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afc2417b10
This function is only used in vfs_acl_common.c and will be modified in the next commit. Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12028 Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
4806 lines
136 KiB
C
4806 lines
136 KiB
C
/*
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Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
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SMB NT Security Descriptor / Unix permission conversion.
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Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 1994-2009.
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Copyright (C) Andreas Gruenbacher 2002.
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Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2009.
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This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
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(at your option) any later version.
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This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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GNU General Public License for more details.
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You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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#include "smbd/smbd.h"
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#include "system/filesys.h"
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#include "../libcli/security/security.h"
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#include "trans2.h"
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#include "passdb/lookup_sid.h"
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#include "auth.h"
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#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/idmap.h"
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#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_smb_acl.h"
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#include "lib/param/loadparm.h"
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extern const struct generic_mapping file_generic_mapping;
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#undef DBGC_CLASS
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#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_ACLS
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/****************************************************************************
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Data structures representing the internal ACE format.
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****************************************************************************/
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enum ace_owner {UID_ACE, GID_ACE, WORLD_ACE};
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enum ace_attribute {ALLOW_ACE, DENY_ACE}; /* Used for incoming NT ACLS. */
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typedef struct canon_ace {
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struct canon_ace *next, *prev;
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SMB_ACL_TAG_T type;
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mode_t perms; /* Only use S_I(R|W|X)USR mode bits here. */
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struct dom_sid trustee;
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enum ace_owner owner_type;
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enum ace_attribute attr;
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struct unixid unix_ug;
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uint8_t ace_flags; /* From windows ACE entry. */
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} canon_ace;
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#define ALL_ACE_PERMS (S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR)
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/*
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* EA format of user.SAMBA_PAI (Samba_Posix_Acl_Interitance)
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* attribute on disk - version 1.
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* All values are little endian.
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*
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* | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | ....
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* +------+------+-------------+---------------------+-------------+--------------------+
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* | vers | flag | num_entries | num_default_entries | ..entries.. | default_entries... |
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* +------+------+-------------+---------------------+-------------+--------------------+
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*
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* Entry format is :
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*
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* | 1 | 4 |
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* +------+-------------------+
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* | value| uid/gid or world |
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* | type | value |
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* +------+-------------------+
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*
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* Version 2 format. Stores extra Windows metadata about an ACL.
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*
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* | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | ....
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* +------+----------+-------------+---------------------+-------------+--------------------+
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* | vers | ace | num_entries | num_default_entries | ..entries.. | default_entries... |
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* | 2 | type | | | | |
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* +------+----------+-------------+---------------------+-------------+--------------------+
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*
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* Entry format is :
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*
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* | 1 | 1 | 4 |
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* +------+------+-------------------+
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* | ace | value| uid/gid or world |
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* | flag | type | value |
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* +------+-------------------+------+
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*
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*/
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#define PAI_VERSION_OFFSET 0
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#define PAI_V1_FLAG_OFFSET 1
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#define PAI_V1_NUM_ENTRIES_OFFSET 2
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#define PAI_V1_NUM_DEFAULT_ENTRIES_OFFSET 4
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#define PAI_V1_ENTRIES_BASE 6
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#define PAI_V1_ACL_FLAG_PROTECTED 0x1
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#define PAI_V1_ENTRY_LENGTH 5
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#define PAI_V1_VERSION 1
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#define PAI_V2_TYPE_OFFSET 1
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#define PAI_V2_NUM_ENTRIES_OFFSET 3
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#define PAI_V2_NUM_DEFAULT_ENTRIES_OFFSET 5
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#define PAI_V2_ENTRIES_BASE 7
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#define PAI_V2_ENTRY_LENGTH 6
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#define PAI_V2_VERSION 2
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/*
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* In memory format of user.SAMBA_PAI attribute.
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*/
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struct pai_entry {
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struct pai_entry *next, *prev;
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uint8_t ace_flags;
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enum ace_owner owner_type;
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struct unixid unix_ug;
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};
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struct pai_val {
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uint16_t sd_type;
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unsigned int num_entries;
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struct pai_entry *entry_list;
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unsigned int num_def_entries;
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struct pai_entry *def_entry_list;
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};
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/************************************************************************
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Return a uint32_t of the pai_entry principal.
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************************************************************************/
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static uint32_t get_pai_entry_val(struct pai_entry *paie)
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{
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switch (paie->owner_type) {
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case UID_ACE:
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DEBUG(10,("get_pai_entry_val: uid = %u\n", (unsigned int)paie->unix_ug.id ));
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return (uint32_t)paie->unix_ug.id;
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case GID_ACE:
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DEBUG(10,("get_pai_entry_val: gid = %u\n", (unsigned int)paie->unix_ug.id ));
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return (uint32_t)paie->unix_ug.id;
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case WORLD_ACE:
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default:
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DEBUG(10,("get_pai_entry_val: world ace\n"));
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return (uint32_t)-1;
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}
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}
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/************************************************************************
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Return a uint32_t of the entry principal.
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************************************************************************/
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static uint32_t get_entry_val(canon_ace *ace_entry)
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{
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switch (ace_entry->owner_type) {
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case UID_ACE:
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DEBUG(10,("get_entry_val: uid = %u\n", (unsigned int)ace_entry->unix_ug.id ));
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return (uint32_t)ace_entry->unix_ug.id;
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case GID_ACE:
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DEBUG(10,("get_entry_val: gid = %u\n", (unsigned int)ace_entry->unix_ug.id ));
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return (uint32_t)ace_entry->unix_ug.id;
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case WORLD_ACE:
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default:
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DEBUG(10,("get_entry_val: world ace\n"));
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return (uint32_t)-1;
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}
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}
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/************************************************************************
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Create the on-disk format (always v2 now). Caller must free.
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************************************************************************/
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static char *create_pai_buf_v2(canon_ace *file_ace_list,
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canon_ace *dir_ace_list,
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uint16_t sd_type,
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size_t *store_size)
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{
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char *pai_buf = NULL;
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canon_ace *ace_list = NULL;
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char *entry_offset = NULL;
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unsigned int num_entries = 0;
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unsigned int num_def_entries = 0;
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unsigned int i;
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for (ace_list = file_ace_list; ace_list; ace_list = ace_list->next) {
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num_entries++;
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}
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for (ace_list = dir_ace_list; ace_list; ace_list = ace_list->next) {
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num_def_entries++;
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}
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DEBUG(10,("create_pai_buf_v2: num_entries = %u, num_def_entries = %u\n", num_entries, num_def_entries ));
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*store_size = PAI_V2_ENTRIES_BASE +
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((num_entries + num_def_entries)*PAI_V2_ENTRY_LENGTH);
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pai_buf = talloc_array(talloc_tos(), char, *store_size);
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if (!pai_buf) {
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return NULL;
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}
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/* Set up the header. */
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memset(pai_buf, '\0', PAI_V2_ENTRIES_BASE);
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SCVAL(pai_buf,PAI_VERSION_OFFSET,PAI_V2_VERSION);
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SSVAL(pai_buf,PAI_V2_TYPE_OFFSET, sd_type);
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SSVAL(pai_buf,PAI_V2_NUM_ENTRIES_OFFSET,num_entries);
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SSVAL(pai_buf,PAI_V2_NUM_DEFAULT_ENTRIES_OFFSET,num_def_entries);
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DEBUG(10,("create_pai_buf_v2: sd_type = 0x%x\n",
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(unsigned int)sd_type ));
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entry_offset = pai_buf + PAI_V2_ENTRIES_BASE;
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i = 0;
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for (ace_list = file_ace_list; ace_list; ace_list = ace_list->next) {
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uint8_t type_val = (uint8_t)ace_list->owner_type;
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uint32_t entry_val = get_entry_val(ace_list);
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SCVAL(entry_offset,0,ace_list->ace_flags);
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SCVAL(entry_offset,1,type_val);
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SIVAL(entry_offset,2,entry_val);
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DEBUG(10,("create_pai_buf_v2: entry %u [0x%x] [0x%x] [0x%x]\n",
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i,
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(unsigned int)ace_list->ace_flags,
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(unsigned int)type_val,
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(unsigned int)entry_val ));
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i++;
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entry_offset += PAI_V2_ENTRY_LENGTH;
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}
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for (ace_list = dir_ace_list; ace_list; ace_list = ace_list->next) {
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uint8_t type_val = (uint8_t)ace_list->owner_type;
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uint32_t entry_val = get_entry_val(ace_list);
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SCVAL(entry_offset,0,ace_list->ace_flags);
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SCVAL(entry_offset,1,type_val);
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SIVAL(entry_offset,2,entry_val);
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DEBUG(10,("create_pai_buf_v2: entry %u [0x%x] [0x%x] [0x%x]\n",
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i,
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(unsigned int)ace_list->ace_flags,
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(unsigned int)type_val,
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(unsigned int)entry_val ));
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i++;
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entry_offset += PAI_V2_ENTRY_LENGTH;
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}
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return pai_buf;
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}
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/************************************************************************
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Store the user.SAMBA_PAI attribute on disk.
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************************************************************************/
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static void store_inheritance_attributes(files_struct *fsp,
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canon_ace *file_ace_list,
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canon_ace *dir_ace_list,
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uint16_t sd_type)
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{
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int ret;
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size_t store_size;
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char *pai_buf;
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if (!lp_map_acl_inherit(SNUM(fsp->conn))) {
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return;
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}
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pai_buf = create_pai_buf_v2(file_ace_list, dir_ace_list,
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sd_type, &store_size);
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if (fsp->fh->fd != -1) {
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ret = SMB_VFS_FSETXATTR(fsp, SAMBA_POSIX_INHERITANCE_EA_NAME,
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pai_buf, store_size, 0);
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} else {
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ret = SMB_VFS_SETXATTR(fsp->conn, fsp->fsp_name->base_name,
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SAMBA_POSIX_INHERITANCE_EA_NAME,
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pai_buf, store_size, 0);
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}
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TALLOC_FREE(pai_buf);
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DEBUG(10,("store_inheritance_attribute: type 0x%x for file %s\n",
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(unsigned int)sd_type,
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fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
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if (ret == -1 && !no_acl_syscall_error(errno)) {
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DEBUG(1,("store_inheritance_attribute: Error %s\n", strerror(errno) ));
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}
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}
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/************************************************************************
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Delete the in memory inheritance info.
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************************************************************************/
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static void free_inherited_info(struct pai_val *pal)
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{
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if (pal) {
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struct pai_entry *paie, *paie_next;
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for (paie = pal->entry_list; paie; paie = paie_next) {
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paie_next = paie->next;
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TALLOC_FREE(paie);
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}
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for (paie = pal->def_entry_list; paie; paie = paie_next) {
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paie_next = paie->next;
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TALLOC_FREE(paie);
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}
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TALLOC_FREE(pal);
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}
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}
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/************************************************************************
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Get any stored ACE flags.
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************************************************************************/
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static uint16_t get_pai_flags(struct pai_val *pal, canon_ace *ace_entry, bool default_ace)
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{
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struct pai_entry *paie;
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if (!pal) {
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return 0;
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}
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/* If the entry exists it is inherited. */
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for (paie = (default_ace ? pal->def_entry_list : pal->entry_list); paie; paie = paie->next) {
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if (ace_entry->owner_type == paie->owner_type &&
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get_entry_val(ace_entry) == get_pai_entry_val(paie))
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return paie->ace_flags;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/************************************************************************
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Ensure an attribute just read is valid - v1.
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************************************************************************/
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static bool check_pai_ok_v1(const char *pai_buf, size_t pai_buf_data_size)
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{
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uint16_t num_entries;
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uint16_t num_def_entries;
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if (pai_buf_data_size < PAI_V1_ENTRIES_BASE) {
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/* Corrupted - too small. */
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return false;
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}
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if (CVAL(pai_buf,PAI_VERSION_OFFSET) != PAI_V1_VERSION) {
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return false;
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}
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num_entries = SVAL(pai_buf,PAI_V1_NUM_ENTRIES_OFFSET);
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num_def_entries = SVAL(pai_buf,PAI_V1_NUM_DEFAULT_ENTRIES_OFFSET);
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/* Check the entry lists match. */
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/* Each entry is 5 bytes (type plus 4 bytes of uid or gid). */
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if (((num_entries + num_def_entries)*PAI_V1_ENTRY_LENGTH) +
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PAI_V1_ENTRIES_BASE != pai_buf_data_size) {
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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/************************************************************************
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Ensure an attribute just read is valid - v2.
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************************************************************************/
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static bool check_pai_ok_v2(const char *pai_buf, size_t pai_buf_data_size)
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{
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uint16_t num_entries;
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uint16_t num_def_entries;
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if (pai_buf_data_size < PAI_V2_ENTRIES_BASE) {
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/* Corrupted - too small. */
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return false;
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}
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if (CVAL(pai_buf,PAI_VERSION_OFFSET) != PAI_V2_VERSION) {
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return false;
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}
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num_entries = SVAL(pai_buf,PAI_V2_NUM_ENTRIES_OFFSET);
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num_def_entries = SVAL(pai_buf,PAI_V2_NUM_DEFAULT_ENTRIES_OFFSET);
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/* Check the entry lists match. */
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/* Each entry is 6 bytes (flags + type + 4 bytes of uid or gid). */
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if (((num_entries + num_def_entries)*PAI_V2_ENTRY_LENGTH) +
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PAI_V2_ENTRIES_BASE != pai_buf_data_size) {
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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/************************************************************************
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Decode the owner.
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************************************************************************/
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static bool get_pai_owner_type(struct pai_entry *paie, const char *entry_offset)
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{
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paie->owner_type = (enum ace_owner)CVAL(entry_offset,0);
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switch( paie->owner_type) {
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case UID_ACE:
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paie->unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_UID;
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paie->unix_ug.id = (uid_t)IVAL(entry_offset,1);
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DEBUG(10,("get_pai_owner_type: uid = %u\n",
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(unsigned int)paie->unix_ug.id ));
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break;
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case GID_ACE:
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paie->unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_GID;
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paie->unix_ug.id = (gid_t)IVAL(entry_offset,1);
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DEBUG(10,("get_pai_owner_type: gid = %u\n",
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(unsigned int)paie->unix_ug.id ));
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break;
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case WORLD_ACE:
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paie->unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_NOT_SPECIFIED;
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paie->unix_ug.id = -1;
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DEBUG(10,("get_pai_owner_type: world ace\n"));
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break;
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default:
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DEBUG(10,("get_pai_owner_type: unknown type %u\n",
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(unsigned int)paie->owner_type ));
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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|
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/************************************************************************
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|
Process v2 entries.
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************************************************************************/
|
|
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static const char *create_pai_v1_entries(struct pai_val *paiv,
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const char *entry_offset,
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bool def_entry)
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{
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < paiv->num_entries; i++) {
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struct pai_entry *paie = talloc(talloc_tos(), struct pai_entry);
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if (!paie) {
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return NULL;
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}
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paie->ace_flags = SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE;
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if (!get_pai_owner_type(paie, entry_offset)) {
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TALLOC_FREE(paie);
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return NULL;
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}
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if (!def_entry) {
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DLIST_ADD(paiv->entry_list, paie);
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} else {
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DLIST_ADD(paiv->def_entry_list, paie);
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}
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entry_offset += PAI_V1_ENTRY_LENGTH;
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}
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return entry_offset;
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}
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|
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/************************************************************************
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|
Convert to in-memory format from version 1.
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|
************************************************************************/
|
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static struct pai_val *create_pai_val_v1(const char *buf, size_t size)
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{
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const char *entry_offset;
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struct pai_val *paiv = NULL;
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|
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if (!check_pai_ok_v1(buf, size)) {
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return NULL;
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}
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|
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paiv = talloc(talloc_tos(), struct pai_val);
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if (!paiv) {
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return NULL;
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}
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|
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memset(paiv, '\0', sizeof(struct pai_val));
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|
|
paiv->sd_type = (CVAL(buf,PAI_V1_FLAG_OFFSET) == PAI_V1_ACL_FLAG_PROTECTED) ?
|
|
SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED : 0;
|
|
|
|
paiv->num_entries = SVAL(buf,PAI_V1_NUM_ENTRIES_OFFSET);
|
|
paiv->num_def_entries = SVAL(buf,PAI_V1_NUM_DEFAULT_ENTRIES_OFFSET);
|
|
|
|
entry_offset = buf + PAI_V1_ENTRIES_BASE;
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(10,("create_pai_val: num_entries = %u, num_def_entries = %u\n",
|
|
paiv->num_entries, paiv->num_def_entries ));
|
|
|
|
entry_offset = create_pai_v1_entries(paiv, entry_offset, false);
|
|
if (entry_offset == NULL) {
|
|
free_inherited_info(paiv);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
entry_offset = create_pai_v1_entries(paiv, entry_offset, true);
|
|
if (entry_offset == NULL) {
|
|
free_inherited_info(paiv);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return paiv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/************************************************************************
|
|
Process v2 entries.
|
|
************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static const char *create_pai_v2_entries(struct pai_val *paiv,
|
|
unsigned int num_entries,
|
|
const char *entry_offset,
|
|
bool def_entry)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_entries; i++) {
|
|
struct pai_entry *paie = talloc(talloc_tos(), struct pai_entry);
|
|
if (!paie) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
paie->ace_flags = CVAL(entry_offset,0);
|
|
|
|
if (!get_pai_owner_type(paie, entry_offset+1)) {
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(paie);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!def_entry) {
|
|
DLIST_ADD(paiv->entry_list, paie);
|
|
} else {
|
|
DLIST_ADD(paiv->def_entry_list, paie);
|
|
}
|
|
entry_offset += PAI_V2_ENTRY_LENGTH;
|
|
}
|
|
return entry_offset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/************************************************************************
|
|
Convert to in-memory format from version 2.
|
|
************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static struct pai_val *create_pai_val_v2(const char *buf, size_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *entry_offset;
|
|
struct pai_val *paiv = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!check_pai_ok_v2(buf, size)) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
paiv = talloc(talloc_tos(), struct pai_val);
|
|
if (!paiv) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(paiv, '\0', sizeof(struct pai_val));
|
|
|
|
paiv->sd_type = SVAL(buf,PAI_V2_TYPE_OFFSET);
|
|
|
|
paiv->num_entries = SVAL(buf,PAI_V2_NUM_ENTRIES_OFFSET);
|
|
paiv->num_def_entries = SVAL(buf,PAI_V2_NUM_DEFAULT_ENTRIES_OFFSET);
|
|
|
|
entry_offset = buf + PAI_V2_ENTRIES_BASE;
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(10,("create_pai_val_v2: sd_type = 0x%x num_entries = %u, num_def_entries = %u\n",
|
|
(unsigned int)paiv->sd_type,
|
|
paiv->num_entries, paiv->num_def_entries ));
|
|
|
|
entry_offset = create_pai_v2_entries(paiv, paiv->num_entries,
|
|
entry_offset, false);
|
|
if (entry_offset == NULL) {
|
|
free_inherited_info(paiv);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
entry_offset = create_pai_v2_entries(paiv, paiv->num_def_entries,
|
|
entry_offset, true);
|
|
if (entry_offset == NULL) {
|
|
free_inherited_info(paiv);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return paiv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/************************************************************************
|
|
Convert to in-memory format - from either version 1 or 2.
