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samba-mirror/source3/libads/kerberos.c
Günther Deschner 351e749246 r15240: Correctly disallow unauthorized access when logging on with the
kerberized pam_winbind and workstation restrictions are in effect.

The krb5 AS-REQ needs to add the host netbios-name in the address-list.

We don't get the clear NT_STATUS_INVALID_WORKSTATION code back yet from
the edata of the KRB_ERROR but the login at least fails when the local
machine is not in the workstation list on the DC.

Guenther
(This used to be commit 8b2ba11508)
2007-10-10 11:16:29 -05:00

841 lines
24 KiB
C

/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
kerberos utility library
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2001
Copyright (C) Remus Koos 2001
Copyright (C) Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 2004.
Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 2004.
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
#define LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME "MEMORY:libads"
/*
we use a prompter to avoid a crash bug in the kerberos libs when
dealing with empty passwords
this prompter is just a string copy ...
*/
static krb5_error_code
kerb_prompter(krb5_context ctx, void *data,
const char *name,
const char *banner,
int num_prompts,
krb5_prompt prompts[])
{
if (num_prompts == 0) return 0;
memset(prompts[0].reply->data, '\0', prompts[0].reply->length);
if (prompts[0].reply->length > 0) {
if (data) {
strncpy(prompts[0].reply->data, data, prompts[0].reply->length-1);
prompts[0].reply->length = strlen(prompts[0].reply->data);
} else {
prompts[0].reply->length = 0;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
simulate a kinit, putting the tgt in the given cache location. If cache_name == NULL
place in default cache location.
remus@snapserver.com
*/
int kerberos_kinit_password_ext(const char *principal,
const char *password,
int time_offset,
time_t *expire_time,
time_t *renew_till_time,
const char *cache_name,
BOOL request_pac,
BOOL add_netbios_addr,
time_t renewable_time)
{
krb5_context ctx = NULL;
krb5_error_code code = 0;
krb5_ccache cc = NULL;
krb5_principal me;
krb5_creds my_creds;
krb5_get_init_creds_opt opt;
smb_krb5_addresses *addr = NULL;
initialize_krb5_error_table();
if ((code = krb5_init_context(&ctx)))
return code;
if (time_offset != 0) {
krb5_set_real_time(ctx, time(NULL) + time_offset, 0);
}
DEBUG(10,("kerberos_kinit_password: using %s as ccache\n",
cache_name ? cache_name: krb5_cc_default_name(ctx)));
if ((code = krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, cache_name ? cache_name : krb5_cc_default_name(ctx), &cc))) {
krb5_free_context(ctx);
return code;
}
if ((code = smb_krb5_parse_name(ctx, principal, &me))) {
krb5_free_context(ctx);
return code;
}
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init(&opt);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_renew_life(&opt, renewable_time);
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable(&opt, 1);
if (request_pac) {
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_SET_PAC_REQUEST
code = krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_pac_request(ctx, &opt, True);
if (code) {
krb5_free_principal(ctx, me);
krb5_free_context(ctx);
return code;
}
#endif
}
if (add_netbios_addr) {
code = smb_krb5_gen_netbios_krb5_address(&addr);
if (code) {
krb5_free_principal(ctx, me);
krb5_free_context(ctx);
return code;
}
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_address_list(&opt, addr->addrs);
}
if ((code = krb5_get_init_creds_password(ctx, &my_creds, me, CONST_DISCARD(char *,password),
kerb_prompter, NULL, 0, NULL, &opt)))
{
