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samba-mirror/source4/kdc/pac-glue.c
Andrew Bartlett 4a56399798 r12383: Fixes for Apple's AD client. Don't segfualt in the KDC, and they
require the isSynchronized flag in the rootDSE.

Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit e48464c884)
2007-10-10 13:47:33 -05:00

375 lines
9.4 KiB
C

/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
PAC Glue between Samba and the KDC
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "kdc/kdc.h"
#include "include/ads.h"
#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h"
#include "heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h"
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/krb5pac.h"
#include "auth/auth.h"
/* Given the right private pointer from hdb_ldb, get a PAC from the attached ldb messages */
static krb5_error_code samba_get_pac(krb5_context context,
struct hdb_ldb_private *private,
krb5_principal client,
krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_keyblock,
krb5_keyblock *server_keyblock,
time_t tgs_authtime,
krb5_data *pac)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info;
DATA_BLOB tmp_blob;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(private, 0, "samba_get_pac context");
if (!mem_ctx) {
return ENOMEM;
}
nt_status = authsam_make_server_info(mem_ctx, private->samdb,
private->msg,
private->realm_ref_msg,
data_blob(NULL, 0),
data_blob(NULL, 0),
&server_info);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Getting user info for PAC failed: %s\n",
nt_errstr(nt_status)));
return ENOMEM;
}
ret = kerberos_create_pac(mem_ctx, server_info,
context,
krbtgt_keyblock,
server_keyblock,
client,
tgs_authtime,
&tmp_blob);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1, ("PAC encoding failed: %s\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, mem_ctx)));
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
ret = krb5_data_copy(pac, tmp_blob.data, tmp_blob.length);
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
/* Wrap the PAC in the right ASN.1. Will always free 'pac', on success or failure */
static krb5_error_code wrap_pac(krb5_context context, krb5_data *pac, AuthorizationData **out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
unsigned char *buf;
size_t buf_size;
size_t len;
AD_IF_RELEVANT if_relevant;
AuthorizationData *auth_data;
if_relevant.len = 1;
if_relevant.val = malloc(sizeof(*if_relevant.val));
if (!if_relevant.val) {
krb5_data_free(pac);
*out = NULL;
return ENOMEM;
}
if_relevant.val[0].ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC;
if_relevant.val[0].ad_data.data = NULL;
if_relevant.val[0].ad_data.length = 0;
/* pac.data will be freed with this */
if_relevant.val[0].ad_data.data = pac->data;
if_relevant.val[0].ad_data.length = pac->length;
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthorizationData, buf, buf_size, &if_relevant, &len, ret);
free_AuthorizationData(&if_relevant);
if (ret) {
*out = NULL;
return ret;
}
auth_data = malloc(sizeof(*auth_data));
if (!auth_data) {
free(buf);
*out = NULL;
return ret;
}
auth_data->len = 1;
auth_data->val = malloc(sizeof(*auth_data->val));
if (!auth_data->val) {
free(buf);
free(auth_data);
*out = NULL;
return ret;
}
auth_data->val[0].ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT;
auth_data->val[0].ad_data.length = len;
auth_data->val[0].ad_data.data = buf;
*out = auth_data;
return 0;
}
/* Given a hdb_entry, create a PAC out of the private data
Don't create it if the client has the UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED bit
set, or if they specificaly asked not to get it.
*/
krb5_error_code hdb_ldb_authz_data_as_req(krb5_context context, struct hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex,
METHOD_DATA* pa_data_seq,
time_t authtime,
EncryptionKey *tgtkey,
EncryptionKey *sessionkey,
AuthorizationData **out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
int i;
krb5_data pac;
krb5_boolean pac_wanted = TRUE;
unsigned int userAccountControl;
struct PA_PAC_REQUEST pac_request;
struct hdb_ldb_private *private = talloc_get_type(entry_ex->ctx, struct hdb_ldb_private);
/* The user account may be set not to want the PAC */
userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_uint(private->msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
if (userAccountControl & UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) {
*out = NULL;
return 0;
}
/* The user may not want a PAC */
for (i=0; i<pa_data_seq->len; i++) {
if (pa_data_seq->val[i].padata_type == KRB5_PADATA_PA_PAC_REQUEST) {
ret = decode_PA_PAC_REQUEST(pa_data_seq->val[i].padata_value.data,
