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samba-mirror/source4/auth/kerberos/kerberos_pac.c
Joseph Sutton 915b40521e s4:auth: Check that the PAC is not NULL before dereferencing it
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
2023-11-01 20:10:45 +00:00

540 lines
16 KiB
C

/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
Create and parse the krb5 PAC
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2004-2005,2008
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2001
Copyright (C) Luke Howard 2002-2003
Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher 2004-2005
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "system/kerberos.h"
#include "auth/auth.h"
#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_krb5pac.h"
#include <ldb.h>
#include "auth/auth_sam_reply.h"
#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos_util.h"
#include "auth/kerberos/pac_utils.h"
krb5_error_code kerberos_encode_pac(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct PAC_DATA *pac_data,
krb5_context context,
const krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_keyblock,
const krb5_keyblock *service_keyblock,
DATA_BLOB *pac)
{
NTSTATUS nt_status;
krb5_error_code ret;
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
DATA_BLOB zero_blob = data_blob(NULL, 0);
DATA_BLOB tmp_blob = data_blob(NULL, 0);
struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *kdc_checksum = NULL;
struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *srv_checksum = NULL;
uint32_t i;
/* First, just get the keytypes filled in (and lengths right, eventually) */
for (i=0; i < pac_data->num_buffers; i++) {
if (pac_data->buffers[i].type != PAC_TYPE_KDC_CHECKSUM) {
continue;
}
kdc_checksum = &pac_data->buffers[i].info->kdc_cksum,
ret = smb_krb5_make_pac_checksum(mem_ctx,
&zero_blob,
context,
krbtgt_keyblock,
&kdc_checksum->type,
&kdc_checksum->signature);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(2, ("making krbtgt PAC checksum failed: %s\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, mem_ctx)));
talloc_free(pac_data);
return ret;
}
}
for (i=0; i < pac_data->num_buffers; i++) {
if (pac_data->buffers[i].type != PAC_TYPE_SRV_CHECKSUM) {
continue;
}
srv_checksum = &pac_data->buffers[i].info->srv_cksum;
ret = smb_krb5_make_pac_checksum(mem_ctx,
&zero_blob,
context,
service_keyblock,
&srv_checksum->type,
&srv_checksum->signature);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(2, ("making service PAC checksum failed: %s\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, mem_ctx)));
talloc_free(pac_data);
return ret;
}
}
if (!kdc_checksum) {
DEBUG(2, ("Invalid PAC constructed for signing, no KDC checksum present!\n"));
return EINVAL;
}
if (!srv_checksum) {
DEBUG(2, ("Invalid PAC constructed for signing, no SRV checksum present!\n"));
return EINVAL;
}
/* But wipe out the actual signatures */
memset(kdc_checksum->signature.data, '\0', kdc_checksum->signature.length);
memset(srv_checksum->signature.data, '\0', srv_checksum->signature.length);
ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(&tmp_blob, mem_ctx,
pac_data,
(ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_DATA);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
DEBUG(1, ("PAC (presig) push failed: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
talloc_free(pac_data);
return EINVAL;
}
/* Then sign the result of the previous push, where the sig was zero'ed out */
ret = smb_krb5_make_pac_checksum(mem_ctx,
&tmp_blob,
context,
service_keyblock,
&srv_checksum->type,
&srv_checksum->signature);
if (ret) {
DBG_WARNING("making krbtgt PAC srv_checksum failed: %s\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, mem_ctx));
talloc_free(pac_data);
return ret;
}
/* Then sign Server checksum */
ret = smb_krb5_make_pac_checksum(mem_ctx,
&srv_checksum->signature,
context,
krbtgt_keyblock,
&kdc_checksum->type,
&kdc_checksum->signature);
if (ret) {
DBG_WARNING("making krbtgt PAC kdc_checksum failed: %s\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, mem_ctx));
talloc_free(pac_data);
return ret;
}
/* And push it out again, this time to the world. This relies on deterministic pointer values */
ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(&tmp_blob, mem_ctx,
pac_data,
(ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_DATA);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
DEBUG(1, ("PAC (final) push failed: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
talloc_free(pac_data);
return EINVAL;
}
*pac = tmp_blob;
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code kerberos_create_pac(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc,
krb5_context context,
const krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_keyblock,
const krb5_keyblock *service_keyblock,
krb5_principal client_principal,
time_t tgs_authtime,
DATA_BLOB *pac)
{
NTSTATUS nt_status;
krb5_error_code ret;
struct PAC_DATA *pac_data = talloc(mem_ctx, struct PAC_DATA);
struct netr_SamInfo3 *sam3;
union PAC_INFO *u_LOGON_INFO;
struct PAC_LOGON_INFO *LOGON_INFO;
union PAC_INFO *u_LOGON_NAME;
struct PAC_LOGON_NAME *LOGON_NAME;
union PAC_INFO *u_KDC_CHECKSUM;
union PAC_INFO *u_SRV_CHECKSUM;
char *name;
enum {
PAC_BUF_LOGON_INFO = 0,
PAC_BUF_LOGON_NAME = 1,
PAC_BUF_SRV_CHECKSUM = 2,
PAC_BUF_KDC_CHECKSUM = 3,
PAC_BUF_NUM_BUFFERS = 4
};
if (!pac_data) {
return ENOMEM;
}
pac_data->num_buffers = PAC_BUF_NUM_BUFFERS;
pac_data->version = 0;
pac_data->buffers = talloc_array(pac_data,
struct PAC_BUFFER,
pac_data->num_buffers);
if (!pac_data->buffers) {
talloc_free(pac_data);
return ENOMEM;
}
/* LOGON_INFO */
u_LOGON_INFO = talloc_zero(pac_data->buffers, union PAC_INFO);
if (!u_LOGON_INFO) {
talloc_free(pac_data);
return ENOMEM;
}
pac_data->buffers[PAC_BUF_LOGON_INFO].type = PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO;
pac_data->buffers[PAC_BUF_LOGON_INFO].info = u_LOGON_INFO;
/* LOGON_NAME */
u_LOGON_NAME = talloc_zero(pac_data->buffers, union PAC_INFO);
if (!u_LOGON_NAME) {
talloc_free(pac_data);
return ENOMEM;
}
pac_data->buffers[PAC_BUF_LOGON_NAME].type = PAC_TYPE_LOGON_NAME;
pac_data->buffers[PAC_BUF_LOGON_NAME].info = u_LOGON_NAME;
LOGON_NAME = &u_LOGON_NAME->logon_name;
/* SRV_CHECKSUM */
u_SRV_CHECKSUM = talloc_zero(pac_data->buffers, union PAC_INFO);
if (!u_SRV_CHECKSUM) {
talloc_free(pac_data);
return ENOMEM;
}
pac_data->buffers[PAC_BUF_SRV_CHECKSUM].type = PAC_TYPE_SRV_CHECKSUM;
pac_data->buffers[PAC_BUF_SRV_CHECKSUM].info = u_SRV_CHECKSUM;
/* KDC_CHECKSUM */
u_KDC_CHECKSUM = talloc_zero(pac_data->buffers, union PAC_INFO);
if (!u_KDC_CHECKSUM) {
talloc_free(pac_data);
return ENOMEM;
}
pac_data->buffers[PAC_BUF_KDC_CHECKSUM].type = PAC_TYPE_KDC_CHECKSUM;
pac_data->buffers[PAC_BUF_KDC_CHECKSUM].info = u_KDC_CHECKSUM;
/* now the real work begins... */
LOGON_INFO = talloc_zero(u_LOGON_INFO, struct PAC_LOGON_INFO);
if (!LOGON_INFO) {
talloc_free(pac_data);
return ENOMEM;
}
nt_status = auth_convert_user_info_dc_saminfo3(LOGON_INFO, user_info_dc,
AUTH_INCLUDE_RESOURCE_GROUPS,
&sam3, NULL);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DEBUG(1, ("Getting Samba info failed: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
talloc_free(pac_data);
return EINVAL;
}
u_LOGON_INFO->logon_info.info = LOGON_INFO;
LOGON_INFO->info3 = *sam3;
ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, client_principal,
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM |
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY,
&name);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
LOGON_NAME->account_name = talloc_strdup(LOGON_NAME, name);
free(name);
/*
this logon_time field is absolutely critical. This is what
caused all our PAC troubles :-)
*/
unix_to_nt_time(&LOGON_NAME->logon_time, tgs_authtime);
ret = kerberos_encode_pac(mem_ctx,
pac_data,
context,
krbtgt_keyblock,
service_keyblock,
pac);
talloc_free(pac_data);
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code kerberos_pac_buffer_present(krb5_context context,
const krb5_const_pac pac,
uint32_t type)
{
#ifdef SAMBA4_USES_HEIMDAL
return krb5_pac_get_buffer(context, pac, type, NULL);
#else /* MIT */
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_data data;
/*
* MIT won't let us pass NULL for the data parameter, so we are forced
* to allocate a new buffer and then immediately free it.