smb_krb5_free_addresses(ctx, addr);
krb5_free_principal(ctx, me);
krb5_free_context(ctx);
return code;
}
if ((code = krb5_cc_initialize(ctx, cc, me))) {
smb_krb5_free_addresses(ctx, addr);
krb5_free_cred_contents(ctx, &my_creds);
krb5_free_principal(ctx, me);
krb5_free_context(ctx);
return code;
}
if ((code = krb5_cc_store_cred(ctx, cc, &my_creds))) {
krb5_cc_close(ctx, cc);
smb_krb5_free_addresses(ctx, addr);
krb5_free_cred_contents(ctx, &my_creds);
krb5_free_principal(ctx, me);
krb5_free_context(ctx);
return code;
}
if (expire_time) {
*expire_time = (time_t) my_creds.times.endtime;
}
if (renew_till_time) {
*renew_till_time = (time_t) my_creds.times.renew_till;
}
krb5_cc_close(ctx, cc);
smb_krb5_free_addresses(ctx, addr);
krb5_free_cred_contents(ctx, &my_creds);
krb5_free_principal(ctx, me);
krb5_free_context(ctx);
return 0;
}
/* run kinit to setup our ccache */
int ads_kinit_password(ADS_STRUCT *ads)
{
char *s;
int ret;
const char *account_name;
fstring acct_name;
if ( IS_DC ) {
/* this will end up getting a ticket for DOMAIN@RUSTED.REA.LM */
account_name = lp_workgroup();
} else {
/* always use the sAMAccountName for security = domain */
/* global_myname()$@REA.LM */
if ( lp_security() == SEC_DOMAIN ) {
fstr_sprintf( acct_name, "%s$", global_myname() );
account_name = acct_name;
}
else
/* This looks like host/global_myname()@REA.LM */
account_name = ads->auth.user_name;
}
if (asprintf(&s, "%s@%s", account_name, ads->auth.realm) == -1) {
return KRB5_CC_NOMEM;
}
if (!ads->auth.password) {
return KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD;
}
ret = kerberos_kinit_password_ext(s, ads->auth.password, ads->auth.time_offset,
&ads->auth.expire, NULL, NULL, False, False, ads->auth.renewable);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(0,("kerberos_kinit_password %s failed: %s\n",
s, error_message(ret)));
}
free(s);
return ret;
}
int ads_kdestroy(const char *cc_name)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_context ctx = NULL;
krb5_ccache cc = NULL;
initialize_krb5_error_table();
if ((code = krb5_init_context (&ctx))) {
DEBUG(3, ("ads_kdestroy: kdb5_init_context failed: %s\n",
error_message(code)));
return code;
}
if (!cc_name) {
if ((code = krb5_cc_default(ctx, &cc))) {
krb5_free_context(ctx);
return code;
}
} else {
if ((code = krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, cc_name, &cc))) {
DEBUG(3, ("ads_kdestroy: krb5_cc_resolve failed: %s\n",
error_message(code)));
krb5_free_context(ctx);
return code;
}
}
if ((code = krb5_cc_destroy (ctx, cc))) {
DEBUG(3, ("ads_kdestroy: krb5_cc_destroy failed: %s\n",
error_message(code)));
}
krb5_free_context (ctx);
return code;
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to fetch the salting principal for a service. Active
Directory may use a non-obvious principal name to generate the salt
when it determines the key to use for encrypting tickets for a service,
and hopefully we detected that when we joined the domain.
************************************************************************/
static char *kerberos_secrets_fetch_salting_principal(const char *service, int enctype)
{
char *key = NULL;
char *ret = NULL;
asprintf(&key, "%s/%s/enctype=%d", SECRETS_SALTING_PRINCIPAL, service, enctype);
if (!key) {
return NULL;
}
ret = (char *)secrets_fetch(key, NULL);
SAFE_FREE(key);
return ret;
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to get the salting principal for this service. Active
Directory may use a non-obvious principal name to generate the salt
when it determines the key to use for encrypting tickets for a service,
and hopefully we detected that when we joined the domain.
Caller must free if return is not null.