pa_data_seq->val[i].padata_value.length,
&pac_request, NULL);
if (ret == 0) {
pac_wanted = !!pac_request.include_pac;
}
free_PA_PAC_REQUEST(&pac_request);
break;
}
}
if (!pac_wanted) {
*out = NULL;
return 0;
}
/* Get PAC from Samba */
ret = samba_get_pac(context,
private,
entry_ex->entry.principal,
tgtkey,
tgtkey,
authtime,
&pac);
if (ret) {
*out = NULL;
return ret;
}
return wrap_pac(context, &pac, out);
}
/* Resign (and reform, including possibly new groups) a PAC */
krb5_error_code hdb_ldb_authz_data_tgs_req(krb5_context context, struct hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex,
krb5_principal client,
AuthorizationData *in,
time_t authtime,
EncryptionKey *tgtkey,
EncryptionKey *servicekey,
EncryptionKey *sessionkey,
AuthorizationData **out)
{
NTSTATUS nt_status;
krb5_error_code ret;
unsigned int userAccountControl;
struct hdb_ldb_private *private = talloc_get_type(entry_ex->ctx, struct hdb_ldb_private);
krb5_data k5pac_in, k5pac_out;
DATA_BLOB pac_in, pac_out;
struct PAC_LOGON_INFO *logon_info;
union netr_Validation validation;
struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info_out;
krb5_boolean found = FALSE;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
/* The service account may be set not to want the PAC */
userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_uint(private->msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
if (userAccountControl & UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) {
*out = NULL;
return 0;
}
ret = _krb5_find_type_in_ad(context, KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC,
&k5pac_in, &found, sessionkey, in);
if (ret || !found) {
*out = NULL;
return 0;
}
mem_ctx = talloc_new(private);
if (!mem_ctx) {
krb5_data_free(&k5pac_in);
*out = NULL;
return ENOMEM;
}
pac_in = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, k5pac_in.data, k5pac_in.length);
krb5_data_free(&k5pac_in);
if (!pac_in.data) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
*out = NULL;
return ENOMEM;
}
/* Parse the PAC again, for the logon info */
nt_status = kerberos_pac_logon_info(mem_ctx, &logon_info,
pac_in,
context,
tgtkey,
tgtkey,
client, authtime,
&ret);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DEBUG(1, ("Failed to parse PAC in TGT: %s/%s\n",
nt_errstr(nt_status), error_message(ret)));
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
*out = NULL;
return ret;
}
/* Pull this right into the normal auth sysstem structures */
validation.sam3 = &logon_info->info3;
nt_status = make_server_info_netlogon_validation(mem_ctx,
"",
3, &validation,
&server_info_out);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
*out = NULL;
return ENOMEM;
}
/* And make a new PAC, possibly containing new groups */
ret = kerberos_create_pac(mem_ctx,
server_info_out,
context,
tgtkey,
servicekey,
client,
authtime,
&pac_out);
if (ret != 0) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
*out = NULL;
return ret;
}
ret = krb5_data_copy(&k5pac_out, pac_out.data, pac_out.length);
if (ret != 0) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
*out = NULL;
return ret;
}
return wrap_pac(context, &k5pac_out, out);
}
/* Given an hdb entry (and in particular it's private member), consult
* the account_ok routine in auth/auth_sam.c for consistancy */
krb5_error_code hdb_ldb_check_client_access(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex,
HostAddresses *addresses)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(entry_ex->ctx);
struct hdb_ldb_private *private = talloc_get_type(entry_ex->ctx, struct hdb_ldb_private);
char *name, *workstation = NULL;
int i;
if (!tmp_ctx) {
return ENOMEM;
}
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, &name);
if (ret != 0) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ret;
}
if (addresses) {
for (i=0; i < addresses->len; i++) {
if (addresses->val->addr_type == KRB5_ADDRESS_NETBIOS) {
workstation = talloc_strndup(tmp_ctx, addresses->val->address.data, MIN(addresses->val->address.length, 15));
if (workstation) {
break;
}
}
}
}
/* Strip space padding */
if (workstation) {
i = MIN(strlen(workstation), 15);
for (; i > 0 && workstation[i - 1] == ' '; i--) {
workstation[i - 1] = '\0';
}
}
nt_status = authsam_account_ok(tmp_ctx,
private->samdb,
MSV1_0_ALLOW_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT | MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT,
private->msg,
private->realm_ref_msg,
workstation,
name);
free(name);
/* TODO: Need a more complete mapping of NTSTATUS to krb5kdc errors */
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
}
return 0;
}