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samba-mirror/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c
Andreas Schneider c6a21e1897 s3:rpc_server: Allow to use RC4 for setting passwords
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
2020-10-29 14:19:36 +00:00

1297 lines
34 KiB
C

/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
Samba utility functions
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001-2004
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
/* These comments regard the code to change the user's unix password: */
/* fork a child process to exec passwd and write to its
* tty to change a users password. This is running as the
* user who is attempting to change the password.
*/
/*
* This code was copied/borrowed and stolen from various sources.
* The primary source was the poppasswd.c from the authors of POPMail. This software
* was included as a client to change passwords using the 'passwd' program
* on the remote machine.
*
* This code has been hacked by Bob Nance (nance@niehs.nih.gov) and Evan Patterson
* (patters2@niehs.nih.gov) at the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences
* and rights to modify, distribute or incorporate this change to the CAP suite or
* using it for any other reason are granted, so long as this disclaimer is left intact.
*/
/*
This code was hacked considerably for inclusion in Samba, primarily
by Andrew.Tridgell@anu.edu.au. The biggest change was the addition
of the "password chat" option, which allows the easy runtime
specification of the expected sequence of events to change a
password.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "system/terminal.h"
#include "system/passwd.h"
#include "system/filesys.h"
#include "../libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
#include "rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_util.h"
#include "passdb.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "lib/util/sys_rw.h"
#include "lib/crypto/gnutls_helpers.h"
#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
#include <gnutls/crypto.h>
#ifndef ALLOW_CHANGE_PASSWORD
#if (defined(HAVE_TERMIOS_H) && defined(HAVE_DUP2) && defined(HAVE_SETSID))
#define ALLOW_CHANGE_PASSWORD 1
#endif
#endif
#if ALLOW_CHANGE_PASSWORD
static int findpty(char **slave)
{
int master = -1;
char *line = NULL;
DIR *dirp = NULL;
const char *dpname;
*slave = NULL;
#if defined(HAVE_GRANTPT)
#if defined(HAVE_POSIX_OPENPT)
master = posix_openpt(O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY);
#else
/* Try to open /dev/ptmx. If that fails, fall through to old method. */
master = open("/dev/ptmx", O_RDWR, 0);
#endif
if (master >= 0) {
grantpt(master);
unlockpt(master);
line = (char *)ptsname(master);
if (line) {
*slave = SMB_STRDUP(line);
}
if (*slave == NULL) {
DEBUG(0,
("findpty: Unable to create master/slave pty pair.\n"));
/* Stop fd leak on error. */
close(master);
return -1;
} else {
DEBUG(10,
("findpty: Allocated slave pty %s\n", *slave));
return (master);
}
}
#endif /* HAVE_GRANTPT */
line = SMB_STRDUP("/dev/ptyXX");
if (!line) {
return (-1);
}
dirp = opendir("/dev");
if (!dirp) {
SAFE_FREE(line);
return (-1);
}
while ((dpname = readdirname(dirp)) != NULL) {
if (strncmp(dpname, "pty", 3) == 0 && strlen(dpname) == 5) {
DEBUG(3,
("pty: try to open %s, line was %s\n", dpname,
line));
line[8] = dpname[3];
line[9] = dpname[4];
if ((master = open(line, O_RDWR, 0)) >= 0) {
DEBUG(3, ("pty: opened %s\n", line));
line[5] = 't';
*slave = line;
closedir(dirp);
return (master);
}
}
}
closedir(dirp);
SAFE_FREE(line);
return (-1);
}
static int dochild(int master, const char *slavedev, const struct passwd *pass,
const char *passwordprogram, bool as_root)
{
int slave;
struct termios stermios;
gid_t gid;
uid_t uid;
char * const eptrs[1] = { NULL };
if (pass == NULL)
{
DEBUG(0,
("dochild: user doesn't exist in the UNIX password database.\n"));
return False;
}
gid = pass->pw_gid;
uid = pass->pw_uid;
gain_root_privilege();
/* Start new session - gets rid of controlling terminal. */
if (setsid() < 0)
{
DEBUG(3,
("Weirdness, couldn't let go of controlling terminal\n"));
return (False);
}
/* Open slave pty and acquire as new controlling terminal. */
if ((slave = open(slavedev, O_RDWR, 0)) < 0)
{
DEBUG(3, ("More weirdness, could not open %s\n", slavedev));
return (False);
}
#if defined(TIOCSCTTY) && !defined(SUNOS5)
/*
* On patched Solaris 10 TIOCSCTTY is defined but seems not to work,
* see the discussion under
* https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=5366.