************************************************************************/
krb5_principal kerberos_fetch_salt_princ_for_host_princ(krb5_context context,
krb5_principal host_princ,
int enctype)
{
char *unparsed_name = NULL, *salt_princ_s = NULL;
krb5_principal ret_princ = NULL;
if (smb_krb5_unparse_name(context, host_princ, &unparsed_name) != 0) {
return (krb5_principal)NULL;
}
if ((salt_princ_s = kerberos_secrets_fetch_salting_principal(unparsed_name, enctype)) == NULL) {
SAFE_FREE(unparsed_name);
return (krb5_principal)NULL;
}
if (smb_krb5_parse_name(context, salt_princ_s, &ret_princ) != 0) {
SAFE_FREE(unparsed_name);
SAFE_FREE(salt_princ_s);
return (krb5_principal)NULL;
}
SAFE_FREE(unparsed_name);
SAFE_FREE(salt_princ_s);
return ret_princ;
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to set the salting principal for this service. Active
Directory may use a non-obvious principal name to generate the salt
when it determines the key to use for encrypting tickets for a service,
and hopefully we detected that when we joined the domain.
Setting principal to NULL deletes this entry.
************************************************************************/
BOOL kerberos_secrets_store_salting_principal(const char *service,
int enctype,
const char *principal)
{
char *key = NULL;
BOOL ret = False;
krb5_context context = NULL;
krb5_principal princ = NULL;
char *princ_s = NULL;
char *unparsed_name = NULL;
krb5_init_context(&context);
if (!context) {
return False;
}
if (strchr_m(service, '@')) {
asprintf(&princ_s, "%s", service);
} else {
asprintf(&princ_s, "%s@%s", service, lp_realm());
}
if (smb_krb5_parse_name(context, princ_s, &princ) != 0) {
goto out;
}
if (smb_krb5_unparse_name(context, princ, &unparsed_name) != 0) {
goto out;
}
asprintf(&key, "%s/%s/enctype=%d", SECRETS_SALTING_PRINCIPAL, unparsed_name, enctype);
if (!key) {
goto out;
}
if ((principal != NULL) && (strlen(principal) > 0)) {
ret = secrets_store(key, principal, strlen(principal) + 1);
} else {
ret = secrets_delete(key);
}
out:
SAFE_FREE(key);
SAFE_FREE(princ_s);
SAFE_FREE(unparsed_name);
if (context) {
krb5_free_context(context);
}
return ret;
}
/************************************************************************
Routine to get initial credentials as a service ticket for the local machine.
Returns a buffer initialized with krb5_mk_req_extended.
************************************************************************/
static krb5_error_code get_service_ticket(krb5_context ctx,
krb5_ccache ccache,
const char *service_principal,
int enctype,
krb5_data *p_outbuf)
{
krb5_creds creds, *new_creds = NULL;
char *service_s = NULL;
char *machine_account = NULL, *password = NULL;
krb5_data in_data;
krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
krb5_error_code err = 0;
ZERO_STRUCT(creds);
asprintf(&machine_account, "%s$@%s", global_myname(), lp_realm());
if (machine_account == NULL) {
goto out;
}
password = secrets_fetch_machine_password(lp_workgroup(), NULL, NULL);
if (password == NULL) {
goto out;
}
if ((err = kerberos_kinit_password(machine_account, password,
0, LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME)) != 0) {
DEBUG(0,("get_service_ticket: kerberos_kinit_password %s failed: %s\n",
machine_account,
error_message(err)));
goto out;
}
/* Ok - the above call has gotten a TGT. Now we need to get a service
ticket to ourselves. */
/* Set up the enctype and client and server principal fields for krb5_get_credentials. */
kerberos_set_creds_enctype(&creds, enctype);
if ((err = krb5_cc_get_principal(ctx, ccache, &creds.client))) {
DEBUG(3, ("get_service_ticket: krb5_cc_get_principal failed: %s\n",
error_message(err)));
goto out;
}
if (strchr_m(service_principal, '@')) {
asprintf(&service_s, "%s", service_principal);
} else {
asprintf(&service_s, "%s@%s", service_principal, lp_realm());
}
if ((err = smb_krb5_parse_name(ctx, service_s, &creds.server))) {
DEBUG(0,("get_service_ticket: smb_krb5_parse_name %s failed: %s\n",
service_s, error_message(err)));
goto out;
}
if ((err = krb5_get_credentials(ctx, 0, ccache, &creds, &new_creds))) {
DEBUG(5,("get_service_ticket: krb5_get_credentials for %s enctype %d failed: %s\n",
service_s, enctype, error_message(err)));
goto out;
}
memset(&in_data, '\0', sizeof(in_data));
if ((err = krb5_mk_req_extended(ctx, &auth_context, 0, &in_data,
new_creds, p_outbuf)) != 0) {
DEBUG(0,("get_service_ticket: krb5_mk_req_extended failed: %s\n",
error_message(err)));
goto out;
}
out:
if (auth_context) {
krb5_auth_con_free(ctx, auth_context);
}
if (new_creds) {
krb5_free_creds(ctx, new_creds);
}
if (creds.server) {
krb5_free_principal(ctx, creds.server);
}
if (creds.client) {
krb5_free_principal(ctx, creds.client);
}
SAFE_FREE(service_s);
SAFE_FREE(password);
SAFE_FREE(machine_account);
return err;
}
/************************************************************************
Check if the machine password can be used in conjunction with the salting_principal
to generate a key which will successfully decrypt the AP_REQ already
gotten as a message to the local machine.
