mirror of
https://github.com/samba-team/samba.git
synced 2024-12-23 17:34:34 +03:00
0182ddf97d
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
3736 lines
100 KiB
C
3736 lines
100 KiB
C
/*
|
||
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
|
||
|
||
Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
|
||
|
||
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
|
||
Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
|
||
|
||
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
||
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
|
||
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
|
||
(at your option) any later version.
|
||
|
||
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
|
||
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
|
||
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
|
||
GNU General Public License for more details.
|
||
|
||
|
||
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
|
||
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
#include "includes.h"
|
||
#include "libcli/security/security.h"
|
||
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_security.h"
|
||
#include "auth/auth.h"
|
||
#include "auth/auth_sam.h"
|
||
#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
|
||
#include "dsdb/common/util.h"
|
||
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
|
||
#include "param/param.h"
|
||
#include "param/secrets.h"
|
||
#include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
|
||
#include "system/kerberos.h"
|
||
#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
|
||
#include "kdc/authn_policy_util.h"
|
||
#include "kdc/sdb.h"
|
||
#include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
|
||
#include "kdc/db-glue.h"
|
||
#include "kdc/pac-glue.h"
|
||
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_irpc_c.h"
|
||
#include "lib/messaging/irpc.h"
|
||
|
||
#undef DBGC_CLASS
|
||
#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_KERBEROS
|
||
|
||
#undef strcasecmp
|
||
#undef strncasecmp
|
||
|
||
#define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno) \
|
||
((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) >> 16))
|
||
|
||
#define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(kvno) \
|
||
((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF))
|
||
|
||
#define SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, krbtgt) \
|
||
((krb5_kvno)((((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF) | \
|
||
((((uint32_t)krbtgt) << 16) & 0xFFFF0000)))
|
||
|
||
enum trust_direction {
|
||
UNKNOWN = 0,
|
||
INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
|
||
OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
|
||
"securityIdentifier",
|
||
"flatName",
|
||
"trustPartner",
|
||
"trustAttributes",
|
||
"trustDirection",
|
||
"trustType",
|
||
"msDS-TrustForestTrustInfo",
|
||
"trustAuthIncoming",
|
||
"trustAuthOutgoing",
|
||
"whenCreated",
|
||
"msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
|
||
NULL
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
send a message to the drepl server telling it to initiate a
|
||
REPL_SECRET getncchanges extended op to fetch the users secrets
|
||
*/
|
||
static void auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
||
struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx,
|
||
struct tevent_context *event_ctx,
|
||
struct ldb_dn *user_dn)
|
||
{
|
||
struct dcerpc_binding_handle *irpc_handle;
|
||
struct drepl_trigger_repl_secret r;
|
||
struct tevent_req *req;
|
||
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
|
||
|
||
tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
|
||
if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
irpc_handle = irpc_binding_handle_by_name(tmp_ctx, msg_ctx,
|
||
"dreplsrv",
|
||
&ndr_table_irpc);
|
||
if (irpc_handle == NULL) {
|
||
DBG_WARNING("Unable to get binding handle for dreplsrv\n");
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
r.in.user_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(user_dn);
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* This seem to rely on the current IRPC implementation,
|
||
* which delivers the message in the _send function.
|
||
*
|
||
* TODO: we need a ONE_WAY IRPC handle and register
|
||
* a callback and wait for it to be triggered!
|
||
*/
|
||
req = dcerpc_drepl_trigger_repl_secret_r_send(tmp_ctx,
|
||
event_ctx,
|
||
irpc_handle,
|
||
&r);
|
||
|
||
/* we aren't interested in a reply */
|
||
talloc_free(req);
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static time_t ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, time_t default_val)
|
||
{
|
||
const char *tmp;
|
||
const char *gentime;
|
||
struct tm tm;
|
||
|
||
gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
|
||
if (!gentime)
|
||
return default_val;
|
||
|
||
tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
|
||
if (tmp == NULL) {
|
||
return default_val;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return timegm(&tm);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static struct SDBFlags uf2SDBFlags(krb5_context context, uint32_t userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
|
||
{
|
||
struct SDBFlags flags = int2SDBFlags(0);
|
||
|
||
/* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
|
||
flags.immutable = 1;
|
||
|
||
/* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
|
||
flags.invalid = 1;
|
||
|
||
flags.renewable = 1;
|
||
|
||
/* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
|
||
flags.server = 1;
|
||
|
||
/* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
|
||
if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
|
||
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
|
||
flags.client = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
flags.invalid = 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
|
||
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
|
||
flags.client = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
flags.invalid = 0;
|
||
}
|
||
if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
|
||
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
|
||
flags.client = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
flags.invalid = 0;
|
||
}
|
||
if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
|
||
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
|
||
flags.client = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
flags.invalid = 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
|
||
if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
|
||
flags.client = 0;
|
||
}
|
||
if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
|
||
flags.locked_out = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
/*
|
||
if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWD_NOTREQD) {
|
||
flags.invalid = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
*/
|
||
/*
|
||
UF_PASSWD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevant
|
||
*/
|
||
if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
|
||
flags.invalid = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
|
||
flags.invalid = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
*/
|
||
if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
|
||
flags.require_hwauth = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
|
||
flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* this is confusing...
|
||
*
|
||
* UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
|
||
* => ok_as_delegate
|
||
*
|
||
* and
|
||
*
|
||
* UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION
|
||
* => trusted_for_delegation
|
||
*/
|
||
flags.trusted_for_delegation = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
|
||
flags.forwardable = 1;
|
||
flags.proxiable = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
|
||
flags.require_preauth = 0;
|
||
} else {
|
||
flags.require_preauth = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (userAccountControl & UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) {
|
||
flags.no_auth_data_reqd = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return flags;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
|
||
{
|
||
if (p->db_entry != NULL) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* A sdb_entry still has a reference
|
||
*/
|
||
return -1;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (p->kdc_entry != NULL) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* hdb_entry or krb5_db_entry still
|
||
* have a reference...
|
||
*/
|
||
return -1;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Sort keys in descending order of strength.
|
||
*
|
||
* Explanaton from Greg Hudson:
|
||
*
|
||
* To encrypt tickets only the first returned key is used by the MIT KDC. The
|
||
* other keys just communicate support for session key enctypes, and aren't
|
||
* really used. The encryption key for the ticket enc part doesn't have
|
||
* to be of a type requested by the client. The session key enctype is chosen
|
||
* based on the client preference order, limited by the set of enctypes present
|
||
* in the server keys (unless the string attribute is set on the server
|
||
* principal overriding that set).
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
static int sdb_key_strength_priority(krb5_enctype etype)
|
||
{
|
||
static const krb5_enctype etype_list[] = {
|
||
ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
|
||
ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
|
||
ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1,
|
||
ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
|
||
ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5,
|
||
ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4,
|
||
ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
|
||
ENCTYPE_NULL
|
||
};
|
||
int i;
|
||
|
||
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(etype_list); i++) {
|
||
if (etype == etype_list[i]) {
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return ARRAY_SIZE(etype_list) - i;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static int sdb_key_strength_cmp(const struct sdb_key *k1, const struct sdb_key *k2)
|
||
{
|
||
int p1 = sdb_key_strength_priority(KRB5_KEY_TYPE(&k1->key));
|
||
int p2 = sdb_key_strength_priority(KRB5_KEY_TYPE(&k2->key));
|
||
|
||
if (p1 == p2) {
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (p1 > p2) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* Higher priority comes first
|
||
*/
|
||
return -1;
|
||
} else {
|
||
return 1;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static void samba_kdc_sort_keys(struct sdb_keys *keys)
|
||
{
|
||
if (keys == NULL) {
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
TYPESAFE_QSORT(keys->val, keys->len, sdb_key_strength_cmp);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
int samba_kdc_set_fixed_keys(krb5_context context,
|
||
const struct ldb_val *secretbuffer,
|
||
uint32_t supported_enctypes,
|
||
struct sdb_keys *keys)
|
||
{
|
||
uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
|
||
int ret;
|
||
|
||
allocated_keys = 3;
|
||
keys->len = 0;
|
||
keys->val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(struct sdb_key));
|
||
if (keys->val == NULL) {
|
||
memset(secretbuffer->data, 0, secretbuffer->length);
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
|
||
struct sdb_key key = {};
|
||
|
||
ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
|
||
ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
|
||
secretbuffer->data,
|
||
MIN(secretbuffer->length, 32),
|
||
&key.key);
|
||
if (ret) {
|
||
memset(secretbuffer->data, 0, secretbuffer->length);
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
keys->val[keys->len] = key;
|
||
keys->len++;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
|
||
struct sdb_key key = {};
|
||
|
||
ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
|
||
ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
|
||
secretbuffer->data,
|
||
MIN(secretbuffer->length, 16),
|
||
&key.key);
|
||
if (ret) {
|
||
memset(secretbuffer->data, 0, secretbuffer->length);
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
keys->val[keys->len] = key;
|
||
keys->len++;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
|
||
struct sdb_key key = {};
|
||
|
||
ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
|
||
ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
|
||
secretbuffer->data,
|
||
MIN(secretbuffer->length, 16),
|
||
&key.key);
|
||
if (ret) {
|
||
memset(secretbuffer->data, 0, secretbuffer->length);
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
keys->val[keys->len] = key;
|
||
keys->len++;
|
||
}
|
||
ret = 0;
|
||
out:
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
static int samba_kdc_set_random_keys(krb5_context context,
|
||
uint32_t supported_enctypes,
|
||
struct sdb_keys *keys)
|
||
{
|
||
struct ldb_val secret_val;
|
||
uint8_t secretbuffer[32];
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Fake keys until we have a better way to reject
|
||
* non-pkinit requests.
|
||
*
|
||
* We just need to indicate which encryption types are
|
||
* supported.
