mirror of
https://github.com/samba-team/samba.git
synced 2024-12-22 13:34:15 +03:00
3cab9f6a34
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6edf88f5c4
)
[jsutton@samba.org Removed change to decode_pwd_string_from_buffer514()
that is not present in 4.16]
1168 lines
30 KiB
C
1168 lines
30 KiB
C
/*
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Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
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SMB parameters and setup
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Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998
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Modified by Jeremy Allison 1995.
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Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 1995-2000.
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Copyright (C) Luke Kennethc Casson Leighton 1996-2000.
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Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2002-2003
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This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
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(at your option) any later version.
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This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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GNU General Public License for more details.
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You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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#include "system/time.h"
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#include "../libcli/auth/msrpc_parse.h"
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#include "../lib/crypto/crypto.h"
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#include "../libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
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#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_ntlmssp.h"
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#include "lib/crypto/gnutls_helpers.h"
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#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
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#include <gnutls/crypto.h>
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int SMBencrypt_hash(const uint8_t lm_hash[16], const uint8_t *c8, uint8_t p24[24])
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{
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uint8_t p21[21];
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int rc;
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memset(p21,'\0',21);
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memcpy(p21, lm_hash, 16);
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rc = SMBOWFencrypt(p21, c8, p24);
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#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
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DEBUG(100,("SMBencrypt_hash: lm#, challenge, response\n"));
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dump_data(100, p21, 16);
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dump_data(100, c8, 8);
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dump_data(100, p24, 24);
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#endif
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return rc;
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}
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/*
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This implements the X/Open SMB password encryption
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It takes a password ('unix' string), a 8 byte "crypt key"
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and puts 24 bytes of encrypted password into p24
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Returns False if password must have been truncated to create LM hash
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*/
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bool SMBencrypt(const char *passwd, const uint8_t *c8, uint8_t p24[24])
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{
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bool ret;
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uint8_t lm_hash[16];
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int rc;
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ret = E_deshash(passwd, lm_hash);
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rc = SMBencrypt_hash(lm_hash, c8, p24);
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if (rc != 0) {
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ret = false;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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/**
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* Creates the MD4 Hash of the users password in NT UNICODE.
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* @param passwd password in 'unix' charset.
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* @param p16 return password hashed with md4, caller allocated 16 byte buffer
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*/
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bool E_md4hash(const char *passwd, uint8_t p16[16])
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{
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size_t len;
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smb_ucs2_t *wpwd;
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bool ret;
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ret = push_ucs2_talloc(NULL, &wpwd, passwd, &len);
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if (!ret || len < 2) {
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/* We don't want to return fixed data, as most callers
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* don't check */
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mdfour(p16, (const uint8_t *)passwd, strlen(passwd));
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return false;
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}
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len -= 2;
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mdfour(p16, (const uint8_t *)wpwd, len);
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talloc_free(wpwd);
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return true;
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}
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/**
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* Creates the DES forward-only Hash of the users password in DOS ASCII charset
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* @param passwd password in 'unix' charset.
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* @param p16 return password hashed with DES, caller allocated 16 byte buffer
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* @return false if password was > 14 characters, and therefore may be incorrect, otherwise true
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* @note p16 is filled in regardless
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*/
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bool E_deshash(const char *passwd, uint8_t p16[16])
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{
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bool ret;
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int rc;
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uint8_t dospwd[14];
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TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
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size_t converted_size;
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char *tmpbuf;
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ZERO_STRUCT(dospwd);
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tmpbuf = strupper_talloc(frame, passwd);
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if (tmpbuf == NULL) {
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/* Too many callers don't check this result, we need to fill in the buffer with something */
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strlcpy((char *)dospwd, passwd ? passwd : "", sizeof(dospwd));
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E_P16(dospwd, p16);
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talloc_free(frame);
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return false;
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}
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ZERO_STRUCT(dospwd);
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ret = convert_string_error(CH_UNIX, CH_DOS, tmpbuf, strlen(tmpbuf), dospwd, sizeof(dospwd), &converted_size);
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talloc_free(frame);
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/* Only the first 14 chars are considered, password need not
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* be null terminated. We do this in the error and success
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* case to avoid returning a fixed 'password' buffer, but
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* callers should not use it when E_deshash returns false */
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rc = E_P16((const uint8_t *)dospwd, p16);
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if (rc != 0) {
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ret = false;
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}
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ZERO_STRUCT(dospwd);
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return ret;
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}
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/**
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* Creates the MD4 and DES (LM) Hash of the users password.
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* MD4 is of the NT Unicode, DES is of the DOS UPPERCASE password.
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* @param passwd password in 'unix' charset.