************************************************************************/
static BOOL verify_service_password(krb5_context ctx,
int enctype,
const char *salting_principal,
krb5_data *in_data)
{
BOOL ret = False;
krb5_principal salting_kprinc = NULL;
krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
krb5_keyblock key;
krb5_data passdata;
char *salting_s = NULL;
char *machine_account = NULL, *password = NULL;
krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
krb5_error_code err;
memset(&passdata, '\0', sizeof(passdata));
memset(&key, '\0', sizeof(key));
asprintf(&machine_account, "%s$@%s", global_myname(), lp_realm());
if (machine_account == NULL) {
goto out;
}
password = secrets_fetch_machine_password(lp_workgroup(), NULL, NULL);
if (password == NULL) {
goto out;
}
if (strchr_m(salting_principal, '@')) {
asprintf(&salting_s, "%s", salting_principal);
} else {
asprintf(&salting_s, "%s@%s", salting_principal, lp_realm());
}
if ((err = smb_krb5_parse_name(ctx, salting_s, &salting_kprinc))) {
DEBUG(0,("verify_service_password: smb_krb5_parse_name %s failed: %s\n",
salting_s, error_message(err)));
goto out;
}
passdata.length = strlen(password);
passdata.data = (char*)password;
if ((err = create_kerberos_key_from_string_direct(ctx, salting_kprinc, &passdata, &key, enctype))) {
DEBUG(0,("verify_service_password: create_kerberos_key_from_string %d failed: %s\n",
enctype, error_message(err)));
goto out;
}
if ((err = krb5_auth_con_init(ctx, &auth_context)) != 0) {
DEBUG(0,("verify_service_password: krb5_auth_con_init failed %s\n", error_message(err)));
goto out;
}
if ((err = krb5_auth_con_setuseruserkey(ctx, auth_context, &key)) != 0) {
DEBUG(0,("verify_service_password: krb5_auth_con_setuseruserkey failed %s\n", error_message(err)));
goto out;
}
if (!(err = krb5_rd_req(ctx, &auth_context, in_data, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ticket))) {
DEBUG(10,("verify_service_password: decrypted message with enctype %u salt %s!\n",
(unsigned int)enctype, salting_s));
ret = True;
}
out:
memset(&passdata, 0, sizeof(passdata));
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(ctx, &key);
if (ticket != NULL) {
krb5_free_ticket(ctx, ticket);
}
if (salting_kprinc) {
krb5_free_principal(ctx, salting_kprinc);
}
SAFE_FREE(salting_s);
SAFE_FREE(password);
SAFE_FREE(machine_account);
return ret;
}
/************************************************************************
*
* From the current draft of kerberos-clarifications:
*
* It is not possible to reliably generate a user's key given a pass
* phrase without contacting the KDC, since it will not be known
* whether alternate salt or parameter values are required.
*
* And because our server has a password, we have this exact problem. We
* make multiple guesses as to which principal name provides the salt which
* the KDC is using.