*/
if (ioctl(slave, TIOCSCTTY, 0) < 0)
{
DEBUG(3, ("Error in ioctl call for slave pty\n"));
/* return(False); */
}
#elif defined(I_PUSH) && defined(I_FIND)
if (ioctl(slave, I_FIND, "ptem") == 0) {
ioctl(slave, I_PUSH, "ptem");
}
if (ioctl(slave, I_FIND, "ldterm") == 0) {
ioctl(slave, I_PUSH, "ldterm");
}
#endif
/* Close master. */
close(master);
/* Make slave stdin/out/err of child. */
if (dup2(slave, STDIN_FILENO) != STDIN_FILENO)
{
DEBUG(3, ("Could not re-direct stdin\n"));
return (False);
}
if (dup2(slave, STDOUT_FILENO) != STDOUT_FILENO)
{
DEBUG(3, ("Could not re-direct stdout\n"));
return (False);
}
if (dup2(slave, STDERR_FILENO) != STDERR_FILENO)
{
DEBUG(3, ("Could not re-direct stderr\n"));
return (False);
}
if (slave > 2)
close(slave);
/* Set proper terminal attributes - no echo, canonical input processing,
no map NL to CR/NL on output. */
if (tcgetattr(0, &stermios) < 0)
{
DEBUG(3,
("could not read default terminal attributes on pty\n"));
return (False);
}
stermios.c_lflag &= ~(ECHO | ECHOE | ECHOK | ECHONL);
stermios.c_lflag |= ICANON;
#ifdef ONLCR
stermios.c_oflag &= ~(ONLCR);
#endif
if (tcsetattr(0, TCSANOW, &stermios) < 0)
{
DEBUG(3, ("could not set attributes of pty\n"));
return (False);
}
/* make us completely into the right uid */
if (!as_root)
{
become_user_permanently(uid, gid);
}
DEBUG(10,
("Invoking '%s' as password change program.\n",
passwordprogram));
/* execl() password-change application */
if (execle("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", passwordprogram, NULL, eptrs) < 0)
{
DEBUG(3, ("Bad status returned from %s\n", passwordprogram));
return (False);
}
return (True);
}
static int expect(int master, char *issue, char *expected)
{
char buffer[1024];
int attempts, timeout, nread;
size_t len;
bool match = False;
for (attempts = 0; attempts < 2; attempts++) {
NTSTATUS status;
if (!strequal(issue, ".")) {
if (lp_passwd_chat_debug())
DEBUG(100, ("expect: sending [%s]\n", issue));
if ((len = sys_write(master, issue, strlen(issue))) != strlen(issue)) {
DEBUG(2,("expect: (short) write returned %d\n",
(int)len ));
return False;
}
}
if (strequal(expected, "."))
return True;
/* Initial timeout. */
timeout = lp_passwd_chat_timeout() * 1000;
nread = 0;
buffer[nread] = 0;
while (True) {
status = read_fd_with_timeout(
master, buffer + nread, 1,
sizeof(buffer) - nread - 1,
timeout, &len);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(2, ("expect: read error %s\n",
nt_errstr(status)));
break;
}
nread += len;
buffer[nread] = 0;
{
/* Eat leading/trailing whitespace before match. */
char *str = SMB_STRDUP(buffer);
if (!str) {
DEBUG(2,("expect: ENOMEM\n"));
return False;
}
trim_char(str, ' ', ' ');
if ((match = unix_wild_match(expected, str)) == True) {
/* Now data has started to return, lower timeout. */
timeout = lp_passwd_chat_timeout() * 100;
}
SAFE_FREE(str);
}
}
if (lp_passwd_chat_debug())
DEBUG(100, ("expect: expected [%s] received [%s] match %s\n",
expected, buffer, match ? "yes" : "no" ));
if (match)
break;
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(2, ("expect: %s\n", nt_errstr(status)));
return False;
}
}
DEBUG(10,("expect: returning %s\n", match ? "True" : "False" ));
return match;
}
static void pwd_sub(char *buf)
{
all_string_sub(buf, "\\n", "\n", 0);
all_string_sub(buf, "\\r", "\r", 0);
all_string_sub(buf, "\\s", " ", 0);
all_string_sub(buf, "\\t", "\t", 0);
}
static int talktochild(int master, const char *seq)
{
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
int count = 0;
char *issue;
char *expected;
issue = talloc_strdup(frame, ".");
if (!issue) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return false;
}
while (next_token_talloc(frame, &seq, &expected, NULL)) {
pwd_sub(expected);
count++;
if (!expect(master, issue, expected)) {
DEBUG(3, ("Response %d incorrect\n", count));
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return false;
}
if (!next_token_talloc(frame, &seq, &issue, NULL)) {
issue = talloc_strdup(frame, ".");
if (!issue) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return false;
}
}
pwd_sub(issue);
}
if (!strequal(issue, ".")) {
/* we have one final issue to send */
expected = talloc_strdup(frame, ".");
if (!expected) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return false;
}
if (!expect(master, issue, expected)) {