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* @param nt_p16 return password hashed with md4, caller allocated 16 byte buffer
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* @param p16 return password hashed with des, caller allocated 16 byte buffer
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*/
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/* Does both the NT and LM owfs of a user's password */
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void nt_lm_owf_gen(const char *pwd, uint8_t nt_p16[16], uint8_t p16[16])
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{
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/* Calculate the MD4 hash (NT compatible) of the password */
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memset(nt_p16, '\0', 16);
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E_md4hash(pwd, nt_p16);
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#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
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DEBUG(100,("nt_lm_owf_gen: pwd, nt#\n"));
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dump_data(120, (const uint8_t *)pwd, strlen(pwd));
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dump_data(100, nt_p16, 16);
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#endif
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E_deshash(pwd, (uint8_t *)p16);
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#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
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DEBUG(100,("nt_lm_owf_gen: pwd, lm#\n"));
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dump_data(120, (const uint8_t *)pwd, strlen(pwd));
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dump_data(100, p16, 16);
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#endif
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}
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/* Does both the NTLMv2 owfs of a user's password */
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bool ntv2_owf_gen(const uint8_t owf[16],
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const char *user_in, const char *domain_in,
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uint8_t kr_buf[16])
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{
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smb_ucs2_t *user;
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smb_ucs2_t *domain;
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size_t user_byte_len;
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size_t domain_byte_len;
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gnutls_hmac_hd_t hmac_hnd = NULL;
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int rc;
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bool ok = false;
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TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_init("ntv2_owf_gen for %s\\%s", domain_in, user_in);
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if (!mem_ctx) {
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return false;
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}
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if (!user_in) {
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user_in = "";
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}
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if (!domain_in) {
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domain_in = "";
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}
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user_in = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, user_in);
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if (user_in == NULL) {
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talloc_free(mem_ctx);
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return false;
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}
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ok = push_ucs2_talloc(mem_ctx, &user, user_in, &user_byte_len );
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if (!ok) {
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DEBUG(0, ("push_uss2_talloc() for user failed)\n"));
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talloc_free(mem_ctx);
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return false;
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}
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ok = push_ucs2_talloc(mem_ctx, &domain, domain_in, &domain_byte_len);
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if (!ok) {
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DEBUG(0, ("push_ucs2_talloc() for domain failed\n"));
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talloc_free(mem_ctx);
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return false;
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}
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SMB_ASSERT(user_byte_len >= 2);
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SMB_ASSERT(domain_byte_len >= 2);
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/* We don't want null termination */
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user_byte_len = user_byte_len - 2;
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domain_byte_len = domain_byte_len - 2;
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rc = gnutls_hmac_init(&hmac_hnd,
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GNUTLS_MAC_MD5,
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owf,
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16);
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if (rc < 0) {
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ok = false;
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goto out;
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}
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rc = gnutls_hmac(hmac_hnd, user, user_byte_len);
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if (rc < 0) {
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gnutls_hmac_deinit(hmac_hnd, NULL);
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ok = false;
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goto out;
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}
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rc = gnutls_hmac(hmac_hnd, domain, domain_byte_len);
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if (rc < 0) {
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gnutls_hmac_deinit(hmac_hnd, NULL);
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ok = false;
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goto out;
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}
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gnutls_hmac_deinit(hmac_hnd, kr_buf);
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#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
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DEBUG(100, ("ntv2_owf_gen: user, domain, owfkey, kr\n"));
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dump_data(100, (uint8_t *)user, user_byte_len);