*
************************************************************************/
static void kerberos_derive_salting_principal_for_enctype(const char *service_principal,
krb5_context ctx,
krb5_ccache ccache,
krb5_enctype enctype,
krb5_enctype *enctypes)
{
char *salting_principals[3] = {NULL, NULL, NULL}, *second_principal = NULL;
krb5_error_code err = 0;
krb5_data outbuf;
int i, j;
memset(&outbuf, '\0', sizeof(outbuf));
/* Check that the service_principal is useful. */
if ((service_principal == NULL) || (strlen(service_principal) == 0)) {
return;
}
/* Generate our first guess -- the principal as-given. */
asprintf(&salting_principals[0], "%s", service_principal);
if ((salting_principals[0] == NULL) || (strlen(salting_principals[0]) == 0)) {
return;
}
/* Generate our second guess -- the computer's principal, as Win2k3. */
asprintf(&second_principal, "host/%s.%s", global_myname(), lp_realm());
if (second_principal != NULL) {
strlower_m(second_principal);
asprintf(&salting_principals[1], "%s@%s", second_principal, lp_realm());
SAFE_FREE(second_principal);
}
if ((salting_principals[1] == NULL) || (strlen(salting_principals[1]) == 0)) {
goto out;
}
/* Generate our third guess -- the computer's principal, as Win2k. */
asprintf(&second_principal, "HOST/%s", global_myname());
if (second_principal != NULL) {
strlower_m(second_principal + 5);
asprintf(&salting_principals[2], "%s@%s",
second_principal, lp_realm());
SAFE_FREE(second_principal);
}
if ((salting_principals[2] == NULL) || (strlen(salting_principals[2]) == 0)) {
goto out;
}
/* Get a service ticket for ourselves into our memory ccache. */
/* This will commonly fail if there is no principal by that name (and we're trying
many names). So don't print a debug 0 error. */
if ((err = get_service_ticket(ctx, ccache, service_principal, enctype, &outbuf)) != 0) {
DEBUG(3, ("verify_service_password: get_service_ticket failed: %s\n",
error_message(err)));
goto out;
}
/* At this point we have a message to ourselves, salted only the KDC knows how. We
have to work out what that salting is. */
/* Try and find the correct salting principal. */
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(salting_principals) / sizeof(salting_principals[i]); i++) {
if (verify_service_password(ctx, enctype, salting_principals[i], &outbuf)) {
break;
}
}
/* If we failed to get a match, return. */
if (i >= sizeof(salting_principals) / sizeof(salting_principals[i])) {
goto out;
}
/* If we succeeded, store the principal for use for all enctypes which
* share the same cipher and string-to-key function. Doing this here
* allows servers which just pass a keytab to krb5_rd_req() to work
* correctly. */
for (j = 0; enctypes[j] != 0; j++) {
if (enctype != enctypes[j]) {
/* If this enctype isn't compatible with the one which
* we used, skip it. */
if (!kerberos_compatible_enctypes(ctx, enctypes[j], enctype))
continue;
}
/* If the principal which gives us the proper salt is the one
* which we would normally guess, don't bother noting anything
* in the secrets tdb. */
if (strcmp(service_principal, salting_principals[i]) != 0) {
kerberos_secrets_store_salting_principal(service_principal,
enctypes[j],
salting_principals[i]);
}
}
out :
kerberos_free_data_contents(ctx, &outbuf);
SAFE_FREE(salting_principals[0]);
SAFE_FREE(salting_principals[1]);
SAFE_FREE(salting_principals[2]);
SAFE_FREE(second_principal);
}
/************************************************************************
Go through all the possible enctypes for this principal.
************************************************************************/
static void kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(krb5_context context,
krb5_ccache ccache,
krb5_enctype *enctypes,
char *service_principal)
{
int i;
/* Try for each enctype separately, because the rules are
* different for different enctypes. */
for (i = 0; enctypes[i] != 0; i++) {
/* Delete secrets entry first. */
kerberos_secrets_store_salting_principal(service_principal, 0, NULL);
#ifdef ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC
if (enctypes[i] == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC) {
/* Of course this'll always work, so just save
* ourselves the effort. */
continue;
}
#endif
/* Try to figure out what's going on with this
* principal. */
kerberos_derive_salting_principal_for_enctype(service_principal,
context,
ccache,
enctypes[i],
enctypes);
}
}
/************************************************************************
Wrapper function for the above.