|
||
*/
|
||
generate_secret_buffer(secretbuffer, sizeof(secretbuffer));
|
||
|
||
secret_val = data_blob_const(secretbuffer,
|
||
sizeof(secretbuffer));
|
||
return samba_kdc_set_fixed_keys(context,
|
||
&secret_val,
|
||
supported_enctypes,
|
||
keys);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
struct samba_kdc_user_keys {
|
||
struct sdb_keys *skeys;
|
||
uint32_t kvno;
|
||
uint32_t *returned_kvno;
|
||
uint32_t supported_enctypes;
|
||
uint32_t *available_enctypes;
|
||
const struct samr_Password *nthash;
|
||
const char *salt_string;
|
||
uint16_t num_pkeys;
|
||
const struct package_PrimaryKerberosKey4 *pkeys;
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fill_user_keys(krb5_context context,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_user_keys *p)
|
||
{
|
||
/*
|
||
* Make sure we'll never reveal DES keys
|
||
*/
|
||
uint32_t supported_enctypes = p->supported_enctypes &= ~(ENC_CRC32 | ENC_RSA_MD5);
|
||
uint32_t _available_enctypes = 0;
|
||
uint32_t *available_enctypes = p->available_enctypes;
|
||
uint32_t _returned_kvno = 0;
|
||
uint32_t *returned_kvno = p->returned_kvno;
|
||
uint32_t num_pkeys = p->num_pkeys;
|
||
uint32_t allocated_keys = num_pkeys;
|
||
uint32_t i;
|
||
int ret;
|
||
|
||
if (available_enctypes == NULL) {
|
||
available_enctypes = &_available_enctypes;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
*available_enctypes = 0;
|
||
|
||
if (returned_kvno == NULL) {
|
||
returned_kvno = &_returned_kvno;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
*returned_kvno = p->kvno;
|
||
|
||
if (p->nthash != NULL) {
|
||
allocated_keys += 1;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
allocated_keys = MAX(1, allocated_keys);
|
||
|
||
/* allocate space to decode into */
|
||
p->skeys->len = 0;
|
||
p->skeys->val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(struct sdb_key));
|
||
if (p->skeys->val == NULL) {
|
||
return ENOMEM;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
for (i=0; i < num_pkeys; i++) {
|
||
struct sdb_key key = {};
|
||
uint32_t enctype_bit;
|
||
|
||
if (p->pkeys[i].value == NULL) {
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
enctype_bit = kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(p->pkeys[i].keytype);
|
||
if (!(enctype_bit & supported_enctypes)) {
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (p->salt_string != NULL) {
|
||
DATA_BLOB salt;
|
||
|
||
salt = data_blob_string_const(p->salt_string);
|
||
|
||
key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
|
||
if (key.salt == NULL) {
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
goto fail;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
key.salt->type = KRB5_PW_SALT;
|
||
|
||
ret = smb_krb5_copy_data_contents(&key.salt->salt,
|
||
salt.data,
|
||
salt.length);
|
||
if (ret) {
|
||
ZERO_STRUCTP(key.salt);
|
||
sdb_key_free(&key);
|
||
goto fail;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
|
||
p->pkeys[i].keytype,
|
||
p->pkeys[i].value->data,
|
||
p->pkeys[i].value->length,
|
||
&key.key);
|
||
if (ret == 0) {
|
||
p->skeys->val[p->skeys->len++] = key;
|
||
*available_enctypes |= enctype_bit;
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
ZERO_STRUCT(key.key);
|
||
sdb_key_free(&key);
|
||
if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
|
||
DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
|
||
p->pkeys[i].keytype));
|
||
ret = 0;
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
goto fail;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (p->nthash != NULL && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) {
|
||
struct sdb_key key = {};
|
||
|
||
ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
|
||
ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
|
||
p->nthash->hash,
|
||
sizeof(p->nthash->hash),
|
||
&key.key);
|
||
if (ret == 0) {
|
||
p->skeys->val[p->skeys->len++] = key;
|
||
|
||
*available_enctypes |= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
|
||
} else if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
|
||
DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
|
||
ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC));
|
||
ret = 0;
|
||
}
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
goto fail;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
samba_kdc_sort_keys(p->skeys);
|
||
|
||
return 0;
|
||
fail:
|
||
sdb_keys_free(p->skeys);
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
|
||
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
||
const struct ldb_message *msg,
|
||
bool is_krbtgt,
|
||
bool is_rodc,
|
||
uint32_t userAccountControl,
|
||
enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
|
||
unsigned flags,
|
||
krb5_kvno requested_kvno,
|
||
struct sdb_entry *entry,
|
||
const uint32_t supported_enctypes_in,
|
||
uint32_t *supported_enctypes_out)
|
||
{
|
||
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
|
||
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
|
||
struct samr_Password *hash;
|
||
unsigned int num_ntPwdHistory = 0;
|
||
struct samr_Password *ntPwdHistory = NULL;
|
||
struct samr_Password *old_hash = NULL;
|
||
struct samr_Password *older_hash = NULL;
|
||
const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
|
||
struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
|
||
struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
|
||
struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
|
||
struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
|
||
int krbtgt_number = 0;
|
||
uint32_t current_kvno;
|
||
uint32_t old_kvno = 0;
|
||
uint32_t older_kvno = 0;
|
||
uint32_t returned_kvno = 0;
|
||
uint16_t i;
|
||
struct samba_kdc_user_keys keys = { .num_pkeys = 0, };
|
||
struct samba_kdc_user_keys old_keys = { .num_pkeys = 0, };
|
||
struct samba_kdc_user_keys older_keys = { .num_pkeys = 0, };
|
||
uint32_t available_enctypes = 0;
|
||
uint32_t supported_enctypes = supported_enctypes_in;
|
||
|
||
*supported_enctypes_out = 0;
|
||
|
||
/* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */
|
||
if (is_rodc) {
|
||
krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
|
||
|
||
if (krbtgt_number == -1) {
|
||
return EINVAL;
|
||
}
|
||
if (krbtgt_number == 0) {
|
||
return EINVAL;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if ((ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT)
|
||
&& (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED)) {
|
||
ret = samba_kdc_set_random_keys(context,
|
||
supported_enctypes,
|
||
&entry->keys);
|
||
|
||
*supported_enctypes_out = supported_enctypes & ENC_ALL_TYPES;
|
||
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
current_kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
|
||
if (current_kvno > 1) {
|
||
old_kvno = current_kvno - 1;
|
||
}
|
||
if (current_kvno > 2) {
|
||
older_kvno = current_kvno - 2;
|
||
}
|
||
if (is_krbtgt) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* Even for the main krbtgt account
|
||
* we have to strictly split the kvno into
|
||
* two 16-bit parts and the upper 16-bit
|
||
* need to be all zero, even if
|
||
* the msDS-KeyVersionNumber has a value
|
||
* larger than 65535.
|
||
*
|
||
* See https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14951
|
||
*/
|
||
current_kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(current_kvno);
|
||
old_kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(old_kvno);
|
||
older_kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(older_kvno);
|
||
requested_kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(requested_kvno);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Get keys from the db */
|
||
|
||
hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
|
||
num_ntPwdHistory = samdb_result_hashes(mem_ctx, msg,
|
||
"ntPwdHistory",
|
||
&ntPwdHistory);
|
||
if (num_ntPwdHistory > 1) {
|
||
old_hash = &ntPwdHistory[1];
|
||
}
|
||
if (num_ntPwdHistory > 2) {
|
||
older_hash = &ntPwdHistory[1];
|
||
}
|
||
sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
|
||
|
||
/* supplementalCredentials if present */
|
||
if (sc_val) {
|
||
ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
|
||
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
|
||
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
|
||
dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
|
||
ret = EINVAL;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
|
||
if (scb.sub.num_packages != 0) {
|
||
NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
|
||
ret = EINVAL;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
|
||
if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
|
||
scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
|
||
if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
|
||
scpk = NULL;
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
/*
|
||
* Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys element
|
||
* of supplementalCredentials
|
||
*
|
||
* The legacy Primary:Kerberos only contains
|
||
* single DES keys, which are completely ignored
|
||
* now.
|
||
*/
|
||
if (scpk) {
|
||
DATA_BLOB blob;
|
||
|
||
blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
|
||
if (!blob.data) {
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
|
||
ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
|
||
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
|
||
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
|
||
ret = EINVAL;
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
|
||
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (_pkb.version != 4) {
|
||
ret = EINVAL;
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
|
||
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
keys = (struct samba_kdc_user_keys) {
|
||
.kvno = current_kvno,
|
||
.supported_enctypes = supported_enctypes,
|
||
.nthash = hash,
|
||
.salt_string = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->salt.string : NULL,
|
||
.num_pkeys = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->num_keys : 0,
|
||
.pkeys = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->keys : NULL,
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
old_keys = (struct samba_kdc_user_keys) {
|
||
.kvno = old_kvno,
|
||
.supported_enctypes = supported_enctypes,
|
||
.nthash = old_hash,
|
||
.salt_string = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->salt.string : NULL,
|
||
.num_pkeys = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->num_old_keys : 0,
|
||
.pkeys = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->old_keys : NULL,
|
||
};
|
||
older_keys = (struct samba_kdc_user_keys) {
|
||
.kvno = older_kvno,
|
||
.supported_enctypes = supported_enctypes,
|
||
.nthash = older_hash,
|
||
.salt_string = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->salt.string : NULL,
|
||
.num_pkeys = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->num_older_keys : 0,
|
||
.pkeys = pkb4 != NULL ? pkb4->older_keys : NULL,
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
if (flags & SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
|
||
if (requested_kvno == keys.kvno) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* The current kvno was requested,
|
||
* so we return it.
|
||
*/
|
||
keys.skeys = &entry->keys;
|
||
keys.available_enctypes = &available_enctypes;
|
||
keys.returned_kvno = &returned_kvno;
|
||
} else if (requested_kvno == 0) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* don't return any keys
|
||
*/
|
||
} else if (requested_kvno == old_keys.kvno) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* return the old keys as default keys
|
||
* with the requested kvno.
|
||
*/
|
||
old_keys.skeys = &entry->keys;
|
||
old_keys.available_enctypes = &available_enctypes;
|
||
old_keys.returned_kvno = &returned_kvno;
|
||
} else if (requested_kvno == older_keys.kvno) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* return the older keys as default keys
|
||
* with the requested kvno.
|
||
*/
|
||
older_keys.skeys = &entry->keys;
|
||
older_keys.available_enctypes = &available_enctypes;
|
||
older_keys.returned_kvno = &returned_kvno;
|
||
} else {
|
||
/*
|
||
* don't return any keys
|
||
*/
|
||
}
|
||
} else {
|
||
bool include_history = false;
|
||
|
||
if ((flags & SDB_F_GET_CLIENT) && (flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ)) {
|
||
include_history = true;
|
||
} else if (flags & SDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) {
|
||
include_history = true;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
keys.skeys = &entry->keys;
|
||
keys.available_enctypes = &available_enctypes;
|
||
keys.returned_kvno = &returned_kvno;
|
||
|
||
if (include_history && old_keys.kvno != 0) {
|
||
old_keys.skeys = &entry->old_keys;
|
||
}
|
||
if (include_history && older_keys.kvno != 0) {
|
||
older_keys.skeys = &entry->older_keys;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (keys.skeys != NULL) {
|
||
ret = samba_kdc_fill_user_keys(context, &keys);
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (old_keys.skeys != NULL) {
|
||
ret = samba_kdc_fill_user_keys(context, &old_keys);
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (older_keys.skeys != NULL) {
|
||
ret = samba_kdc_fill_user_keys(context, &older_keys);
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
*supported_enctypes_out |= available_enctypes;
|
||
|
||
if (is_krbtgt) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* Even for the main krbtgt account
|
||
* we have to strictly split the kvno into
|
||
* two 16-bit parts and the upper 16-bit
|
||
* need to be all zero, even if
|
||
* the msDS-KeyVersionNumber has a value
|
||
* larger than 65535.
|
||
*
|
||
* See https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14951
|
||
*/
|
||
returned_kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(returned_kvno, krbtgt_number);
|
||
}
|
||
entry->kvno = returned_kvno;
|
||
|
||
out:
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static int principal_comp_strcmp_int(krb5_context context,
|
||
krb5_const_principal principal,
|
||
unsigned int component,
|
||
const char *string,
|
||
bool do_strcasecmp)
|
||
{
|
||
const char *p;
|
||
|
||
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_GET_COMP_STRING)
|
||
p = krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, principal, component);
|
||
if (p == NULL) {
|
||
return -1;
|
||
}
|
||
if (do_strcasecmp) {
|
||
return strcasecmp(p, string);
|
||
} else {
|
||
return strcmp(p, string);
|
||
}
|
||
#else
|
||
size_t len;
|
||
krb5_data *d;
|
||
if (component >= krb5_princ_size(context, principal)) {
|
||
return -1;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
d = krb5_princ_component(context, principal, component);
|
||
if (d == NULL) {
|
||
return -1;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
p = d->data;
|
||
|
||
len = strlen(string);
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* We explicitly return -1 or 1. Subtracting of the two lengths might
|
||
* give the wrong result if the result overflows or loses data when
|
||
* narrowed to int.