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dump_data(100, (uint8_t *)domain, domain_byte_len);
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dump_data(100, owf, 16);
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dump_data(100, kr_buf, 16);
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#endif
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ok = true;
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out:
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talloc_free(mem_ctx);
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return ok;
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}
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/* Does the des encryption from the NT or LM MD4 hash. */
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int SMBOWFencrypt(const uint8_t passwd[16], const uint8_t *c8, uint8_t p24[24])
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{
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uint8_t p21[21];
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ZERO_STRUCT(p21);
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memcpy(p21, passwd, 16);
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return E_P24(p21, c8, p24);
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}
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/* Does the des encryption. */
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int SMBNTencrypt_hash(const uint8_t nt_hash[16], const uint8_t *c8, uint8_t *p24)
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{
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uint8_t p21[21];
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int rc;
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memset(p21,'\0',21);
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memcpy(p21, nt_hash, 16);
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rc = SMBOWFencrypt(p21, c8, p24);
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#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
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DEBUG(100,("SMBNTencrypt: nt#, challenge, response\n"));
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dump_data(100, p21, 16);
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dump_data(100, c8, 8);
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dump_data(100, p24, 24);
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#endif
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return rc;
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}
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/* Does the NT MD4 hash then des encryption. Plaintext version of the above. */
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int SMBNTencrypt(const char *passwd, const uint8_t *c8, uint8_t *p24)
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{
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uint8_t nt_hash[16];
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E_md4hash(passwd, nt_hash);
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return SMBNTencrypt_hash(nt_hash, c8, p24);
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}
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|
|
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/* Does the md5 encryption from the Key Response for NTLMv2. */
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NTSTATUS SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2(const uint8_t kr[16],
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const DATA_BLOB *srv_chal,
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const DATA_BLOB *smbcli_chal,
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uint8_t resp_buf[16])
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{
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gnutls_hmac_hd_t hmac_hnd = NULL;
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NTSTATUS status;
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int rc;
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rc = gnutls_hmac_init(&hmac_hnd,
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GNUTLS_MAC_MD5,
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kr,
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16);
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if (rc < 0) {
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return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_HMAC_NOT_SUPPORTED);
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}
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rc = gnutls_hmac(hmac_hnd, srv_chal->data, srv_chal->length);
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if (rc < 0) {
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status = gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_HMAC_NOT_SUPPORTED);
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goto out;
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}
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rc = gnutls_hmac(hmac_hnd, smbcli_chal->data, smbcli_chal->length);
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if (rc < 0) {
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status = gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_HMAC_NOT_SUPPORTED);
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goto out;
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}
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#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
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DEBUG(100, ("SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2: srv_chal, smbcli_chal, resp_buf\n"));
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dump_data(100, srv_chal->data, srv_chal->length);
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dump_data(100, smbcli_chal->data, smbcli_chal->length);
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dump_data(100, resp_buf, 16);
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#endif
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status = NT_STATUS_OK;
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out:
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gnutls_hmac_deinit(hmac_hnd, resp_buf);
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return status;
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}
|
|
|
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NTSTATUS SMBsesskeygen_ntv2(const uint8_t kr[16],
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const uint8_t *nt_resp,
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uint8_t sess_key[16])
|
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{
|
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int rc;
|
|
|
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/* a very nice, 128 bit, variable session key */
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rc = gnutls_hmac_fast(GNUTLS_MAC_MD5,
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kr,
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16,
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nt_resp,
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16,