*/
ret = krb5_pac_get_buffer(context, pac, type, &data);
if (ret == 0) {
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &data);
}
return ret;
#endif /* SAMBA4_USES_HEIMDAL */
}
krb5_error_code kerberos_pac_to_user_info_dc(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_const_pac pac,
krb5_context context,
struct auth_user_info_dc **user_info_dc,
const enum auth_group_inclusion group_inclusion,
struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *pac_srv_sig,
struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *pac_kdc_sig,
struct PAC_DOMAIN_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP **resource_groups)
{
NTSTATUS nt_status;
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
krb5_error_code ret;
DATA_BLOB pac_logon_info_in, pac_srv_checksum_in, pac_kdc_checksum_in;
krb5_data k5pac_logon_info_in, k5pac_srv_checksum_in, k5pac_kdc_checksum_in;
DATA_BLOB pac_upn_dns_info_in;
krb5_data k5pac_upn_dns_info_in;
union PAC_INFO info;
union PAC_INFO _upn_dns_info;
struct PAC_UPN_DNS_INFO *upn_dns_info = NULL;
struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc_out;
const struct PAC_DOMAIN_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP *resource_groups_in = NULL;
struct PAC_DOMAIN_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP *resource_groups_out = NULL;
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
if (!tmp_ctx) {
return ENOMEM;
}
if (pac == NULL) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return EINVAL;
}
ret = krb5_pac_get_buffer(context, pac, PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO, &k5pac_logon_info_in);
if (ret != 0) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return EINVAL;
}
pac_logon_info_in = data_blob_const(k5pac_logon_info_in.data, k5pac_logon_info_in.length);
ndr_err = ndr_pull_union_blob(&pac_logon_info_in, tmp_ctx, &info,
PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO,
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_PAC_INFO);
smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &k5pac_logon_info_in);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
DEBUG(0,("can't parse the PAC LOGON_INFO: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return EINVAL;
}
if (info.logon_info.info == NULL) {
DEBUG(0,("can't parse the PAC LOGON_INFO: missing info pointer\n"));
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return EINVAL;
}
ret = krb5_pac_get_buffer(context, pac, PAC_TYPE_UPN_DNS_INFO,
&k5pac_upn_dns_info_in);
if (ret == ENOENT) {
ZERO_STRUCT(k5pac_upn_dns_info_in);
ret = 0;
}
if (ret != 0) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return EINVAL;
}
pac_upn_dns_info_in = data_blob_const(k5pac_upn_dns_info_in.data,
k5pac_upn_dns_info_in.length);
if (pac_upn_dns_info_in.length != 0) {
ndr_err = ndr_pull_union_blob(&pac_upn_dns_info_in, tmp_ctx,
&_upn_dns_info,
PAC_TYPE_UPN_DNS_INFO,
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_PAC_INFO);
smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &k5pac_upn_dns_info_in);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
DEBUG(0,("can't parse the PAC UPN_DNS_INFO: %s\n",
nt_errstr(nt_status)));
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return EINVAL;
}
upn_dns_info = &_upn_dns_info.upn_dns_info;
}
/* Pull this right into the normal auth system structures */
nt_status = make_user_info_dc_pac(tmp_ctx,
info.logon_info.info,
upn_dns_info,
group_inclusion,
&user_info_dc_out);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DBG_ERR("make_user_info_dc_pac() failed - %s\n",
nt_errstr(nt_status));
NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(PAC_LOGON_INFO, info.logon_info.info);
if (upn_dns_info != NULL) {
NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(PAC_UPN_DNS_INFO, upn_dns_info);