|
||
*/
|
||
if (d->length < len) {
|
||
return -1;
|
||
} else if (d->length > len) {
|
||
return 1;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (do_strcasecmp) {
|
||
return strncasecmp(p, string, len);
|
||
} else {
|
||
return memcmp(p, string, len);
|
||
}
|
||
#endif
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static int principal_comp_strcasecmp(krb5_context context,
|
||
krb5_const_principal principal,
|
||
unsigned int component,
|
||
const char *string)
|
||
{
|
||
return principal_comp_strcmp_int(context, principal,
|
||
component, string, true);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static int principal_comp_strcmp(krb5_context context,
|
||
krb5_const_principal principal,
|
||
unsigned int component,
|
||
const char *string)
|
||
{
|
||
return principal_comp_strcmp_int(context, principal,
|
||
component, string, false);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static bool is_kadmin_changepw(krb5_context context,
|
||
krb5_const_principal principal)
|
||
{
|
||
return krb5_princ_size(context, principal) == 2 &&
|
||
(principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 0, "kadmin") == 0) &&
|
||
(principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 1, "changepw") == 0);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_get_entry_principal(
|
||
krb5_context context,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
const char *samAccountName,
|
||
enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
|
||
unsigned flags,
|
||
bool is_kadmin_changepw,
|
||
krb5_const_principal in_princ,
|
||
krb5_principal *out_princ)
|
||
{
|
||
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
|
||
krb5_error_code code = 0;
|
||
bool canon = flags & (SDB_F_CANON|SDB_F_FORCE_CANON);
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* If we are set to canonicalize, we get back the fixed UPPER
|
||
* case realm, and the real username (ie matching LDAP
|
||
* samAccountName)
|
||
*
|
||
* Otherwise, if we are set to enterprise, we
|
||
* get back the whole principal as-sent
|
||
*
|
||
* Finally, if we are not set to canonicalize, we get back the
|
||
* fixed UPPER case realm, but the as-sent username
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* We need to ensure that the kadmin/changepw principal isn't able to
|
||
* issue krbtgt tickets, even if canonicalization is turned on.
|
||
*/
|
||
if (!is_kadmin_changepw) {
|
||
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT && canon) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* When requested to do so, ensure that both
|
||
* the realm values in the principal are set
|
||
* to the upper case, canonical realm
|
||
*/
|
||
code = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
|
||
out_princ,
|
||
lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx),
|
||
"krbtgt",
|
||
lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx),
|
||
NULL);
|
||
if (code != 0) {
|
||
return code;
|
||
}
|
||
smb_krb5_principal_set_type(context,
|
||
*out_princ,
|
||
KRB5_NT_SRV_INST);
|
||
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if ((canon && flags & (SDB_F_FORCE_CANON|SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ)) ||
|
||
(ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && in_princ == NULL)) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* SDB_F_CANON maps from the canonicalize flag in the
|
||
* packet, and has a different meaning between AS-REQ
|
||
* and TGS-REQ. We only change the principal in the
|
||
* AS-REQ case.
|
||
*
|
||
* The SDB_F_FORCE_CANON if for new MIT KDC code that
|
||
* wants the canonical name in all lookups, and takes
|
||
* care to canonicalize only when appropriate.
|
||
*/
|
||
code = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
|
||
out_princ,
|
||
lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx),
|
||
samAccountName,
|
||
NULL);
|
||
return code;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* For a krbtgt entry, this appears to be required regardless of the
|
||
* canonicalize flag from the client.
|
||
*/
|
||
code = krb5_copy_principal(context, in_princ, out_princ);
|
||
if (code != 0) {
|
||
return code;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* While we have copied the client principal, tests show that Win2k3
|
||
* returns the 'corrected' realm, not the client-specified realm. This
|
||
* code attempts to replace the client principal's realm with the one
|
||
* we determine from our records
|
||
*/
|
||
code = smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context,
|
||
*out_princ,
|
||
lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
|
||
|
||
return code;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
|
||
*/
|
||
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
||
krb5_const_principal principal,
|
||
enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
|
||
unsigned flags,
|
||
krb5_kvno kvno,
|
||
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
|
||
struct ldb_message *msg,
|
||
struct sdb_entry *entry)
|
||
{
|
||
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
|
||
uint32_t userAccountControl;
|
||
uint32_t msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
|
||
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
|
||
krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
|
||
struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
|
||
NTTIME acct_expiry;
|
||
NTSTATUS status;
|
||
bool protected_user = false;
|
||
uint32_t rid;
|
||
bool is_krbtgt = false;
|
||
bool is_rodc = false;
|
||
bool force_rc4 = lpcfg_kdc_force_enable_rc4_weak_session_keys(lp_ctx);
|
||
struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
|
||
struct ldb_val computer_val = data_blob_string_const("computer");
|
||
uint32_t config_default_supported_enctypes = lpcfg_kdc_default_domain_supported_enctypes(lp_ctx);
|
||
uint32_t default_supported_enctypes =
|
||
config_default_supported_enctypes != 0 ?
|
||
config_default_supported_enctypes :
|
||
ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK;
|
||
uint32_t supported_enctypes
|
||
= ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
|
||
"msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
|
||
default_supported_enctypes);
|
||
uint32_t pa_supported_enctypes;
|
||
uint32_t supported_session_etypes;
|
||
uint32_t available_enctypes = 0;
|
||
/*
|
||
* also legacy enctypes are announced,
|
||
* but effectively restricted by kdc_enctypes
|
||
*/
|
||
uint32_t domain_enctypes = ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5 | ENC_RSA_MD5 | ENC_CRC32;
|
||
uint32_t config_kdc_enctypes = lpcfg_kdc_supported_enctypes(lp_ctx);
|
||
uint32_t kdc_enctypes =
|
||
config_kdc_enctypes != 0 ?
|
||
config_kdc_enctypes :
|
||
ENC_ALL_TYPES;
|
||
const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
|
||
|
||
const struct authn_kerberos_client_policy *authn_client_policy = NULL;
|
||
const struct authn_server_policy *authn_server_policy = NULL;
|
||
int64_t enforced_tgt_lifetime_raw;
|
||
|
||
ZERO_STRUCTP(entry);
|
||
|
||
if (supported_enctypes == 0) {
|
||
supported_enctypes = default_supported_enctypes;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (dsdb_functional_level(kdc_db_ctx->samdb) >= DS_DOMAIN_FUNCTION_2008) {
|
||
domain_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) {
|
||
is_rodc = true;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (!samAccountName) {
|
||
ret = ENOENT;
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
|
||
|
||
if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
|
||
is_computer = TRUE;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
p = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
|
||
if (!p) {
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
p->is_rodc = is_rodc;
|
||
p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
|
||
p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
|
||
if (!p->realm_dn) {
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
|
||
|
||
entry->skdc_entry = p;
|
||
|
||
userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
|
||
|
||
msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed
|
||
= ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
|
||
"msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed",
|
||
UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE);
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* This brings in the lockout flag, block the account if not
|
||
* found. We need the weird UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE check because
|
||
* we do not want to fail open if the value is not returned,
|
||
* but 0 is a valid value (all OK)
|
||
*/
|
||
if (msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed == UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
|
||
ret = EINVAL;
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: "
|
||
"no msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed present");
|
||
goto out;
|
||
} else {
|
||
userAccountControl |= msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT) {
|
||
p->is_krbtgt = true;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
|
||
entry->flags = uf2SDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Take control of the returned principal here, rather than
|
||
* allowing the Heimdal code to do it as we have specific
|
||
* behaviour around the forced realm to honour
|
||
*/
|
||
entry->flags.force_canonicalize = true;
|
||
|
||
/* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
|
||
* default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
|
||
* by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
|
||
* their probably pathetically insecure password) */
|
||
|
||
if (entry->flags.server
|
||
&& lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
|
||
if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
|
||
entry->flags.server = 0;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* We restrict a 3-part SPN ending in my domain/realm to full
|
||
* domain controllers.
|
||
*
|
||
* This avoids any cases where (eg) a demoted DC still has
|
||
* these more restricted SPNs.
|
||
*/
|
||
if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) > 2) {
|
||
char *third_part
|
||
= smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx,
|
||
context,
|
||
principal,
|
||
2);
|
||
bool is_our_realm =
|
||
lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx,
|
||
third_part);
|
||
bool is_dc = userAccountControl &
|
||
(UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT | UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT);
|
||
if (is_our_realm && !is_dc) {
|
||
entry->flags.server = 0;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
/*
|
||
* To give the correct type of error to the client, we must
|
||
* not just return the entry without .server set, we must
|
||
* pretend the principal does not exist. Otherwise we may
|
||
* return ERR_POLICY instead of
|
||
* KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN
|
||
*/
|
||
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER && entry->flags.server == 0) {
|
||
ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no servicePrincipalName present for this server, refusing with no-such-entry");
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
if (flags & SDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) {
|
||
/* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
|
||
* of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
|
||
* DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
|
||
* we must return */
|
||
|
||
/* use 'whenCreated' */
|
||
entry->created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
|
||
/* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
|
||
|
||
ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
|
||
&entry->created_by.principal,
|
||
lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
|
||
if (ret) {
|
||
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
entry->modified_by = (struct sdb_event *) malloc(sizeof(struct sdb_event));
|
||
if (entry->modified_by == NULL) {
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* use 'whenChanged' */
|
||
entry->modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
|
||
/* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
|
||
ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
|
||
&entry->modified_by->principal,
|
||
lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
|
||
if (ret) {
|
||
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
|
||
* virtue of being that particular RID */
|
||
status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
|
||
|
||
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
|
||
ret = EINVAL;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
|
||
char *realm = NULL;
|
||
|
||
entry->valid_end = NULL;
|
||
entry->pw_end = NULL;
|
||
|
||
entry->flags.invalid = 0;
|
||
entry->flags.server = 1;
|
||
|
||
realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
|
||
mem_ctx, context, principal);
|
||
if (realm == NULL) {
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
|
||
* 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
|
||
* trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
|
||
* Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
|
||
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER &&
|
||
is_kadmin_changepw(context, principal) &&
|
||
lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, realm)) {
|
||
entry->flags.change_pw = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(realm);
|
||
|
||
entry->flags.client = 0;
|
||
entry->flags.forwardable = 1;
|
||
entry->flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
|
||
} else if (is_rodc) {
|
||
/* The RODC krbtgt account is like the main krbtgt,
|
||
* but it does not have a changepw or kadmin
|
||
* service */
|
||
|
||
entry->valid_end = NULL;
|
||
entry->pw_end = NULL;
|
||
|
||
/* Also don't allow the RODC krbtgt to be a client (it should not be needed) */
|
||
entry->flags.client = 0;
|
||
entry->flags.invalid = 0;
|
||
entry->flags.server = 1;
|
||
|
||
entry->flags.client = 0;
|
||
entry->flags.forwardable = 1;
|
||
entry->flags.ok_as_delegate = 0;
|
||
} else if (entry->flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
|
||
/* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
|
||
* client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
|
||
|
||
/* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
|
||
* it could bypass the password restrictions */
|
||
entry->flags.client = 0;
|
||
|
||
entry->valid_end = NULL;
|
||
entry->pw_end = NULL;
|
||
|
||
} else {
|
||
NTTIME must_change_time
|
||
= samdb_result_nttime(msg,
|
||
"msDS-UserPasswordExpiryTimeComputed",
|
||
0);
|
||
if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
|
||
entry->pw_end = NULL;
|
||
} else {
|
||
entry->pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry->pw_end));
|
||
if (entry->pw_end == NULL) {
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
*entry->pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
|
||
if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
|
||
entry->valid_end = NULL;
|
||
} else {
|
||
entry->valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry->valid_end));
|
||
if (entry->valid_end == NULL) {
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
*entry->valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ret = samba_kdc_get_entry_principal(context,
|
||
kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
samAccountName,
|
||
ent_type,
|
||
flags,
|
||
entry->flags.change_pw,
|
||
principal,
|
||
&entry->principal);
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
entry->valid_start = NULL;
|
||
|
||
entry->max_life = malloc(sizeof(*entry->max_life));
|
||
if (entry->max_life == NULL) {
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
|
||
*entry->max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime;
|
||
} else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT) {
|
||
*entry->max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime;
|
||
} else {
|
||
*entry->max_life = MIN(kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
|
||
kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (entry->flags.change_pw) {
|
||
/* Limit lifetime of kpasswd tickets to two minutes or less. */
|
||
*entry->max_life = MIN(*entry->max_life, CHANGEPW_LIFETIME);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
entry->max_renew = malloc(sizeof(*entry->max_renew));
|
||
if (entry->max_renew == NULL) {
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
*entry->max_renew = kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime;
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* A principal acting as a client that is not being looked up as the
|
||
* principal of an armor ticket may have an authentication policy apply
|
||
* to it.