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sess_key);
|
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if (rc != 0) {
|
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return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_HASH_NOT_SUPPORTED);
|
|
}
|
|
|
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#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
|
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DEBUG(100, ("SMBsesskeygen_ntv2:\n"));
|
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dump_data(100, sess_key, 16);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(const uint8_t kr[16], uint8_t sess_key[16])
|
|
{
|
|
/* yes, this session key does not change - yes, this
|
|
is a problem - but it is 128 bits */
|
|
|
|
mdfour((uint8_t *)sess_key, kr, 16);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
|
|
DEBUG(100, ("SMBsesskeygen_ntv1:\n"));
|
|
dump_data(100, sess_key, 16);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NTSTATUS SMBsesskeygen_lm_sess_key(const uint8_t lm_hash[16],
|
|
const uint8_t lm_resp[24], /* only uses 8 */
|
|
uint8_t sess_key[16])
|
|
{
|
|
/* Calculate the LM session key (effective length 40 bits,
|
|
but changes with each session) */
|
|
uint8_t p24[24];
|
|
uint8_t partial_lm_hash[14];
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(partial_lm_hash, lm_hash, 8);
|
|
memset(partial_lm_hash + 8, 0xbd, 6);
|
|
|
|
rc = des_crypt56_gnutls(p24, lm_resp, partial_lm_hash, SAMBA_GNUTLS_ENCRYPT);
|
|
if (rc < 0) {
|
|
return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DISABLED_BY_POLICY_OTHER);
|
|
}
|
|
rc = des_crypt56_gnutls(p24+8, lm_resp, partial_lm_hash + 7, SAMBA_GNUTLS_ENCRYPT);
|
|
if (rc < 0) {
|
|
return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DISABLED_BY_POLICY_OTHER);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(sess_key, p24, 16);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
|
|
DEBUG(100, ("SMBsesskeygen_lm_sess_key: \n"));
|
|
dump_data(100, sess_key, 16);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DATA_BLOB NTLMv2_generate_names_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
|
const char *hostname,
|
|
const char *domain)
|
|
{
|
|
DATA_BLOB names_blob = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* Deliberately ignore return here.. */
|
|
if (hostname != NULL) {
|
|
(void)msrpc_gen(mem_ctx, &names_blob,
|
|
"aaa",
|
|
MsvAvNbDomainName, domain,
|
|
MsvAvNbComputerName, hostname,
|
|
MsvAvEOL, "");
|
|
} else {
|
|
(void)msrpc_gen(mem_ctx, &names_blob,
|
|
"aa",
|
|
MsvAvNbDomainName, domain,
|
|
MsvAvEOL, "");
|
|
}
|
|
return names_blob;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static DATA_BLOB NTLMv2_generate_client_data(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
|
NTTIME nttime,
|
|
const DATA_BLOB *names_blob)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t client_chal[8];
|
|
DATA_BLOB response = data_blob(NULL, 0);
|
|
uint8_t long_date[8];
|
|
|
|
generate_random_buffer(client_chal, sizeof(client_chal));
|
|
|
|
push_nttime(long_date, 0, nttime);
|
|
|
|
/* See http://www.ubiqx.org/cifs/SMB.html#SMB.8.5 */
|
|
|
|
/* Deliberately ignore return here.. */
|
|
(void)msrpc_gen(mem_ctx, &response, "ddbbdb",
|
|
0x00000101, /* Header */
|
|
0, /* 'Reserved' */
|
|
long_date, 8, /* Timestamp */
|
|
client_chal, 8, /* client challenge */
|
|
0, /* Unknown */
|
|
names_blob->data, names_blob->length); /* End of name list */
|
|
|
|
return response;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static DATA_BLOB NTLMv2_generate_response(TALLOC_CTX *out_mem_ctx,
|
|
const uint8_t ntlm_v2_hash[16],
|
|
const DATA_BLOB *server_chal,
|
|
NTTIME nttime,
|
|
const DATA_BLOB *names_blob)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t ntlmv2_response[16];
|
|
DATA_BLOB ntlmv2_client_data;
|
|
DATA_BLOB final_response;
|
|
NTSTATUS status;
|
|
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(out_mem_ctx, 0,
|
|
"NTLMv2_generate_response internal context");
|
|
|
|
if (!mem_ctx) {
|
|
return data_blob(NULL, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* NTLMv2 */
|
|
/* generate some data to pass into the response function - including
|
|
the hostname and domain name of the server */
|
|
ntlmv2_client_data = NTLMv2_generate_client_data(mem_ctx, nttime, names_blob);
|
|
|
|
/* Given that data, and the challenge from the server, generate a response */
|
|
status = SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2(ntlm_v2_hash,
|
|
server_chal,
|
|
&ntlmv2_client_data,
|
|
ntlmv2_response);
|
|
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
|
|
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
|
return data_blob(NULL, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
final_response = data_blob_talloc(out_mem_ctx, NULL, sizeof(ntlmv2_response) + ntlmv2_client_data.length);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(final_response.data, ntlmv2_response, sizeof(ntlmv2_response));
|
|
|
|
memcpy(final_response.data+sizeof(ntlmv2_response),
|
|
ntlmv2_client_data.data, ntlmv2_client_data.length);
|
|
|
|
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
|
|
|
return final_response;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static DATA_BLOB LMv2_generate_response(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
|
const uint8_t ntlm_v2_hash[16],
|
|
const DATA_BLOB *server_chal)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t lmv2_response[16];
|
|
DATA_BLOB lmv2_client_data = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 8);
|
|
DATA_BLOB final_response = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL,24);
|
|
NTSTATUS status;
|
|
|
|
/* LMv2 */
|
|
/* client-supplied random data */
|
|
generate_random_buffer(lmv2_client_data.data, lmv2_client_data.length);
|
|
|
|
/* Given that data, and the challenge from the server, generate a response */
|
|
status = SMBOWFencrypt_ntv2(ntlm_v2_hash,
|
|
server_chal,
|
|
&lmv2_client_data,
|
|
lmv2_response);
|
|
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
|
|
data_blob_free(&lmv2_client_data);
|
|
return data_blob(NULL, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(final_response.data, lmv2_response, sizeof(lmv2_response));
|
|
|
|
/* after the first 16 bytes is the random data we generated above,
|
|
so the server can verify us with it */
|
|
memcpy(final_response.data+sizeof(lmv2_response),
|
|
lmv2_client_data.data, lmv2_client_data.length);
|
|
|
|
data_blob_free(&lmv2_client_data);
|
|
|
|
return final_response;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool SMBNTLMv2encrypt_hash(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
|
const char *user, const char *domain, const uint8_t nt_hash[16],
|
|
const DATA_BLOB *server_chal,
|
|
const NTTIME *server_timestamp,
|
|
const DATA_BLOB *names_blob,
|
|
DATA_BLOB *lm_response, DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
|
|
DATA_BLOB *lm_session_key, DATA_BLOB *user_session_key)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t ntlm_v2_hash[16];
|
|
NTSTATUS status;
|
|
|
|
/* We don't use the NT# directly. Instead we use it mashed up with
|
|
the username and domain.