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return False;
}
}
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return (count > 0);
}
static bool chat_with_program(char *passwordprogram, const struct passwd *pass,
char *chatsequence, bool as_root)
{
char *slavedev = NULL;
int master;
pid_t pid, wpid;
int wstat;
bool chstat = False;
void (*saved_handler)(int);
if (pass == NULL) {
DEBUG(0, ("chat_with_program: user doesn't exist in the UNIX password database.\n"));
return False;
}
/* allocate a pseudo-terminal device */
if ((master = findpty(&slavedev)) < 0) {
DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: Cannot Allocate pty for password change: %s\n", pass->pw_name));
return (False);
}
/*
* We need to temporarily stop CatchChild from eating
* SIGCLD signals as it also eats the exit status code. JRA.
*/
saved_handler = CatchChildLeaveStatus();
if ((pid = fork()) < 0) {
DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: Cannot fork() child for password change: %s\n", pass->pw_name));
SAFE_FREE(slavedev);
close(master);
(void)CatchSignal(SIGCLD, saved_handler);
return (False);
}
/* we now have a pty */
if (pid > 0) { /* This is the parent process */
/* Don't need this anymore in parent. */
SAFE_FREE(slavedev);
if ((chstat = talktochild(master, chatsequence)) == False) {
DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: Child failed to change password: %s\n", pass->pw_name));
kill(pid, SIGKILL); /* be sure to end this process */
}
while ((wpid = waitpid(pid, &wstat, 0)) < 0) {
if (errno == EINTR) {
errno = 0;
continue;
}
break;
}
if (wpid < 0) {
DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: The process is no longer waiting!\n\n"));
close(master);
(void)CatchSignal(SIGCLD, saved_handler);
return (False);
}
/*
* Go back to ignoring children.
*/
(void)CatchSignal(SIGCLD, saved_handler);
close(master);
if (pid != wpid) {
DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: We were waiting for the wrong process ID\n"));
return (False);
}
if (WIFEXITED(wstat) && (WEXITSTATUS(wstat) != 0)) {
DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: The process exited with status %d \
while we were waiting\n", WEXITSTATUS(wstat)));
return (False);
}
#if defined(WIFSIGNALLED) && defined(WTERMSIG)
else if (WIFSIGNALLED(wstat)) {
DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: The process was killed by signal %d \
while we were waiting\n", WTERMSIG(wstat)));
return (False);
}
#endif
} else {
/* CHILD */
/*
* Lose any elevated privileges.
*/
drop_effective_capability(KERNEL_OPLOCK_CAPABILITY);
drop_effective_capability(DMAPI_ACCESS_CAPABILITY);
/* make sure it doesn't freeze */
alarm(20);
if (as_root)
become_root();
DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: Dochild for user %s (uid=%d,gid=%d) (as_root = %s)\n", pass->pw_name,
(int)getuid(), (int)getgid(), BOOLSTR(as_root) ));
chstat = dochild(master, slavedev, pass, passwordprogram, as_root);
if (as_root)
unbecome_root();
/*
* The child should never return from dochild() ....
*/
DEBUG(0, ("chat_with_program: Error: dochild() returned %d\n", chstat));
exit(1);
}
if (chstat)
DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: Password change %ssuccessful for user %s\n",
(chstat ? "" : "un"), pass->pw_name));
return (chstat);
}
bool chgpasswd(const char *name, const char *rhost, const struct passwd *pass,
const char *oldpass, const char *newpass, bool as_root)
{
const struct loadparm_substitution *lp_sub =
loadparm_s3_global_substitution();
char *passwordprogram = NULL;
char *chatsequence = NULL;
size_t i;
size_t len;
TALLOC_CTX *ctx = talloc_tos();
if (!oldpass) {
oldpass = "";
}
DEBUG(3, ("chgpasswd: Password change (as_root=%s) for user: %s\n", BOOLSTR(as_root), name));
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100, ("chgpasswd: Passwords: old=%s new=%s\n", oldpass, newpass));
#endif
/* Take the passed information and test it for minimum criteria */
/* Password is same as old password */
if (strcmp(oldpass, newpass) == 0) {
/* don't allow same password */
DEBUG(2, ("chgpasswd: Password Change: %s, New password is same as old\n", name)); /* log the attempt */
return (False); /* inform the user */
}
/*
* Check the old and new passwords don't contain any control
* characters.