|
|
************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static struct pai_val *create_pai_val(const char *buf, size_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
if (size < 1) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (CVAL(buf,PAI_VERSION_OFFSET) == PAI_V1_VERSION) {
|
|
return create_pai_val_v1(buf, size);
|
|
} else if (CVAL(buf,PAI_VERSION_OFFSET) == PAI_V2_VERSION) {
|
|
return create_pai_val_v2(buf, size);
|
|
} else {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/************************************************************************
|
|
Load the user.SAMBA_PAI attribute.
|
|
************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static struct pai_val *fload_inherited_info(files_struct *fsp)
|
|
{
|
|
char *pai_buf;
|
|
size_t pai_buf_size = 1024;
|
|
struct pai_val *paiv = NULL;
|
|
ssize_t ret;
|
|
|
|
if (!lp_map_acl_inherit(SNUM(fsp->conn))) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((pai_buf = talloc_array(talloc_tos(), char, pai_buf_size)) == NULL) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
if (fsp->fh->fd != -1) {
|
|
ret = SMB_VFS_FGETXATTR(fsp, SAMBA_POSIX_INHERITANCE_EA_NAME,
|
|
pai_buf, pai_buf_size);
|
|
} else {
|
|
ret = SMB_VFS_GETXATTR(fsp->conn,
|
|
fsp->fsp_name->base_name,
|
|
SAMBA_POSIX_INHERITANCE_EA_NAME,
|
|
pai_buf, pai_buf_size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ret == -1) {
|
|
if (errno != ERANGE) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Buffer too small - enlarge it. */
|
|
pai_buf_size *= 2;
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(pai_buf);
|
|
if (pai_buf_size > 1024*1024) {
|
|
return NULL; /* Limit malloc to 1mb. */
|
|
}
|
|
if ((pai_buf = talloc_array(talloc_tos(), char, pai_buf_size)) == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
} while (ret == -1);
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(10,("load_inherited_info: ret = %lu for file %s\n",
|
|
(unsigned long)ret, fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
|
|
|
|
if (ret == -1) {
|
|
/* No attribute or not supported. */
|
|
#if defined(ENOATTR)
|
|
if (errno != ENOATTR)
|
|
DEBUG(10,("load_inherited_info: Error %s\n", strerror(errno) ));
|
|
#else
|
|
if (errno != ENOSYS)
|
|
DEBUG(10,("load_inherited_info: Error %s\n", strerror(errno) ));
|
|
#endif
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(pai_buf);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
paiv = create_pai_val(pai_buf, ret);
|
|
|
|
if (paiv) {
|
|
DEBUG(10,("load_inherited_info: ACL type is 0x%x for file %s\n",
|
|
(unsigned int)paiv->sd_type, fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(pai_buf);
|
|
return paiv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/************************************************************************
|
|
Load the user.SAMBA_PAI attribute.
|
|
************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static struct pai_val *load_inherited_info(const struct connection_struct *conn,
|
|
const char *fname)
|
|
{
|
|
char *pai_buf;
|
|
size_t pai_buf_size = 1024;
|
|
struct pai_val *paiv = NULL;
|
|
ssize_t ret;
|
|
|
|
if (!lp_map_acl_inherit(SNUM(conn))) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((pai_buf = talloc_array(talloc_tos(), char, pai_buf_size)) == NULL) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
ret = SMB_VFS_GETXATTR(conn, fname,
|
|
SAMBA_POSIX_INHERITANCE_EA_NAME,
|
|
pai_buf, pai_buf_size);
|
|
|
|
if (ret == -1) {
|
|
if (errno != ERANGE) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Buffer too small - enlarge it. */
|
|
pai_buf_size *= 2;
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(pai_buf);
|
|
if (pai_buf_size > 1024*1024) {
|
|
return NULL; /* Limit malloc to 1mb. */
|
|
}
|
|
if ((pai_buf = talloc_array(talloc_tos(), char, pai_buf_size)) == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
} while (ret == -1);
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(10,("load_inherited_info: ret = %lu for file %s\n", (unsigned long)ret, fname));
|
|
|
|
if (ret == -1) {
|
|
/* No attribute or not supported. */
|
|
#if defined(ENOATTR)
|
|
if (errno != ENOATTR)
|
|
DEBUG(10,("load_inherited_info: Error %s\n", strerror(errno) ));
|
|
#else
|
|
if (errno != ENOSYS)
|
|
DEBUG(10,("load_inherited_info: Error %s\n", strerror(errno) ));
|
|
#endif
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(pai_buf);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
paiv = create_pai_val(pai_buf, ret);
|
|
|
|
if (paiv) {
|
|
DEBUG(10,("load_inherited_info: ACL type 0x%x for file %s\n",
|
|
(unsigned int)paiv->sd_type,
|
|
fname));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(pai_buf);
|
|
return paiv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Functions to manipulate the internal ACE format.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Count a linked list of canonical ACE entries.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static size_t count_canon_ace_list( canon_ace *l_head )
|
|
{
|
|
size_t count = 0;
|
|
canon_ace *ace;
|
|
|
|
for (ace = l_head; ace; ace = ace->next)
|
|
count++;
|
|
|
|
return count;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Free a linked list of canonical ACE entries.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static void free_canon_ace_list( canon_ace *l_head )
|
|
{
|
|
canon_ace *list, *next;
|
|
|
|
for (list = l_head; list; list = next) {
|
|
next = list->next;
|
|
DLIST_REMOVE(l_head, list);
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(list);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Function to duplicate a canon_ace entry.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static canon_ace *dup_canon_ace( canon_ace *src_ace)
|
|
{
|
|
canon_ace *dst_ace = talloc(talloc_tos(), canon_ace);
|
|
|
|
if (dst_ace == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
*dst_ace = *src_ace;
|
|
dst_ace->prev = dst_ace->next = NULL;
|
|
return dst_ace;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Print out a canon ace.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static void print_canon_ace(canon_ace *pace, int num)
|
|
{
|
|
dbgtext( "canon_ace index %d. Type = %s ", num, pace->attr == ALLOW_ACE ? "allow" : "deny" );
|
|
dbgtext( "SID = %s ", sid_string_dbg(&pace->trustee));
|
|
if (pace->owner_type == UID_ACE) {
|
|
const char *u_name = uidtoname(pace->unix_ug.id);
|
|
dbgtext( "uid %u (%s) ", (unsigned int)pace->unix_ug.id, u_name );
|
|
} else if (pace->owner_type == GID_ACE) {
|
|
char *g_name = gidtoname(pace->unix_ug.id);
|
|
dbgtext( "gid %u (%s) ", (unsigned int)pace->unix_ug.id, g_name );
|
|
} else
|
|
dbgtext( "other ");
|
|
switch (pace->type) {
|
|
case SMB_ACL_USER:
|
|
dbgtext( "SMB_ACL_USER ");
|
|
break;
|
|
case SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ:
|
|
dbgtext( "SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ ");
|
|
break;
|
|
case SMB_ACL_GROUP:
|
|
dbgtext( "SMB_ACL_GROUP ");
|
|
break;
|
|
case SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
|
|
dbgtext( "SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ ");
|
|
break;
|
|
case SMB_ACL_OTHER:
|
|
dbgtext( "SMB_ACL_OTHER ");
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
dbgtext( "MASK " );
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dbgtext( "ace_flags = 0x%x ", (unsigned int)pace->ace_flags);
|
|
dbgtext( "perms ");
|
|
dbgtext( "%c", pace->perms & S_IRUSR ? 'r' : '-');
|
|
dbgtext( "%c", pace->perms & S_IWUSR ? 'w' : '-');
|
|
dbgtext( "%c\n", pace->perms & S_IXUSR ? 'x' : '-');
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Print out a canon ace list.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static void print_canon_ace_list(const char *name, canon_ace *ace_list)
|
|
{
|
|
int count = 0;
|
|
|
|
if( DEBUGLVL( 10 )) {
|
|
dbgtext( "print_canon_ace_list: %s\n", name );
|
|
for (;ace_list; ace_list = ace_list->next, count++)
|
|
print_canon_ace(ace_list, count );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Map POSIX ACL perms to canon_ace permissions (a mode_t containing only S_(R|W|X)USR bits).
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static mode_t convert_permset_to_mode_t(SMB_ACL_PERMSET_T permset)
|
|
{
|
|
mode_t ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
ret |= (sys_acl_get_perm(permset, SMB_ACL_READ) ? S_IRUSR : 0);
|
|
ret |= (sys_acl_get_perm(permset, SMB_ACL_WRITE) ? S_IWUSR : 0);
|
|
ret |= (sys_acl_get_perm(permset, SMB_ACL_EXECUTE) ? S_IXUSR : 0);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Map generic UNIX permissions to canon_ace permissions (a mode_t containing only S_(R|W|X)USR bits).
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static mode_t unix_perms_to_acl_perms(mode_t mode, int r_mask, int w_mask, int x_mask)
|
|
{
|
|
mode_t ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (mode & r_mask)
|
|
ret |= S_IRUSR;
|
|
if (mode & w_mask)
|
|
ret |= S_IWUSR;
|
|
if (mode & x_mask)
|
|
ret |= S_IXUSR;
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Map canon_ace permissions (a mode_t containing only S_(R|W|X)USR bits) to
|
|
an SMB_ACL_PERMSET_T.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static int map_acl_perms_to_permset(connection_struct *conn, mode_t mode, SMB_ACL_PERMSET_T *p_permset)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sys_acl_clear_perms(*p_permset) == -1)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
if (mode & S_IRUSR) {
|
|
if (sys_acl_add_perm(*p_permset, SMB_ACL_READ) == -1)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (mode & S_IWUSR) {
|
|
if (sys_acl_add_perm(*p_permset, SMB_ACL_WRITE) == -1)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (mode & S_IXUSR) {
|
|
if (sys_acl_add_perm(*p_permset, SMB_ACL_EXECUTE) == -1)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Function to create owner and group SIDs from a SMB_STRUCT_STAT.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
void create_file_sids(const SMB_STRUCT_STAT *psbuf, struct dom_sid *powner_sid, struct dom_sid *pgroup_sid)
|
|
{
|
|
uid_to_sid( powner_sid, psbuf->st_ex_uid );
|
|
gid_to_sid( pgroup_sid, psbuf->st_ex_gid );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Merge aces with a common UID or GID - if both are allow or deny, OR the permissions together and
|
|
delete the second one. If the first is deny, mask the permissions off and delete the allow
|
|
if the permissions become zero, delete the deny if the permissions are non zero.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static void merge_aces( canon_ace **pp_list_head, bool dir_acl)
|
|
{
|
|
canon_ace *l_head = *pp_list_head;
|
|
canon_ace *curr_ace_outer;
|
|
canon_ace *curr_ace_outer_next;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* First, merge allow entries with identical SIDs, and deny entries
|
|
* with identical SIDs.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
for (curr_ace_outer = l_head; curr_ace_outer; curr_ace_outer = curr_ace_outer_next) {
|
|
canon_ace *curr_ace;
|
|
canon_ace *curr_ace_next;
|
|
|
|
curr_ace_outer_next = curr_ace_outer->next; /* Save the link in case we delete. */
|
|
|
|
for (curr_ace = curr_ace_outer->next; curr_ace; curr_ace = curr_ace_next) {
|
|
bool can_merge = false;
|
|
|
|
curr_ace_next = curr_ace->next; /* Save the link in case of delete. */
|
|
|
|
/* For file ACLs we can merge if the SIDs and ALLOW/DENY
|
|
* types are the same. For directory acls we must also
|
|
* ensure the POSIX ACL types are the same.
|
|
*
|
|
* For the IDMAP_BOTH case, we must not merge
|
|
* the UID and GID ACE values for same SID
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!dir_acl) {
|
|
can_merge = (curr_ace->unix_ug.id == curr_ace_outer->unix_ug.id &&
|
|
curr_ace->owner_type == curr_ace_outer->owner_type &&
|
|
(curr_ace->attr == curr_ace_outer->attr));
|
|
} else {
|
|
can_merge = (curr_ace->unix_ug.id == curr_ace_outer->unix_ug.id &&
|
|
curr_ace->owner_type == curr_ace_outer->owner_type &&
|
|
(curr_ace->type == curr_ace_outer->type) &&
|
|
(curr_ace->attr == curr_ace_outer->attr));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (can_merge) {
|
|
if( DEBUGLVL( 10 )) {
|
|
dbgtext("merge_aces: Merging ACE's\n");
|
|
print_canon_ace( curr_ace_outer, 0);
|
|
print_canon_ace( curr_ace, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Merge two allow or two deny ACE's. */
|
|
|
|
/* Theoretically we shouldn't merge a dir ACE if
|
|
* one ACE has the CI flag set, and the other
|
|
* ACE has the OI flag set, but this is rare
|
|
* enough we can ignore it. */
|
|
|
|
curr_ace_outer->perms |= curr_ace->perms;
|
|
curr_ace_outer->ace_flags |= curr_ace->ace_flags;
|
|
DLIST_REMOVE(l_head, curr_ace);
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(curr_ace);
|
|
curr_ace_outer_next = curr_ace_outer->next; /* We may have deleted the link. */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now go through and mask off allow permissions with deny permissions.
|
|
* We can delete either the allow or deny here as we know that each SID
|
|
* appears only once in the list.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
for (curr_ace_outer = l_head; curr_ace_outer; curr_ace_outer = curr_ace_outer_next) {
|
|
canon_ace *curr_ace;
|
|
canon_ace *curr_ace_next;
|
|
|
|
curr_ace_outer_next = curr_ace_outer->next; /* Save the link in case we delete. */
|
|
|
|
for (curr_ace = curr_ace_outer->next; curr_ace; curr_ace = curr_ace_next) {
|
|
|
|
curr_ace_next = curr_ace->next; /* Save the link in case of delete. */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Subtract ACE's with different entries. Due to the ordering constraints
|
|
* we've put on the ACL, we know the deny must be the first one.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (curr_ace->unix_ug.id == curr_ace_outer->unix_ug.id &&
|
|
(curr_ace->owner_type == curr_ace_outer->owner_type) &&
|
|
(curr_ace_outer->attr == DENY_ACE) && (curr_ace->attr == ALLOW_ACE)) {
|
|
|
|
if( DEBUGLVL( 10 )) {
|
|
dbgtext("merge_aces: Masking ACE's\n");
|
|
print_canon_ace( curr_ace_outer, 0);
|
|
print_canon_ace( curr_ace, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
curr_ace->perms &= ~curr_ace_outer->perms;
|
|
|
|
if (curr_ace->perms == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The deny overrides the allow. Remove the allow.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
DLIST_REMOVE(l_head, curr_ace);
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(curr_ace);
|
|
curr_ace_outer_next = curr_ace_outer->next; /* We may have deleted the link. */
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Even after removing permissions, there
|
|
* are still allow permissions - delete the deny.
|
|
* It is safe to delete the deny here,
|
|
* as we are guarenteed by the deny first
|
|
* ordering that all the deny entries for
|
|
* this SID have already been merged into one
|
|
* before we can get to an allow ace.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
DLIST_REMOVE(l_head, curr_ace_outer);
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(curr_ace_outer);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} /* end for curr_ace */
|
|
} /* end for curr_ace_outer */
|
|
|
|
/* We may have modified the list. */
|
|
|
|
*pp_list_head = l_head;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Map canon_ace perms to permission bits NT.
|
|
The attr element is not used here - we only process deny entries on set,
|
|
not get. Deny entries are implicit on get with ace->perms = 0.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
uint32_t map_canon_ace_perms(int snum,
|
|
enum security_ace_type *pacl_type,
|
|
mode_t perms,
|
|
bool directory_ace)
|
|
{
|
|
uint32_t nt_mask = 0;
|
|
|
|
*pacl_type = SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED;
|
|
|
|
if (lp_acl_map_full_control(snum) && ((perms & ALL_ACE_PERMS) == ALL_ACE_PERMS)) {
|
|
if (directory_ace) {
|
|
nt_mask = UNIX_DIRECTORY_ACCESS_RWX;
|
|
} else {
|
|
nt_mask = (UNIX_ACCESS_RWX & ~DELETE_ACCESS);
|
|
}
|
|
} else if ((perms & ALL_ACE_PERMS) == (mode_t)0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Windows NT refuses to display ACEs with no permissions in them (but
|
|
* they are perfectly legal with Windows 2000). If the ACE has empty
|
|
* permissions we cannot use 0, so we use the otherwise unused
|
|
* WRITE_OWNER permission, which we ignore when we set an ACL.
|
|
* We abstract this into a #define of UNIX_ACCESS_NONE to allow this
|
|
* to be changed in the future.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
nt_mask = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (directory_ace) {
|
|
nt_mask |= ((perms & S_IRUSR) ? UNIX_DIRECTORY_ACCESS_R : 0 );
|
|
nt_mask |= ((perms & S_IWUSR) ? UNIX_DIRECTORY_ACCESS_W : 0 );
|
|
nt_mask |= ((perms & S_IXUSR) ? UNIX_DIRECTORY_ACCESS_X : 0 );
|
|
} else {
|
|
nt_mask |= ((perms & S_IRUSR) ? UNIX_ACCESS_R : 0 );
|
|
nt_mask |= ((perms & S_IWUSR) ? UNIX_ACCESS_W : 0 );
|
|
nt_mask |= ((perms & S_IXUSR) ? UNIX_ACCESS_X : 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((perms & S_IWUSR) && lp_dos_filemode(snum)) {
|
|
nt_mask |= (SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC|SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER|DELETE_ACCESS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(10,("map_canon_ace_perms: Mapped (UNIX) %x to (NT) %x\n",
|
|
(unsigned int)perms, (unsigned int)nt_mask ));
|
|
|
|
return nt_mask;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Map NT perms to a UNIX mode_t.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
#define FILE_SPECIFIC_READ_BITS (FILE_READ_DATA|FILE_READ_EA)
|
|
#define FILE_SPECIFIC_WRITE_BITS (FILE_WRITE_DATA|FILE_APPEND_DATA|FILE_WRITE_EA)
|
|
#define FILE_SPECIFIC_EXECUTE_BITS (FILE_EXECUTE)
|
|
|
|
static mode_t map_nt_perms( uint32_t *mask, int type)
|
|
{
|
|
mode_t mode = 0;
|
|
|
|
switch(type) {
|
|
case S_IRUSR:
|
|
if((*mask) & GENERIC_ALL_ACCESS)
|
|
mode = S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR;
|
|
else {
|
|
mode |= ((*mask) & (GENERIC_READ_ACCESS|FILE_SPECIFIC_READ_BITS)) ? S_IRUSR : 0;
|
|
mode |= ((*mask) & (GENERIC_WRITE_ACCESS|FILE_SPECIFIC_WRITE_BITS)) ? S_IWUSR : 0;
|
|
mode |= ((*mask) & (GENERIC_EXECUTE_ACCESS|FILE_SPECIFIC_EXECUTE_BITS)) ? S_IXUSR : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case S_IRGRP:
|
|
if((*mask) & GENERIC_ALL_ACCESS)
|
|
mode = S_IRGRP|S_IWGRP|S_IXGRP;
|
|
else {
|
|
mode |= ((*mask) & (GENERIC_READ_ACCESS|FILE_SPECIFIC_READ_BITS)) ? S_IRGRP : 0;
|
|
mode |= ((*mask) & (GENERIC_WRITE_ACCESS|FILE_SPECIFIC_WRITE_BITS)) ? S_IWGRP : 0;
|
|
mode |= ((*mask) & (GENERIC_EXECUTE_ACCESS|FILE_SPECIFIC_EXECUTE_BITS)) ? S_IXGRP : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case S_IROTH:
|
|
if((*mask) & GENERIC_ALL_ACCESS)
|
|
mode = S_IROTH|S_IWOTH|S_IXOTH;
|
|
else {
|
|
mode |= ((*mask) & (GENERIC_READ_ACCESS|FILE_SPECIFIC_READ_BITS)) ? S_IROTH : 0;
|
|
mode |= ((*mask) & (GENERIC_WRITE_ACCESS|FILE_SPECIFIC_WRITE_BITS)) ? S_IWOTH : 0;
|
|
mode |= ((*mask) & (GENERIC_EXECUTE_ACCESS|FILE_SPECIFIC_EXECUTE_BITS)) ? S_IXOTH : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return mode;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Unpack a struct security_descriptor into a UNIX owner and group.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
NTSTATUS unpack_nt_owners(struct connection_struct *conn,
|
|
uid_t *puser, gid_t *pgrp,
|
|
uint32_t security_info_sent, const struct
|
|
security_descriptor *psd)
|
|
{
|
|
*puser = (uid_t)-1;
|
|
*pgrp = (gid_t)-1;
|
|
|
|
if(security_info_sent == 0) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("unpack_nt_owners: no security info sent !\n"));
|
|
return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Validate the owner and group SID's.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(5,("unpack_nt_owners: validating owner_sids.\n"));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Don't immediately fail if the owner sid cannot be validated.
