN_VERSION);
memcpy(sig->data + 4, digest, 8);
memcpy(sig->data + 12, seq_num, 4);
} else {
uint32_t crc;
crc = crc32_calc_buffer((const char *)data, length);
if (!msrpc_gen(sig_mem_ctx, sig, "dddd", NTLMSSP_SIGN_VERSION, 0, crc, ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_seq_num)) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
NTLMSSPcalc_ap(ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash, sig->data+4, sig->length-4);
}
dump_data_pw("calculated ntlmssp signature\n", sig->data, sig->length);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
NTSTATUS ntlmssp_sign_packet(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
TALLOC_CTX *sig_mem_ctx,
const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
DATA_BLOB *sig)
{
NTSTATUS nt_status;
if (!ntlmssp_state->session_key.length) {
DEBUG(3, ("NO session key, cannot check sign packet\n"));
return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
}
nt_status = ntlmssp_make_packet_signature(ntlmssp_state, sig_mem_ctx,
data, length, NTLMSSP_SEND, sig);
/* increment counter on send */
ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_seq_num++;
return nt_status;
}
/**
* Check the signature of an incoming packet
*
*/
NTSTATUS ntlmssp_check_packet(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
TALLOC_CTX *sig_mem_ctx,
const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
const DATA_BLOB *sig)
{
DATA_BLOB local_sig;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
if (!ntlmssp_state->session_key.length) {
DEBUG(3, ("NO session key, cannot check packet signature\n"));
return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
}
if (sig->length < 8) {
DEBUG(0, ("NTLMSSP packet check failed due to short signature (%lu bytes)!\n",
(unsigned long)sig->length));
}
nt_status = ntlmssp_make_packet_signature(ntlmssp_state, sig_mem_ctx, data,
length, NTLMSSP_RECEIVE, &local_sig);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("NTLMSSP packet check failed with %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
return nt_status;
}
/* increment counter on recv */
ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_seq_num++;
if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2) {
if (local_sig.length != sig->length ||
memcmp(local_sig.data,
sig->data, sig->length) != 0) {
DEBUG(5, ("BAD SIG NTLM2: wanted signature of\n"));
dump_data(5, local_sig.data, local_sig.length);
DEBUG(5, ("BAD SIG: got signature of\n"));
dump_data(5, sig->data, sig->length);
DEBUG(0, ("NTLMSSP NTLM2 packet check failed due to invalid signature!\n"));
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
} else {
if (local_sig.length != sig->length ||
memcmp(local_sig.data + 8,
sig->data + 8, sig->length - 8) != 0) {
DEBUG(5, ("BAD SIG NTLM1: wanted signature of\n"));
dump_data(5, (const char *)local_sig.data, local_sig.length);
DEBUG(5, ("BAD SIG: got signature of\n"));
dump_data(5, (const char *)(sig->data), sig->length);
DEBUG(0, ("NTLMSSP NTLM1 packet check failed due to invalid signature!\n"));
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
}
dump_data_pw("checked ntlmssp signature\n", sig->data, sig->length);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/**
* Seal data with the NTLMSSP algorithm
*
*/
NTSTATUS ntlmssp_seal_packet(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
TALLOC_CTX *sig_mem_ctx,
uint8_t *data, size_t length,
DATA_BLOB *sig)
{
if (!ntlmssp_state->session_key.length) {
DEBUG(3, ("NO session key, cannot seal packet\n"));
return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
}
DEBUG(10,("ntlmssp_seal_data: seal\n"));
dump_data_pw("ntlmssp clear data\n", data, length);
if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2) {
HMACMD5Context ctx;
uint8_t seq_num[4];
uint8_t digest[16];
SIVAL(seq_num, 0, ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_seq_num);
hmac_md5_init_limK_to_64(ntlmssp_state->send_sign_key,
sizeof(ntlmssp_state->send_sign_key), &ctx);
hmac_md5_update(seq_num, 4, &ctx);
hmac_md5_update(data, length, &ctx);
hmac_md5_final(digest, &ctx);
/* The order of these two operations matters - we must first seal the packet,
then seal the sequence number - this is becouse the send_seal_hash is not
constant, but is is rather updated with each iteration */
NTLMSSPcalc_ap(ntlmssp_state->send_seal_hash, data, length);
if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH) {
NTLMSSPcalc_ap(ntlmssp_state->send_seal_hash, digest, 8);
}
*sig = data_blob_talloc(sig_mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
SIVAL(sig->data, 0, NTLMSSP_SIGN_VERSION);
memcpy(sig->data + 4, digest, 8);
memcpy(sig->data + 12, seq_num, 4);
} else {
uint32_t crc;
crc = crc32_calc_buffer((const char *)data, length);
if (!msrpc_gen(sig_mem_ctx, sig, "dddd", NTLMSSP_SIGN_VERSION, 0, crc, ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_seq_num)) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/* The order of these two operations matters - we must first seal the packet,
then seal the sequence number - this is becouse the ntlmssp_hash is not
constant, but is is rather updated with each iteration */
NTLMSSPcalc_ap(ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash, data, length);
NTLMSSPcalc_ap(ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash, sig->data+4, sig->length-4);
}
dump_data_pw("ntlmssp signature\n", sig->data, sig->length);
dump_data_pw("ntlmssp sealed data\n", data, length);
/* increment counter on send */
ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_seq_num++;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/**
* Unseal data with the NTLMSSP algorithm
*
*/
NTSTATUS ntlmssp_unseal_packet(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
TALLOC_CTX *sig_mem_ctx,
uint8_t *data, size_t length,
DATA_BLOB *sig)
{
if (!ntlmssp_state->session_key.length) {
DEBUG(3, ("NO session key, cannot unseal packet\n"));
return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
}
dump_data_pw("ntlmssp sealed data\n", data, length);
if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2) {
NTLMSSPcalc_ap(ntlmssp_state->recv_seal_hash, data, length);
} else {
NTLMSSPcalc_ap(ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash, data, length);
}
dump_data_pw("ntlmssp clear data\n", data, length);
return ntlmssp_check_packet(ntlmssp_state, sig_mem_ctx, data, length, sig);
}
/**
Initialise the state for NTLMSSP signing.