|
||
*
|
||
* We won’t get an authentication policy for the client of an S4U2Self
|
||
* or S4U2Proxy request. Those clients are looked up with
|
||
* SDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ instead of with SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ.
|
||
*/
|
||
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT &&
|
||
(flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ) &&
|
||
!(flags & SDB_F_ARMOR_PRINCIPAL))
|
||
{
|
||
ret = authn_policy_kerberos_client(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
|
||
&authn_client_policy);
|
||
if (ret) {
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* A principal acting as a server may have an authentication policy
|
||
* apply to it.
|
||
*/
|
||
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
|
||
ret = authn_policy_server(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
|
||
&authn_server_policy);
|
||
if (ret) {
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
enforced_tgt_lifetime_raw = authn_policy_enforced_tgt_lifetime_raw(authn_client_policy);
|
||
if (enforced_tgt_lifetime_raw != 0) {
|
||
int64_t lifetime_secs = enforced_tgt_lifetime_raw;
|
||
|
||
lifetime_secs /= INT64_C(1000) * 1000 * 10;
|
||
lifetime_secs = MIN(lifetime_secs, INT_MAX);
|
||
lifetime_secs = MAX(lifetime_secs, INT_MIN);
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Set both lifetime and renewal time based only on the
|
||
* configured maximum lifetime — not on the configured renewal
|
||
* time. Yes, this is what Windows does.
|
||
*/
|
||
lifetime_secs = MIN(*entry->max_life, lifetime_secs);
|
||
*entry->max_life = lifetime_secs;
|
||
*entry->max_renew = lifetime_secs;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT && (flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ)) {
|
||
int result;
|
||
const struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc = NULL;
|
||
/*
|
||
* These protections only apply to clients, so servers in the
|
||
* Protected Users group may still have service tickets to them
|
||
* encrypted with RC4. For accounts looked up as servers, note
|
||
* that 'msg' does not contain the 'memberOf' attribute for
|
||
* determining whether the account is a member of Protected
|
||
* Users.
|
||
*
|
||
* Additionally, Microsoft advises that accounts for services
|
||
* and computers should never be members of Protected Users, or
|
||
* they may fail to authenticate.
|
||
*/
|
||
status = samba_kdc_get_user_info_from_db(p, msg, &user_info_dc);
|
||
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
|
||
ret = EINVAL;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
result = dsdb_is_protected_user(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
|
||
user_info_dc->sids,
|
||
user_info_dc->num_sids);
|
||
if (result == -1) {
|
||
ret = EINVAL;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
protected_user = result;
|
||
|
||
if (protected_user && enforced_tgt_lifetime_raw == 0)
|
||
{
|
||
/*
|
||
* If a TGT lifetime hasn’t been set, Protected Users
|
||
* enforces a four hour TGT lifetime.
|
||
*/
|
||
*entry->max_life = MIN(*entry->max_life, 4 * 60 * 60);
|
||
*entry->max_renew = MIN(*entry->max_renew, 4 * 60 * 60);
|
||
|
||
entry->flags.forwardable = 0;
|
||
entry->flags.proxiable = 0;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT || is_rodc) {
|
||
bool enable_fast;
|
||
|
||
is_krbtgt = true;
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs)
|
||
* ignore msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes completely
|
||
* but support all supported enctypes by the domain.
|
||
*/
|
||
supported_enctypes = domain_enctypes;
|
||
|
||
enable_fast = lpcfg_kdc_enable_fast(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
|
||
if (enable_fast) {
|
||
supported_enctypes |= ENC_FAST_SUPPORTED;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
supported_enctypes |= ENC_CLAIMS_SUPPORTED;
|
||
supported_enctypes |= ENC_COMPOUND_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED;
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Resource SID compression is enabled implicitly, unless
|
||
* disabled in msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes.
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
} else if (userAccountControl & (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* DCs and RODCs computer accounts take
|
||
* msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes unmodified, but
|
||
* force all enctypes supported by the domain.
|
||
*/
|
||
supported_enctypes |= domain_enctypes;
|
||
|
||
} else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT ||
|
||
(ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY)) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it
|
||
* supports, and this will vary between computers a
|
||
* user logs in from. Therefore, so that we accept any
|
||
* of the client's keys for decrypting padata,
|
||
* supported_enctypes should not restrict etype usage.
|
||
*
|
||
* likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported,
|
||
* to export into a keytab.
|
||
*/
|
||
supported_enctypes |= ENC_ALL_TYPES;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
|
||
if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
|
||
supported_enctypes &= ~ENC_ALL_TYPES;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (protected_user) {
|
||
supported_enctypes &= ~ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
pa_supported_enctypes = supported_enctypes;
|
||
supported_session_etypes = supported_enctypes;
|
||
if (supported_session_etypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK) {
|
||
supported_session_etypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
|
||
supported_session_etypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128;
|
||
}
|
||
if (force_rc4) {
|
||
supported_session_etypes |= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
|
||
}
|
||
/*
|
||
* now that we remembered what to announce in pa_supported_enctypes
|
||
* and normalized ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK, we restrict the
|
||
* rest to the enc types the local kdc supports.
|
||
*/
|
||
supported_enctypes &= kdc_enctypes;
|
||
supported_session_etypes &= kdc_enctypes;
|
||
|
||
/* Get keys from the db */
|
||
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, p, msg,
|
||
is_krbtgt, is_rodc,
|
||
userAccountControl,
|
||
ent_type, flags, kvno, entry,
|
||
supported_enctypes,
|
||
&available_enctypes);
|
||
if (ret) {
|
||
/* Could be bogus data in the entry, or out of memory */
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* If we only have a nthash stored,
|
||
* but a better session key would be
|
||
* available, we fallback to fetching the
|
||
* RC4_HMAC_MD5, which implicitly also
|
||
* would allow an RC4_HMAC_MD5 session key.
|
||
* But only if the kdc actually supports
|
||
* RC4_HMAC_MD5.
|
||
*/
|
||
if (available_enctypes == 0 &&
|
||
(supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) == 0 &&
|
||
(supported_enctypes & ~ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) != 0 &&
|
||
(kdc_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) != 0)
|
||
{
|
||
supported_enctypes = ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
|
||
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, p, msg,
|
||
is_krbtgt, is_rodc,
|
||
userAccountControl,
|
||
ent_type, flags, kvno, entry,
|
||
supported_enctypes,
|
||
&available_enctypes);
|
||
if (ret) {
|
||
/* Could be bogus data in the entry, or out of memory */
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* We need to support all session keys enctypes for
|
||
* all keys we provide
|
||
*/
|
||
supported_session_etypes |= available_enctypes;
|
||
|
||
ret = sdb_entry_set_etypes(entry);
|
||
if (ret) {
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (entry->flags.server) {
|
||
bool add_aes256 =
|
||
supported_session_etypes & KERB_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96;
|
||
bool add_aes128 =
|
||
supported_session_etypes & KERB_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96;
|
||
bool add_rc4 =
|
||
supported_session_etypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
|
||
ret = sdb_entry_set_session_etypes(entry,
|
||
add_aes256,
|
||
add_aes128,
|
||
add_rc4);
|
||
if (ret) {
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (entry->keys.len != 0) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* FIXME: Currently limited to Heimdal so as not to
|
||
* break MIT KDCs, for which no fix is available.
|
||
*/
|
||
#ifdef SAMBA4_USES_HEIMDAL
|
||
if (is_krbtgt) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* The krbtgt account, having no reason to
|
||
* issue tickets encrypted in weaker keys,
|
||
* shall only make available its strongest
|
||
* key. All weaker keys are stripped out. This
|
||
* makes it impossible for an RC4-encrypted
|
||
* TGT to be accepted when AES KDC keys exist.
|
||
*
|
||
* This controls the ticket key and so the PAC
|
||
* signature algorithms indirectly, preventing
|
||
* a weak KDC checksum from being accepted
|
||
* when we verify the signatures for an
|
||
* S4U2Proxy evidence ticket. As such, this is
|
||
* indispensable for addressing
|
||
* CVE-2022-37966.
|
||
*
|
||
* Being strict here also provides protection
|
||
* against possible future attacks on weak
|
||
* keys.
|
||
*/
|
||
entry->keys.len = 1;
|
||
if (entry->etypes != NULL) {
|
||
entry->etypes->len = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
entry->old_keys.len = MIN(entry->old_keys.len, 1);
|
||
entry->older_keys.len = MIN(entry->older_keys.len, 1);
|
||
}
|
||
#endif
|
||
} else if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* We are on an RODC, but don't have keys for this
|
||
* account. Signal this to the caller
|
||
*/
|
||
auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
kdc_db_ctx->msg_ctx,
|
||
kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx,
|
||
msg->dn);
|
||
return SDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
|
||
} else {
|
||
/*
|
||
* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
|
||
* hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
|
||
* allows an entry with no keys (yet).