|
|
This prevents username swapping during the auth exchange
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ntv2_owf_gen(nt_hash, user, domain, ntlm_v2_hash)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (nt_response) {
|
|
const NTTIME *nttime = server_timestamp;
|
|
NTTIME _now = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (nttime == NULL) {
|
|
struct timeval tv_now = timeval_current();
|
|
_now = timeval_to_nttime(&tv_now);
|
|
nttime = &_now;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*nt_response = NTLMv2_generate_response(mem_ctx,
|
|
ntlm_v2_hash,
|
|
server_chal,
|
|
*nttime,
|
|
names_blob);
|
|
if (user_session_key) {
|
|
*user_session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
|
|
|
|
/* The NTLMv2 calculations also provide a session key, for signing etc later */
|
|
/* use only the first 16 bytes of nt_response for session key */
|
|
status = SMBsesskeygen_ntv2(ntlm_v2_hash,
|
|
nt_response->data,
|
|
user_session_key->data);
|
|
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* LMv2 */
|
|
|
|
if (lm_response) {
|
|
if (server_timestamp != NULL) {
|
|
*lm_response = data_blob_talloc_zero(mem_ctx, 24);
|
|
} else {
|
|
*lm_response = LMv2_generate_response(mem_ctx,
|
|
ntlm_v2_hash,
|
|
server_chal);
|
|
}
|
|
if (lm_session_key) {
|
|
*lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
|
|
|
|
/* The NTLMv2 calculations also provide a session key, for signing etc later */
|
|
/* use only the first 16 bytes of lm_response for session key */
|
|
status = SMBsesskeygen_ntv2(ntlm_v2_hash,
|
|
lm_response->data,
|
|
lm_session_key->data);
|
|
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool SMBNTLMv2encrypt(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
|
const char *user, const char *domain,
|
|
const char *password,
|
|
const DATA_BLOB *server_chal,
|
|
const DATA_BLOB *names_blob,
|
|
DATA_BLOB *lm_response, DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
|
|
DATA_BLOB *lm_session_key, DATA_BLOB *user_session_key)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t nt_hash[16];
|
|
E_md4hash(password, nt_hash);
|
|
|
|
return SMBNTLMv2encrypt_hash(mem_ctx,
|
|
user, domain, nt_hash,
|
|
server_chal, NULL, names_blob,
|
|
lm_response, nt_response, lm_session_key, user_session_key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NTSTATUS NTLMv2_RESPONSE_verify_netlogon_creds(const char *account_name,
|
|
const char *account_domain,
|
|
const DATA_BLOB response,
|
|
const struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds,
|
|
const char *workgroup)
|
|
{
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *frame = NULL;
|
|
/* RespType + HiRespType */
|
|
static const char *magic = "\x01\x01";
|
|
int cmp;
|
|
struct NTLMv2_RESPONSE v2_resp;
|
|
enum ndr_err_code err;
|
|
const struct AV_PAIR *av_nb_cn = NULL;
|
|
const struct AV_PAIR *av_nb_dn = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (response.length < 48) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* NTLMv2_RESPONSE has at least 48 bytes.
|
|
*/
|
|
return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cmp = memcmp(response.data + 16, magic, 2);
|
|
if (cmp != 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* It doesn't look like a valid NTLMv2_RESPONSE
|
|
*/
|
|
return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (response.length == 95) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* ndr_pull_NTLMv2_RESPONSE() fails on this strange blob,
|
|
* because the AvPairs content is not valid
|
|
* as AvLen of the first pair is 33032 (0x8108).
|
|
*
|
|
* I saw a single machine sending the following 3 times
|
|
* in a row, but I'm not sure if everything is static.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note this is NTLMv2_CLIENT_CHALLENGE only, not
|
|
* the full NTLMv2_RESPONSE (which has Response of 16 bytes
|
|
* before the NTLMv2_CLIENT_CHALLENGE).
|
|
*
|
|
* Note this code only prevents
|
|
* ndr_pull_error(Buffer Size Error): Pull bytes 39016
|
|
* debug message for a known case, the actual
|
|
* bug is also handled below in a generic way to
|
|
* map NT_STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL to NT_STATUS_OK.
|
|
*
|
|
* See https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14932
|
|
*/
|
|
static const char *netapp_magic =
|
|
"\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
|
|
"\x3f\x3f\x3f\x3f\x3f\x3f\x3f\x3f"
|
|
"\xb8\x82\x3a\xf1\xb3\xdd\x08\x15"
|
|
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x11\xa2\x08\x81"
|
|
"\x50\x38\x22\x78\x2b\x94\x47\xfe"
|
|
"\x54\x94\x7b\xff\x17\x27\x5a\xb4"
|
|
"\xf4\x18\xba\xdc\x2c\x38\xfd\x5b"
|
|
"\xfb\x0e\xc1\x85\x1e\xcc\x92\xbb"
|
|
"\x9b\xb1\xc4\xd5\x53\x14\xff\x8c"
|
|
"\x76\x49\xf5\x45\x90\x19\xa2";
|
|
/*
|
|
* First we check the initial bytes
|
|
* and the 0x3F timestamp.