*/
NTSTATUS ntlmssp_sign_init(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state)
{
uint8_t p24[24];
ZERO_STRUCT(p24);
DEBUG(3, ("NTLMSSP Sign/Seal - Initialising with flags:\n"));
debug_ntlmssp_flags(ntlmssp_state->neg_flags);
if (!ntlmssp_state->session_key.length) {
DEBUG(3, ("NO session key, cannot intialise signing\n"));
return NT_STATUS_NO_USER_SESSION_KEY;
}
if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2)
{
DATA_BLOB weak_session_key = ntlmssp_state->session_key;
const char *send_sign_const;
const char *send_seal_const;
const char *recv_sign_const;
const char *recv_seal_const;
switch (ntlmssp_state->role) {
case NTLMSSP_CLIENT:
send_sign_const = CLI_SIGN;
send_seal_const = CLI_SEAL;
recv_sign_const = SRV_SIGN;
recv_seal_const = SRV_SEAL;
break;
case NTLMSSP_SERVER:
send_sign_const = SRV_SIGN;
send_seal_const = SRV_SEAL;
recv_sign_const = CLI_SIGN;
recv_seal_const = CLI_SEAL;
break;
}
/**
Weaken NTLMSSP keys to cope with down-level clients, servers and export restrictions.
We probably should have some parameters to control this, once we get NTLM2 working.
*/
if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128) {
} else if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56) {
weak_session_key.length = 6;
} else { /* forty bits */
weak_session_key.length = 5;
}
dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP weakend master key:\n",
weak_session_key.data,
weak_session_key.length);
/* SEND */
calc_ntlmv2_key(ntlmssp_state->send_sign_key,
ntlmssp_state->session_key, send_sign_const);
dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP send sign key:\n",
ntlmssp_state->send_sign_key,
sizeof(ntlmssp_state->send_sign_key));
calc_ntlmv2_key(ntlmssp_state->send_seal_key,
weak_session_key, send_seal_const);
dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP send seal key:\n",
ntlmssp_state->send_seal_key,
sizeof(ntlmssp_state->send_seal_key));
calc_hash(ntlmssp_state->send_seal_hash,
ntlmssp_state->send_seal_key,
sizeof(ntlmssp_state->send_seal_key));
dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP send sesl hash:\n",
ntlmssp_state->send_seal_hash,
sizeof(ntlmssp_state->send_seal_hash));
/* RECV */
calc_ntlmv2_key(ntlmssp_state->recv_sign_key,
ntlmssp_state->session_key, recv_sign_const);
dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP recv sign key:\n",
ntlmssp_state->recv_sign_key,
sizeof(ntlmssp_state->recv_sign_key));
calc_ntlmv2_key(ntlmssp_state->recv_seal_key,
weak_session_key, recv_seal_const);
dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP recv seal key:\n",
ntlmssp_state->recv_seal_key,
sizeof(ntlmssp_state->recv_seal_key));
calc_hash(ntlmssp_state->recv_seal_hash,
ntlmssp_state->recv_seal_key,
sizeof(ntlmssp_state->recv_seal_key));
dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP receive seal hash:\n",
ntlmssp_state->recv_seal_hash,
sizeof(ntlmssp_state->recv_seal_hash));
} else {
DEBUG(5, ("NTLMSSP Sign/Seal - using NTLM1\n"));
calc_hash(ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash,
ntlmssp_state->session_key.data,
ntlmssp_state->session_key.length);
dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP hash:\n", ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash,
sizeof(ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_hash));
}
ntlmssp_state->ntlmssp_seq_num = 0;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}