|
||
*/
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
|
||
p->supported_enctypes = pa_supported_enctypes;
|
||
|
||
p->client_policy = talloc_steal(p, authn_client_policy);
|
||
p->server_policy = talloc_steal(p, authn_server_policy);
|
||
|
||
out:
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
/* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
|
||
sdb_entry_free(entry);
|
||
} else {
|
||
talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, p);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
|
||
* The kvno is what the remote client asked for
|
||
*/
|
||
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
||
enum trust_direction direction,
|
||
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
|
||
unsigned flags,
|
||
uint32_t kvno,
|
||
struct ldb_message *msg,
|
||
struct sdb_entry *entry)
|
||
{
|
||
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
|
||
const char *our_realm = lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx);
|
||
char *partner_realm = NULL;
|
||
const char *realm = NULL;
|
||
const char *krbtgt_realm = NULL;
|
||
DATA_BLOB password_utf16 = data_blob_null;
|
||
DATA_BLOB password_utf8 = data_blob_null;
|
||
struct samr_Password _password_hash;
|
||
const struct samr_Password *password_hash = NULL;
|
||
const struct ldb_val *password_val;
|
||
struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
|
||
struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
|
||
bool use_previous = false;
|
||
uint32_t current_kvno;
|
||
uint32_t previous_kvno;
|
||
uint32_t num_keys = 0;
|
||
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
|
||
int ret;
|
||
unsigned int i;
|
||
struct AuthenticationInformationArray *auth_array;
|
||
struct timeval tv;
|
||
NTTIME an_hour_ago;
|
||
uint32_t *auth_kvno;
|
||
bool preferr_current = false;
|
||
bool force_rc4 = lpcfg_kdc_force_enable_rc4_weak_session_keys(lp_ctx);
|
||
uint32_t supported_enctypes = ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
|
||
uint32_t pa_supported_enctypes;
|
||
uint32_t supported_session_etypes;
|
||
uint32_t config_kdc_enctypes = lpcfg_kdc_supported_enctypes(lp_ctx);
|
||
uint32_t kdc_enctypes =
|
||
config_kdc_enctypes != 0 ?
|
||
config_kdc_enctypes :
|
||
ENC_ALL_TYPES;
|
||
struct lsa_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx *tdo = NULL;
|
||
NTSTATUS status;
|
||
|
||
ZERO_STRUCTP(entry);
|
||
|
||
if (dsdb_functional_level(kdc_db_ctx->samdb) >= DS_DOMAIN_FUNCTION_2008) {
|
||
/* If not told otherwise, Windows now assumes that trusts support AES. */
|
||
supported_enctypes = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
|
||
"msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
|
||
ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
pa_supported_enctypes = supported_enctypes;
|
||
supported_session_etypes = supported_enctypes;
|
||
if (supported_session_etypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK) {
|
||
supported_session_etypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
|
||
supported_session_etypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128;
|
||
}
|
||
if (force_rc4) {
|
||
supported_session_etypes |= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
|
||
}
|
||
/*
|
||
* now that we remembered what to announce in pa_supported_enctypes
|
||
* and normalized ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK, we restrict the
|
||
* rest to the enc types the local kdc supports.
|
||
*/
|
||
supported_enctypes &= kdc_enctypes;
|
||
supported_session_etypes &= kdc_enctypes;
|
||
|
||
status = dsdb_trust_parse_tdo_info(mem_ctx, msg, &tdo);
|
||
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
|
||
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (!(tdo->trust_direction & direction)) {
|
||
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
||
ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (tdo->trust_type != LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* Only UPLEVEL domains support kerberos here,
|
||
* as we don't support LSA_TRUST_TYPE_MIT.
|
||
*/
|
||
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
||
ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (tdo->trust_attributes & LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* We don't support selective authentication yet.
|
||
*/
|
||
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
||
ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (tdo->domain_name.string == NULL) {
|
||
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
||
ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
partner_realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, tdo->domain_name.string);
|
||
if (partner_realm == NULL) {
|
||
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (direction == INBOUND) {
|
||
realm = our_realm;
|
||
krbtgt_realm = partner_realm;
|
||
|
||
password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
|
||
} else { /* OUTBOUND */
|
||
realm = partner_realm;
|
||
krbtgt_realm = our_realm;
|
||
|
||
password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (password_val == NULL) {
|
||
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
||
ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
|
||
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
|
||
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
|
||
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
||
ret = EINVAL;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
p = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
|
||
if (!p) {
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
p->is_trust = true;
|
||
p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
|
||
p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
|
||
p->supported_enctypes = pa_supported_enctypes;
|
||
|
||
talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
|
||
|
||
entry->skdc_entry = p;
|
||
|
||
/* use 'whenCreated' */
|
||
entry->created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
|
||
/* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
|
||
ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
|
||
&entry->created_by.principal,
|
||
realm, "kadmin", NULL);
|
||
if (ret) {
|
||
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* We always need to generate the canonicalized principal
|
||
* with the values of our database.
|
||
*/
|
||
ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &entry->principal, realm,
|
||
"krbtgt", krbtgt_realm, NULL);
|
||
if (ret) {
|
||
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
smb_krb5_principal_set_type(context, entry->principal,
|
||
KRB5_NT_SRV_INST);
|
||
|
||
entry->valid_start = NULL;
|
||
|
||
/* we need to work out if we are going to use the current or
|
||
* the previous password hash.
|
||
* We base this on the kvno the client passes in. If the kvno
|
||
* passed in is equal to the current kvno in our database then
|
||
* we use the current structure. If it is the current kvno-1,
|
||
* then we use the previous substrucure.
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Windows preferrs the previous key for one hour.
|
||
*/
|
||
tv = timeval_current();
|
||
if (tv.tv_sec > 3600) {
|
||
tv.tv_sec -= 3600;
|
||
}
|
||
an_hour_ago = timeval_to_nttime(&tv);
|
||
|
||
/* first work out the current kvno */
|
||
current_kvno = 0;
|
||
for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
|
||
struct AuthenticationInformation *a =
|
||
&password_blob.current.array[i];
|
||
|
||
if (a->LastUpdateTime <= an_hour_ago) {
|
||
preferr_current = true;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (a->AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
|
||
current_kvno = a->AuthInfo.version.version;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
if (current_kvno == 0) {
|
||
previous_kvno = 255;
|
||
} else {
|
||
previous_kvno = current_kvno - 1;
|
||
}
|
||
for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
|
||
struct AuthenticationInformation *a =
|
||
&password_blob.previous.array[i];
|
||
|
||
if (a->AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
|
||
previous_kvno = a->AuthInfo.version.version;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* work out whether we will use the previous or current
|
||
password */
|
||
if (password_blob.previous.count == 0) {
|
||
/* there is no previous password */
|
||
use_previous = false;
|
||
} else if (!(flags & SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED)) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* If not specified we use the lowest kvno
|
||
* for the first hour after an update.
|
||
*/
|
||
if (preferr_current) {
|
||
use_previous = false;
|
||
} else if (previous_kvno < current_kvno) {
|
||
use_previous = true;
|
||
} else {
|
||
use_previous = false;
|
||
}
|
||
} else if (kvno == current_kvno) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* Exact match ...
|
||
*/
|
||
use_previous = false;
|
||
} else if (kvno == previous_kvno) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* Exact match ...
|
||
*/
|
||
use_previous = true;
|
||
} else {
|
||
/*
|
||
* Fallback to the current one for anything else
|
||
*/
|
||
use_previous = false;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (use_previous) {
|
||
auth_array = &password_blob.previous;
|
||
auth_kvno = &previous_kvno;
|
||
} else {
|
||
auth_array = &password_blob.current;
|
||
auth_kvno = ¤t_kvno;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* use the kvno the client specified, if available */
|
||
if (flags & SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
|
||
entry->kvno = kvno;
|
||
} else {
|
||
entry->kvno = *auth_kvno;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
for (i=0; i < auth_array->count; i++) {
|
||
if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
|
||
bool ok;
|
||
|
||
password_utf16 = data_blob_const(auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
|
||
auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
|
||
if (password_utf16.length == 0) {
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
|
||
mdfour(_password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
|
||
if (password_hash == NULL) {
|
||
num_keys += 1;
|
||
}
|
||
password_hash = &_password_hash;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (!(supported_enctypes & (ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128|ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256))) {
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ok = convert_string_talloc(mem_ctx,
|
||
CH_UTF16MUNGED, CH_UTF8,
|
||
password_utf16.data,
|
||
password_utf16.length,
|
||
(void *)&password_utf8.data,
|
||
&password_utf8.length);
|
||
if (!ok) {
|
||
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
|
||
num_keys += 1;
|
||
}
|
||
if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
|
||
num_keys += 1;
|
||
}
|
||
break;
|
||
} else if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
|
||
if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
|
||
password_hash = &auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
|
||
num_keys += 1;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
|
||
if (num_keys == 0) {
|
||
DBG_WARNING("no usable key found\n");
|
||
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
||
ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
entry->keys.val = calloc(num_keys, sizeof(struct sdb_key));
|
||
if (entry->keys.val == NULL) {
|
||
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (password_utf8.length != 0) {
|
||
struct sdb_key key = {};
|
||
krb5_const_principal salt_principal = entry->principal;
|
||
krb5_data salt;
|
||
krb5_data cleartext_data;
|
||
|
||
cleartext_data.data = discard_const_p(char, password_utf8.data);
|
||
cleartext_data.length = password_utf8.length;
|
||
|
||
ret = smb_krb5_get_pw_salt(context,
|
||
salt_principal,
|
||
&salt);
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
|
||
ret = smb_krb5_create_key_from_string(context,
|
||
salt_principal,
|
||
&salt,
|
||
&cleartext_data,
|
||
ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
|
||
&key.key);
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &salt);
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
entry->keys.val[entry->keys.len] = key;
|
||
entry->keys.len++;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
|
||
ret = smb_krb5_create_key_from_string(context,
|
||
salt_principal,
|
||
&salt,
|
||
&cleartext_data,
|
||
ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
|
||
&key.key);
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &salt);
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
entry->keys.val[entry->keys.len] = key;
|
||
entry->keys.len++;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context, &salt);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (password_hash != NULL) {
|
||
struct sdb_key key = {};
|
||
|
||
ret = smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context,
|
||
ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
|
||
password_hash->hash,
|
||
sizeof(password_hash->hash),
|
||
&key.key);
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
entry->keys.val[entry->keys.len] = key;
|
||
entry->keys.len++;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
entry->flags = int2SDBFlags(0);
|
||
entry->flags.immutable = 1;
|
||
entry->flags.invalid = 0;
|
||
entry->flags.server = 1;
|
||
entry->flags.require_preauth = 1;
|
||
|
||
entry->pw_end = NULL;
|
||
|
||
entry->max_life = NULL;
|
||
|
||
entry->max_renew = NULL;
|
||
|
||
/* Match Windows behavior and allow forwardable flag in cross-realm. */
|
||
entry->flags.forwardable = 1;
|
||
|
||
samba_kdc_sort_keys(&entry->keys);
|
||
|
||
ret = sdb_entry_set_etypes(entry);
|
||
if (ret) {
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
{
|
||
bool add_aes256 =
|
||
supported_session_etypes & KERB_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96;
|
||
bool add_aes128 =
|
||
supported_session_etypes & KERB_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96;
|
||
bool add_rc4 =
|
||
supported_session_etypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
|
||
ret = sdb_entry_set_session_etypes(entry,
|
||
add_aes256,
|
||
add_aes128,
|
||
add_rc4);
|
||
if (ret) {
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
|
||
|
||
out:
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(partner_realm);
|
||
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
/* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
|
||
sdb_entry_free(entry);
|
||
} else {
|
||
talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, p);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return ret;
|
||
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
|
||
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
||
const char *realm,
|
||
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
|
||
struct ldb_message **pmsg)
|
||
{
|
||
NTSTATUS status;
|
||
const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
|
||
|
||
status = dsdb_trust_search_tdo(ldb_ctx, realm, realm,
|
||
attrs, mem_ctx, pmsg);
|
||
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
|
||
return 0;
|
||
} else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND)) {
|
||
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
} else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
|
||
int ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_trust: out of memory");
|
||
return ret;
|
||
} else {
|
||
int ret = EINVAL;
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_trust: %s", nt_errstr(status));
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
||
krb5_const_principal principal,
|
||
const char **attrs,
|
||
struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
|
||
struct ldb_message **msg)
|
||
{
|
||
NTSTATUS nt_status;
|
||
char *principal_string = NULL;
|
||
|
||
if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
|
||
principal_string = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context,
|
||
principal, 0);
|
||
if (principal_string == NULL) {
|
||
return ENOMEM;
|
||
}
|
||
} else {
|
||
char *principal_string_m = NULL;
|
||
krb5_error_code ret;
|
||
|
||
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string_m);
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
principal_string = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, principal_string_m);
|
||
SAFE_FREE(principal_string_m);
|
||
if (principal_string == NULL) {
|
||
return ENOMEM;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
|
||
mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
|
||
realm_dn, msg);
|
||
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
|
||
krb5_principal fallback_principal = NULL;
