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5cd9495fb3
A new event context is constructed by LDB when required for secrets.ldb This will be essentially unused, as LDB on TDB will only trigger 'fake' events, and blocks on transactions and lock operations anyway. Andrew Bartlett
193 lines
5.5 KiB
C
193 lines
5.5 KiB
C
/*
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Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
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Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2001
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Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2002
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Copyright (C) Rafal Szczesniak 2002
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This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
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(at your option) any later version.
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This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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GNU General Public License for more details.
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You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*/
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/* the Samba secrets database stores any generated, private information
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such as the local SID and machine trust password */
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#include "includes.h"
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#include "secrets.h"
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#include "param/param.h"
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#include "system/filesys.h"
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#include "tdb_wrap.h"
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#include "lib/ldb-samba/ldb_wrap.h"
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#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h"
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#include "../lib/util/util_tdb.h"
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#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_security.h"
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#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
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/**
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* Use a TDB to store an incrementing random seed.
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*
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* Initialised to the current pid, the very first time Samba starts,
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* and incremented by one each time it is needed.
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*
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* @note Not called by systems with a working /dev/urandom.
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*/
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static void get_rand_seed(struct tdb_wrap *secretsdb, int *new_seed)
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{
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*new_seed = getpid();
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if (secretsdb != NULL) {
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tdb_change_int32_atomic(secretsdb->tdb, "INFO/random_seed", new_seed, 1);
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}
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}
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/**
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* open up the secrets database
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*/
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struct tdb_wrap *secrets_init(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx)
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{
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char *fname;
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uint8_t dummy;
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struct tdb_wrap *tdb;
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fname = private_path(mem_ctx, lp_ctx, "secrets.tdb");
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tdb = tdb_wrap_open(mem_ctx, fname, 0, TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0600);
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if (!tdb) {
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DEBUG(0,("Failed to open %s\n", fname));
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talloc_free(fname);
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return NULL;
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}
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talloc_free(fname);
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/**
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* Set a reseed function for the crypto random generator
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*
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* This avoids a problem where systems without /dev/urandom
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* could send the same challenge to multiple clients
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*/
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set_rand_reseed_callback((void (*) (void *, int *))get_rand_seed, tdb);
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/* Ensure that the reseed is done now, while we are root, etc */
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generate_random_buffer(&dummy, sizeof(dummy));
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return tdb;
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}
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/**
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connect to the secrets ldb
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*/
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struct ldb_context *secrets_db_connect(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
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struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx)
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{
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return ldb_wrap_connect(mem_ctx, NULL, lp_ctx, lpcfg_secrets_url(lp_ctx),
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NULL, NULL, 0);
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}
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/**
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* Retrieve the domain SID from the secrets database.
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* @return pointer to a SID object if the SID could be obtained, NULL otherwise
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*/
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struct dom_sid *secrets_get_domain_sid(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
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struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
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const char *domain,
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enum netr_SchannelType *sec_channel_type,
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char **errstring)
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{
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struct ldb_context *ldb;
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struct ldb_message *msg;
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int ldb_ret;
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const char *attrs[] = { "objectSid", "secureChannelType", NULL };
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struct dom_sid *result = NULL;
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const struct ldb_val *v;
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enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
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*errstring = NULL;
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ldb = secrets_db_connect(mem_ctx, lp_ctx);
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if (ldb == NULL) {
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DEBUG(5, ("secrets_db_connect failed\n"));
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return NULL;
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}
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ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(ldb, ldb, &msg,
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ldb_dn_new(mem_ctx, ldb, SECRETS_PRIMARY_DOMAIN_DN),
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LDB_SCOPE_ONELEVEL,
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attrs, 0, SECRETS_PRIMARY_DOMAIN_FILTER, domain);
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if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
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*errstring = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "Failed to find record for %s in %s: %s: %s",
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domain, (char *) ldb_get_opaque(ldb, "ldb_url"),
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ldb_strerror(ldb_ret), ldb_errstring(ldb));
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return NULL;
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}
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v = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "objectSid");
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if (v == NULL) {
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*errstring = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "Failed to find a SID on record for %s in %s",
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domain, (char *) ldb_get_opaque(ldb, "ldb_url"));
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return NULL;
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}
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if (sec_channel_type) {
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int t;
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t = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "secureChannelType", -1);
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if (t == -1) {
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*errstring = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "Failed to find secureChannelType for %s in %s",
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domain, (char *) ldb_get_opaque(ldb, "ldb_url"));
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return NULL;
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}
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*sec_channel_type = t;
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}
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result = talloc(mem_ctx, struct dom_sid);
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if (result == NULL) {
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talloc_free(ldb);
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return NULL;
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}
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ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(v, result, result,
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(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_dom_sid);
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if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
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*errstring = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "Failed to parse SID on record for %s in %s",
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domain, (char *) ldb_get_opaque(ldb, "ldb_url"));
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talloc_free(result);
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talloc_free(ldb);
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return NULL;
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}
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return result;
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}
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char *keytab_name_from_msg(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct ldb_context *ldb, struct ldb_message *msg)
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{
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const char *krb5keytab = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "krb5Keytab", NULL);
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if (krb5keytab) {
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return talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, krb5keytab);
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} else {
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char *file_keytab;
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char *relative_path;
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const char *privateKeytab = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "privateKeytab", NULL);
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if (!privateKeytab) {
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return NULL;
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}
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relative_path = ldb_relative_path(ldb, mem_ctx, privateKeytab);
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if (!relative_path) {
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return NULL;
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}
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file_keytab = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "FILE:%s", relative_path);
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talloc_free(relative_path);
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return file_keytab;
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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