|
|
*/
|
|
cmp = memcmp(response.data + 16,
|
|
netapp_magic,
|
|
16);
|
|
if (cmp == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Then check everything after the
|
|
* client challenge
|
|
*/
|
|
cmp = memcmp(response.data + 40,
|
|
netapp_magic + 24,
|
|
response.length - 40);
|
|
if (cmp == 0) {
|
|
DBG_DEBUG("Invalid NETAPP NTLMv2_RESPONSE "
|
|
"for user[%s\\%s] against "
|
|
"SEC_CHAN(%u)[%s/%s] "
|
|
"in workgroup[%s]\n",
|
|
account_domain,
|
|
account_name,
|
|
creds->secure_channel_type,
|
|
creds->computer_name,
|
|
creds->account_name,
|
|
workgroup);
|
|
return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
frame = talloc_stackframe();
|
|
|
|
err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&response, frame, &v2_resp,
|
|
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_NTLMv2_RESPONSE);
|
|
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(err)) {
|
|
NTSTATUS status;
|
|
status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(err);
|
|
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We are supposed to ignore invalid buffers,
|
|
* see https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14932
|
|
*/
|
|
status = NT_STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
DEBUG(2,("%s: Failed to parse NTLMv2_RESPONSE length=%u "
|
|
"for user[%s\\%s] against SEC_CHAN(%u)[%s/%s] "
|
|
"in workgroup[%s] - %s %s %s\n",
|
|
__func__,
|
|
(unsigned)response.length,
|
|
account_domain,
|
|
account_name,
|
|
creds->secure_channel_type,
|
|
creds->computer_name,
|
|
creds->account_name,
|
|
workgroup,
|
|
ndr_map_error2string(err),
|
|
NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) ? "(ignoring) =>" : "=>",
|
|
nt_errstr(status)));
|
|
dump_data(2, response.data, response.length);
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (DEBUGLVL(10)) {
|
|
NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(NTLMv2_RESPONSE, &v2_resp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Make sure the netbios computer name in the
|
|
* NTLMv2_RESPONSE matches the computer name
|
|
* in the secure channel credentials for workstation
|
|
* trusts.
|
|
*
|
|
* And the netbios domain name matches our
|
|
* workgroup.
|
|
*
|
|
* This prevents workstations from requesting
|
|
* the session key of NTLMSSP sessions of clients
|
|
* to other hosts.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (creds->secure_channel_type == SEC_CHAN_WKSTA) {
|
|
av_nb_cn = ndr_ntlmssp_find_av(&v2_resp.Challenge.AvPairs,
|
|
MsvAvNbComputerName);
|
|
av_nb_dn = ndr_ntlmssp_find_av(&v2_resp.Challenge.AvPairs,
|
|
MsvAvNbDomainName);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (av_nb_cn != NULL) {
|
|
const char *v = NULL;
|
|
char *a = NULL;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
|
|
v = av_nb_cn->Value.AvNbComputerName;
|
|
|
|
a = talloc_strdup(frame, creds->account_name);
|
|
if (a == NULL) {
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
|
|
}
|
|
len = strlen(a);
|
|
if (len > 0 && a[len - 1] == '$') {
|
|
a[len - 1] = '\0';
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cmp = strcasecmp_m(a, v);
|
|
if (cmp != 0) {
|
|
DEBUG(2,("%s: NTLMv2_RESPONSE with "
|
|
"NbComputerName[%s] rejected "
|
|
"for user[%s\\%s] "
|
|
"against SEC_CHAN_WKSTA[%s/%s] "
|
|
"in workgroup[%s]\n",
|
|
__func__, v,
|
|
account_domain,
|
|
account_name,
|
|
creds->computer_name,
|
|
creds->account_name,
|
|
workgroup));
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (av_nb_dn != NULL) {
|
|
const char *v = NULL;
|
|
|
|
v = av_nb_dn->Value.AvNbDomainName;
|
|
|
|
cmp = strcasecmp_m(workgroup, v);
|
|
if (cmp != 0) {
|
|
DEBUG(2,("%s: NTLMv2_RESPONSE with "
|
|
"NbDomainName[%s] rejected "
|
|
"for user[%s\\%s] "
|
|
"against SEC_CHAN_WKSTA[%s/%s] "
|
|
"in workgroup[%s]\n",
|
|
__func__, v,
|
|
account_domain,
|
|
account_name,
|
|
creds->computer_name,
|
|
creds->account_name,
|
|
workgroup));
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/***********************************************************
|
|
encode a password buffer with a unicode password. The buffer
|
|
is filled with random data to make it harder to attack.
|
|
************************************************************/
|
|
bool encode_pw_buffer(uint8_t buffer[516], const char *password, int string_flags)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t new_pw[512];
|
|
ssize_t new_pw_len;
|
|
|
|
/* the incoming buffer can be any alignment. */
|
|
string_flags |= STR_NOALIGN;
|
|
|
|
new_pw_len = push_string(new_pw,
|
|
password,
|
|
sizeof(new_pw), string_flags);
|
|
if (new_pw_len == -1) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&buffer[512 - new_pw_len], new_pw, new_pw_len);
|
|
|
|
generate_random_buffer(buffer, 512 - new_pw_len);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The length of the new password is in the last 4 bytes of
|
|
* the data buffer.