************************************************************************/
BOOL kerberos_derive_salting_principal(char *service_principal)
{
krb5_context context = NULL;
krb5_enctype *enctypes = NULL;
krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
initialize_krb5_error_table();
if ((ret = krb5_init_context(&context)) != 0) {
DEBUG(1,("kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals: krb5_init_context failed. %s\n",
error_message(ret)));
return False;
}
if ((ret = get_kerberos_allowed_etypes(context, &enctypes)) != 0) {
DEBUG(1,("kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals: get_kerberos_allowed_etypes failed. %s\n",
error_message(ret)));
goto out;
}
if ((ret = krb5_cc_resolve(context, LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME, &ccache)) != 0) {
DEBUG(3, ("get_service_ticket: krb5_cc_resolve for %s failed: %s\n",
LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME, error_message(ret)));
goto out;
}
kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service_principal);
out:
if (enctypes) {
free_kerberos_etypes(context, enctypes);
}
if (ccache) {
krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache);
}
if (context) {
krb5_free_context(context);
}
return ret ? False : True;
}
/************************************************************************
Core function to try and determine what salt is being used for any keytab
keys.
************************************************************************/
BOOL kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals(void)
{
fstring my_fqdn;
char *service = NULL;
krb5_context context = NULL;
krb5_enctype *enctypes = NULL;
krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
BOOL retval = False;
initialize_krb5_error_table();
if ((ret = krb5_init_context(&context)) != 0) {
DEBUG(1,("kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals: krb5_init_context failed. %s\n",
error_message(ret)));
return False;
}
if ((ret = get_kerberos_allowed_etypes(context, &enctypes)) != 0) {
DEBUG(1,("kerberos_derive_cifs_salting_principals: get_kerberos_allowed_etypes failed. %s\n",
error_message(ret)));
goto out;
}
if ((ret = krb5_cc_resolve(context, LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME, &ccache)) != 0) {
DEBUG(3, ("get_service_ticket: krb5_cc_resolve for %s failed: %s\n",
LIBADS_CCACHE_NAME, error_message(ret)));
goto out;
}
if (asprintf(&service, "%s$", global_myname()) != -1) {
strlower_m(service);
kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
SAFE_FREE(service);
}
if (asprintf(&service, "cifs/%s", global_myname()) != -1) {
strlower_m(service);
kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
SAFE_FREE(service);
}
if (asprintf(&service, "host/%s", global_myname()) != -1) {
strlower_m(service);
kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
SAFE_FREE(service);
}
if (asprintf(&service, "cifs/%s.%s", global_myname(), lp_realm()) != -1) {
strlower_m(service);
kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
SAFE_FREE(service);
}
if (asprintf(&service, "host/%s.%s", global_myname(), lp_realm()) != -1) {
strlower_m(service);
kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
SAFE_FREE(service);
}
name_to_fqdn(my_fqdn, global_myname());
if (asprintf(&service, "cifs/%s", my_fqdn) != -1) {
strlower_m(service);
kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
SAFE_FREE(service);
}
if (asprintf(&service, "host/%s", my_fqdn) != -1) {
strlower_m(service);
kerberos_derive_salting_principal_direct(context, ccache, enctypes, service);
SAFE_FREE(service);
}
retval = True;
out:
if (enctypes) {
free_kerberos_etypes(context, enctypes);
}
if (ccache) {
krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache);
}
if (context) {
krb5_free_context(context);
}
return retval;
}
int kerberos_kinit_password(const char *principal,
const char *password,
int time_offset,
const char *cache_name)
{
return kerberos_kinit_password_ext(principal,
password,
time_offset,
0,
0,
cache_name,
False,
False,
0);
}
#endif