|
||
unsigned int num_comp;
|
||
char *fallback_realm = NULL;
|
||
char *fallback_account = NULL;
|
||
krb5_error_code ret;
|
||
|
||
ret = krb5_parse_name(context, principal_string,
|
||
&fallback_principal);
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(principal_string);
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
num_comp = krb5_princ_size(context, fallback_principal);
|
||
fallback_realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
|
||
mem_ctx, context, fallback_principal);
|
||
if (fallback_realm == NULL) {
|
||
krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
|
||
return ENOMEM;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (num_comp == 1) {
|
||
size_t len;
|
||
|
||
fallback_account = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx,
|
||
context, fallback_principal, 0);
|
||
if (fallback_account == NULL) {
|
||
krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm);
|
||
return ENOMEM;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
len = strlen(fallback_account);
|
||
if (len >= 2 && fallback_account[len - 1] == '$') {
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(fallback_account);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
|
||
fallback_principal = NULL;
|
||
|
||
if (fallback_account != NULL) {
|
||
char *with_dollar;
|
||
|
||
with_dollar = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s$",
|
||
fallback_account);
|
||
if (with_dollar == NULL) {
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm);
|
||
return ENOMEM;
|
||
}
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(fallback_account);
|
||
|
||
ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context,
|
||
&fallback_principal,
|
||
fallback_realm,
|
||
with_dollar, NULL);
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(with_dollar);
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm);
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm);
|
||
|
||
if (fallback_principal != NULL) {
|
||
char *fallback_string = NULL;
|
||
|
||
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context,
|
||
fallback_principal,
|
||
&fallback_string);
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
|
||
mem_ctx,
|
||
fallback_string,
|
||
attrs,
|
||
realm_dn, msg);
|
||
SAFE_FREE(fallback_string);
|
||
}
|
||
krb5_free_principal(context, fallback_principal);
|
||
fallback_principal = NULL;
|
||
}
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(principal_string);
|
||
|
||
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
|
||
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
} else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
|
||
return ENOMEM;
|
||
} else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
|
||
return EINVAL;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
||
krb5_const_principal principal,
|
||
unsigned flags,
|
||
krb5_kvno kvno,
|
||
struct sdb_entry *entry)
|
||
{
|
||
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
|
||
krb5_error_code ret;
|
||
struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
|
||
|
||
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
|
||
&realm_dn, &msg);
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
|
||
principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
|
||
flags, kvno,
|
||
realm_dn, msg, entry);
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
||
krb5_const_principal principal,
|
||
unsigned flags,
|
||
uint32_t kvno,
|
||
struct sdb_entry *entry)
|
||
{
|
||
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
|
||
krb5_error_code ret;
|
||
struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
|
||
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
|
||
char *realm_from_princ;
|
||
char *realm_princ_comp = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context, principal, 1);
|
||
|
||
realm_from_princ = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
|
||
mem_ctx, context, principal);
|
||
if (realm_from_princ == NULL) {
|
||
/* can't happen */
|
||
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) != 2
|
||
|| (principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 0, KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
|
||
/* Not a krbtgt */
|
||
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
|
||
|
||
if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, realm_from_princ)
|
||
&& lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, realm_princ_comp)) {
|
||
/* us, or someone quite like us */
|
||
/* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
|
||
* is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
|
||
* krbtgt */
|
||
|
||
int lret;
|
||
unsigned int krbtgt_number;
|
||
/* w2k8r2 sometimes gives us a kvno of 255 for inter-domain
|
||
trust tickets. We don't yet know what this means, but we do
|
||
seem to need to treat it as unspecified */
|
||
if (flags & SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
|
||
krbtgt_number = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno);
|
||
if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
|
||
if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
|
||
return SDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
} else {
|
||
krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (krbtgt_number == kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
|
||
lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
|
||
&msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
|
||
krbtgt_attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
|
||
"(objectClass=user)");
|
||
} else {
|
||
/* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
|
||
* ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another
|
||
* RODC if we are a read-write DC */
|
||
lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
|
||
&msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
|
||
krbtgt_attrs,
|
||
DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
|
||
"(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
|
||
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
|
||
(unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
|
||
"samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
|
||
(unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
|
||
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
} else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
|
||
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
|
||
(unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
|
||
"samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
|
||
(unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
|
||
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
|
||
principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
|
||
flags, kvno, realm_dn, msg, entry);
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
|
||
}
|
||
return ret;
|
||
|
||
} else {
|
||
enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
|
||
const char *realm = NULL;
|
||
|
||
/* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
|
||
|
||
if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), realm_from_princ) == 0) {
|
||
/* look for inbound trust */
|
||
direction = INBOUND;
|
||
realm = realm_princ_comp;
|
||
} else if (principal_comp_strcasecmp(context, principal, 1, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx)) == 0) {
|
||
/* look for outbound trust */
|
||
direction = OUTBOUND;
|
||
realm = realm_from_princ;
|
||
} else {
|
||
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
|
||
realm_from_princ,
|
||
realm_princ_comp);
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
|
||
realm_from_princ,
|
||
realm_princ_comp);
|
||
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
|
||
|
||
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
|
||
mem_ctx,
|
||
realm, realm_dn, &msg);
|
||
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: could not find principal in DB");
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: could not find principal in DB");
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
|
||
direction,
|
||
realm_dn, flags, kvno, msg, entry);
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: trust_message2entry failed for %s",
|
||
ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: "
|
||
"trust_message2entry failed for %s",
|
||
ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
|
||
}
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
||
krb5_const_principal principal,
|
||
unsigned flags,
|
||
const char **attrs,
|
||
struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
|
||
struct ldb_message **msg)
|
||
{
|
||
krb5_error_code ret;
|
||
if ((smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL)
|
||
&& krb5_princ_size(context, principal) >= 2) {
|
||
/* 'normal server' case */
|
||
int ldb_ret;
|
||
NTSTATUS nt_status;
|
||
struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
|
||
char *principal_string;
|
||
|
||
ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
|
||
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
|
||
&principal_string);
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* At this point we may find the host is known to be
|
||
* in a different realm, so we should generate a
|
||
* referral instead */
|
||
nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
|
||
mem_ctx, principal_string,
|
||
&user_dn, realm_dn);
|
||
free(principal_string);
|
||
|
||
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
|
||
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
|
||
mem_ctx,
|
||
msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
|
||
attrs,
|
||
DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
|
||
"(objectClass=*)");
|
||
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
|
||
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
}
|
||
return 0;
|
||
} else if (!(flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ)
|
||
&& smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* The behaviour of accepting an
|
||
* KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL server principal
|
||
* containing a UPN only applies to TGS-REQ packets,
|
||
* not AS-REQ packets.
|
||
*/
|
||
return samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
mem_ctx, principal, attrs,
|
||
realm_dn, msg);
|
||
} else {
|
||
/*
|
||
* This case is for:
|
||
* - the AS-REQ, where we only accept
|
||
* samAccountName based lookups for the server, no
|
||
* matter if the name is an
|
||
* KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL or not
|
||
* - for the TGS-REQ when we are not given an
|
||
* KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL, which also must
|
||
* only lookup samAccountName based names.
|
||
*/
|
||
int lret;
|
||
char *short_princ;
|
||
krb5_principal enterprise_principal = NULL;
|
||
krb5_const_principal used_principal = NULL;
|
||
char *name1 = NULL;
|
||
size_t len1 = 0;
|
||
char *filter = NULL;
|
||
|
||
if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
|
||
char *str = NULL;
|
||
/* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
|
||
if (krb5_princ_size(context, principal) != 1) {
|
||
ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_server: request for an "
|
||
"enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
|
||
krb5_princ_size(context, principal));
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
str = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context, principal, 0);
|
||
if (str == NULL) {
|
||
return KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
|
||
}
|
||
ret = krb5_parse_name(context, str,
|
||
&enterprise_principal);
|
||
talloc_free(str);
|
||
if (ret) {
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
used_principal = enterprise_principal;
|
||
} else {
|
||
used_principal = principal;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
|
||
*realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
|
||
|
||
/* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referral */
|
||
|
||
ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, used_principal,
|
||
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM |
|
||
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY,
|
||
&short_princ);
|
||
used_principal = NULL;
|
||
krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_principal);
|
||
enterprise_principal = NULL;
|
||
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_server: could not parse principal");
|
||
krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_server: could not parse principal");
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
name1 = ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ);
|
||
SAFE_FREE(short_princ);
|
||
if (name1 == NULL) {
|
||
return ENOMEM;
|
||
}
|
||
len1 = strlen(name1);
|
||
if (len1 >= 1 && name1[len1 - 1] != '$') {
|
||
filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx,
|
||
"(&(objectClass=user)(|(samAccountName=%s)(samAccountName=%s$)))",
|
||
name1, name1);
|
||
if (filter == NULL) {
|
||
return ENOMEM;
|
||
}
|
||
} else {
|
||
filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx,
|
||
"(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
|
||
name1);
|
||
if (filter == NULL) {
|
||
return ENOMEM;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
|
||
*realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
|
||
attrs,
|
||
DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
|
||
"%s", filter);
|
||
if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
|
||
DBG_DEBUG("Failed to find an entry for %s filter:%s\n",
|
||
name1, filter);
|
||
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
}
|
||
if (lret == LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION) {
|
||
DBG_DEBUG("Failed to find unique entry for %s filter:%s\n",
|
||
name1, filter);
|
||
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
}
|
||
if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
|
||
DBG_ERR("Failed single search for %s - %s\n",
|
||
name1, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb));
|
||
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
}
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
||
krb5_const_principal principal,
|
||
unsigned flags,
|
||
krb5_kvno kvno,
|
||
struct sdb_entry *entry)
|
||
{
|
||
krb5_error_code ret;
|
||
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
|
||
struct ldb_message *msg;
|
||
|
||
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
|
||
flags, server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
|
||
principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
|
||
flags, kvno,
|
||
realm_dn, msg, entry);
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
char *client_name = NULL;
|
||
krb5_error_code code;
|
||
|
||
code = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &client_name);
|
||
if (code == 0) {
|
||
krb5_warnx(context,
|
||
"samba_kdc_fetch_server: message2entry failed for "
|
||
"%s",
|
||
client_name);
|
||
} else {
|
||
krb5_warnx(context,
|
||
"samba_kdc_fetch_server: message2entry and "
|
||
"krb5_unparse_name failed");
|
||
}
|
||
SAFE_FREE(client_name);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_realm(krb5_context context,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
||
krb5_const_principal principal,
|
||
unsigned flags,
|
||
struct sdb_entry *entry)
|
||
{
|
||
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
|
||
NTSTATUS status;
|
||
krb5_error_code ret;
|
||
bool check_realm = false;
|
||
const char *realm = NULL;
|
||
struct dsdb_trust_routing_table *trt = NULL;
|
||
const struct lsa_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx *tdo = NULL;
|
||
unsigned int num_comp;
|
||
bool ok;
|
||
char *upper = NULL;
|
||
|
||
num_comp = krb5_princ_size(context, principal);
|
||
|
||
if (flags & SDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
|
||
if (flags & SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ) {
|
||
check_realm = true;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
if (flags & SDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
|
||
if (flags & SDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ) {
|
||
check_realm = true;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (!check_realm) {
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(frame, context, principal);
|
||
if (realm == NULL) {
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
||
return ENOMEM;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* The requested realm needs to be our own
|
||
*/
|
||
ok = lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx, realm);
|
||
if (!ok) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* The request is not for us...