|
|
* This may be a group chown only set.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (security_info_sent & SECINFO_OWNER) {
|
|
if (!sid_to_uid(psd->owner_sid, puser)) {
|
|
if (lp_force_unknown_acl_user(SNUM(conn))) {
|
|
/* this allows take ownership to work
|
|
* reasonably */
|
|
*puser = get_current_uid(conn);
|
|
} else {
|
|
DEBUG(3,("unpack_nt_owners: unable to validate"
|
|
" owner sid for %s\n",
|
|
sid_string_dbg(psd->owner_sid)));
|
|
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_OWNER;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
DEBUG(3,("unpack_nt_owners: owner sid mapped to uid %u\n",
|
|
(unsigned int)*puser ));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Don't immediately fail if the group sid cannot be validated.
|
|
* This may be an owner chown only set.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (security_info_sent & SECINFO_GROUP) {
|
|
if (!sid_to_gid(psd->group_sid, pgrp)) {
|
|
if (lp_force_unknown_acl_user(SNUM(conn))) {
|
|
/* this allows take group ownership to work
|
|
* reasonably */
|
|
*pgrp = get_current_gid(conn);
|
|
} else {
|
|
DEBUG(3,("unpack_nt_owners: unable to validate"
|
|
" group sid.\n"));
|
|
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_OWNER;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
DEBUG(3,("unpack_nt_owners: group sid mapped to gid %u\n",
|
|
(unsigned int)*pgrp));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(5,("unpack_nt_owners: owner_sids validated.\n"));
|
|
|
|
return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void trim_ace_perms(canon_ace *pace)
|
|
{
|
|
pace->perms = pace->perms & (S_IXUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IRUSR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void ensure_minimal_owner_ace_perms(const bool is_directory,
|
|
canon_ace *pace)
|
|
{
|
|
pace->perms |= S_IRUSR;
|
|
if (is_directory) {
|
|
pace->perms |= (S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Check if a given uid/SID is in a group gid/SID. This is probably very
|
|
expensive and will need optimisation. A *lot* of optimisation :-). JRA.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static bool uid_entry_in_group(connection_struct *conn, canon_ace *uid_ace, canon_ace *group_ace )
|
|
{
|
|
/* "Everyone" always matches every uid. */
|
|
|
|
if (dom_sid_equal(&group_ace->trustee, &global_sid_World))
|
|
return True;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* if it's the current user, we already have the unix token
|
|
* and don't need to do the complex user_in_group_sid() call
|
|
*/
|
|
if (uid_ace->unix_ug.id == get_current_uid(conn)) {
|
|
const struct security_unix_token *curr_utok = NULL;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
if (group_ace->unix_ug.id == get_current_gid(conn)) {
|
|
return True;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
curr_utok = get_current_utok(conn);
|
|
for (i=0; i < curr_utok->ngroups; i++) {
|
|
if (group_ace->unix_ug.id == curr_utok->groups[i]) {
|
|
return True;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* user_in_group_sid() uses create_token_from_sid()
|
|
* which creates an artificial NT token given just a username,
|
|
* so this is not reliable for users from foreign domains
|
|
* exported by winbindd!
|
|
*/
|
|
return user_sid_in_group_sid(&uid_ace->trustee, &group_ace->trustee);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
A well formed POSIX file or default ACL has at least 3 entries, a
|
|
SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ, SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ, SMB_ACL_OTHER_OBJ.
|
|
In addition, the owner must always have at least read access.
|
|
When using this call on get_acl, the pst struct is valid and contains
|
|
the mode of the file.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static bool ensure_canon_entry_valid_on_get(connection_struct *conn,
|
|
canon_ace **pp_ace,
|
|
const struct dom_sid *pfile_owner_sid,
|
|
const struct dom_sid *pfile_grp_sid,
|
|
const SMB_STRUCT_STAT *pst)
|
|
{
|
|
canon_ace *pace;
|
|
bool got_user = false;
|
|
bool got_group = false;
|
|
bool got_other = false;
|
|
|
|
for (pace = *pp_ace; pace; pace = pace->next) {
|
|
if (pace->type == SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ) {
|
|
got_user = true;
|
|
} else if (pace->type == SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ) {
|
|
got_group = true;
|
|
} else if (pace->type == SMB_ACL_OTHER) {
|
|
got_other = true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!got_user) {
|
|
if ((pace = talloc(talloc_tos(), canon_ace)) == NULL) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("malloc fail.\n"));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ZERO_STRUCTP(pace);
|
|
pace->type = SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ;
|
|
pace->owner_type = UID_ACE;
|
|
pace->unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_UID;
|
|
pace->unix_ug.id = pst->st_ex_uid;
|
|
pace->trustee = *pfile_owner_sid;
|
|
pace->attr = ALLOW_ACE;
|
|
pace->perms = unix_perms_to_acl_perms(pst->st_ex_mode, S_IRUSR, S_IWUSR, S_IXUSR);
|
|
DLIST_ADD(*pp_ace, pace);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!got_group) {
|
|
if ((pace = talloc(talloc_tos(), canon_ace)) == NULL) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("malloc fail.\n"));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ZERO_STRUCTP(pace);
|
|
pace->type = SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
|
|
pace->owner_type = GID_ACE;
|
|
pace->unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_GID;
|
|
pace->unix_ug.id = pst->st_ex_gid;
|
|
pace->trustee = *pfile_grp_sid;
|
|
pace->attr = ALLOW_ACE;
|
|
pace->perms = unix_perms_to_acl_perms(pst->st_ex_mode, S_IRGRP, S_IWGRP, S_IXGRP);
|
|
DLIST_ADD(*pp_ace, pace);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!got_other) {
|
|
if ((pace = talloc(talloc_tos(), canon_ace)) == NULL) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("malloc fail.\n"));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ZERO_STRUCTP(pace);
|
|
pace->type = SMB_ACL_OTHER;
|
|
pace->owner_type = WORLD_ACE;
|
|
pace->unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_NOT_SPECIFIED;
|
|
pace->unix_ug.id = -1;
|
|
pace->trustee = global_sid_World;
|
|
pace->attr = ALLOW_ACE;
|
|
pace->perms = unix_perms_to_acl_perms(pst->st_ex_mode, S_IROTH, S_IWOTH, S_IXOTH);
|
|
DLIST_ADD(*pp_ace, pace);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
A well formed POSIX file or default ACL has at least 3 entries, a
|
|
SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ, SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ, SMB_ACL_OTHER_OBJ.
|
|
In addition, the owner must always have at least read access.
|
|
When using this call on set_acl, the pst struct has
|
|
been modified to have a mode containing the default for this file or directory
|
|
type.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static bool ensure_canon_entry_valid_on_set(connection_struct *conn,
|
|
canon_ace **pp_ace,
|
|
bool is_default_acl,
|
|
const struct share_params *params,
|
|
const bool is_directory,
|
|
const struct dom_sid *pfile_owner_sid,
|
|
const struct dom_sid *pfile_grp_sid,
|
|
const SMB_STRUCT_STAT *pst)
|
|
{
|
|
canon_ace *pace;
|
|
canon_ace *pace_user = NULL;
|
|
canon_ace *pace_group = NULL;
|
|
canon_ace *pace_other = NULL;
|
|
bool got_duplicate_user = false;
|
|
bool got_duplicate_group = false;
|
|
|
|
for (pace = *pp_ace; pace; pace = pace->next) {
|
|
trim_ace_perms(pace);
|
|
if (pace->type == SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ) {
|
|
ensure_minimal_owner_ace_perms(is_directory, pace);
|
|
pace_user = pace;
|
|
} else if (pace->type == SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ) {
|
|
pace_group = pace;
|
|
} else if (pace->type == SMB_ACL_OTHER) {
|
|
pace_other = pace;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!pace_user) {
|
|
canon_ace *pace_iter;
|
|
|
|
if ((pace = talloc(talloc_tos(), canon_ace)) == NULL) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("talloc fail.\n"));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ZERO_STRUCTP(pace);
|
|
pace->type = SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ;
|
|
pace->owner_type = UID_ACE;
|
|
pace->unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_UID;
|
|
pace->unix_ug.id = pst->st_ex_uid;
|
|
pace->trustee = *pfile_owner_sid;
|
|
pace->attr = ALLOW_ACE;
|
|
/* Start with existing user permissions, principle of least
|
|
surprises for the user. */
|
|
pace->perms = unix_perms_to_acl_perms(pst->st_ex_mode, S_IRUSR, S_IWUSR, S_IXUSR);
|
|
|
|
/* See if the owning user is in any of the other groups in
|
|
the ACE, or if there's a matching user entry (by uid
|
|
or in the case of ID_TYPE_BOTH by SID).
|
|
If so, OR in the permissions from that entry. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (pace_iter = *pp_ace; pace_iter; pace_iter = pace_iter->next) {
|
|
if (pace_iter->type == SMB_ACL_USER &&
|
|
pace_iter->unix_ug.id == pace->unix_ug.id) {
|
|
pace->perms |= pace_iter->perms;
|
|
} else if (pace_iter->type == SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ || pace_iter->type == SMB_ACL_GROUP) {
|
|
if (dom_sid_equal(&pace->trustee, &pace_iter->trustee)) {
|
|
pace->perms |= pace_iter->perms;
|
|
} else if (uid_entry_in_group(conn, pace, pace_iter)) {
|
|
pace->perms |= pace_iter->perms;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pace->perms == 0) {
|
|
/* If we only got an "everyone" perm, just use that. */
|
|
if (pace_other)
|
|
pace->perms = pace_other->perms;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ensure we have default parameters for the
|
|
* user (owner) even on default ACLs.
|
|
*/
|
|
ensure_minimal_owner_ace_perms(is_directory, pace);
|
|
|
|
DLIST_ADD(*pp_ace, pace);
|
|
pace_user = pace;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!pace_group) {
|
|
if ((pace = talloc(talloc_tos(), canon_ace)) == NULL) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("talloc fail.\n"));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ZERO_STRUCTP(pace);
|
|
pace->type = SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
|
|
pace->owner_type = GID_ACE;
|
|
pace->unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_GID;
|
|
pace->unix_ug.id = pst->st_ex_gid;
|
|
pace->trustee = *pfile_grp_sid;
|
|
pace->attr = ALLOW_ACE;
|
|
|
|
/* If we only got an "everyone" perm, just use that. */
|
|
if (pace_other) {
|
|
pace->perms = pace_other->perms;
|
|
} else {
|
|
pace->perms = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DLIST_ADD(*pp_ace, pace);
|
|
pace_group = pace;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!pace_other) {
|
|
if ((pace = talloc(talloc_tos(), canon_ace)) == NULL) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("talloc fail.\n"));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ZERO_STRUCTP(pace);
|
|
pace->type = SMB_ACL_OTHER;
|
|
pace->owner_type = WORLD_ACE;
|
|
pace->unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_NOT_SPECIFIED;
|
|
pace->unix_ug.id = -1;
|
|
pace->trustee = global_sid_World;
|
|
pace->attr = ALLOW_ACE;
|
|
pace->perms = 0;
|
|
|
|
DLIST_ADD(*pp_ace, pace);
|
|
pace_other = pace;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure when setting a POSIX ACL, that the uid for a
|
|
SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ ACE (the owner ACE entry) has a duplicate
|
|
permission entry as an SMB_ACL_USER, and a gid for a
|
|
SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ ACE (the primary group ACE entry) also has
|
|
a duplicate permission entry as an SMB_ACL_GROUP. If not,
|
|
then if the ownership or group ownership of this file or
|
|
directory gets changed, the user or group can lose their
|
|
access. */
|
|
|
|
for (pace = *pp_ace; pace; pace = pace->next) {
|
|
if (pace->type == SMB_ACL_USER &&
|
|
pace->unix_ug.id == pace_user->unix_ug.id) {
|
|
/* Already got one. */
|
|
got_duplicate_user = true;
|
|
} else if (pace->type == SMB_ACL_GROUP &&
|
|
pace->unix_ug.id == pace_group->unix_ug.id) {
|
|
/* Already got one. */
|
|
got_duplicate_group = true;
|
|
} else if ((pace->type == SMB_ACL_GROUP)
|
|
&& (dom_sid_equal(&pace->trustee, &pace_user->trustee))) {
|
|
/* If the SID owning the file appears
|
|
* in a group entry, then we have
|
|
* enough duplication, they will still
|
|
* have access */
|
|
got_duplicate_user = true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If the SID is equal for the user and group that we need
|
|
to add the duplicate for, add only the group */
|
|
if (!got_duplicate_user && !got_duplicate_group
|
|
&& dom_sid_equal(&pace_group->trustee,
|
|
&pace_user->trustee)) {
|
|
/* Add a duplicate SMB_ACL_GROUP entry, this
|
|
* will cover the owning SID as well, as it
|
|
* will always be mapped to both a uid and
|
|
* gid. */
|
|
|
|
if ((pace = talloc(talloc_tos(), canon_ace)) == NULL) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("talloc fail.\n"));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ZERO_STRUCTP(pace);
|
|
pace->type = SMB_ACL_GROUP;;
|
|
pace->owner_type = GID_ACE;
|
|
pace->unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_GID;
|
|
pace->unix_ug.id = pace_group->unix_ug.id;
|
|
pace->trustee = pace_group->trustee;
|
|
pace->attr = pace_group->attr;
|
|
pace->perms = pace_group->perms;
|
|
|
|
DLIST_ADD(*pp_ace, pace);
|
|
|
|
/* We're done here, make sure the
|
|
statements below are not executed. */
|
|
got_duplicate_user = true;
|
|
got_duplicate_group = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!got_duplicate_user) {
|
|
/* Add a duplicate SMB_ACL_USER entry. */
|
|
if ((pace = talloc(talloc_tos(), canon_ace)) == NULL) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("talloc fail.\n"));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ZERO_STRUCTP(pace);
|
|
pace->type = SMB_ACL_USER;;
|
|
pace->owner_type = UID_ACE;
|
|
pace->unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_UID;
|
|
pace->unix_ug.id = pace_user->unix_ug.id;
|
|
pace->trustee = pace_user->trustee;
|
|
pace->attr = pace_user->attr;
|
|
pace->perms = pace_user->perms;
|
|
|
|
DLIST_ADD(*pp_ace, pace);
|
|
|
|
got_duplicate_user = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!got_duplicate_group) {
|
|
/* Add a duplicate SMB_ACL_GROUP entry. */
|
|
if ((pace = talloc(talloc_tos(), canon_ace)) == NULL) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("talloc fail.\n"));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ZERO_STRUCTP(pace);
|
|
pace->type = SMB_ACL_GROUP;;
|
|
pace->owner_type = GID_ACE;
|
|
pace->unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_GID;
|
|
pace->unix_ug.id = pace_group->unix_ug.id;
|
|
pace->trustee = pace_group->trustee;
|
|
pace->attr = pace_group->attr;
|
|
pace->perms = pace_group->perms;
|
|
|
|
DLIST_ADD(*pp_ace, pace);
|
|
|
|
got_duplicate_group = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Check if a POSIX ACL has the required SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ and SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ entries.
|
|
If it does not have them, check if there are any entries where the trustee is the
|
|
file owner or the owning group, and map these to SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ and SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ.
|
|
Note we must not do this to default directory ACLs.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static void check_owning_objs(canon_ace *ace, struct dom_sid *pfile_owner_sid, struct dom_sid *pfile_grp_sid)
|
|
{
|
|
bool got_user_obj, got_group_obj;
|
|
canon_ace *current_ace;
|
|
int i, entries;
|
|
|
|
entries = count_canon_ace_list(ace);
|
|
got_user_obj = False;
|
|
got_group_obj = False;
|
|
|
|
for (i=0, current_ace = ace; i < entries; i++, current_ace = current_ace->next) {
|
|
if (current_ace->type == SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ)
|
|
got_user_obj = True;
|
|
else if (current_ace->type == SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ)
|
|
got_group_obj = True;
|
|
}
|
|
if (got_user_obj && got_group_obj) {
|
|
DEBUG(10,("check_owning_objs: ACL had owning user/group entries.\n"));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i=0, current_ace = ace; i < entries; i++, current_ace = current_ace->next) {
|
|
if (!got_user_obj && current_ace->owner_type == UID_ACE &&
|
|
dom_sid_equal(¤t_ace->trustee, pfile_owner_sid)) {
|
|
current_ace->type = SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ;
|
|
got_user_obj = True;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!got_group_obj && current_ace->owner_type == GID_ACE &&
|
|
dom_sid_equal(¤t_ace->trustee, pfile_grp_sid)) {
|
|
current_ace->type = SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
|
|
got_group_obj = True;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!got_user_obj)
|
|
DEBUG(10,("check_owning_objs: ACL is missing an owner entry.\n"));
|
|
if (!got_group_obj)
|
|
DEBUG(10,("check_owning_objs: ACL is missing an owning group entry.\n"));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool add_current_ace_to_acl(files_struct *fsp, struct security_ace *psa,
|
|
canon_ace **file_ace, canon_ace **dir_ace,
|
|
bool *got_file_allow, bool *got_dir_allow,
|
|
bool *all_aces_are_inherit_only,
|
|
canon_ace *current_ace)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Map the given NT permissions into a UNIX mode_t containing only
|
|
* S_I(R|W|X)USR bits.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
current_ace->perms |= map_nt_perms( &psa->access_mask, S_IRUSR);
|
|
current_ace->attr = (psa->type == SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED) ? ALLOW_ACE : DENY_ACE;
|
|
|
|
/* Store the ace_flag. */
|
|
current_ace->ace_flags = psa->flags;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now add the created ace to either the file list, the directory
|
|
* list, or both. We *MUST* preserve the order here (hence we use
|
|
* DLIST_ADD_END) as NT ACLs are order dependent.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (fsp->is_directory) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We can only add to the default POSIX ACE list if the ACE is
|
|
* designed to be inherited by both files and directories.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((psa->flags & (SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT|SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT)) ==
|
|
(SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT|SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT)) {
|
|
|
|
canon_ace *current_dir_ace = current_ace;
|
|
DLIST_ADD_END(*dir_ace, current_ace);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note if this was an allow ace. We can't process
|
|
* any further deny ace's after this.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (current_ace->attr == ALLOW_ACE)
|
|
*got_dir_allow = True;
|
|
|
|
if ((current_ace->attr == DENY_ACE) && *got_dir_allow) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("add_current_ace_to_acl: "
|
|
"malformed ACL in "
|
|
"inheritable ACL! Deny entry "
|
|
"after Allow entry. Failing "
|
|
"to set on file %s.\n",
|
|
fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( DEBUGLVL( 10 )) {
|
|
dbgtext("add_current_ace_to_acl: adding dir ACL:\n");
|
|
print_canon_ace( current_ace, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If this is not an inherit only ACE we need to add a duplicate
|
|
* to the file acl.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!(psa->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY)) {
|
|
canon_ace *dup_ace = dup_canon_ace(current_ace);
|
|
|
|
if (!dup_ace) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("add_current_ace_to_acl: malloc fail !\n"));
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We must not free current_ace here as its
|
|
* pointer is now owned by the dir_ace list.