*/
len = strlen(oldpass);
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (iscntrl((int)oldpass[i])) {
DEBUG(0, ("chgpasswd: oldpass contains control characters (disallowed).\n"));
return False;
}
}
len = strlen(newpass);
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (iscntrl((int)newpass[i])) {
DEBUG(0, ("chgpasswd: newpass contains control characters (disallowed).\n"));
return False;
}
}
#ifdef WITH_PAM
if (lp_pam_password_change()) {
bool ret;
#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
const char *prevlocale = setlocale(LC_ALL, "C");
#endif
if (as_root)
become_root();
if (pass) {
ret = smb_pam_passchange(pass->pw_name, rhost,
oldpass, newpass);
} else {
ret = smb_pam_passchange(name, rhost, oldpass,
newpass);
}
if (as_root)
unbecome_root();
#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
setlocale(LC_ALL, prevlocale);
#endif
return ret;
}
#endif
/* A non-PAM password change just doen't make sense without a valid local user */
if (pass == NULL) {
DEBUG(0, ("chgpasswd: user %s doesn't exist in the UNIX password database.\n", name));
return false;
}
passwordprogram = lp_passwd_program(ctx, lp_sub);
if (!passwordprogram || !*passwordprogram) {
DEBUG(2, ("chgpasswd: Null password program - no password changing\n"));
return false;
}
chatsequence = lp_passwd_chat(ctx, lp_sub);
if (!chatsequence || !*chatsequence) {
DEBUG(2, ("chgpasswd: Null chat sequence - no password changing\n"));
return false;
}
if (as_root) {
/* The password program *must* contain the user name to work. Fail if not. */
if (strstr_m(passwordprogram, "%u") == NULL) {
DEBUG(0,("chgpasswd: Running as root the 'passwd program' parameter *MUST* contain \
the string %%u, and the given string %s does not.\n", passwordprogram ));
return false;
}
}
passwordprogram = talloc_string_sub(ctx, passwordprogram, "%u", name);
if (!passwordprogram) {
return false;
}
/* note that we do NOT substitute the %o and %n in the password program
as this would open up a security hole where the user could use
a new password containing shell escape characters */
chatsequence = talloc_string_sub(ctx, chatsequence, "%u", name);
if (!chatsequence) {
return false;
}
chatsequence = talloc_all_string_sub(ctx,
chatsequence,
"%o",
oldpass);
if (!chatsequence) {
return false;
}
chatsequence = talloc_all_string_sub(ctx,
chatsequence,
"%n",
newpass);
if (chatsequence == NULL) {
return false;
}
return chat_with_program(passwordprogram,
pass,
chatsequence,
as_root);
}
#else /* ALLOW_CHANGE_PASSWORD */
bool chgpasswd(const char *name, const struct passwd *pass,
const char *oldpass, const char *newpass, bool as_root)
{
DEBUG(0, ("chgpasswd: Unix Password changing not compiled in (user=%s)\n", name));
return (False);
}
#endif /* ALLOW_CHANGE_PASSWORD */
/***********************************************************
Decrypt and verify a user password change.
The 516 byte long buffers are encrypted with the old NT and
old LM passwords, and if the NT passwords are present, both
buffers contain a unicode string.
After decrypting the buffers, check the password is correct by
matching the old hashed passwords with the passwords in the passdb.