|
||
*/
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
||
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
|
||
char *principal_string = NULL;
|
||
krb5_principal enterprise_principal = NULL;
|
||
char *enterprise_realm = NULL;
|
||
|
||
if (num_comp != 1) {
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
||
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
principal_string = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(frame, context,
|
||
principal, 0);
|
||
if (principal_string == NULL) {
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
||
return ENOMEM;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ret = krb5_parse_name(context, principal_string,
|
||
&enterprise_principal);
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(principal_string);
|
||
if (ret) {
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
enterprise_realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
|
||
frame, context, enterprise_principal);
|
||
krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_principal);
|
||
if (enterprise_realm != NULL) {
|
||
realm = enterprise_realm;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (flags & SDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
|
||
char *service_realm = NULL;
|
||
|
||
ret = principal_comp_strcmp(context, principal, 0, KRB5_TGS_NAME);
|
||
if (ret == 0) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* we need to search krbtgt/ locally
|
||
*/
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* We need to check the last component against the routing table.
|
||
*
|
||
* Note this works only with 2 or 3 component principals, e.g:
|
||
*
|
||
* servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base
|
||
* servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/bla.base
|
||
* servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/ForestDnsZones.bla.base
|
||
* servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/DomainDnsZones.bla.base
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
if (num_comp == 2 || num_comp == 3) {
|
||
service_realm = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(frame,
|
||
context,
|
||
principal,
|
||
num_comp - 1);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (service_realm != NULL) {
|
||
realm = service_realm;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ok = lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx, realm);
|
||
if (ok) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* skip the expensive routing lookup
|
||
*/
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
status = dsdb_trust_routing_table_load(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
|
||
frame, &trt);
|
||
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
||
return EINVAL;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
tdo = dsdb_trust_routing_by_name(trt, realm);
|
||
if (tdo == NULL) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* This principal has to be local
|
||
*/
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (tdo->trust_attributes & LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* TODO: handle the routing within the forest
|
||
*
|
||
* This should likely be handled in
|
||
* samba_kdc_message2entry() in case we're
|
||
* a global catalog. We'd need to check
|
||
* if realm_dn is our own domain and derive
|
||
* the dns domain name from realm_dn and check that
|
||
* against the routing table or fallback to
|
||
* the tdo we found here.
|
||
*
|
||
* But for now we don't support multiple domains
|
||
* in our forest correctly anyway.
|
||
*
|
||
* Just search in our local database.
|
||
*/
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ZERO_STRUCTP(entry);
|
||
|
||
ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal,
|
||
&entry->principal);
|
||
if (ret) {
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
upper = strupper_talloc(frame, tdo->domain_name.string);
|
||
if (upper == NULL) {
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
||
return ENOMEM;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ret = smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context,
|
||
entry->principal,
|
||
upper);
|
||
if (ret) {
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
||
return SDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
krb5_const_principal principal,
|
||
unsigned flags,
|
||
krb5_kvno kvno,
|
||
struct sdb_entry *entry)
|
||
{
|
||
krb5_error_code ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
|
||
|
||
mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
|
||
if (!mem_ctx) {
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_realm(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
|
||
principal, flags, entry);
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
goto done;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
|
||
if (flags & SDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
|
||
ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry);
|
||
if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
|
||
}
|
||
if (flags & SDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
|
||
/* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
|
||
ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry);
|
||
if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
|
||
|
||
/* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
|
||
ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry);
|
||
if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
|
||
}
|
||
if (flags & SDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
|
||
ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry);
|
||
if (ret != SDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
done:
|
||
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
struct samba_kdc_seq {
|
||
unsigned int index;
|
||
unsigned int count;
|
||
struct ldb_message **msgs;
|
||
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
struct sdb_entry *entry)
|
||
{
|
||
krb5_error_code ret;
|
||
struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
|
||
const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
|
||
struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
|
||
const char *sAMAccountName = NULL;
|
||
krb5_principal principal = NULL;
|
||
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
|
||
|
||
if (!priv) {
|
||
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
|
||
|
||
if (!mem_ctx) {
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
while (priv->index < priv->count) {
|
||
msg = priv->msgs[priv->index++];
|
||
|
||
sAMAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "sAMAccountName", NULL);
|
||
if (sAMAccountName != NULL) {
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (sAMAccountName == NULL) {
|
||
ret = SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ret = smb_krb5_make_principal(context, &principal,
|
||
realm, sAMAccountName, NULL);
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
|
||
principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
|
||
SDB_F_ADMIN_DATA|SDB_F_GET_ANY,
|
||
0 /* kvno */,
|
||
priv->realm_dn, msg, entry);
|
||
|
||
out:
|
||
if (principal != NULL) {
|
||
krb5_free_principal(context, principal);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
|
||
kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
|
||
} else {
|
||
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
struct sdb_entry *entry)
|
||
{
|
||
struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
|
||
struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
|
||
char *realm;
|
||
struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
|
||
krb5_error_code ret;
|
||
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
|
||
int lret;
|
||
|
||
if (priv) {
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
|
||
kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
|
||
if (!priv) {
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
priv->index = 0;
|
||
priv->msgs = NULL;
|
||
priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
|
||
priv->count = 0;
|
||
|
||
mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
|
||
|
||
if (!mem_ctx) {
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
krb5_free_default_realm(context, realm);
|
||
|
||
lret = dsdb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
|
||
priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
|
||
DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
|
||
"(objectClass=user)");
|
||
|
||
if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
|
||
return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
priv->count = res->count;
|
||
priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
|
||
talloc_free(res);
|
||
|
||
kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
|
||
|
||
ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
|
||
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(priv);
|
||
kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
|
||
} else {
|
||
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
||
}
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
struct sdb_entry *entry)
|
||
{
|
||
return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
|
||
*
|
||
* The safest way to determine 'self' is to check the DB record made at
|
||
* the time the principal was presented to the KDC.
|
||
*/
|
||
krb5_error_code
|
||
samba_kdc_check_client_matches_target_service(krb5_context context,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry_client,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry_server_target)
|
||
{
|
||
struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
|
||
struct dom_sid *target_sid;
|
||
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
|
||
|
||
orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(frame,
|
||
skdc_entry_client->msg,
|
||
"objectSid");
|
||
target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(frame,
|
||
skdc_entry_server_target->msg,
|
||
"objectSid");
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Allow delegation to the same record (representing a
|
||
* principal), even if by a different name. The easy and safe
|
||
* way to prove this is by SID comparison
|
||
*/
|
||
if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
|
||
talloc_free(frame);
|
||
return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
talloc_free(frame);
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
|
||
* slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
|
||
* database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
|
||
* SID */
|
||
|
||
krb5_error_code
|
||
samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry,
|
||
krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
|
||
{
|
||
krb5_error_code ret;
|
||
struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
|
||
struct ldb_message *msg;
|
||
struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
|
||
struct dom_sid *target_sid;
|
||
const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
|
||
"objectSid", NULL
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
|
||
|
||
if (!mem_ctx) {
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match: talloc_named() failed!");
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
|
||
ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
|
||
|
||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, skdc_entry->msg, "objectSid");
|
||
target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
|
||
|
||
/* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
|
||
* name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
|
||
* comparison */
|
||
if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
|
||
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
||
#if defined(KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH) /* MIT */
|
||
return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
|
||
#else /* Heimdal (where this is an enum) */
|
||
return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
|
||
#endif
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal
|
||
* with S4U2Proxy.
|
||
*/
|
||
krb5_error_code
|
||
samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy(krb5_context context,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry,
|
||
krb5_const_principal target_principal)
|
||
{
|
||
krb5_error_code ret;
|
||
char *tmp = NULL;
|
||
const char *client_dn = NULL;
|
||
const char *target_principal_name = NULL;
|
||
struct ldb_message_element *el;
|
||
struct ldb_val val;
|
||
unsigned int i;
|
||
bool found = false;
|
||
|
||
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy");
|
||
|
||
if (!mem_ctx) {
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
|
||
"samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
|
||
" talloc_named() failed!");
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
client_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(skdc_entry->msg->dn);
|
||
if (!client_dn) {
|
||
if (errno == 0) {
|
||
errno = ENOMEM;
|
||
}
|
||
ret = errno;
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
|
||
"samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
|
||
" ldb_dn_get_linearized() failed!");
|
||
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
el = ldb_msg_find_element(skdc_entry->msg, "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo");
|
||
if (el == NULL) {
|
||
ret = ENOENT;
|
||
goto bad_option;
|
||
}
|
||
SMB_ASSERT(el->num_values != 0);
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* This is the Microsoft forwardable flag behavior.
|
||
*
|
||
* If the proxy (target) principal is NULL, and we have any authorized
|
||
* delegation target, allow to forward.
|
||
*/
|
||
if (target_principal == NULL) {
|
||
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* The main heimdal code already checked that the target_principal
|
||
* belongs to the same realm as the client.
|
||
*
|
||
* So we just need the principal without the realm,
|
||
* as that is what is configured in the "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo"
|
||
* attribute.
|
||
*/
|
||
ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, target_principal,
|
||
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &tmp);
|
||
if (ret) {
|
||
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
|
||
"samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
|
||
" krb5_unparse_name() failed!");
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
DBG_DEBUG("client[%s] for target[%s]\n",
|
||
client_dn, tmp);
|
||
|
||
target_principal_name = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, tmp);
|
||
SAFE_FREE(tmp);
|
||
if (target_principal_name == NULL) {
|
||
ret = ENOMEM;
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
|
||
"samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
|
||
" talloc_strdup() failed!");
|
||
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
||
return ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
val = data_blob_string_const(target_principal_name);
|
||
|
||
for (i=0; i<el->num_values; i++) {
|
||
struct ldb_val *val1 = &val;
|
||
struct ldb_val *val2 = &el->values[i];
|
||
int cmp;
|
||
|
||
if (val1->length != val2->length) {
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
cmp = strncasecmp((const char *)val1->data,
|
||
(const char *)val2->data,
|
||
val1->length);
|
||
if (cmp != 0) {
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
found = true;
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (!found) {
|
||
ret = ENOENT;
|
||
goto bad_option;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
DBG_DEBUG("client[%s] allowed target[%s]\n",
|
||
client_dn, target_principal_name);
|
||
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
||
return 0;
|
||
|
||
bad_option:
|
||
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
|
||
"samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] "
|
||
"not allowed for delegation to target[%s]",
|
||
client_dn,
|
||
target_principal_name);
|
||
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
|
||
return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* This method is called for S4U2Proxy requests and implements the
|
||
* resource-based constrained delegation variant, which can support
|
||
* cross-realm delegation.