|
|
*/
|
|
SIVAL(buffer, 512, new_pw_len);
|
|
ZERO_STRUCT(new_pw);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/***********************************************************
|
|
decode a password buffer
|
|
*new_pw_len is the length in bytes of the possibly mulitbyte
|
|
returned password including termination.
|
|
************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
bool decode_pw_buffer(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
|
|
uint8_t in_buffer[516],
|
|
char **pp_new_pwrd,
|
|
size_t *new_pw_len,
|
|
charset_t string_charset)
|
|
{
|
|
int byte_len=0;
|
|
|
|
*pp_new_pwrd = NULL;
|
|
*new_pw_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
Warning !!! : This function is called from some rpc call.
|
|
The password IN the buffer may be a UNICODE string.
|
|
The password IN new_pwrd is an ASCII string
|
|
If you reuse that code somewhere else check first.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* The length of the new password is in the last 4 bytes of the data buffer. */
|
|
|
|
byte_len = IVAL(in_buffer, 512);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
|
|
dump_data(100, in_buffer, 516);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Password cannot be longer than the size of the password buffer */
|
|
if ( (byte_len < 0) || (byte_len > 512)) {
|
|
DEBUG(0, ("decode_pw_buffer: incorrect password length (%d).\n", byte_len));
|
|
DEBUG(0, ("decode_pw_buffer: check that 'encrypt passwords = yes'\n"));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* decode into the return buffer. */
|
|
if (!convert_string_talloc(ctx, string_charset, CH_UNIX,
|
|
&in_buffer[512 - byte_len],
|
|
byte_len,
|
|
(void *)pp_new_pwrd,
|
|
new_pw_len)) {
|
|
DEBUG(0, ("decode_pw_buffer: failed to convert incoming password\n"));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
talloc_keep_secret(*pp_new_pwrd);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
|
|
DEBUG(100,("decode_pw_buffer: new_pwrd: "));
|
|
dump_data(100, (uint8_t *)*pp_new_pwrd, *new_pw_len);
|
|
DEBUG(100,("multibyte len:%lu\n", (unsigned long int)*new_pw_len));
|
|
DEBUG(100,("original char len:%d\n", byte_len/2));
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/***********************************************************
|
|
Encode an arc4 password change buffer.
|
|
************************************************************/
|
|
NTSTATUS encode_rc4_passwd_buffer(const char *passwd,
|
|
const DATA_BLOB *session_key,
|
|
struct samr_CryptPasswordEx *out_crypt_pwd)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t _confounder[16] = {0};
|
|
DATA_BLOB confounder = data_blob_const(_confounder, 16);
|
|
DATA_BLOB pw_data = data_blob_const(out_crypt_pwd->data, 516);
|
|
bool ok;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
ok = encode_pw_buffer(pw_data.data, passwd, STR_UNICODE);
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
generate_random_buffer(confounder.data, confounder.length);
|
|
|
|
rc = samba_gnutls_arcfour_confounded_md5(&confounder,
|
|
session_key,
|
|
&pw_data,
|
|
SAMBA_GNUTLS_ENCRYPT);
|
|
if (rc < 0) {
|
|
ZERO_ARRAY(_confounder);
|
|
data_blob_clear(&pw_data);
|
|
return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DISABLED_BY_POLICY_OTHER);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The packet format is the 516 byte RC4 encrypted
|
|
* pasword followed by the 16 byte counfounder
|
|
* The confounder is a salt to prevent pre-computed hash attacks on the
|
|
* database.
|
|
*/
|
|
memcpy(&out_crypt_pwd->data[516], confounder.data, confounder.length);
|
|
ZERO_ARRAY(_confounder);
|
|
|
|
return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/***********************************************************
|
|
Decode an arc4 encrypted password change buffer.
|
|
************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
NTSTATUS decode_rc4_passwd_buffer(const DATA_BLOB *psession_key,
|
|
struct samr_CryptPasswordEx *inout_crypt_pwd)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Confounder is last 16 bytes. */
|
|
DATA_BLOB confounder = data_blob_const(&inout_crypt_pwd->data[516], 16);
|
|
DATA_BLOB pw_data = data_blob_const(&inout_crypt_pwd->data, 516);
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
rc = samba_gnutls_arcfour_confounded_md5(&confounder,
|
|
psession_key,
|
|
&pw_data,
|
|
SAMBA_GNUTLS_DECRYPT);
|
|
if (rc < 0) {
|
|
return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DISABLED_BY_POLICY_OTHER);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/***********************************************************
|
|
encode a password buffer with an already unicode password. The
|
|
rest of the buffer is filled with random data to make it harder to attack.