************************************************************/
static NTSTATUS check_oem_password(const char *user,
uchar password_encrypted_with_lm_hash[516],
const uchar old_lm_hash_encrypted[16],
uchar password_encrypted_with_nt_hash[516],
const uchar old_nt_hash_encrypted[16],
struct samu *sampass,
char **pp_new_passwd)
{
uchar null_pw[16];
uchar null_ntpw[16];
uint8_t *password_encrypted;
const uint8_t *encryption_key;
const uint8_t *lanman_pw, *nt_pw;
uint32_t acct_ctrl;
size_t new_pw_len;
uchar new_nt_hash[16];
uchar new_lm_hash[16];
uchar verifier[16];
char no_pw[2];
bool nt_pass_set = (password_encrypted_with_nt_hash && old_nt_hash_encrypted);
bool lm_pass_set = (password_encrypted_with_lm_hash && old_lm_hash_encrypted);
enum ntlm_auth_level ntlm_auth_level = lp_ntlm_auth();
gnutls_cipher_hd_t cipher_hnd = NULL;
gnutls_datum_t enc_key;
int rc;
/* this call should be disabled without NTLM auth */
if (ntlm_auth_level == NTLM_AUTH_DISABLED) {
DBG_WARNING("NTLM password changes not"
"permitted by configuration.\n");
return NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED;
}
acct_ctrl = pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass);
#if 0
/* I am convinced this check here is wrong, it is valid to
* change a password of a user that has a disabled account - gd */
if (acct_ctrl & ACB_DISABLED) {
DEBUG(2,("check_lanman_password: account %s disabled.\n", user));
return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED;
}
#endif
if ((acct_ctrl & ACB_PWNOTREQ) && lp_null_passwords()) {
/* construct a null password (in case one is needed */
no_pw[0] = 0;
no_pw[1] = 0;
nt_lm_owf_gen(no_pw, null_ntpw, null_pw);
lanman_pw = null_pw;
nt_pw = null_pw;
} else {
/* save pointers to passwords so we don't have to keep looking them up */
if (lp_lanman_auth()) {
lanman_pw = pdb_get_lanman_passwd(sampass);
} else {
lanman_pw = NULL;
}
nt_pw = pdb_get_nt_passwd(sampass);
}
if (nt_pw && nt_pass_set) {
/* IDEAL Case: passwords are in unicode, and we can
* read use the password encrypted with the NT hash
*/
password_encrypted = password_encrypted_with_nt_hash;
encryption_key = nt_pw;
} else if (lanman_pw && lm_pass_set) {
/* password may still be in unicode, but use LM hash version */
password_encrypted = password_encrypted_with_lm_hash;
encryption_key = lanman_pw;
} else if (nt_pass_set) {
DEBUG(1, ("NT password change supplied for user %s, but we have no NT password to check it with\n",
user));
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
} else if (lm_pass_set) {
if (lp_lanman_auth()) {
DEBUG(1, ("LM password change supplied for user %s, but we have no LanMan password to check it with\n",
user));
} else {
DEBUG(1, ("LM password change supplied for user %s, but we have disabled LanMan authentication\n",
user));
}
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
} else {
DEBUG(1, ("password change requested for user %s, but no password supplied!\n",
user));
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
/*
* Decrypt the password with the key
*/
enc_key = (gnutls_datum_t) {
.data = discard_const_p(unsigned char, encryption_key),
.size = 16,
};
GNUTLS_FIPS140_SET_LAX_MODE();
rc = gnutls_cipher_init(&cipher_hnd,
GNUTLS_CIPHER_ARCFOUR_128,
&enc_key,
NULL);
if (rc < 0) {
GNUTLS_FIPS140_SET_STRICT_MODE();
return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_CRYPTO_SYSTEM_INVALID);
}
rc = gnutls_cipher_decrypt(cipher_hnd,
password_encrypted,
516);
gnutls_cipher_deinit(cipher_hnd);
GNUTLS_FIPS140_SET_STRICT_MODE();
if (rc < 0) {
return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, NT_STATUS_CRYPTO_SYSTEM_INVALID);
}
if (!decode_pw_buffer(talloc_tos(),
password_encrypted,
pp_new_passwd,
&new_pw_len,
nt_pass_set ? CH_UTF16 : CH_DOS)) {
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
/*
* To ensure we got the correct new password, hash it and
* use it as a key to test the passed old password.