|
|
*/
|
|
current_ace = dup_ace;
|
|
/* We've essentially split this ace into two,
|
|
* and added the ace with inheritance request
|
|
* bits to the directory ACL. Drop those bits for
|
|
* the ACE we're adding to the file list. */
|
|
current_ace->ace_flags &= ~(SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT|
|
|
SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT|
|
|
SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We must not free current_ace here as its
|
|
* pointer is now owned by the dir_ace list.
|
|
*/
|
|
current_ace = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* current_ace is now either owned by file_ace
|
|
* or is NULL. We can safely operate on current_dir_ace
|
|
* to treat mapping for default acl entries differently
|
|
* than access acl entries.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (current_dir_ace->owner_type == UID_ACE) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We already decided above this is a uid,
|
|
* for default acls ace's only CREATOR_OWNER
|
|
* maps to ACL_USER_OBJ. All other uid
|
|
* ace's are ACL_USER.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (dom_sid_equal(¤t_dir_ace->trustee,
|
|
&global_sid_Creator_Owner)) {
|
|
current_dir_ace->type = SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ;
|
|
} else {
|
|
current_dir_ace->type = SMB_ACL_USER;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (current_dir_ace->owner_type == GID_ACE) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We already decided above this is a gid,
|
|
* for default acls ace's only CREATOR_GROUP
|
|
* maps to ACL_GROUP_OBJ. All other uid
|
|
* ace's are ACL_GROUP.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (dom_sid_equal(¤t_dir_ace->trustee,
|
|
&global_sid_Creator_Group)) {
|
|
current_dir_ace->type = SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
|
|
} else {
|
|
current_dir_ace->type = SMB_ACL_GROUP;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Only add to the file ACL if not inherit only.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (current_ace && !(psa->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY)) {
|
|
DLIST_ADD_END(*file_ace, current_ace);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note if this was an allow ace. We can't process
|
|
* any further deny ace's after this.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (current_ace->attr == ALLOW_ACE)
|
|
*got_file_allow = True;
|
|
|
|
if ((current_ace->attr == DENY_ACE) && *got_file_allow) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("add_current_ace_to_acl: malformed "
|
|
"ACL in file ACL ! Deny entry after "
|
|
"Allow entry. Failing to set on file "
|
|
"%s.\n", fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( DEBUGLVL( 10 )) {
|
|
dbgtext("add_current_ace_to_acl: adding file ACL:\n");
|
|
print_canon_ace( current_ace, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
*all_aces_are_inherit_only = False;
|
|
/*
|
|
* We must not free current_ace here as its
|
|
* pointer is now owned by the file_ace list.
|
|
*/
|
|
current_ace = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Free if ACE was not added.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(current_ace);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Unpack a struct security_descriptor into two canonical ace lists.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static bool create_canon_ace_lists(files_struct *fsp,
|
|
const SMB_STRUCT_STAT *pst,
|
|
struct dom_sid *pfile_owner_sid,
|
|
struct dom_sid *pfile_grp_sid,
|
|
canon_ace **ppfile_ace,
|
|
canon_ace **ppdir_ace,
|
|
const struct security_acl *dacl)
|
|
{
|
|
bool all_aces_are_inherit_only = (fsp->is_directory ? True : False);
|
|
canon_ace *file_ace = NULL;
|
|
canon_ace *dir_ace = NULL;
|
|
canon_ace *current_ace = NULL;
|
|
bool got_dir_allow = False;
|
|
bool got_file_allow = False;
|
|
int i, j;
|
|
|
|
*ppfile_ace = NULL;
|
|
*ppdir_ace = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Convert the incoming ACL into a more regular form.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
for(i = 0; i < dacl->num_aces; i++) {
|
|
struct security_ace *psa = &dacl->aces[i];
|
|
|
|
if((psa->type != SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED) && (psa->type != SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED)) {
|
|
DEBUG(3,("create_canon_ace_lists: unable to set anything but an ALLOW or DENY ACE.\n"));
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Deal with the fact that NT 4.x re-writes the canonical format
|
|
* that we return for default ACLs. If a directory ACE is identical
|
|
* to a inherited directory ACE then NT changes the bits so that the
|
|
* first ACE is set to OI|IO and the second ACE for this SID is set
|
|
* to CI. We need to repair this. JRA.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
for(i = 0; i < dacl->num_aces; i++) {
|
|
struct security_ace *psa1 = &dacl->aces[i];
|
|
|
|
for (j = i + 1; j < dacl->num_aces; j++) {
|
|
struct security_ace *psa2 = &dacl->aces[j];
|
|
|
|
if (psa1->access_mask != psa2->access_mask)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (!dom_sid_equal(&psa1->trustee, &psa2->trustee))
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ok - permission bits and SIDs are equal.
|
|
* Check if flags were re-written.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (psa1->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY) {
|
|
|
|
psa1->flags |= (psa2->flags & (SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT|SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT));
|
|
psa2->flags &= ~(SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT|SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT);
|
|
|
|
} else if (psa2->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY) {
|
|
|
|
psa2->flags |= (psa1->flags & (SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT|SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT));
|
|
psa1->flags &= ~(SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT|SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for(i = 0; i < dacl->num_aces; i++) {
|
|
struct security_ace *psa = &dacl->aces[i];
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Create a canon_ace entry representing this NT DACL ACE.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((current_ace = talloc(talloc_tos(), canon_ace)) == NULL) {
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(file_ace);
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(dir_ace);
|
|
DEBUG(0,("create_canon_ace_lists: malloc fail.\n"));
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ZERO_STRUCTP(current_ace);
|
|
|
|
sid_copy(¤t_ace->trustee, &psa->trustee);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Try and work out if the SID is a user or group
|
|
* as we need to flag these differently for POSIX.
|
|
* Note what kind of a POSIX ACL this should map to.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if( dom_sid_equal(¤t_ace->trustee, &global_sid_World)) {
|
|
current_ace->owner_type = WORLD_ACE;
|
|
current_ace->unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_NOT_SPECIFIED;
|
|
current_ace->unix_ug.id = -1;
|
|
current_ace->type = SMB_ACL_OTHER;
|
|
} else if (dom_sid_equal(¤t_ace->trustee, &global_sid_Creator_Owner)) {
|
|
current_ace->owner_type = UID_ACE;
|
|
current_ace->unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_UID;
|
|
current_ace->unix_ug.id = pst->st_ex_uid;
|
|
current_ace->type = SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The Creator Owner entry only specifies inheritable permissions,
|
|
* never access permissions. WinNT doesn't always set the ACE to
|
|
* INHERIT_ONLY, though.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
psa->flags |= SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY;
|
|
|
|
} else if (dom_sid_equal(¤t_ace->trustee, &global_sid_Creator_Group)) {
|
|
current_ace->owner_type = GID_ACE;
|
|
current_ace->unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_GID;
|
|
current_ace->unix_ug.id = pst->st_ex_gid;
|
|
current_ace->type = SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The Creator Group entry only specifies inheritable permissions,
|
|
* never access permissions. WinNT doesn't always set the ACE to
|
|
* INHERIT_ONLY, though.
|
|
*/
|
|
psa->flags |= SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
struct unixid unixid;
|
|
|
|
if (!sids_to_unixids(¤t_ace->trustee, 1, &unixid)) {
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(file_ace);
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(dir_ace);
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(current_ace);
|
|
DEBUG(0, ("create_canon_ace_lists: sids_to_unixids "
|
|
"failed for %s (allocation failure)\n",
|
|
sid_string_dbg(¤t_ace->trustee)));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (unixid.type == ID_TYPE_BOTH) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We must add both a user and group
|
|
* entry POSIX_ACL.
|
|
* This is due to the fact that in POSIX
|
|
* user entries are more specific than
|
|
* groups.
|
|
*/
|
|
current_ace->owner_type = UID_ACE;
|
|
current_ace->unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_UID;
|
|
current_ace->unix_ug.id = unixid.id;
|
|
current_ace->type =
|
|
(unixid.id == pst->st_ex_uid) ?
|
|
SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ :
|
|
SMB_ACL_USER;
|
|
|
|
/* Add the user object to the posix ACL,
|
|
and proceed to the group mapping
|
|
below. This handles the talloc_free
|
|
of current_ace if not added for some
|
|
reason */
|
|
if (!add_current_ace_to_acl(fsp,
|
|
psa,
|
|
&file_ace,
|
|
&dir_ace,
|
|
&got_file_allow,
|
|
&got_dir_allow,
|
|
&all_aces_are_inherit_only,
|
|
current_ace)) {
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(file_ace);
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(dir_ace);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((current_ace = talloc(talloc_tos(),
|
|
canon_ace)) == NULL) {
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(file_ace);
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(dir_ace);
|
|
DEBUG(0,("create_canon_ace_lists: "
|
|
"malloc fail.\n"));
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ZERO_STRUCTP(current_ace);
|
|
|
|
sid_copy(¤t_ace->trustee, &psa->trustee);
|
|
|
|
current_ace->unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_GID;
|
|
current_ace->unix_ug.id = unixid.id;
|
|
current_ace->owner_type = GID_ACE;
|
|
/* If it's the primary group, this is a
|
|
group_obj, not a group. */
|
|
if (current_ace->unix_ug.id == pst->st_ex_gid) {
|
|
current_ace->type = SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
|
|
} else {
|
|
current_ace->type = SMB_ACL_GROUP;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (unixid.type == ID_TYPE_UID) {
|
|
current_ace->owner_type = UID_ACE;
|
|
current_ace->unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_UID;
|
|
current_ace->unix_ug.id = unixid.id;
|
|
/* If it's the owning user, this is a user_obj,
|
|
not a user. */
|
|
if (current_ace->unix_ug.id == pst->st_ex_uid) {
|
|
current_ace->type = SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ;
|
|
} else {
|
|
current_ace->type = SMB_ACL_USER;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (unixid.type == ID_TYPE_GID) {
|
|
current_ace->unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_GID;
|
|
current_ace->unix_ug.id = unixid.id;
|
|
current_ace->owner_type = GID_ACE;
|
|
/* If it's the primary group, this is a
|
|
group_obj, not a group. */
|
|
if (current_ace->unix_ug.id == pst->st_ex_gid) {
|
|
current_ace->type = SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
|
|
} else {
|
|
current_ace->type = SMB_ACL_GROUP;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Silently ignore map failures in non-mappable SIDs (NT Authority, BUILTIN etc).
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (non_mappable_sid(&psa->trustee)) {
|
|
DEBUG(10, ("create_canon_ace_lists: ignoring "
|
|
"non-mappable SID %s\n",
|
|
sid_string_dbg(&psa->trustee)));
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(current_ace);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (lp_force_unknown_acl_user(SNUM(fsp->conn))) {
|
|
DEBUG(10, ("create_canon_ace_lists: ignoring "
|
|
"unknown or foreign SID %s\n",
|
|
sid_string_dbg(&psa->trustee)));
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(current_ace);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(file_ace);
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(dir_ace);
|
|
DEBUG(0, ("create_canon_ace_lists: unable to map SID "
|
|
"%s to uid or gid.\n",
|
|
sid_string_dbg(¤t_ace->trustee)));
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(current_ace);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* handles the talloc_free of current_ace if not added for some reason */
|
|
if (!add_current_ace_to_acl(fsp, psa, &file_ace, &dir_ace,
|
|
&got_file_allow, &got_dir_allow,
|
|
&all_aces_are_inherit_only, current_ace)) {
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(file_ace);
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(dir_ace);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (fsp->is_directory && all_aces_are_inherit_only) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Windows 2000 is doing one of these weird 'inherit acl'
|
|
* traverses to conserve NTFS ACL resources. Just pretend
|
|
* there was no DACL sent. JRA.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(10,("create_canon_ace_lists: Win2k inherit acl traverse. Ignoring DACL.\n"));
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(file_ace);
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(dir_ace);
|
|
file_ace = NULL;
|
|
dir_ace = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if we have SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ and SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ entries in
|
|
* the file ACL. If we don't have them, check if any SMB_ACL_USER/SMB_ACL_GROUP
|
|
* entries can be converted to *_OBJ. Don't do this for the default
|
|
* ACL, we will create them separately for this if needed inside
|
|
* ensure_canon_entry_valid_on_set().
|
|
*/
|
|
if (file_ace) {
|
|
check_owning_objs(file_ace, pfile_owner_sid, pfile_grp_sid);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*ppfile_ace = file_ace;
|
|
*ppdir_ace = dir_ace;
|
|
|
|
return True;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
ASCII art time again... JRA :-).
|
|
|
|
We have 4 cases to process when moving from an NT ACL to a POSIX ACL. Firstly,
|
|
we insist the ACL is in canonical form (ie. all DENY entries preceede ALLOW
|
|
entries). Secondly, the merge code has ensured that all duplicate SID entries for
|
|
allow or deny have been merged, so the same SID can only appear once in the deny
|
|
list or once in the allow list.
|
|
|
|
We then process as follows :
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
First pass - look for a Everyone DENY entry.
|
|
|
|
If it is deny all (rwx) trunate the list at this point.
|
|
Else, walk the list from this point and use the deny permissions of this
|
|
entry as a mask on all following allow entries. Finally, delete
|
|
the Everyone DENY entry (we have applied it to everything possible).
|
|
|
|
In addition, in this pass we remove any DENY entries that have
|
|
no permissions (ie. they are a DENY nothing).
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
Second pass - only deal with deny user entries.
|
|
|
|
DENY user1 (perms XXX)
|
|
|
|
new_perms = 0
|
|
for all following allow group entries where user1 is in group
|
|
new_perms |= group_perms;
|
|
|
|
user1 entry perms = new_perms & ~ XXX;
|
|
|
|
Convert the deny entry to an allow entry with the new perms and
|
|
push to the end of the list. Note if the user was in no groups
|
|
this maps to a specific allow nothing entry for this user.
|
|
|
|
The common case from the NT ACL choser (userX deny all) is
|
|
optimised so we don't do the group lookup - we just map to
|
|
an allow nothing entry.
|
|
|
|
What we're doing here is inferring the allow permissions the
|
|
person setting the ACE on user1 wanted by looking at the allow
|
|
permissions on the groups the user is currently in. This will
|
|
be a snapshot, depending on group membership but is the best
|
|
we can do and has the advantage of failing closed rather than
|
|
open.
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
Third pass - only deal with deny group entries.
|
|
|
|
DENY group1 (perms XXX)
|
|
|
|
for all following allow user entries where user is in group1
|
|
user entry perms = user entry perms & ~ XXX;
|
|
|
|
If there is a group Everyone allow entry with permissions YYY,
|
|
convert the group1 entry to an allow entry and modify its
|
|
permissions to be :
|
|
|
|
new_perms = YYY & ~ XXX
|
|
|
|
and push to the end of the list.
|
|
|
|
If there is no group Everyone allow entry then convert the
|
|
group1 entry to a allow nothing entry and push to the end of the list.
|
|
|
|
Note that the common case from the NT ACL choser (groupX deny all)
|
|
cannot be optimised here as we need to modify user entries who are
|
|
in the group to change them to a deny all also.
|
|
|
|
What we're doing here is modifying the allow permissions of
|
|
user entries (which are more specific in POSIX ACLs) to mask
|
|
out the explicit deny set on the group they are in. This will
|
|
be a snapshot depending on current group membership but is the
|
|
best we can do and has the advantage of failing closed rather
|
|
than open.
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
Fourth pass - cope with cumulative permissions.
|
|
|
|
for all allow user entries, if there exists an allow group entry with
|
|
more permissive permissions, and the user is in that group, rewrite the
|
|
allow user permissions to contain both sets of permissions.
|
|
|
|
Currently the code for this is #ifdef'ed out as these semantics make
|
|
no sense to me. JRA.