|
||
*/
|
||
krb5_error_code samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy_rbcd(
|
||
krb5_context context,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
krb5_const_principal client_principal,
|
||
krb5_const_principal server_principal,
|
||
krb5_const_pac header_pac,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_entry *proxy_skdc_entry)
|
||
{
|
||
krb5_error_code code;
|
||
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
|
||
char *client_name = NULL;
|
||
char *server_name = NULL;
|
||
const char *proxy_dn = NULL;
|
||
const DATA_BLOB *data = NULL;
|
||
struct security_descriptor *rbcd_security_descriptor = NULL;
|
||
struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc = NULL;
|
||
struct security_token *security_token = NULL;
|
||
uint32_t session_info_flags =
|
||
AUTH_SESSION_INFO_DEFAULT_GROUPS |
|
||
AUTH_SESSION_INFO_SIMPLE_PRIVILEGES;
|
||
/*
|
||
* Testing shows that although Windows grants SEC_ADS_GENERIC_ALL access
|
||
* in security descriptors it creates for RBCD, its KDC only requires
|
||
* SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS for the access check to succeed.
|
||
*/
|
||
uint32_t access_desired = SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS;
|
||
uint32_t access_granted = 0;
|
||
NTSTATUS nt_status;
|
||
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = NULL;
|
||
|
||
mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
0,
|
||
"samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy_rbcd");
|
||
if (mem_ctx == NULL) {
|
||
errno = ENOMEM;
|
||
code = errno;
|
||
|
||
return code;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
proxy_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(proxy_skdc_entry->msg->dn);
|
||
if (proxy_dn == NULL) {
|
||
DBG_ERR("ldb_dn_get_linearized failed for proxy_dn!\n");
|
||
if (errno == 0) {
|
||
errno = ENOMEM;
|
||
}
|
||
code = errno;
|
||
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
rbcd_security_descriptor = talloc_zero(mem_ctx,
|
||
struct security_descriptor);
|
||
if (rbcd_security_descriptor == NULL) {
|
||
errno = ENOMEM;
|
||
code = errno;
|
||
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
code = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context,
|
||
client_principal,
|
||
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY,
|
||
&client_name);
|
||
if (code != 0) {
|
||
DBG_ERR("Unable to parse client_principal!\n");
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
code = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context,
|
||
server_principal,
|
||
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY,
|
||
&server_name);
|
||
if (code != 0) {
|
||
DBG_ERR("Unable to parse server_principal!\n");
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
DBG_INFO("Check delegation from client[%s] to server[%s] via "
|
||
"proxy[%s]\n",
|
||
client_name,
|
||
server_name,
|
||
proxy_dn);
|
||
|
||
code = kerberos_pac_to_user_info_dc(mem_ctx,
|
||
header_pac,
|
||
context,
|
||
&user_info_dc,
|
||
AUTH_INCLUDE_RESOURCE_GROUPS,
|
||
NULL,
|
||
NULL,
|
||
NULL);
|
||
if (code != 0) {
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (!(user_info_dc->info->user_flags & NETLOGON_GUEST)) {
|
||
session_info_flags |= AUTH_SESSION_INFO_AUTHENTICATED;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
nt_status = auth_generate_security_token(mem_ctx,
|
||
kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx,
|
||
kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
|
||
user_info_dc,
|
||
session_info_flags,
|
||
&security_token);
|
||
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
|
||
code = map_errno_from_nt_status(nt_status);
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
data = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(proxy_skdc_entry->msg,
|
||
"msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity");
|
||
if (data == NULL) {
|
||
DBG_WARNING("Could not find security descriptor "
|
||
"msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity in "
|
||
"proxy[%s]\n",
|
||
proxy_dn);
|
||
code = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(
|
||
data,
|
||
mem_ctx,
|
||
rbcd_security_descriptor,
|
||
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_security_descriptor);
|
||
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
|
||
errno = ndr_map_error2errno(ndr_err);
|
||
DBG_ERR("Failed to unmarshall "
|
||
"msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity "
|
||
"security descriptor of proxy[%s]\n",
|
||
proxy_dn);
|
||
code = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) {
|
||
NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_token, security_token);
|
||
NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, rbcd_security_descriptor);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
nt_status = sec_access_check_ds(rbcd_security_descriptor,
|
||
security_token,
|
||
access_desired,
|
||
&access_granted,
|
||
NULL,
|
||
NULL);
|
||
|
||
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
|
||
DBG_WARNING("RBCD: sec_access_check_ds(access_desired=%#08x, "
|
||
"access_granted:%#08x) failed with: %s\n",
|
||
access_desired,
|
||
access_granted,
|
||
nt_errstr(nt_status));
|
||
|
||
code = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
|
||
goto out;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
DBG_NOTICE("RBCD: Access granted for client[%s]\n", client_name);
|
||
|
||
code = 0;
|
||
out:
|
||
SAFE_FREE(client_name);
|
||
SAFE_FREE(server_name);
|
||
|
||
TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
|
||
return code;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
NTSTATUS samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx,
|
||
struct samba_kdc_db_context **kdc_db_ctx_out)
|
||
{
|
||
int ldb_ret;
|
||
struct ldb_message *msg;
|
||
struct auth_session_info *session_info;
|
||
struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
|
||
/* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
|
||
* authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is highly likely to
|
||
* be circular.
|
||
*
|
||
* In future we may set this up to use EXTERNAL and SSL
|
||
* certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
kdc_db_ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_db_context);
|
||
if (kdc_db_ctx == NULL) {
|
||
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
|
||
}
|
||
kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx = base_ctx->ev_ctx;
|
||
kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx = base_ctx->lp_ctx;
|
||
kdc_db_ctx->msg_ctx = base_ctx->msg_ctx;
|
||
|
||
/* get default kdc policy */
|
||
lpcfg_default_kdc_policy(mem_ctx,
|
||
base_ctx->lp_ctx,
|
||
&kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
|
||
&kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime,
|
||
&kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime);
|
||
|
||
session_info = system_session(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
|
||
if (session_info == NULL) {
|
||
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
|
||
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Setup the link to LDB */
|
||
kdc_db_ctx->samdb = samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
base_ctx->ev_ctx,
|
||
base_ctx->lp_ctx,
|
||
session_info,
|
||
NULL,
|
||
0);
|
||
if (kdc_db_ctx->samdb == NULL) {
|
||
DBG_WARNING("Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!\n");
|
||
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
|
||
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */
|
||
ldb_ret = samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, &kdc_db_ctx->rodc);
|
||
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
|
||
DBG_WARNING("Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n",
|
||
ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb));
|
||
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
|
||
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
|
||
}
|
||
if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
|
||
int my_krbtgt_number;
|
||
const char *secondary_keytab[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL };
|
||
struct ldb_dn *account_dn;
|
||
struct ldb_dn *server_dn = samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx);
|
||
if (!server_dn) {
|
||
DBG_WARNING("Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n",
|
||
ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb));
|
||
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
|
||
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, server_dn,
|
||
"serverReference", &account_dn);
|
||
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
|
||
DBG_WARNING("Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n",
|
||
ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb));
|
||
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
|
||
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, account_dn,
|
||
"msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn);
|
||
talloc_free(account_dn);
|
||
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
|
||
DBG_WARNING("Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n",
|
||
ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb));
|
||
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
|
||
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
&msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
|
||
secondary_keytab,
|
||
DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
|
||
"(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
|
||
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
|
||
DBG_WARNING("Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
|
||
ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
|
||
ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
|
||
ldb_strerror(ldb_ret));
|
||
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
|
||
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
|
||
}
|
||
my_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
|
||
if (my_krbtgt_number == -1) {
|
||
DBG_WARNING("Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n",
|
||
ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
|
||
my_krbtgt_number);
|
||
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
|
||
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
|
||
}
|
||
kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = my_krbtgt_number;
|
||
|
||
} else {
|
||
kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
|
||
ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
|
||
&msg,
|
||
ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
|
||
LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
|
||
krbtgt_attrs,
|
||
DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
|
||
"(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
|
||
|
||
if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
|
||
DBG_WARNING("could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb));
|
||
talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
|
||
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
|
||
}
|
||
kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn = talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, msg->dn);
|
||
kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
|
||
talloc_free(msg);
|
||
}
|
||
*kdc_db_ctx_out = kdc_db_ctx;
|
||
return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
krb5_error_code dsdb_extract_aes_256_key(krb5_context context,
|
||
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
||
const struct ldb_message *msg,
|
||
uint32_t user_account_control,
|
||
const uint32_t *kvno,
|
||
uint32_t *kvno_out,
|
||
DATA_BLOB *aes_256_key,
|
||
DATA_BLOB *salt)
|
||
{
|
||
krb5_error_code krb5_ret;
|
||
uint32_t supported_enctypes;
|
||
unsigned flags = SDB_F_GET_CLIENT;
|
||
struct sdb_entry sentry = {};
|
||
|
||
if (kvno != NULL) {
|
||
flags |= SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
krb5_ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context,
|
||
mem_ctx,
|
||
msg,
|
||
false, /* is_krbtgt */
|
||
false, /* is_rodc */
|
||
user_account_control,
|
||
SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
|
||
flags,
|
||
(kvno != NULL) ? *kvno : 0,
|
||
&sentry,
|
||
ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256,
|
||
&supported_enctypes);
|
||
if (krb5_ret != 0) {
|
||
DBG_ERR("Failed to parse supplementalCredentials "
|
||
"of %s with %s kvno using "
|
||
"ENCTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256 "
|
||
"Kerberos Key: %s\n",
|
||
ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn),
|
||
(kvno != NULL) ? "previous" : "current",
|
||
krb5_get_error_message(context,
|
||
krb5_ret));
|
||
return krb5_ret;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if ((supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) == 0 ||
|
||
sentry.keys.len != 1) {
|
||
DBG_INFO("Failed to find a ENCTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256 "
|
||
"key in supplementalCredentials "
|
||
"of %s at KVNO %u (got %u keys, expected 1)\n",
|
||
ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn),
|
||
sentry.kvno,
|
||
sentry.keys.len);
|
||
sdb_entry_free(&sentry);
|
||
return ENOENT;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (sentry.keys.val[0].salt == NULL) {
|
||
DBG_INFO("Failed to find a salt in "
|
||
"supplementalCredentials "
|
||
"of %s at KVNO %u\n",
|
||
ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn),
|
||
sentry.kvno);
|
||
sdb_entry_free(&sentry);
|
||
return ENOENT;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (aes_256_key != NULL) {
|
||
*aes_256_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx,
|
||
KRB5_KEY_DATA(&sentry.keys.val[0].key),
|
||
KRB5_KEY_LENGTH(&sentry.keys.val[0].key));
|
||
if (aes_256_key->data == NULL) {
|
||
sdb_entry_free(&sentry);
|
||
return ENOMEM;
|
||
}
|
||
talloc_keep_secret(aes_256_key->data);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (salt != NULL) {
|
||
*salt = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx,
|
||
sentry.keys.val[0].salt->salt.data,
|
||
sentry.keys.val[0].salt->salt.length);
|
||
if (salt->data == NULL) {
|
||
sdb_entry_free(&sentry);
|
||
return ENOMEM;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (kvno_out != NULL) {
|
||
*kvno_out = sentry.kvno;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
sdb_entry_free(&sentry);
|
||
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|