|
|
************************************************************/
|
|
bool set_pw_in_buffer(uint8_t buffer[516], const DATA_BLOB *password)
|
|
{
|
|
if (password->length > 512) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&buffer[512 - password->length], password->data, password->length);
|
|
|
|
generate_random_buffer(buffer, 512 - password->length);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The length of the new password is in the last 4 bytes of
|
|
* the data buffer.
|
|
*/
|
|
SIVAL(buffer, 512, password->length);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/***********************************************************
|
|
decode a password buffer
|
|
*new_pw_size is the length in bytes of the extracted unicode password
|
|
************************************************************/
|
|
bool extract_pw_from_buffer(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
|
uint8_t in_buffer[516], DATA_BLOB *new_pass)
|
|
{
|
|
int byte_len=0;
|
|
|
|
/* The length of the new password is in the last 4 bytes of the data buffer. */
|
|
|
|
byte_len = IVAL(in_buffer, 512);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
|
|
dump_data(100, in_buffer, 516);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Password cannot be longer than the size of the password buffer */
|
|
if ( (byte_len < 0) || (byte_len > 512)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*new_pass = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, &in_buffer[512 - byte_len], byte_len);
|
|
|
|
if (!new_pass->data) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* encode a wkssvc_PasswordBuffer:
|
|
*
|
|
* similar to samr_CryptPasswordEx. Different: 8byte confounder (instead of
|
|
* 16byte), confounder in front of the 516 byte buffer (instead of after that
|
|
* buffer), calling MD5Update() first with session_key and then with confounder
|
|
* (vice versa in samr) - Guenther */
|
|
|
|
WERROR encode_wkssvc_join_password_buffer(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
|
const char *pwd,
|
|
DATA_BLOB *session_key,
|
|
struct wkssvc_PasswordBuffer **out_pwd_buf)
|
|
{
|
|
struct wkssvc_PasswordBuffer *pwd_buf = NULL;
|
|
uint8_t _confounder[8] = {0};
|
|
DATA_BLOB confounder = data_blob_const(_confounder, 8);
|
|
uint8_t pwbuf[516] = {0};
|
|
DATA_BLOB encrypt_pwbuf = data_blob_const(pwbuf, 516);
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
pwd_buf = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct wkssvc_PasswordBuffer);
|
|
if (pwd_buf == NULL) {
|
|
return WERR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
encode_pw_buffer(pwbuf, pwd, STR_UNICODE);
|
|
|
|
generate_random_buffer(_confounder, sizeof(_confounder));
|
|
|
|
rc = samba_gnutls_arcfour_confounded_md5(session_key,
|
|
&confounder,
|
|
&encrypt_pwbuf,
|
|
SAMBA_GNUTLS_ENCRYPT);
|
|
if (rc < 0) {
|
|
ZERO_ARRAY(_confounder);
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(pwd_buf);
|
|
return gnutls_error_to_werror(rc, WERR_CONTENT_BLOCKED);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&pwd_buf->data[0], confounder.data, confounder.length);
|
|
ZERO_ARRAY(_confounder);
|
|
memcpy(&pwd_buf->data[8], encrypt_pwbuf.data, encrypt_pwbuf.length);
|
|
ZERO_ARRAY(pwbuf);
|
|
|
|
*out_pwd_buf = pwd_buf;
|
|
|
|
return WERR_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
WERROR decode_wkssvc_join_password_buffer(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
|
struct wkssvc_PasswordBuffer *pwd_buf,
|
|
DATA_BLOB *session_key,
|
|
char **pwd)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t _confounder[8] = { 0 };
|
|
DATA_BLOB confounder = data_blob_const(_confounder, 8);
|
|
uint8_t pwbuf[516] = {0};
|
|
DATA_BLOB decrypt_pwbuf = data_blob_const(pwbuf, 516);
|
|
bool ok;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
if (pwd_buf == NULL) {
|
|
return WERR_INVALID_PASSWORD;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*pwd = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (session_key->length != 16) {
|
|
DEBUG(10,("invalid session key\n"));
|
|
return WERR_INVALID_PASSWORD;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
confounder = data_blob_const(&pwd_buf->data[0], 8);
|
|
memcpy(&pwbuf, &pwd_buf->data[8], 516);
|
|
|
|
rc = samba_gnutls_arcfour_confounded_md5(session_key,
|
|
&confounder,
|
|
&decrypt_pwbuf,
|
|
SAMBA_GNUTLS_ENCRYPT);
|
|
if (rc < 0) {
|
|
ZERO_ARRAY(_confounder);
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(pwd_buf);
|
|
return gnutls_error_to_werror(rc, WERR_CONTENT_BLOCKED);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ok = decode_pw_buffer(mem_ctx,
|
|
decrypt_pwbuf.data,
|
|
pwd,
|
|
&decrypt_pwbuf.length,
|
|
CH_UTF16);
|
|
ZERO_ARRAY(pwbuf);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
return WERR_INVALID_PASSWORD;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return WERR_OK;
|
|
}
|