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Note we *MUST* do the deny user pass first as this will convert deny user
|
|
entries into allow user entries which can then be processed by the deny
|
|
group pass.
|
|
|
|
The above algorithm took a *lot* of thinking about - hence this
|
|
explaination :-). JRA.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Process a canon_ace list entries. This is very complex code. We need
|
|
to go through and remove the "deny" permissions from any allow entry that matches
|
|
the id of this entry. We have already refused any NT ACL that wasn't in correct
|
|
order (DENY followed by ALLOW). If any allow entry ends up with zero permissions,
|
|
we just remove it (to fail safe). We have already removed any duplicate ace
|
|
entries. Treat an "Everyone" DENY_ACE as a special case - use it to mask all
|
|
allow entries.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static void process_deny_list(connection_struct *conn, canon_ace **pp_ace_list )
|
|
{
|
|
canon_ace *ace_list = *pp_ace_list;
|
|
canon_ace *curr_ace = NULL;
|
|
canon_ace *curr_ace_next = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Pass 1 above - look for an Everyone, deny entry. */
|
|
|
|
for (curr_ace = ace_list; curr_ace; curr_ace = curr_ace_next) {
|
|
canon_ace *allow_ace_p;
|
|
|
|
curr_ace_next = curr_ace->next; /* So we can't lose the link. */
|
|
|
|
if (curr_ace->attr != DENY_ACE)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (curr_ace->perms == (mode_t)0) {
|
|
|
|
/* Deny nothing entry - delete. */
|
|
|
|
DLIST_REMOVE(ace_list, curr_ace);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!dom_sid_equal(&curr_ace->trustee, &global_sid_World))
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* JRATEST - assert. */
|
|
SMB_ASSERT(curr_ace->owner_type == WORLD_ACE);
|
|
|
|
if (curr_ace->perms == ALL_ACE_PERMS) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Optimisation. This is a DENY_ALL to Everyone. Truncate the
|
|
* list at this point including this entry.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
canon_ace *prev_entry = DLIST_PREV(curr_ace);
|
|
|
|
free_canon_ace_list( curr_ace );
|
|
if (prev_entry)
|
|
DLIST_REMOVE(ace_list, prev_entry);
|
|
else {
|
|
/* We deleted the entire list. */
|
|
ace_list = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (allow_ace_p = curr_ace->next; allow_ace_p; allow_ace_p = allow_ace_p->next) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Only mask off allow entries.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (allow_ace_p->attr != ALLOW_ACE)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
allow_ace_p->perms &= ~curr_ace->perms;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now it's been applied, remove it.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
DLIST_REMOVE(ace_list, curr_ace);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Pass 2 above - deal with deny user entries. */
|
|
|
|
for (curr_ace = ace_list; curr_ace; curr_ace = curr_ace_next) {
|
|
mode_t new_perms = (mode_t)0;
|
|
canon_ace *allow_ace_p;
|
|
|
|
curr_ace_next = curr_ace->next; /* So we can't lose the link. */
|
|
|
|
if (curr_ace->attr != DENY_ACE)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (curr_ace->owner_type != UID_ACE)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (curr_ace->perms == ALL_ACE_PERMS) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Optimisation - this is a deny everything to this user.
|
|
* Convert to an allow nothing and push to the end of the list.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
curr_ace->attr = ALLOW_ACE;
|
|
curr_ace->perms = (mode_t)0;
|
|
DLIST_DEMOTE(ace_list, curr_ace);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (allow_ace_p = curr_ace->next; allow_ace_p; allow_ace_p = allow_ace_p->next) {
|
|
|
|
if (allow_ace_p->attr != ALLOW_ACE)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* We process GID_ACE and WORLD_ACE entries only. */
|
|
|
|
if (allow_ace_p->owner_type == UID_ACE)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (uid_entry_in_group(conn, curr_ace, allow_ace_p))
|
|
new_perms |= allow_ace_p->perms;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Convert to a allow entry, modify the perms and push to the end
|
|
* of the list.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
curr_ace->attr = ALLOW_ACE;
|
|
curr_ace->perms = (new_perms & ~curr_ace->perms);
|
|
DLIST_DEMOTE(ace_list, curr_ace);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Pass 3 above - deal with deny group entries. */
|
|
|
|
for (curr_ace = ace_list; curr_ace; curr_ace = curr_ace_next) {
|
|
canon_ace *allow_ace_p;
|
|
canon_ace *allow_everyone_p = NULL;
|
|
|
|
curr_ace_next = curr_ace->next; /* So we can't lose the link. */
|
|
|
|
if (curr_ace->attr != DENY_ACE)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (curr_ace->owner_type != GID_ACE)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
for (allow_ace_p = curr_ace->next; allow_ace_p; allow_ace_p = allow_ace_p->next) {
|
|
|
|
if (allow_ace_p->attr != ALLOW_ACE)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* Store a pointer to the Everyone allow, if it exists. */
|
|
if (allow_ace_p->owner_type == WORLD_ACE)
|
|
allow_everyone_p = allow_ace_p;
|
|
|
|
/* We process UID_ACE entries only. */
|
|
|
|
if (allow_ace_p->owner_type != UID_ACE)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* Mask off the deny group perms. */
|
|
|
|
if (uid_entry_in_group(conn, allow_ace_p, curr_ace))
|
|
allow_ace_p->perms &= ~curr_ace->perms;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Convert the deny to an allow with the correct perms and
|
|
* push to the end of the list.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
curr_ace->attr = ALLOW_ACE;
|
|
if (allow_everyone_p)
|
|
curr_ace->perms = allow_everyone_p->perms & ~curr_ace->perms;
|
|
else
|
|
curr_ace->perms = (mode_t)0;
|
|
DLIST_DEMOTE(ace_list, curr_ace);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Doing this fourth pass allows Windows semantics to be layered
|
|
* on top of POSIX semantics. I'm not sure if this is desirable.
|
|
* For example, in W2K ACLs there is no way to say, "Group X no
|
|
* access, user Y full access" if user Y is a member of group X.
|
|
* This seems completely broken semantics to me.... JRA.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
/* Pass 4 above - deal with allow entries. */
|
|
|
|
for (curr_ace = ace_list; curr_ace; curr_ace = curr_ace_next) {
|
|
canon_ace *allow_ace_p;
|
|
|
|
curr_ace_next = curr_ace->next; /* So we can't lose the link. */
|
|
|
|
if (curr_ace->attr != ALLOW_ACE)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (curr_ace->owner_type != UID_ACE)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
for (allow_ace_p = ace_list; allow_ace_p; allow_ace_p = allow_ace_p->next) {
|
|
|
|
if (allow_ace_p->attr != ALLOW_ACE)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* We process GID_ACE entries only. */
|
|
|
|
if (allow_ace_p->owner_type != GID_ACE)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* OR in the group perms. */
|
|
|
|
if (uid_entry_in_group(conn, curr_ace, allow_ace_p))
|
|
curr_ace->perms |= allow_ace_p->perms;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
*pp_ace_list = ace_list;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Unpack a struct security_descriptor into two canonical ace lists. We don't depend on this
|
|
succeeding.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static bool unpack_canon_ace(files_struct *fsp,
|
|
const SMB_STRUCT_STAT *pst,
|
|
struct dom_sid *pfile_owner_sid,
|
|
struct dom_sid *pfile_grp_sid,
|
|
canon_ace **ppfile_ace,
|
|
canon_ace **ppdir_ace,
|
|
uint32_t security_info_sent,
|
|
const struct security_descriptor *psd)
|
|
{
|
|
canon_ace *file_ace = NULL;
|
|
canon_ace *dir_ace = NULL;
|
|
|
|
*ppfile_ace = NULL;
|
|
*ppdir_ace = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if(security_info_sent == 0) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("unpack_canon_ace: no security info sent !\n"));
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If no DACL then this is a chown only security descriptor.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if(!(security_info_sent & SECINFO_DACL) || !psd->dacl)
|
|
return True;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now go through the DACL and create the canon_ace lists.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!create_canon_ace_lists( fsp, pst, pfile_owner_sid, pfile_grp_sid,
|
|
&file_ace, &dir_ace, psd->dacl))
|
|
return False;
|
|
|
|
if ((file_ace == NULL) && (dir_ace == NULL)) {
|
|
/* W2K traverse DACL set - ignore. */
|
|
return True;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Go through the canon_ace list and merge entries
|
|
* belonging to identical users of identical allow or deny type.
|
|
* We can do this as all deny entries come first, followed by
|
|
* all allow entries (we have mandated this before accepting this acl).
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
print_canon_ace_list( "file ace - before merge", file_ace);
|
|
merge_aces( &file_ace, false);
|
|
|
|
print_canon_ace_list( "dir ace - before merge", dir_ace);
|
|
merge_aces( &dir_ace, true);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* NT ACLs are order dependent. Go through the acl lists and
|
|
* process DENY entries by masking the allow entries.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
print_canon_ace_list( "file ace - before deny", file_ace);
|
|
process_deny_list(fsp->conn, &file_ace);
|
|
|
|
print_canon_ace_list( "dir ace - before deny", dir_ace);
|
|
process_deny_list(fsp->conn, &dir_ace);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* A well formed POSIX file or default ACL has at least 3 entries, a
|
|
* SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ, SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ, SMB_ACL_OTHER_OBJ
|
|
* and optionally a mask entry. Ensure this is the case.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
print_canon_ace_list( "file ace - before valid", file_ace);
|
|
|
|
if (!ensure_canon_entry_valid_on_set(fsp->conn, &file_ace, false, fsp->conn->params,
|
|
fsp->is_directory, pfile_owner_sid, pfile_grp_sid, pst)) {
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(file_ace);
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(dir_ace);
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
print_canon_ace_list( "dir ace - before valid", dir_ace);
|
|
|
|
if (dir_ace && !ensure_canon_entry_valid_on_set(fsp->conn, &dir_ace, true, fsp->conn->params,
|
|
fsp->is_directory, pfile_owner_sid, pfile_grp_sid, pst)) {
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(file_ace);
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(dir_ace);
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
print_canon_ace_list( "file ace - return", file_ace);
|
|
print_canon_ace_list( "dir ace - return", dir_ace);
|
|
|
|
*ppfile_ace = file_ace;
|
|
*ppdir_ace = dir_ace;
|
|
return True;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/******************************************************************************
|
|
When returning permissions, try and fit NT display
|
|
semantics if possible. Note the the canon_entries here must have been malloced.
|
|
The list format should be - first entry = owner, followed by group and other user
|
|
entries, last entry = other.
|
|
|
|
Note that this doesn't exactly match the NT semantics for an ACL. As POSIX entries
|
|
are not ordered, and match on the most specific entry rather than walking a list,
|
|
then a simple POSIX permission of rw-r--r-- should really map to 5 entries,
|
|
|
|
Entry 0: owner : deny all except read and write.
|
|
Entry 1: owner : allow read and write.
|
|
Entry 2: group : deny all except read.
|
|
Entry 3: group : allow read.
|
|
Entry 4: Everyone : allow read.
|
|
|
|
But NT cannot display this in their ACL editor !
|
|
********************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static void arrange_posix_perms(const char *filename, canon_ace **pp_list_head)
|
|
{
|
|
canon_ace *l_head = *pp_list_head;
|
|
canon_ace *owner_ace = NULL;
|
|
canon_ace *other_ace = NULL;
|
|
canon_ace *ace = NULL;
|
|
|
|
for (ace = l_head; ace; ace = ace->next) {
|
|
if (ace->type == SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ)
|
|
owner_ace = ace;
|
|
else if (ace->type == SMB_ACL_OTHER) {
|
|
/* Last ace - this is "other" */
|
|
other_ace = ace;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!owner_ace || !other_ace) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("arrange_posix_perms: Invalid POSIX permissions for file %s, missing owner or other.\n",
|
|
filename ));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The POSIX algorithm applies to owner first, and other last,
|
|
* so ensure they are arranged in this order.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (owner_ace) {
|
|
DLIST_PROMOTE(l_head, owner_ace);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (other_ace) {
|
|
DLIST_DEMOTE(l_head, other_ace);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We have probably changed the head of the list. */
|
|
|
|
*pp_list_head = l_head;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Create a linked list of canonical ACE entries.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static canon_ace *canonicalise_acl(struct connection_struct *conn,
|
|
const char *fname, SMB_ACL_T posix_acl,
|
|
const SMB_STRUCT_STAT *psbuf,
|
|
const struct dom_sid *powner, const struct dom_sid *pgroup, struct pai_val *pal, SMB_ACL_TYPE_T the_acl_type)
|
|
{
|
|
mode_t acl_mask = (S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR);
|
|
canon_ace *l_head = NULL;
|
|
canon_ace *ace = NULL;
|
|
canon_ace *next_ace = NULL;
|
|
int entry_id = SMB_ACL_FIRST_ENTRY;
|
|
bool is_default_acl = (the_acl_type == SMB_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
|
|
SMB_ACL_ENTRY_T entry;
|
|
size_t ace_count;
|
|
|
|
while ( posix_acl && (sys_acl_get_entry(posix_acl, entry_id, &entry) == 1)) {
|
|
SMB_ACL_TAG_T tagtype;
|
|
SMB_ACL_PERMSET_T permset;
|
|
struct dom_sid sid;
|
|
struct unixid unix_ug;
|
|
enum ace_owner owner_type;
|
|
|
|
entry_id = SMB_ACL_NEXT_ENTRY;
|
|
|
|
if (sys_acl_get_tag_type(entry, &tagtype) == -1)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (sys_acl_get_permset(entry, &permset) == -1)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* Decide which SID to use based on the ACL type. */
|
|
switch(tagtype) {
|
|
case SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ:
|
|
/* Get the SID from the owner. */
|
|
sid_copy(&sid, powner);
|
|
unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_UID;
|
|
unix_ug.id = psbuf->st_ex_uid;
|
|
owner_type = UID_ACE;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SMB_ACL_USER:
|
|
{
|
|
uid_t *puid = (uid_t *)sys_acl_get_qualifier(entry);
|
|
if (puid == NULL) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("canonicalise_acl: Failed to get uid.\n"));
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
uid_to_sid( &sid, *puid);
|
|
unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_UID;
|
|
unix_ug.id = *puid;
|
|
owner_type = UID_ACE;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
|
|
/* Get the SID from the owning group. */
|
|
sid_copy(&sid, pgroup);
|
|
unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_GID;
|
|
unix_ug.id = psbuf->st_ex_gid;
|
|
owner_type = GID_ACE;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SMB_ACL_GROUP:
|
|
{
|
|
gid_t *pgid = (gid_t *)sys_acl_get_qualifier(entry);
|
|
if (pgid == NULL) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("canonicalise_acl: Failed to get gid.\n"));
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
gid_to_sid( &sid, *pgid);
|
|
unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_GID;
|
|
unix_ug.id = *pgid;
|
|
owner_type = GID_ACE;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case SMB_ACL_MASK:
|
|
acl_mask = convert_permset_to_mode_t(permset);
|
|
continue; /* Don't count the mask as an entry. */
|
|
case SMB_ACL_OTHER:
|
|
/* Use the Everyone SID */
|
|
sid = global_sid_World;
|
|
unix_ug.type = ID_TYPE_NOT_SPECIFIED;
|
|
unix_ug.id = -1;
|
|
owner_type = WORLD_ACE;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
DEBUG(0,("canonicalise_acl: Unknown tagtype %u\n", (unsigned int)tagtype));
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add this entry to the list.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((ace = talloc(talloc_tos(), canon_ace)) == NULL)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
*ace = (canon_ace) {
|
|
.type = tagtype,
|
|
.perms = convert_permset_to_mode_t(permset),
|
|
.attr = ALLOW_ACE,
|
|
.trustee = sid,
|
|
.unix_ug = unix_ug,
|
|
.owner_type = owner_type,
|
|
.ace_flags = get_pai_flags(pal, ace, is_default_acl)
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
DLIST_ADD(l_head, ace);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This next call will ensure we have at least a user/group/world set.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!ensure_canon_entry_valid_on_get(conn, &l_head,
|
|
powner, pgroup,
|
|
psbuf))
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now go through the list, masking the permissions with the
|
|
* acl_mask. Ensure all DENY Entries are at the start of the list.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(10,("canonicalise_acl: %s ace entries before arrange :\n", is_default_acl ? "Default" : "Access"));
|
|
|
|
for ( ace_count = 0, ace = l_head; ace; ace = next_ace, ace_count++) {
|
|
next_ace = ace->next;
|
|
|
|
/* Masks are only applied to entries other than USER_OBJ and OTHER. */
|
|
if (ace->type != SMB_ACL_OTHER && ace->type != SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ)
|
|
ace->perms &= acl_mask;
|
|
|
|
if (ace->perms == 0) {
|
|
DLIST_PROMOTE(l_head, ace);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( DEBUGLVL( 10 ) ) {
|
|
print_canon_ace(ace, ace_count);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
arrange_posix_perms(fname,&l_head );
|
|
|
|
print_canon_ace_list( "canonicalise_acl: ace entries after arrange", l_head );
|
|
|
|
return l_head;
|
|
|
|
fail:
|
|
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(l_head);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Check if the current user group list contains a given group.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
bool current_user_in_group(connection_struct *conn, gid_t gid)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
const struct security_unix_token *utok = get_current_utok(conn);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < utok->ngroups; i++) {
|
|
if (utok->groups[i] == gid) {
|
|
return True;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Should we override a deny ? Check 'acl group control' and 'dos filemode'.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static bool acl_group_override(connection_struct *conn,
|
|
const struct smb_filename *smb_fname)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((errno != EPERM) && (errno != EACCES)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* file primary group == user primary or supplementary group */
|
|
if (lp_acl_group_control(SNUM(conn)) &&
|
|
current_user_in_group(conn, smb_fname->st.st_ex_gid)) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* user has writeable permission */
|
|
if (lp_dos_filemode(SNUM(conn)) &&
|
|
can_write_to_file(conn, smb_fname)) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Attempt to apply an ACL to a file or directory.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static bool set_canon_ace_list(files_struct *fsp,
|
|
canon_ace *the_ace,
|
|
bool default_ace,
|
|
const SMB_STRUCT_STAT *psbuf,
|
|
bool *pacl_set_support)
|
|
{
|
|
connection_struct *conn = fsp->conn;
|
|
bool ret = False;
|
|
SMB_ACL_T the_acl = sys_acl_init(talloc_tos());
|
|
canon_ace *p_ace;
|
|
int i;
|
|
SMB_ACL_ENTRY_T mask_entry;
|
|
bool got_mask_entry = False;
|
|
SMB_ACL_PERMSET_T mask_permset;
|
|
SMB_ACL_TYPE_T the_acl_type = (default_ace ? SMB_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT : SMB_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
|
|
bool needs_mask = False;
|
|
mode_t mask_perms = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Use the psbuf that was passed in. */
|
|
if (psbuf != &fsp->fsp_name->st) {
|
|
fsp->fsp_name->st = *psbuf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(POSIX_ACL_NEEDS_MASK)
|
|
/* HP-UX always wants to have a mask (called "class" there). */
|
|
needs_mask = True;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (the_acl == NULL) {
|
|
DEBUG(0, ("sys_acl_init failed to allocate an ACL\n"));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( DEBUGLVL( 10 )) {
|
|
dbgtext("set_canon_ace_list: setting ACL:\n");
|
|
for (i = 0, p_ace = the_ace; p_ace; p_ace = p_ace->next, i++ ) {
|
|
print_canon_ace( p_ace, i);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0, p_ace = the_ace; p_ace; p_ace = p_ace->next, i++ ) {
|
|
SMB_ACL_ENTRY_T the_entry;
|
|
SMB_ACL_PERMSET_T the_permset;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* ACLs only "need" an ACL_MASK entry if there are any named user or
|
|
* named group entries. But if there is an ACL_MASK entry, it applies
|
|
* to ACL_USER, ACL_GROUP, and ACL_GROUP_OBJ entries. Set the mask
|
|
* so that it doesn't deny (i.e., mask off) any permissions.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (p_ace->type == SMB_ACL_USER || p_ace->type == SMB_ACL_GROUP) {
|
|
needs_mask = True;
|
|
mask_perms |= p_ace->perms;
|
|
} else if (p_ace->type == SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ) {
|
|
mask_perms |= p_ace->perms;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get the entry for this ACE.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (sys_acl_create_entry(&the_acl, &the_entry) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("set_canon_ace_list: Failed to create entry %d. (%s)\n",
|
|
i, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (p_ace->type == SMB_ACL_MASK) {
|
|
mask_entry = the_entry;
|
|
got_mask_entry = True;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ok - we now know the ACL calls should be working, don't
|
|
* allow fallback to chmod.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
*pacl_set_support = True;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialise the entry from the canon_ace.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* First tell the entry what type of ACE this is.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (sys_acl_set_tag_type(the_entry, p_ace->type) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("set_canon_ace_list: Failed to set tag type on entry %d. (%s)\n",
|
|
i, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Only set the qualifier (user or group id) if the entry is a user
|
|
* or group id ACE.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((p_ace->type == SMB_ACL_USER) || (p_ace->type == SMB_ACL_GROUP)) {
|
|
if (sys_acl_set_qualifier(the_entry,(void *)&p_ace->unix_ug.id) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("set_canon_ace_list: Failed to set qualifier on entry %d. (%s)\n",
|
|
i, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Convert the mode_t perms in the canon_ace to a POSIX permset.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (sys_acl_get_permset(the_entry, &the_permset) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("set_canon_ace_list: Failed to get permset on entry %d. (%s)\n",
|
|
i, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (map_acl_perms_to_permset(conn, p_ace->perms, &the_permset) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("set_canon_ace_list: Failed to create permset for mode (%u) on entry %d. (%s)\n",
|
|
(unsigned int)p_ace->perms, i, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* ..and apply them to the entry.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (sys_acl_set_permset(the_entry, the_permset) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("set_canon_ace_list: Failed to add permset on entry %d. (%s)\n",
|
|
i, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( DEBUGLVL( 10 ))
|
|
print_canon_ace( p_ace, i);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (needs_mask && !got_mask_entry) {
|
|
if (sys_acl_create_entry(&the_acl, &mask_entry) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("set_canon_ace_list: Failed to create mask entry. (%s)\n", strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sys_acl_set_tag_type(mask_entry, SMB_ACL_MASK) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("set_canon_ace_list: Failed to set tag type on mask entry. (%s)\n",strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sys_acl_get_permset(mask_entry, &mask_permset) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("set_canon_ace_list: Failed to get mask permset. (%s)\n", strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (map_acl_perms_to_permset(conn, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR, &mask_permset) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("set_canon_ace_list: Failed to create mask permset. (%s)\n", strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sys_acl_set_permset(mask_entry, mask_permset) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("set_canon_ace_list: Failed to add mask permset. (%s)\n", strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Finally apply it to the file or directory.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if(default_ace || fsp->is_directory || fsp->fh->fd == -1) {
|
|
if (SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_SET_FILE(conn, fsp->fsp_name->base_name,
|
|
the_acl_type, the_acl) == -1) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Some systems allow all the above calls and only fail with no ACL support
|
|
* when attempting to apply the acl. HPUX with HFS is an example of this. JRA.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (no_acl_syscall_error(errno)) {
|
|
*pacl_set_support = False;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (acl_group_override(conn, fsp->fsp_name)) {
|
|
int sret;
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(5,("set_canon_ace_list: acl group "
|
|
"control on and current user in file "
|
|
"%s primary group.\n",
|
|
fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
|
|
|
|
become_root();
|
|
sret = SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_SET_FILE(conn,
|
|
fsp->fsp_name->base_name, the_acl_type,
|
|
the_acl);
|
|
unbecome_root();
|
|
if (sret == 0) {
|
|
ret = True;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ret == False) {
|
|
DEBUG(2,("set_canon_ace_list: "
|
|
"sys_acl_set_file type %s failed for "
|
|
"file %s (%s).\n",
|
|
the_acl_type == SMB_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT ?