}
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return EINVAL;
}
if (pac_srv_sig) {
ret = krb5_pac_get_buffer(context, pac, PAC_TYPE_SRV_CHECKSUM, &k5pac_srv_checksum_in);
if (ret != 0) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ret;
}
pac_srv_checksum_in = data_blob_const(k5pac_srv_checksum_in.data, k5pac_srv_checksum_in.length);
ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&pac_srv_checksum_in, pac_srv_sig,
pac_srv_sig,
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA);
smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &k5pac_srv_checksum_in);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
DEBUG(0,("can't parse the server signature: %s\n",
nt_errstr(nt_status)));
return EINVAL;
}
}
if (pac_kdc_sig) {
ret = krb5_pac_get_buffer(context, pac, PAC_TYPE_KDC_CHECKSUM, &k5pac_kdc_checksum_in);
if (ret != 0) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ret;
}
pac_kdc_checksum_in = data_blob_const(k5pac_kdc_checksum_in.data, k5pac_kdc_checksum_in.length);
ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&pac_kdc_checksum_in, pac_kdc_sig,
pac_kdc_sig,
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA);
smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &k5pac_kdc_checksum_in);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
DEBUG(0,("can't parse the KDC signature: %s\n",
nt_errstr(nt_status)));
return EINVAL;
}
}
/*
* Based on the presence of a REQUESTER_SID PAC buffer, ascertain
* whether the ticket is a TGT. This helps the KDC and kpasswd service
* ensure they do not accept tickets meant for the other.
*
* This heuristic will fail for older Samba versions and Windows prior
* to Nov. 2021 updates, which lack support for the REQUESTER_SID PAC
* buffer.
*/
ret = kerberos_pac_buffer_present(context, pac, PAC_TYPE_REQUESTER_SID);
if (ret == ENOENT) {
/* This probably isn't a TGT. */
user_info_dc_out->ticket_type = TICKET_TYPE_NON_TGT;
} else if (ret != 0) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ret;
} else {
/* This probably is a TGT. */
user_info_dc_out->ticket_type = TICKET_TYPE_TGT;
}
/*
* If we have resource groups and the caller wants them returned, we
* oblige.
*/
resource_groups_in = &info.logon_info.info->resource_groups;
if (resource_groups != NULL && resource_groups_in->groups.count != 0) {
resource_groups_out = talloc(tmp_ctx, struct PAC_DOMAIN_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP);
if (resource_groups_out == NULL) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ENOMEM;
}
*resource_groups_out = (struct PAC_DOMAIN_GROUP_MEMBERSHIP) {
.domain_sid = talloc_steal(resource_groups_out, resource_groups_in->domain_sid),
.groups = {
.count = resource_groups_in->groups.count,
.rids = talloc_steal(resource_groups_out, resource_groups_in->groups.rids),
},
};
}
*user_info_dc = talloc_steal(mem_ctx, user_info_dc_out);
if (resource_groups_out != NULL) {
*resource_groups = talloc_steal(mem_ctx, resource_groups_out);
}
return 0;
}
NTSTATUS kerberos_pac_blob_to_user_info_dc(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
DATA_BLOB pac_blob,
krb5_context context,
struct auth_user_info_dc **user_info_dc,
struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *pac_srv_sig,
struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *pac_kdc_sig)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_pac pac;
ret = krb5_pac_parse(context,
pac_blob.data, pac_blob.length,
&pac);
if (ret) {
return map_nt_error_from_unix_common(ret);
}
ret = kerberos_pac_to_user_info_dc(mem_ctx,
pac,
context,
user_info_dc,
AUTH_INCLUDE_RESOURCE_GROUPS,
pac_srv_sig,
pac_kdc_sig,
NULL);
krb5_pac_free(context, pac);
if (ret) {
return map_nt_error_from_unix_common(ret);
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}