*/
if (nt_pass_set) {
/* NT passwords, verify the NT hash. */
/* Calculate the MD4 hash (NT compatible) of the password */
memset(new_nt_hash, '\0', 16);
E_md4hash(*pp_new_passwd, new_nt_hash);
if (nt_pw) {
/*
* check the NT verifier
*/
rc = E_old_pw_hash(new_nt_hash, nt_pw, verifier);
if (rc != 0) {
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DISABLED_BY_POLICY_OTHER;
return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, status);
}
if (memcmp(verifier, old_nt_hash_encrypted, 16)) {
DEBUG(0, ("check_oem_password: old nt "
"password doesn't match.\n"));
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
/* We could check the LM password here, but there is
* little point, we already know the password is
* correct, and the LM password might not even be
* present. */
/* Further, LM hash generation algorithms
* differ with charset, so we could
* incorrectly fail a perfectly valid password
* change */
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100,
("check_oem_password: password %s ok\n", *pp_new_passwd));
#endif
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
if (lanman_pw) {
/*
* check the lm verifier
*/
rc = E_old_pw_hash(new_nt_hash, lanman_pw, verifier);
if (rc != 0) {
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DISABLED_BY_POLICY_OTHER;
return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, status);
}
if (memcmp(verifier, old_lm_hash_encrypted, 16)) {
DEBUG(0,("check_oem_password: old lm password doesn't match.\n"));
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100,
("check_oem_password: password %s ok\n", *pp_new_passwd));
#endif
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
}
if (lanman_pw && lm_pass_set) {
E_deshash(*pp_new_passwd, new_lm_hash);
/*
* check the lm verifier
*/
rc = E_old_pw_hash(new_lm_hash, lanman_pw, verifier);
if (rc != 0) {
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DISABLED_BY_POLICY_OTHER;
return gnutls_error_to_ntstatus(rc, status);
}
if (memcmp(verifier, old_lm_hash_encrypted, 16)) {
DEBUG(0,("check_oem_password: old lm password doesn't match.\n"));
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100,
("check_oem_password: password %s ok\n", *pp_new_passwd));
#endif
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/* should not be reached */
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
static bool password_in_history(uint8_t nt_pw[NT_HASH_LEN],
uint32_t pw_history_len,
const uint8_t *pw_history)
{
int i;
dump_data(100, nt_pw, NT_HASH_LEN);
dump_data(100, pw_history, PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN * pw_history_len);
for (i=0; i<pw_history_len; i++) {
uint8_t new_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash[SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN];
const uint8_t *current_salt;
const uint8_t *old_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash;
current_salt = &pw_history[i*PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN];
old_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash = current_salt + PW_HISTORY_SALT_LEN;
if (all_zero(old_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash, SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN)) {
/* Ignore zero valued entries. */
continue;
}
if (all_zero(current_salt, PW_HISTORY_SALT_LEN)) {
/*
* New format: zero salt and then plain nt hash.
* Directly compare the hashes.
*/
if (memcmp(nt_pw, old_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash,
SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN) == 0)
{
return true;
}
} else {
gnutls_hash_hd_t hash_hnd = NULL;
int rc;
/*
* Old format: md5sum of salted nt hash.
* Create salted version of new pw to compare.
*/
rc = gnutls_hash_init(&hash_hnd, GNUTLS_DIG_MD5);
if (rc < 0) {
return false;
}
rc = gnutls_hash(hash_hnd, current_salt, 16);
if (rc < 0) {
gnutls_hash_deinit(hash_hnd, NULL);
return false;
}
rc = gnutls_hash(hash_hnd, nt_pw, 16);
if (rc < 0) {
gnutls_hash_deinit(hash_hnd, NULL);
return false;
}
gnutls_hash_deinit(hash_hnd, new_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash);
if (memcmp(new_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash,
old_nt_pw_salted_md5_hash,
SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN) == 0) {
return true;
}
}
}
return false;
}
/***********************************************************
This routine takes the given password and checks it against
the password history. Returns True if this password has been
found in the history list.