|
|
"directory default" : "file",
|
|
fsp_str_dbg(fsp), strerror(errno)));
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_SET_FD(fsp, the_acl) == -1) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Some systems allow all the above calls and only fail with no ACL support
|
|
* when attempting to apply the acl. HPUX with HFS is an example of this. JRA.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (no_acl_syscall_error(errno)) {
|
|
*pacl_set_support = False;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (acl_group_override(conn, fsp->fsp_name)) {
|
|
int sret;
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(5,("set_canon_ace_list: acl group "
|
|
"control on and current user in file "
|
|
"%s primary group.\n",
|
|
fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
|
|
|
|
become_root();
|
|
sret = SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_SET_FD(fsp, the_acl);
|
|
unbecome_root();
|
|
if (sret == 0) {
|
|
ret = True;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ret == False) {
|
|
DEBUG(2,("set_canon_ace_list: "
|
|
"sys_acl_set_file failed for file %s "
|
|
"(%s).\n",
|
|
fsp_str_dbg(fsp), strerror(errno)));
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = True;
|
|
|
|
fail:
|
|
|
|
if (the_acl != NULL) {
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(the_acl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
SMB_ACL_T free_empty_sys_acl(connection_struct *conn, SMB_ACL_T the_acl)
|
|
{
|
|
SMB_ACL_ENTRY_T entry;
|
|
|
|
if (!the_acl)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
if (sys_acl_get_entry(the_acl, SMB_ACL_FIRST_ENTRY, &entry) != 1) {
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(the_acl);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return the_acl;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Convert a canon_ace to a generic 3 element permission - if possible.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
#define MAP_PERM(p,mask,result) (((p) & (mask)) ? (result) : 0 )
|
|
|
|
static bool convert_canon_ace_to_posix_perms( files_struct *fsp, canon_ace *file_ace_list, mode_t *posix_perms)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t ace_count = count_canon_ace_list(file_ace_list);
|
|
canon_ace *ace_p;
|
|
canon_ace *owner_ace = NULL;
|
|
canon_ace *group_ace = NULL;
|
|
canon_ace *other_ace = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (ace_count > 5) {
|
|
DEBUG(3,("convert_canon_ace_to_posix_perms: Too many ACE "
|
|
"entries for file %s to convert to posix perms.\n",
|
|
fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (ace_p = file_ace_list; ace_p; ace_p = ace_p->next) {
|
|
if (ace_p->owner_type == UID_ACE)
|
|
owner_ace = ace_p;
|
|
else if (ace_p->owner_type == GID_ACE)
|
|
group_ace = ace_p;
|
|
else if (ace_p->owner_type == WORLD_ACE)
|
|
other_ace = ace_p;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!owner_ace || !group_ace || !other_ace) {
|
|
DEBUG(3,("convert_canon_ace_to_posix_perms: Can't get "
|
|
"standard entries for file %s.\n", fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ensure all ACE entries are owner, group or other.
|
|
* We can't set if there are any other SIDs.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (ace_p = file_ace_list; ace_p; ace_p = ace_p->next) {
|
|
if (ace_p == owner_ace || ace_p == group_ace ||
|
|
ace_p == other_ace) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ace_p->owner_type == UID_ACE) {
|
|
if (ace_p->unix_ug.id != owner_ace->unix_ug.id) {
|
|
DEBUG(3,("Invalid uid %u in ACE for file %s.\n",
|
|
(unsigned int)ace_p->unix_ug.id,
|
|
fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (ace_p->owner_type == GID_ACE) {
|
|
if (ace_p->unix_ug.id != group_ace->unix_ug.id) {
|
|
DEBUG(3,("Invalid gid %u in ACE for file %s.\n",
|
|
(unsigned int)ace_p->unix_ug.id,
|
|
fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* There should be no duplicate WORLD_ACE entries.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(3,("Invalid type %u, uid %u in "
|
|
"ACE for file %s.\n",
|
|
(unsigned int)ace_p->owner_type,
|
|
(unsigned int)ace_p->unix_ug.id,
|
|
fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*posix_perms = (mode_t)0;
|
|
|
|
*posix_perms |= owner_ace->perms;
|
|
*posix_perms |= MAP_PERM(group_ace->perms, S_IRUSR, S_IRGRP);
|
|
*posix_perms |= MAP_PERM(group_ace->perms, S_IWUSR, S_IWGRP);
|
|
*posix_perms |= MAP_PERM(group_ace->perms, S_IXUSR, S_IXGRP);
|
|
*posix_perms |= MAP_PERM(other_ace->perms, S_IRUSR, S_IROTH);
|
|
*posix_perms |= MAP_PERM(other_ace->perms, S_IWUSR, S_IWOTH);
|
|
*posix_perms |= MAP_PERM(other_ace->perms, S_IXUSR, S_IXOTH);
|
|
|
|
/* The owner must have at least read access. */
|
|
|
|
*posix_perms |= S_IRUSR;
|
|
if (fsp->is_directory)
|
|
*posix_perms |= (S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR);
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(10,("convert_canon_ace_to_posix_perms: converted u=%o,g=%o,w=%o "
|
|
"to perm=0%o for file %s.\n", (int)owner_ace->perms,
|
|
(int)group_ace->perms, (int)other_ace->perms,
|
|
(int)*posix_perms, fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
|
|
|
|
return True;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Incoming NT ACLs on a directory can be split into a default POSIX acl (CI|OI|IO) and
|
|
a normal POSIX acl. Win2k needs these split acls re-merging into one ACL
|
|
with CI|OI set so it is inherited and also applies to the directory.
|
|
Based on code from "Jim McDonough" <jmcd@us.ibm.com>.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static size_t merge_default_aces( struct security_ace *nt_ace_list, size_t num_aces)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i, j;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_aces; i++) {
|
|
for (j = i+1; j < num_aces; j++) {
|
|
uint32_t i_flags_ni = (nt_ace_list[i].flags & ~SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE);
|
|
uint32_t j_flags_ni = (nt_ace_list[j].flags & ~SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE);
|
|
bool i_inh = (nt_ace_list[i].flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE) ? True : False;
|
|
bool j_inh = (nt_ace_list[j].flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE) ? True : False;
|
|
|
|
/* We know the lower number ACE's are file entries. */
|
|
if ((nt_ace_list[i].type == nt_ace_list[j].type) &&
|
|
(nt_ace_list[i].size == nt_ace_list[j].size) &&
|
|
(nt_ace_list[i].access_mask == nt_ace_list[j].access_mask) &&
|
|
dom_sid_equal(&nt_ace_list[i].trustee, &nt_ace_list[j].trustee) &&
|
|
(i_inh == j_inh) &&
|
|
(i_flags_ni == 0) &&
|
|
(j_flags_ni == (SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT|
|
|
SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT|
|
|
SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY))) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* W2K wants to have access allowed zero access ACE's
|
|
* at the end of the list. If the mask is zero, merge
|
|
* the non-inherited ACE onto the inherited ACE.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (nt_ace_list[i].access_mask == 0) {
|
|
nt_ace_list[j].flags = SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT|SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT|
|
|
(i_inh ? SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE : 0);
|
|
if (num_aces - i - 1 > 0)
|
|
memmove(&nt_ace_list[i], &nt_ace_list[i+1], (num_aces-i-1) *
|
|
sizeof(struct security_ace));
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(10,("merge_default_aces: Merging zero access ACE %u onto ACE %u.\n",
|
|
(unsigned int)i, (unsigned int)j ));
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* These are identical except for the flags.
|
|
* Merge the inherited ACE onto the non-inherited ACE.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
nt_ace_list[i].flags = SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT|SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT|
|
|
(i_inh ? SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE : 0);
|
|
if (num_aces - j - 1 > 0)
|
|
memmove(&nt_ace_list[j], &nt_ace_list[j+1], (num_aces-j-1) *
|
|
sizeof(struct security_ace));
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(10,("merge_default_aces: Merging ACE %u onto ACE %u.\n",
|
|
(unsigned int)j, (unsigned int)i ));
|
|
}
|
|
num_aces--;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return num_aces;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add or Replace ACE entry.
|
|
* In some cases we need to add a specific ACE for compatibility reasons.
|
|
* When doing that we must make sure we are not actually creating a duplicate
|
|
* entry. So we need to search whether an ACE entry already exist and eventually
|
|
* replacce the access mask, or add a completely new entry if none was found.
|
|
*
|
|
* This function assumes the array has enough space to add a new entry without
|
|
* any reallocation of memory.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void add_or_replace_ace(struct security_ace *nt_ace_list, size_t *num_aces,
|
|
const struct dom_sid *sid, enum security_ace_type type,
|
|
uint32_t mask, uint8_t flags)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
/* first search for a duplicate */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < *num_aces; i++) {
|
|
if (dom_sid_equal(&nt_ace_list[i].trustee, sid) &&
|
|
(nt_ace_list[i].flags == flags)) break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (i < *num_aces) { /* found */
|
|
nt_ace_list[i].type = type;
|
|
nt_ace_list[i].access_mask = mask;
|
|
DEBUG(10, ("Replacing ACE %d with SID %s and flags %02x\n",
|
|
i, sid_string_dbg(sid), flags));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* not found, append it */
|
|
init_sec_ace(&nt_ace_list[(*num_aces)++], sid, type, mask, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Reply to query a security descriptor from an fsp. If it succeeds it allocates
|
|
the space for the return elements and returns the size needed to return the
|
|
security descriptor. This should be the only external function needed for
|
|
the UNIX style get ACL.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static NTSTATUS posix_get_nt_acl_common(struct connection_struct *conn,
|
|
const char *name,
|
|
const SMB_STRUCT_STAT *sbuf,
|
|
struct pai_val *pal,
|
|
SMB_ACL_T posix_acl,
|
|
SMB_ACL_T def_acl,
|
|
uint32_t security_info,
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
|
struct security_descriptor **ppdesc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct dom_sid owner_sid;
|
|
struct dom_sid group_sid;
|
|
size_t sd_size = 0;
|
|
struct security_acl *psa = NULL;
|
|
size_t num_acls = 0;
|
|
size_t num_def_acls = 0;
|
|
size_t num_aces = 0;
|
|
canon_ace *file_ace = NULL;
|
|
canon_ace *dir_ace = NULL;
|
|
struct security_ace *nt_ace_list = NULL;
|
|
size_t num_profile_acls = 0;
|
|
struct dom_sid orig_owner_sid;
|
|
struct security_descriptor *psd = NULL;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get the owner, group and world SIDs.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
create_file_sids(sbuf, &owner_sid, &group_sid);
|
|
|
|
if (lp_profile_acls(SNUM(conn))) {
|
|
/* For WXP SP1 the owner must be administrators. */
|
|
sid_copy(&orig_owner_sid, &owner_sid);
|
|
sid_copy(&owner_sid, &global_sid_Builtin_Administrators);
|
|
sid_copy(&group_sid, &global_sid_Builtin_Users);
|
|
num_profile_acls = 3;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (security_info & SECINFO_DACL) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* In the optimum case Creator Owner and Creator Group would be used for
|
|
* the ACL_USER_OBJ and ACL_GROUP_OBJ entries, respectively, but this
|
|
* would lead to usability problems under Windows: The Creator entries
|
|
* are only available in browse lists of directories and not for files;
|
|
* additionally the identity of the owning group couldn't be determined.
|
|
* We therefore use those identities only for Default ACLs.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Create the canon_ace lists. */
|
|
file_ace = canonicalise_acl(conn, name, posix_acl, sbuf,
|
|
&owner_sid, &group_sid, pal,
|
|
SMB_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
|
|
|
|
/* We must have *some* ACLS. */
|
|
|
|
if (count_canon_ace_list(file_ace) == 0) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("get_nt_acl : No ACLs on file (%s) !\n", name));
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (S_ISDIR(sbuf->st_ex_mode) && def_acl) {
|
|
dir_ace = canonicalise_acl(conn, name, def_acl,
|
|
sbuf,
|
|
&global_sid_Creator_Owner,
|
|
&global_sid_Creator_Group,
|
|
pal, SMB_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Create the NT ACE list from the canonical ace lists.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
canon_ace *ace;
|
|
enum security_ace_type nt_acl_type;
|
|
|
|
num_acls = count_canon_ace_list(file_ace);
|
|
num_def_acls = count_canon_ace_list(dir_ace);
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate the ace list. */
|
|
if ((nt_ace_list = talloc_array(talloc_tos(), struct security_ace,num_acls + num_profile_acls + num_def_acls)) == NULL) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("get_nt_acl: Unable to malloc space for nt_ace_list.\n"));
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(nt_ace_list, '\0', (num_acls + num_def_acls) * sizeof(struct security_ace) );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Create the NT ACE list from the canonical ace lists.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
for (ace = file_ace; ace != NULL; ace = ace->next) {
|
|
uint32_t acc = map_canon_ace_perms(SNUM(conn),
|
|
&nt_acl_type,
|
|
ace->perms,
|
|
S_ISDIR(sbuf->st_ex_mode));
|
|
init_sec_ace(&nt_ace_list[num_aces++],
|
|
&ace->trustee,
|
|
nt_acl_type,
|
|
acc,
|
|
ace->ace_flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The User must have access to a profile share - even
|
|
* if we can't map the SID. */
|
|
if (lp_profile_acls(SNUM(conn))) {
|
|
add_or_replace_ace(nt_ace_list, &num_aces,
|
|
&global_sid_Builtin_Users,
|
|
SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
|
|
FILE_GENERIC_ALL, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (ace = dir_ace; ace != NULL; ace = ace->next) {
|
|
uint32_t acc = map_canon_ace_perms(SNUM(conn),
|
|
&nt_acl_type,
|
|
ace->perms,
|
|
S_ISDIR(sbuf->st_ex_mode));
|
|
init_sec_ace(&nt_ace_list[num_aces++],
|
|
&ace->trustee,
|
|
nt_acl_type,
|
|
acc,
|
|
ace->ace_flags |
|
|
SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT|
|
|
SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT|
|
|
SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The User must have access to a profile share - even
|
|
* if we can't map the SID. */
|
|
if (lp_profile_acls(SNUM(conn))) {
|
|
add_or_replace_ace(nt_ace_list, &num_aces,
|
|
&global_sid_Builtin_Users,
|
|
SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
|
|
FILE_GENERIC_ALL,
|
|
SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT |
|
|
SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT |
|
|
SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Merge POSIX default ACLs and normal ACLs into one NT ACE.
|
|
* Win2K needs this to get the inheritance correct when replacing ACLs
|
|
* on a directory tree. Based on work by Jim @ IBM.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
num_aces = merge_default_aces(nt_ace_list, num_aces);
|
|
|
|
if (lp_profile_acls(SNUM(conn))) {
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_aces; i++) {
|
|
if (dom_sid_equal(&nt_ace_list[i].trustee, &owner_sid)) {
|
|
add_or_replace_ace(nt_ace_list, &num_aces,
|
|
&orig_owner_sid,
|
|
nt_ace_list[i].type,
|
|
nt_ace_list[i].access_mask,
|
|
nt_ace_list[i].flags);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (num_aces) {
|
|
if((psa = make_sec_acl( talloc_tos(), NT4_ACL_REVISION, num_aces, nt_ace_list)) == NULL) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("get_nt_acl: Unable to malloc space for acl.\n"));
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} /* security_info & SECINFO_DACL */
|
|
|
|
psd = make_standard_sec_desc(mem_ctx,
|
|
(security_info & SECINFO_OWNER) ? &owner_sid : NULL,
|
|
(security_info & SECINFO_GROUP) ? &group_sid : NULL,
|
|
psa,
|
|
&sd_size);
|
|
|
|
if(!psd) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("get_nt_acl: Unable to malloc space for security descriptor.\n"));
|
|
sd_size = 0;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Windows 2000: The DACL_PROTECTED flag in the security
|
|
* descriptor marks the ACL as non-inheriting, i.e., no
|
|
* ACEs from higher level directories propagate to this
|
|
* ACL. In the POSIX ACL model permissions are only
|
|
* inherited at file create time, so ACLs never contain
|
|
* any ACEs that are inherited dynamically. The DACL_PROTECTED
|
|
* flag doesn't seem to bother Windows NT.
|
|
* Always set this if map acl inherit is turned off.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (pal == NULL || !lp_map_acl_inherit(SNUM(conn))) {
|
|
psd->type |= SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED;
|
|
} else {
|
|
psd->type |= pal->sd_type;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (psd->dacl) {
|
|
dacl_sort_into_canonical_order(psd->dacl->aces, (unsigned int)psd->dacl->num_aces);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*ppdesc = psd;
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
if (posix_acl) {
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(posix_acl);
|
|
}
|
|
if (def_acl) {
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(def_acl);
|
|
}
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(file_ace);
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(dir_ace);
|
|
free_inherited_info(pal);
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(nt_ace_list);
|
|
|
|
return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NTSTATUS posix_fget_nt_acl(struct files_struct *fsp, uint32_t security_info,
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
|
struct security_descriptor **ppdesc)
|
|
{
|
|
SMB_STRUCT_STAT sbuf;
|
|
SMB_ACL_T posix_acl = NULL;
|
|
struct pai_val *pal;
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
|
|
NTSTATUS status;
|
|
|
|
*ppdesc = NULL;
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(10,("posix_fget_nt_acl: called for file %s\n",
|
|
fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
|
|
|
|
/* can it happen that fsp_name == NULL ? */
|
|
if (fsp->is_directory || fsp->fh->fd == -1) {
|
|
status = posix_get_nt_acl(fsp->conn, fsp->fsp_name,
|
|
security_info, mem_ctx, ppdesc);
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get the stat struct for the owner info. */
|
|
if(SMB_VFS_FSTAT(fsp, &sbuf) != 0) {
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
return map_nt_error_from_unix(errno);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get the ACL from the fd. */
|
|
posix_acl = SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_GET_FD(fsp, frame);
|
|
|
|
pal = fload_inherited_info(fsp);
|
|
|
|
status = posix_get_nt_acl_common(fsp->conn, fsp->fsp_name->base_name,
|
|
&sbuf, pal, posix_acl, NULL,
|
|
security_info, mem_ctx, ppdesc);
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NTSTATUS posix_get_nt_acl(struct connection_struct *conn,
|
|
const struct smb_filename *smb_fname_in,
|
|
uint32_t security_info,
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
|
struct security_descriptor **ppdesc)
|
|
{
|
|
SMB_ACL_T posix_acl = NULL;
|
|
SMB_ACL_T def_acl = NULL;
|
|
struct pai_val *pal;
|
|
struct smb_filename *smb_fname = NULL;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
|
|
NTSTATUS status;
|
|
|
|
*ppdesc = NULL;
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(10,("posix_get_nt_acl: called for file %s\n",
|
|
smb_fname_in->base_name ));
|
|
|
|
smb_fname = cp_smb_filename(talloc_tos(), smb_fname_in);
|
|
if (smb_fname == NULL) {
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get the stat struct for the owner info. */
|
|
/*
|
|
* We can directly use SMB_VFS_STAT here, as if this was a
|
|
* POSIX call on a symlink, we've already refused it.
|
|
* For a Windows acl mapped call on a symlink, we want to follow
|
|
* it.
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = SMB_VFS_STAT(conn, smb_fname);
|
|
|
|
if (ret == -1) {
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
return map_nt_error_from_unix(errno);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get the ACL from the path. */
|
|
posix_acl = SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_GET_FILE(conn, smb_fname->base_name,
|
|
SMB_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, frame);
|
|
|
|
/* If it's a directory get the default POSIX ACL. */
|
|
if(S_ISDIR(smb_fname->st.st_ex_mode)) {
|
|
def_acl = SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_GET_FILE(conn, smb_fname->base_name,
|
|
SMB_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, frame);
|
|
def_acl = free_empty_sys_acl(conn, def_acl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pal = load_inherited_info(conn, smb_fname->base_name);
|
|
|
|
status = posix_get_nt_acl_common(conn,
|
|
smb_fname->base_name,
|
|
&smb_fname->st,
|
|
pal,
|
|
posix_acl,
|
|
def_acl,
|
|
security_info,
|
|
mem_ctx,
|
|
ppdesc);
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Try to chown a file. We will be able to chown it under the following conditions.
|
|
|
|
1) If we have root privileges, then it will just work.
|
|
2) If we have SeRestorePrivilege we can change the user + group to any other user.
|
|
3) If we have SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege we can change the user to the current user.
|
|
4) If we have write permission to the file and dos_filemodes is set
|
|
then allow chown to the currently authenticated user.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
NTSTATUS try_chown(files_struct *fsp, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
|
|
{
|
|
NTSTATUS status;
|
|
|
|
if(!CAN_WRITE(fsp->conn)) {
|
|
return NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Case (1). */
|
|
status = vfs_chown_fsp(fsp, uid, gid);
|
|
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Case (2) / (3) */
|
|
if (lp_enable_privileges()) {
|
|
bool has_take_ownership_priv = security_token_has_privilege(
|
|
get_current_nttok(fsp->conn),
|
|
SEC_PRIV_TAKE_OWNERSHIP);
|
|
bool has_restore_priv = security_token_has_privilege(
|
|
get_current_nttok(fsp->conn),
|
|
SEC_PRIV_RESTORE);
|
|
|
|
if (has_restore_priv) {
|
|
; /* Case (2) */
|
|
} else if (has_take_ownership_priv) {
|
|
/* Case (3) */
|
|
if (uid == get_current_uid(fsp->conn)) {
|
|
gid = (gid_t)-1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
has_take_ownership_priv = false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (has_take_ownership_priv || has_restore_priv) {
|
|
become_root();
|
|
status = vfs_chown_fsp(fsp, uid, gid);
|
|
unbecome_root();
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Case (4). */
|
|
if (!lp_dos_filemode(SNUM(fsp->conn))) {
|
|
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* only allow chown to the current user. This is more secure,
|
|
and also copes with the case where the SID in a take ownership ACL is
|
|
a local SID on the users workstation
|
|
*/
|
|
if (uid != get_current_uid(fsp->conn)) {
|
|
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
become_root();
|
|
/* Keep the current file gid the same. */
|
|
status = vfs_chown_fsp(fsp, uid, (gid_t)-1);
|
|
unbecome_root();
|
|
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Reply to set a security descriptor on an fsp. security_info_sent is the
|
|
description of the following NT ACL.
|
|
This should be the only external function needed for the UNIX style set ACL.
|
|
We make a copy of psd_orig as internal functions modify the elements inside
|
|
it, even though it's a const pointer.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
NTSTATUS set_nt_acl(files_struct *fsp, uint32_t security_info_sent, const struct security_descriptor *psd_orig)
|
|
{
|
|
connection_struct *conn = fsp->conn;
|
|
uid_t user = (uid_t)-1;
|
|
gid_t grp = (gid_t)-1;
|
|
struct dom_sid file_owner_sid;
|
|
struct dom_sid file_grp_sid;
|
|
canon_ace *file_ace_list = NULL;
|
|
canon_ace *dir_ace_list = NULL;
|
|
bool acl_perms = False;
|
|
mode_t orig_mode = (mode_t)0;
|
|
NTSTATUS status;
|
|
bool set_acl_as_root = false;
|
|
bool acl_set_support = false;
|
|
bool ret = false;
|
|
struct security_descriptor *psd = NULL;
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(10,("set_nt_acl: called for file %s\n",
|
|
fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
|
|
|
|
if (!CAN_WRITE(conn)) {
|
|
DEBUG(10,("set acl rejected on read-only share\n"));
|
|
return NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (psd_orig == NULL) {
|
|
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* MS NFS mode, here's the deal: the client merely wants to
|
|
* modify the mode, but roundtripping get_acl/set/acl would
|
|
* add additional POSIX ACEs. So in case we get a request
|
|
* containing a MS NFS mode SID, we do nothing here.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (security_descriptor_with_ms_nfs(psd_orig)) {
|
|
return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
psd = security_descriptor_copy(talloc_tos(), psd_orig);
|
|
if (psd == NULL) {
|
|
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get the current state of the file.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
status = vfs_stat_fsp(fsp);
|
|
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Save the original element we check against. */
|
|
orig_mode = fsp->fsp_name->st.st_ex_mode;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Unpack the user/group/world id's.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* POSIX can't cope with missing owner/group. */
|
|
if ((security_info_sent & SECINFO_OWNER) && (psd->owner_sid == NULL)) {
|
|
security_info_sent &= ~SECINFO_OWNER;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((security_info_sent & SECINFO_GROUP) && (psd->group_sid == NULL)) {
|
|
security_info_sent &= ~SECINFO_GROUP;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
status = unpack_nt_owners( conn, &user, &grp, security_info_sent, psd);
|
|
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do we need to chown ? If so this must be done first as the incoming
|
|
* CREATOR_OWNER acl will be relative to the *new* owner, not the old.
|
|
* Noticed by Simo.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (((user != (uid_t)-1) && (fsp->fsp_name->st.st_ex_uid != user)) ||
|
|
(( grp != (gid_t)-1) && (fsp->fsp_name->st.st_ex_gid != grp))) {
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(3,("set_nt_acl: chown %s. uid = %u, gid = %u.\n",
|
|
fsp_str_dbg(fsp), (unsigned int)user,
|
|
(unsigned int)grp));
|
|
|
|
status = try_chown(fsp, user, grp);
|
|
if(!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
|
|
DEBUG(3,("set_nt_acl: chown %s, %u, %u failed. Error "
|
|
"= %s.\n", fsp_str_dbg(fsp),
|
|
(unsigned int)user,
|
|
(unsigned int)grp,
|
|
nt_errstr(status)));
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Recheck the current state of the file, which may have changed.
|
|
* (suid/sgid bits, for instance)
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
status = vfs_stat_fsp(fsp);
|
|
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Save the original element we check against. */
|
|
orig_mode = fsp->fsp_name->st.st_ex_mode;
|
|
|
|
/* If we successfully chowned, we know we must
|
|
* be able to set the acl, so do it as root.
|
|
*/
|
|
set_acl_as_root = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
create_file_sids(&fsp->fsp_name->st, &file_owner_sid, &file_grp_sid);
|
|
|
|
if((security_info_sent & SECINFO_DACL) &&
|
|
(psd->type & SEC_DESC_DACL_PRESENT) &&
|
|
(psd->dacl == NULL)) {
|
|
struct security_ace ace[3];
|
|
|
|
/* We can't have NULL DACL in POSIX.
|
|
Use owner/group/Everyone -> full access. */
|
|
|
|
init_sec_ace(&ace[0],
|
|
&file_owner_sid,
|
|
SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
|
|
GENERIC_ALL_ACCESS,
|
|
0);
|
|
init_sec_ace(&ace[1],
|
|
&file_grp_sid,
|
|
SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
|
|
GENERIC_ALL_ACCESS,
|
|
0);
|
|
init_sec_ace(&ace[2],
|
|
&global_sid_World,
|
|
SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
|
|
GENERIC_ALL_ACCESS,
|
|
0);
|
|
psd->dacl = make_sec_acl(talloc_tos(),
|
|
NT4_ACL_REVISION,
|
|
3,
|
|
ace);
|
|
if (psd->dacl == NULL) {
|
|
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
|
|
}
|
|
security_acl_map_generic(psd->dacl, &file_generic_mapping);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
acl_perms = unpack_canon_ace(fsp, &fsp->fsp_name->st, &file_owner_sid,
|
|
&file_grp_sid, &file_ace_list,
|
|
&dir_ace_list, security_info_sent, psd);
|
|
|
|
/* Ignore W2K traverse DACL set. */
|
|
if (!file_ace_list && !dir_ace_list) {
|
|
return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!acl_perms) {
|
|
DEBUG(3,("set_nt_acl: cannot set permissions\n"));
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(file_ace_list);
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(dir_ace_list);
|
|
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Only change security if we got a DACL.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if(!(security_info_sent & SECINFO_DACL) || (psd->dacl == NULL)) {
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(file_ace_list);
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(dir_ace_list);
|
|
return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Try using the POSIX ACL set first. Fall back to chmod if
|
|
* we have no ACL support on this filesystem.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (acl_perms && file_ace_list) {
|
|
if (set_acl_as_root) {
|
|
become_root();
|
|
}
|
|
ret = set_canon_ace_list(fsp, file_ace_list, false,
|
|
&fsp->fsp_name->st, &acl_set_support);
|
|
if (set_acl_as_root) {
|
|
unbecome_root();
|
|
}
|
|
if (acl_set_support && ret == false) {
|
|
DEBUG(3,("set_nt_acl: failed to set file acl on file "
|
|
"%s (%s).\n", fsp_str_dbg(fsp),
|
|
strerror(errno)));
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(file_ace_list);
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(dir_ace_list);
|
|
return map_nt_error_from_unix(errno);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (acl_perms && acl_set_support && fsp->is_directory) {
|
|
if (dir_ace_list) {
|
|
if (set_acl_as_root) {
|
|
become_root();
|
|
}
|
|
ret = set_canon_ace_list(fsp, dir_ace_list, true,
|
|
&fsp->fsp_name->st,
|
|
&acl_set_support);
|
|
if (set_acl_as_root) {
|
|
unbecome_root();
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret == false) {
|
|
DEBUG(3,("set_nt_acl: failed to set default "
|
|
"acl on directory %s (%s).\n",
|
|
fsp_str_dbg(fsp), strerror(errno)));
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(file_ace_list);
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(dir_ace_list);
|
|
return map_nt_error_from_unix(errno);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
int sret = -1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* No default ACL - delete one if it exists.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (set_acl_as_root) {
|
|
become_root();
|
|
}
|
|
sret = SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_DELETE_DEF_FILE(conn,
|
|
fsp->fsp_name->base_name);
|
|
if (set_acl_as_root) {
|
|
unbecome_root();
|
|
}
|
|
if (sret == -1) {
|
|
if (acl_group_override(conn, fsp->fsp_name)) {
|
|
DEBUG(5,("set_nt_acl: acl group "
|
|
"control on and current user "
|
|
"in file %s primary group. "
|
|
"Override delete_def_acl\n",
|
|
fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
|
|
|
|
become_root();
|
|
sret =
|
|
SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_DELETE_DEF_FILE(
|
|
conn,
|
|
fsp->fsp_name->base_name);
|
|
unbecome_root();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sret == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(3,("set_nt_acl: sys_acl_delete_def_file failed (%s)\n", strerror(errno)));
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(file_ace_list);
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(dir_ace_list);
|
|
return map_nt_error_from_unix(errno);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (acl_set_support) {
|
|
if (set_acl_as_root) {
|
|
become_root();
|
|
}
|
|
store_inheritance_attributes(fsp,
|
|
file_ace_list,
|
|
dir_ace_list,
|
|
psd->type);
|
|
if (set_acl_as_root) {
|
|
unbecome_root();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we cannot set using POSIX ACLs we fall back to checking if we need to chmod.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if(!acl_set_support && acl_perms) {
|
|
mode_t posix_perms;
|
|
|
|
if (!convert_canon_ace_to_posix_perms( fsp, file_ace_list, &posix_perms)) {
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(file_ace_list);
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(dir_ace_list);
|
|
DEBUG(3,("set_nt_acl: failed to convert file acl to "
|
|
"posix permissions for file %s.\n",
|
|
fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
|
|
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (orig_mode != posix_perms) {
|
|
int sret = -1;
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(3,("set_nt_acl: chmod %s. perms = 0%o.\n",
|
|
fsp_str_dbg(fsp), (unsigned int)posix_perms));
|
|
|
|
if (set_acl_as_root) {
|
|
become_root();
|
|
}
|
|
sret = SMB_VFS_CHMOD(conn, fsp->fsp_name,
|
|
posix_perms);
|
|
if (set_acl_as_root) {
|
|
unbecome_root();
|
|
}
|
|
if(sret == -1) {
|
|
if (acl_group_override(conn, fsp->fsp_name)) {
|
|
DEBUG(5,("set_nt_acl: acl group "
|
|
"control on and current user "
|
|
"in file %s primary group. "
|
|
"Override chmod\n",
|
|
fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
|
|
|
|
become_root();
|
|
sret = SMB_VFS_CHMOD(conn,
|
|
fsp->fsp_name,
|
|
posix_perms);
|
|
unbecome_root();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sret == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(3,("set_nt_acl: chmod %s, 0%o "
|
|
"failed. Error = %s.\n",
|
|
fsp_str_dbg(fsp),
|
|
(unsigned int)posix_perms,
|
|
strerror(errno)));
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(file_ace_list);
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(dir_ace_list);
|
|
return map_nt_error_from_unix(errno);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(file_ace_list);
|
|
free_canon_ace_list(dir_ace_list);
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure the stat struct in the fsp is correct. */
|
|
status = vfs_stat_fsp(fsp);
|
|
|
|
return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Get the actual group bits stored on a file with an ACL. Has no effect if
|
|
the file has no ACL. Needed in dosmode code where the stat() will return
|
|
the mask bits, not the real group bits, for a file with an ACL.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
int get_acl_group_bits( connection_struct *conn, const char *fname, mode_t *mode )
|
|
{
|
|
int entry_id = SMB_ACL_FIRST_ENTRY;
|
|
SMB_ACL_ENTRY_T entry;
|
|
SMB_ACL_T posix_acl;
|
|
int result = -1;
|
|
|
|
posix_acl = SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_GET_FILE(conn, fname,
|
|
SMB_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, talloc_tos());
|
|
if (posix_acl == (SMB_ACL_T)NULL)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
while (sys_acl_get_entry(posix_acl, entry_id, &entry) == 1) {
|
|
SMB_ACL_TAG_T tagtype;
|
|
SMB_ACL_PERMSET_T permset;
|
|
|
|
entry_id = SMB_ACL_NEXT_ENTRY;
|
|
|
|
if (sys_acl_get_tag_type(entry, &tagtype) ==-1)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (tagtype == SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ) {
|
|
if (sys_acl_get_permset(entry, &permset) == -1) {
|
|
break;
|
|
} else {
|
|
*mode &= ~(S_IRGRP|S_IWGRP|S_IXGRP);
|
|
*mode |= (sys_acl_get_perm(permset, SMB_ACL_READ) ? S_IRGRP : 0);
|
|
*mode |= (sys_acl_get_perm(permset, SMB_ACL_WRITE) ? S_IWGRP : 0);
|
|
*mode |= (sys_acl_get_perm(permset, SMB_ACL_EXECUTE) ? S_IXGRP : 0);
|
|
result = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(posix_acl);
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Do a chmod by setting the ACL USER_OBJ, GROUP_OBJ and OTHER bits in an ACL
|
|
and set the mask to rwx. Needed to preserve complex ACLs set by NT.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static int chmod_acl_internals( connection_struct *conn, SMB_ACL_T posix_acl, mode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
int entry_id = SMB_ACL_FIRST_ENTRY;
|
|
SMB_ACL_ENTRY_T entry;
|
|
int num_entries = 0;
|
|
|
|
while ( sys_acl_get_entry(posix_acl, entry_id, &entry) == 1) {
|
|
SMB_ACL_TAG_T tagtype;
|
|
SMB_ACL_PERMSET_T permset;
|
|
mode_t perms;
|
|
|
|
entry_id = SMB_ACL_NEXT_ENTRY;
|
|
|
|
if (sys_acl_get_tag_type(entry, &tagtype) == -1)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (sys_acl_get_permset(entry, &permset) == -1)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
num_entries++;
|
|
|
|
switch(tagtype) {
|
|
case SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ:
|
|
perms = unix_perms_to_acl_perms(mode, S_IRUSR, S_IWUSR, S_IXUSR);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
|
|
perms = unix_perms_to_acl_perms(mode, S_IRGRP, S_IWGRP, S_IXGRP);
|
|
break;
|
|
case SMB_ACL_MASK:
|
|
/*
|
|
* FIXME: The ACL_MASK entry permissions should really be set to
|
|
* the union of the permissions of all ACL_USER,
|
|
* ACL_GROUP_OBJ, and ACL_GROUP entries. That's what
|
|
* acl_calc_mask() does, but Samba ACLs doesn't provide it.
|
|
*/
|
|
perms = S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SMB_ACL_OTHER:
|
|
perms = unix_perms_to_acl_perms(mode, S_IROTH, S_IWOTH, S_IXOTH);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (map_acl_perms_to_permset(conn, perms, &permset) == -1)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (sys_acl_set_permset(entry, permset) == -1)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If this is a simple 3 element ACL or no elements then it's a standard
|
|
* UNIX permission set. Just use chmod...