************************************************************/
static bool check_passwd_history(struct samu *sampass, const char *plaintext)
{
uchar new_nt_p16[NT_HASH_LEN];
const uint8_t *nt_pw;
const uint8_t *pwhistory;
uint32_t pwHisLen, curr_pwHisLen;
pdb_get_account_policy(PDB_POLICY_PASSWORD_HISTORY, &pwHisLen);
if (pwHisLen == 0) {
return False;
}
pwhistory = pdb_get_pw_history(sampass, &curr_pwHisLen);
if (!pwhistory || curr_pwHisLen == 0) {
return False;
}
/* Only examine the minimum of the current history len and
the stored history len. Avoids race conditions. */
pwHisLen = MIN(pwHisLen,curr_pwHisLen);
nt_pw = pdb_get_nt_passwd(sampass);
E_md4hash(plaintext, new_nt_p16);
if (!memcmp(nt_pw, new_nt_p16, NT_HASH_LEN)) {
DEBUG(10,("check_passwd_history: proposed new password for user %s is the same as the current password !\n",
pdb_get_username(sampass) ));
return True;
}
if (password_in_history(new_nt_p16, pwHisLen, pwhistory)) {
DEBUG(1,("check_passwd_history: proposed new password for "
"user %s found in history list !\n",
pdb_get_username(sampass) ));
return true;
}
return false;
}
/***********************************************************
************************************************************/
NTSTATUS check_password_complexity(const char *username,
const char *fullname,
const char *password,
enum samPwdChangeReason *samr_reject_reason)
{
TALLOC_CTX *tosctx = talloc_tos();
const struct loadparm_substitution *lp_sub =
loadparm_s3_global_substitution();
int check_ret;
char *cmd;
/* Use external script to check password complexity */
if ((lp_check_password_script(tosctx, lp_sub) == NULL)
|| (*(lp_check_password_script(tosctx, lp_sub)) == '\0')){
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
cmd = talloc_string_sub(tosctx, lp_check_password_script(tosctx, lp_sub), "%u",
username);
if (!cmd) {
return NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_RESTRICTION;
}
check_ret = setenv("SAMBA_CPS_ACCOUNT_NAME", username, 1);
if (check_ret != 0) {
return map_nt_error_from_unix_common(errno);
}
unsetenv("SAMBA_CPS_USER_PRINCIPAL_NAME");
if (fullname != NULL) {
check_ret = setenv("SAMBA_CPS_FULL_NAME", fullname, 1);
} else {
unsetenv("SAMBA_CPS_FULL_NAME");
}
if (check_ret != 0) {
return map_nt_error_from_unix_common(errno);
}
check_ret = smbrunsecret(cmd, password);
unsetenv("SAMBA_CPS_ACCOUNT_NAME");
unsetenv("SAMBA_CPS_USER_PRINCIPAL_NAME");
unsetenv("SAMBA_CPS_FULL_NAME");
DEBUG(5,("check_password_complexity: check password script (%s) "
"returned [%d]\n", cmd, check_ret));
TALLOC_FREE(cmd);
if (check_ret != 0) {
DEBUG(1,("check_password_complexity: "
"check password script said new password is not good "
"enough!\n"));
if (samr_reject_reason) {
*samr_reject_reason = SAM_PWD_CHANGE_NOT_COMPLEX;
}
return NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_RESTRICTION;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/***********************************************************
Code to change the oem password. Changes both the lanman
and NT hashes. Old_passwd is almost always NULL.
NOTE this function is designed to be called as root. Check the old password
is correct before calling. JRA.
************************************************************/
static NTSTATUS change_oem_password(struct samu *hnd, const char *rhost,
char *old_passwd, char *new_passwd,
bool as_root,
enum samPwdChangeReason *samr_reject_reason)
{
uint32_t min_len;
uint32_t refuse;
TALLOC_CTX *tosctx = talloc_tos();
struct passwd *pass = NULL;
const char *username = pdb_get_username(hnd);
const char *fullname = pdb_get_fullname(hnd);
time_t can_change_time = pdb_get_pass_can_change_time(hnd);
NTSTATUS status;
if (samr_reject_reason) {
*samr_reject_reason = SAM_PWD_CHANGE_NO_ERROR;
}
/* check to see if the secdesc has previously been set to disallow */
if (!pdb_get_pass_can_change(hnd)) {
DEBUG(1, ("user %s does not have permissions to change password\n", username));
if (samr_reject_reason) {
*samr_reject_reason = SAM_PWD_CHANGE_NO_ERROR;
}
return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_RESTRICTION;
}
/* check to see if it is a Machine account and if the policy
* denies machines to change the password. *
* Should we deny also SRVTRUST and/or DOMSTRUST ? .SSS. */
if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(hnd) & ACB_WSTRUST) {
if (pdb_get_account_policy(PDB_POLICY_REFUSE_MACHINE_PW_CHANGE, &refuse) && refuse) {
DEBUG(1, ("Machine %s cannot change password now, "
"denied by Refuse Machine Password Change policy\n",
username));
if (samr_reject_reason) {
*samr_reject_reason = SAM_PWD_CHANGE_NO_ERROR;
}
return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_RESTRICTION;
}
}
/* removed calculation here, because passdb now calculates
based on policy. jmcd */
if ((can_change_time != 0) && (time(NULL) < can_change_time)) {
DEBUG(1, ("user %s cannot change password now, must "
"wait until %s\n", username,
http_timestring(tosctx, can_change_time)));
if (samr_reject_reason) {
*samr_reject_reason = SAM_PWD_CHANGE_NO_ERROR;
}
return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_RESTRICTION;
}
if (pdb_get_account_policy(PDB_POLICY_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN, &min_len) && (str_charnum(new_passwd) < min_len)) {
DEBUG(1, ("user %s cannot change password - password too short\n",
username));
DEBUGADD(1, (" account policy min password len = %d\n", min_len));
if (samr_reject_reason) {
*samr_reject_reason = SAM_PWD_CHANGE_PASSWORD_TOO_SHORT;
}
return NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_RESTRICTION;
/* return NT_STATUS_PWD_TOO_SHORT; */
}
if (check_passwd_history(hnd,new_passwd)) {
if (samr_reject_reason) {
*samr_reject_reason = SAM_PWD_CHANGE_PWD_IN_HISTORY;
}
return NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_RESTRICTION;
}
pass = Get_Pwnam_alloc(tosctx, username);
if (!pass) {
DEBUG(1, ("change_oem_password: Username %s does not exist in system !?!\n", username));
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
status = check_password_complexity(username,
fullname,
new_passwd,
samr_reject_reason);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
TALLOC_FREE(pass);
return status;
}
/*
* If unix password sync was requested, attempt to change
* the /etc/passwd database first. Return failure if this cannot
* be done.