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((num_entries == 3) || (num_entries == 0))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Get the access ACL of FROM, do a chmod by setting the ACL USER_OBJ,
|
|
GROUP_OBJ and OTHER bits in an ACL and set the mask to rwx. Set the
|
|
resulting ACL on TO. Note that name is in UNIX character set.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static int copy_access_posix_acl(connection_struct *conn, const char *from, const char *to, mode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
SMB_ACL_T posix_acl = NULL;
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
if ((posix_acl = SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_GET_FILE(conn, from,
|
|
SMB_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS,
|
|
talloc_tos())) == NULL)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = chmod_acl_internals(conn, posix_acl, mode)) == -1)
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
ret = SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_SET_FILE(conn, to, SMB_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, posix_acl);
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(posix_acl);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Do a chmod by setting the ACL USER_OBJ, GROUP_OBJ and OTHER bits in an ACL
|
|
and set the mask to rwx. Needed to preserve complex ACLs set by NT.
|
|
Note that name is in UNIX character set.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
int chmod_acl(connection_struct *conn, const char *name, mode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
return copy_access_posix_acl(conn, name, name, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Check for an existing default POSIX ACL on a directory.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static bool directory_has_default_posix_acl(connection_struct *conn, const char *fname)
|
|
{
|
|
SMB_ACL_T def_acl = SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_GET_FILE(conn, fname,
|
|
SMB_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT,
|
|
talloc_tos());
|
|
bool has_acl = False;
|
|
SMB_ACL_ENTRY_T entry;
|
|
|
|
if (def_acl != NULL && (sys_acl_get_entry(def_acl, SMB_ACL_FIRST_ENTRY, &entry) == 1)) {
|
|
has_acl = True;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (def_acl) {
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(def_acl);
|
|
}
|
|
return has_acl;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
If the parent directory has no default ACL but it does have an Access ACL,
|
|
inherit this Access ACL to file name.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
int inherit_access_posix_acl(connection_struct *conn, const char *inherit_from_dir,
|
|
const char *name, mode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
if (directory_has_default_posix_acl(conn, inherit_from_dir))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return copy_access_posix_acl(conn, inherit_from_dir, name, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Do an fchmod by setting the ACL USER_OBJ, GROUP_OBJ and OTHER bits in an ACL
|
|
and set the mask to rwx. Needed to preserve complex ACLs set by NT.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
int fchmod_acl(files_struct *fsp, mode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
connection_struct *conn = fsp->conn;
|
|
SMB_ACL_T posix_acl = NULL;
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
if ((posix_acl = SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_GET_FD(fsp, talloc_tos())) == NULL)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = chmod_acl_internals(conn, posix_acl, mode)) == -1)
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
ret = SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_SET_FD(fsp, posix_acl);
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(posix_acl);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Map from wire type to permset.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static bool unix_ex_wire_to_permset(connection_struct *conn, unsigned char wire_perm, SMB_ACL_PERMSET_T *p_permset)
|
|
{
|
|
if (wire_perm & ~(SMB_POSIX_ACL_READ|SMB_POSIX_ACL_WRITE|SMB_POSIX_ACL_EXECUTE)) {
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sys_acl_clear_perms(*p_permset) == -1) {
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (wire_perm & SMB_POSIX_ACL_READ) {
|
|
if (sys_acl_add_perm(*p_permset, SMB_ACL_READ) == -1) {
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (wire_perm & SMB_POSIX_ACL_WRITE) {
|
|
if (sys_acl_add_perm(*p_permset, SMB_ACL_WRITE) == -1) {
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (wire_perm & SMB_POSIX_ACL_EXECUTE) {
|
|
if (sys_acl_add_perm(*p_permset, SMB_ACL_EXECUTE) == -1) {
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return True;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Map from wire type to tagtype.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static bool unix_ex_wire_to_tagtype(unsigned char wire_tt, SMB_ACL_TAG_T *p_tt)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (wire_tt) {
|
|
case SMB_POSIX_ACL_USER_OBJ:
|
|
*p_tt = SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SMB_POSIX_ACL_USER:
|
|
*p_tt = SMB_ACL_USER;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SMB_POSIX_ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
|
|
*p_tt = SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SMB_POSIX_ACL_GROUP:
|
|
*p_tt = SMB_ACL_GROUP;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SMB_POSIX_ACL_MASK:
|
|
*p_tt = SMB_ACL_MASK;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SMB_POSIX_ACL_OTHER:
|
|
*p_tt = SMB_ACL_OTHER;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
return True;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Create a new POSIX acl from wire permissions.
|
|
FIXME ! How does the share mask/mode fit into this.... ?
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static SMB_ACL_T create_posix_acl_from_wire(connection_struct *conn,
|
|
uint16_t num_acls,
|
|
const char *pdata,
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int i;
|
|
SMB_ACL_T the_acl = sys_acl_init(mem_ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (the_acl == NULL) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_acls; i++) {
|
|
SMB_ACL_ENTRY_T the_entry;
|
|
SMB_ACL_PERMSET_T the_permset;
|
|
SMB_ACL_TAG_T tag_type;
|
|
|
|
if (sys_acl_create_entry(&the_acl, &the_entry) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("create_posix_acl_from_wire: Failed to create entry %u. (%s)\n",
|
|
i, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!unix_ex_wire_to_tagtype(CVAL(pdata,(i*SMB_POSIX_ACL_ENTRY_SIZE)), &tag_type)) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("create_posix_acl_from_wire: invalid wire tagtype %u on entry %u.\n",
|
|
CVAL(pdata,(i*SMB_POSIX_ACL_ENTRY_SIZE)), i ));
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sys_acl_set_tag_type(the_entry, tag_type) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("create_posix_acl_from_wire: Failed to set tagtype on entry %u. (%s)\n",
|
|
i, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get the permset pointer from the new ACL entry. */
|
|
if (sys_acl_get_permset(the_entry, &the_permset) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("create_posix_acl_from_wire: Failed to get permset on entry %u. (%s)\n",
|
|
i, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Map from wire to permissions. */
|
|
if (!unix_ex_wire_to_permset(conn, CVAL(pdata,(i*SMB_POSIX_ACL_ENTRY_SIZE)+1), &the_permset)) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("create_posix_acl_from_wire: invalid permset %u on entry %u.\n",
|
|
CVAL(pdata,(i*SMB_POSIX_ACL_ENTRY_SIZE) + 1), i ));
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Now apply to the new ACL entry. */
|
|
if (sys_acl_set_permset(the_entry, the_permset) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("create_posix_acl_from_wire: Failed to add permset on entry %u. (%s)\n",
|
|
i, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (tag_type == SMB_ACL_USER) {
|
|
uint32_t uidval = IVAL(pdata,(i*SMB_POSIX_ACL_ENTRY_SIZE)+2);
|
|
uid_t uid = (uid_t)uidval;
|
|
if (sys_acl_set_qualifier(the_entry,(void *)&uid) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("create_posix_acl_from_wire: Failed to set uid %u on entry %u. (%s)\n",
|
|
(unsigned int)uid, i, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (tag_type == SMB_ACL_GROUP) {
|
|
uint32_t gidval = IVAL(pdata,(i*SMB_POSIX_ACL_ENTRY_SIZE)+2);
|
|
gid_t gid = (uid_t)gidval;
|
|
if (sys_acl_set_qualifier(the_entry,(void *)&gid) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("create_posix_acl_from_wire: Failed to set gid %u on entry %u. (%s)\n",
|
|
(unsigned int)gid, i, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return the_acl;
|
|
|
|
fail:
|
|
|
|
if (the_acl != NULL) {
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(the_acl);
|
|
}
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Calls from UNIX extensions - Default POSIX ACL set.
|
|
If num_def_acls == 0 and not a directory just return. If it is a directory
|
|
and num_def_acls == 0 then remove the default acl. Else set the default acl
|
|
on the directory.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
bool set_unix_posix_default_acl(connection_struct *conn, const char *fname, const SMB_STRUCT_STAT *psbuf,
|
|
uint16_t num_def_acls, const char *pdata)
|
|
{
|
|
SMB_ACL_T def_acl = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!S_ISDIR(psbuf->st_ex_mode)) {
|
|
if (num_def_acls) {
|
|
DEBUG(5,("set_unix_posix_default_acl: Can't set default ACL on non-directory file %s\n", fname ));
|
|
errno = EISDIR;
|
|
return False;
|
|
} else {
|
|
return True;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!num_def_acls) {
|
|
/* Remove the default ACL. */
|
|
if (SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_DELETE_DEF_FILE(conn, fname) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(5,("set_unix_posix_default_acl: acl_delete_def_file failed on directory %s (%s)\n",
|
|
fname, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
return True;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((def_acl = create_posix_acl_from_wire(conn, num_def_acls,
|
|
pdata,
|
|
talloc_tos())) == NULL) {
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_SET_FILE(conn, fname, SMB_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, def_acl) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(5,("set_unix_posix_default_acl: acl_set_file failed on directory %s (%s)\n",
|
|
fname, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(def_acl);
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(10,("set_unix_posix_default_acl: set default acl for file %s\n", fname ));
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(def_acl);
|
|
return True;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Remove an ACL from a file. As we don't have acl_delete_entry() available
|
|
we must read the current acl and copy all entries except MASK, USER and GROUP
|
|
to a new acl, then set that. This (at least on Linux) causes any ACL to be
|
|
removed.
|
|
FIXME ! How does the share mask/mode fit into this.... ?
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
static bool remove_posix_acl(connection_struct *conn, files_struct *fsp, const char *fname)
|
|
{
|
|
SMB_ACL_T file_acl = NULL;
|
|
int entry_id = SMB_ACL_FIRST_ENTRY;
|
|
SMB_ACL_ENTRY_T entry;
|
|
bool ret = False;
|
|
/* Create a new ACL with only 3 entries, u/g/w. */
|
|
SMB_ACL_T new_file_acl = sys_acl_init(talloc_tos());
|
|
SMB_ACL_ENTRY_T user_ent = NULL;
|
|
SMB_ACL_ENTRY_T group_ent = NULL;
|
|
SMB_ACL_ENTRY_T other_ent = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (new_file_acl == NULL) {
|
|
DEBUG(5,("remove_posix_acl: failed to init new ACL with 3 entries for file %s.\n", fname));
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Now create the u/g/w entries. */
|
|
if (sys_acl_create_entry(&new_file_acl, &user_ent) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(5,("remove_posix_acl: Failed to create user entry for file %s. (%s)\n",
|
|
fname, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sys_acl_set_tag_type(user_ent, SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(5,("remove_posix_acl: Failed to set user entry for file %s. (%s)\n",
|
|
fname, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sys_acl_create_entry(&new_file_acl, &group_ent) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(5,("remove_posix_acl: Failed to create group entry for file %s. (%s)\n",
|
|
fname, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sys_acl_set_tag_type(group_ent, SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(5,("remove_posix_acl: Failed to set group entry for file %s. (%s)\n",
|
|
fname, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sys_acl_create_entry(&new_file_acl, &other_ent) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(5,("remove_posix_acl: Failed to create other entry for file %s. (%s)\n",
|
|
fname, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sys_acl_set_tag_type(other_ent, SMB_ACL_OTHER) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(5,("remove_posix_acl: Failed to set other entry for file %s. (%s)\n",
|
|
fname, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get the current file ACL. */
|
|
if (fsp && fsp->fh->fd != -1) {
|
|
file_acl = SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_GET_FD(fsp, talloc_tos());
|
|
} else {
|
|
file_acl = SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_GET_FILE(conn, fname,
|
|
SMB_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS,
|
|
talloc_tos());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (file_acl == NULL) {
|
|
/* This is only returned if an error occurred. Even for a file with
|
|
no acl a u/g/w acl should be returned. */
|
|
DEBUG(5,("remove_posix_acl: failed to get ACL from file %s (%s).\n",
|
|
fname, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while ( sys_acl_get_entry(file_acl, entry_id, &entry) == 1) {
|
|
SMB_ACL_TAG_T tagtype;
|
|
SMB_ACL_PERMSET_T permset;
|
|
|
|
entry_id = SMB_ACL_NEXT_ENTRY;
|
|
|
|
if (sys_acl_get_tag_type(entry, &tagtype) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(5,("remove_posix_acl: failed to get tagtype from ACL on file %s (%s).\n",
|
|
fname, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sys_acl_get_permset(entry, &permset) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(5,("remove_posix_acl: failed to get permset from ACL on file %s (%s).\n",
|
|
fname, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (tagtype == SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ) {
|
|
if (sys_acl_set_permset(user_ent, permset) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(5,("remove_posix_acl: failed to set permset from ACL on file %s (%s).\n",
|
|
fname, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (tagtype == SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ) {
|
|
if (sys_acl_set_permset(group_ent, permset) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(5,("remove_posix_acl: failed to set permset from ACL on file %s (%s).\n",
|
|
fname, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (tagtype == SMB_ACL_OTHER) {
|
|
if (sys_acl_set_permset(other_ent, permset) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(5,("remove_posix_acl: failed to set permset from ACL on file %s (%s).\n",
|
|
fname, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set the new empty file ACL. */
|
|
if (fsp && fsp->fh->fd != -1) {
|
|
if (SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_SET_FD(fsp, new_file_acl) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(5,("remove_posix_acl: acl_set_file failed on %s (%s)\n",
|
|
fname, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_SET_FILE(conn, fname, SMB_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, new_file_acl) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(5,("remove_posix_acl: acl_set_file failed on %s (%s)\n",
|
|
fname, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = True;
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
if (file_acl) {
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(file_acl);
|
|
}
|
|
if (new_file_acl) {
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(new_file_acl);
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Calls from UNIX extensions - POSIX ACL set.
|
|
If num_def_acls == 0 then read/modify/write acl after removing all entries
|
|
except SMB_ACL_USER_OBJ, SMB_ACL_GROUP_OBJ, SMB_ACL_OTHER.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
bool set_unix_posix_acl(connection_struct *conn, files_struct *fsp, const char *fname, uint16_t num_acls, const char *pdata)
|
|
{
|
|
SMB_ACL_T file_acl = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!num_acls) {
|
|
/* Remove the ACL from the file. */
|
|
return remove_posix_acl(conn, fsp, fname);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((file_acl = create_posix_acl_from_wire(conn, num_acls,
|
|
pdata,
|
|
talloc_tos())) == NULL) {
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (fsp && fsp->fh->fd != -1) {
|
|
/* The preferred way - use an open fd. */
|
|
if (SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_SET_FD(fsp, file_acl) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(5,("set_unix_posix_acl: acl_set_file failed on %s (%s)\n",
|
|
fname, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(file_acl);
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_SET_FILE(conn, fname, SMB_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, file_acl) == -1) {
|
|
DEBUG(5,("set_unix_posix_acl: acl_set_file failed on %s (%s)\n",
|
|
fname, strerror(errno) ));
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(file_acl);
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEBUG(10,("set_unix_posix_acl: set acl for file %s\n", fname ));
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(file_acl);
|
|
return True;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/********************************************************************
|
|
Pull the NT ACL from a file on disk or the OpenEventlog() access
|
|
check. Caller is responsible for freeing the returned security
|
|
descriptor via TALLOC_FREE(). This is designed for dealing with
|
|
user space access checks in smbd outside of the VFS. For example,
|
|
checking access rights in OpenEventlog() or from python.
|
|
|
|
********************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
NTSTATUS get_nt_acl_no_snum(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, const char *fname,
|
|
uint32_t security_info_wanted,
|
|
struct security_descriptor **sd)
|
|
{
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
|
|
connection_struct *conn;
|
|
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
|
|
struct smb_filename *smb_fname = synthetic_smb_fname(talloc_tos(),
|
|
fname,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
0);
|
|
|
|
if (smb_fname == NULL) {
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!posix_locking_init(false)) {
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
status = create_conn_struct(ctx,
|
|
server_event_context(),
|
|
server_messaging_context(),
|
|
&conn,
|
|
-1,
|
|
"/",
|
|
NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
|
|
DEBUG(0,("create_conn_struct returned %s.\n",
|
|
nt_errstr(status)));
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
status = SMB_VFS_GET_NT_ACL(conn,
|
|
smb_fname,
|
|
security_info_wanted,
|
|
ctx,
|
|
sd);
|
|
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
|
|
DEBUG(0, ("get_nt_acl_no_snum: SMB_VFS_GET_NT_ACL returned %s.\n",
|
|
nt_errstr(status)));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
conn_free(conn);
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int posix_sys_acl_blob_get_file(vfs_handle_struct *handle,
|
|
const char *path_p,
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
|
char **blob_description,
|
|
DATA_BLOB *blob)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
|
|
/* Initialise this to zero, in a portable way */
|
|
struct smb_acl_wrapper acl_wrapper = {
|
|
NULL
|
|
};
|
|
struct smb_filename *smb_fname;
|
|
|
|
smb_fname = synthetic_smb_fname(frame, path_p, NULL, NULL, 0);
|
|
if (smb_fname == NULL) {
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
errno = ENOMEM;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
acl_wrapper.access_acl
|
|
= smb_vfs_call_sys_acl_get_file(handle,
|
|
path_p,
|
|
SMB_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS,
|
|
frame);
|
|
|
|
ret = smb_vfs_call_stat(handle, smb_fname);
|
|
if (ret == -1) {
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (S_ISDIR(smb_fname->st.st_ex_mode)) {
|
|
acl_wrapper.default_acl
|
|
= smb_vfs_call_sys_acl_get_file(handle,
|
|
path_p,
|
|
SMB_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT,
|
|
frame);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
acl_wrapper.owner = smb_fname->st.st_ex_uid;
|
|
acl_wrapper.group = smb_fname->st.st_ex_gid;
|
|
acl_wrapper.mode = smb_fname->st.st_ex_mode;
|
|
|
|
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_push_struct_blob(blob, mem_ctx,
|
|
&acl_wrapper,
|
|
(ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_smb_acl_wrapper))) {
|
|
errno = EINVAL;
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*blob_description = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, "posix_acl");
|
|
if (!*blob_description) {
|
|
errno = EINVAL;
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int posix_sys_acl_blob_get_fd(vfs_handle_struct *handle,
|
|
files_struct *fsp,
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
|
char **blob_description,
|
|
DATA_BLOB *blob)
|
|
{
|
|
SMB_STRUCT_STAT sbuf;
|
|
TALLOC_CTX *frame;
|
|
struct smb_acl_wrapper acl_wrapper;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
/* This ensures that we also consider the default ACL */
|
|
if (fsp->is_directory || fsp->fh->fd == -1) {
|
|
return posix_sys_acl_blob_get_file(handle, fsp->fsp_name->base_name,
|
|
mem_ctx, blob_description, blob);
|
|
}
|
|
frame = talloc_stackframe();
|
|
|
|
acl_wrapper.default_acl = NULL;
|
|
|
|
acl_wrapper.access_acl = smb_vfs_call_sys_acl_get_file(handle, fsp->fsp_name->base_name,
|
|
SMB_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, frame);
|
|
|
|
ret = smb_vfs_call_fstat(handle, fsp, &sbuf);
|
|
if (ret == -1) {
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
acl_wrapper.owner = sbuf.st_ex_uid;
|
|
acl_wrapper.group = sbuf.st_ex_gid;
|
|
acl_wrapper.mode = sbuf.st_ex_mode;
|
|
|
|
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_push_struct_blob(blob, mem_ctx,
|
|
&acl_wrapper,
|
|
(ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_smb_acl_wrapper))) {
|
|
errno = EINVAL;
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*blob_description = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, "posix_acl");
|
|
if (!*blob_description) {
|
|
errno = EINVAL;
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|