*
* This occurs before the oem change, because we don't want to
* update it if chgpasswd failed.
*
* Conditional on lp_unix_password_sync() because we don't want
* to touch the unix db unless we have admin permission.
*/
if(lp_unix_password_sync() &&
!chgpasswd(username, rhost, pass, old_passwd, new_passwd,
as_root)) {
TALLOC_FREE(pass);
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
TALLOC_FREE(pass);
if (!pdb_set_plaintext_passwd (hnd, new_passwd)) {
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
/* Now write it into the file. */
return pdb_update_sam_account (hnd);
}
/***********************************************************
Code to check and change the OEM hashed password.
************************************************************/
NTSTATUS pass_oem_change(char *user, const char *rhost,
uchar password_encrypted_with_lm_hash[516],
const uchar old_lm_hash_encrypted[16],
uchar password_encrypted_with_nt_hash[516],
const uchar old_nt_hash_encrypted[16],
enum samPwdChangeReason *reject_reason)
{
char *new_passwd = NULL;
struct samu *sampass = NULL;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
bool ret = false;
bool updated_badpw = false;
NTSTATUS update_login_attempts_status;
if (!(sampass = samu_new(NULL))) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
become_root();
ret = pdb_getsampwnam(sampass, user);
unbecome_root();
if (ret == false) {
DEBUG(0,("pass_oem_change: getsmbpwnam returned NULL\n"));
TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
}
/* Quit if the account was locked out. */
if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_AUTOLOCK) {
DEBUG(3,("check_sam_security: Account for user %s was locked out.\n", user));
TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT;
}
nt_status = check_oem_password(user,
password_encrypted_with_lm_hash,
old_lm_hash_encrypted,
password_encrypted_with_nt_hash,
old_nt_hash_encrypted,
sampass,
&new_passwd);
/*
* Notify passdb backend of login success/failure. If not
* NT_STATUS_OK the backend doesn't like the login
*/
update_login_attempts_status = pdb_update_login_attempts(sampass,
NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status));
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
bool increment_bad_pw_count = false;
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD) &&
(pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_login_attempts_status))
{
increment_bad_pw_count = true;
}
if (increment_bad_pw_count) {
pdb_increment_bad_password_count(sampass);
updated_badpw = true;
} else {
pdb_update_bad_password_count(sampass,
&updated_badpw);
}
} else {
if ((pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_NORMAL) &&
(pdb_get_bad_password_count(sampass) > 0)){
pdb_set_bad_password_count(sampass, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
pdb_set_bad_password_time(sampass, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
updated_badpw = true;
}
}
if (updated_badpw) {
NTSTATUS update_status;
become_root();
update_status = pdb_update_sam_account(sampass);
unbecome_root();
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_status)) {
DEBUG(1, ("Failed to modify entry: %s\n",
nt_errstr(update_status)));
}
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
return nt_status;
}
/* We've already checked the old password here.... */
become_root();
nt_status = change_oem_password(sampass, rhost, NULL, new_passwd,
True, reject_reason);
unbecome_root();
memset(new_passwd, 0, strlen(new_passwd));
TALLOC_FREE(sampass);
return nt_status;
}