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9ee7b022e5
A user without access in the share acl can easily trigger those warnings. Change the logging level, so that they do not appear with the default logging level. Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jul 31 01:17:30 CEST 2014 on sn-devel-104
640 lines
17 KiB
C
640 lines
17 KiB
C
/*
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Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
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uid/user handling
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Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998
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This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
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(at your option) any later version.
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This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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GNU General Public License for more details.
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You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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#include "system/passwd.h"
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#include "smbd/smbd.h"
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#include "smbd/globals.h"
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#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
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#include "libcli/security/security.h"
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#include "passdb/lookup_sid.h"
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#include "auth.h"
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/* what user is current? */
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extern struct current_user current_user;
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/****************************************************************************
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Become the guest user without changing the security context stack.
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****************************************************************************/
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bool change_to_guest(void)
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{
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struct passwd *pass;
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pass = Get_Pwnam_alloc(talloc_tos(), lp_guest_account());
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if (!pass) {
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return false;
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}
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#ifdef AIX
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/* MWW: From AIX FAQ patch to WU-ftpd: call initgroups before
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setting IDs */
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initgroups(pass->pw_name, pass->pw_gid);
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#endif
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set_sec_ctx(pass->pw_uid, pass->pw_gid, 0, NULL, NULL);
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current_user.conn = NULL;
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current_user.vuid = UID_FIELD_INVALID;
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TALLOC_FREE(pass);
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return true;
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}
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/****************************************************************************
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talloc free the conn->session_info if not used in the vuid cache.
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****************************************************************************/
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static void free_conn_session_info_if_unused(connection_struct *conn)
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{
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unsigned int i;
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for (i = 0; i < VUID_CACHE_SIZE; i++) {
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struct vuid_cache_entry *ent;
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ent = &conn->vuid_cache->array[i];
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if (ent->vuid != UID_FIELD_INVALID &&
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conn->session_info == ent->session_info) {
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return;
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}
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}
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/* Not used, safe to free. */
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TALLOC_FREE(conn->session_info);
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}
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/****************************************************************************
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Setup the share access mask for a connection.
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****************************************************************************/
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static uint32_t create_share_access_mask(int snum,
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bool readonly_share,
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const struct security_token *token)
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{
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uint32_t share_access = 0;
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share_access_check(token,
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lp_servicename(talloc_tos(), snum),
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MAXIMUM_ALLOWED_ACCESS,
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&share_access);
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if (readonly_share) {
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share_access &=
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~(SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_FILE_APPEND_DATA |
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SEC_FILE_WRITE_EA | SEC_FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTE |
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SEC_DIR_DELETE_CHILD );
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}
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if (security_token_has_privilege(token, SEC_PRIV_SECURITY)) {
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share_access |= SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY;
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}
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if (security_token_has_privilege(token, SEC_PRIV_RESTORE)) {
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share_access |= SEC_RIGHTS_PRIV_RESTORE;
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}
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if (security_token_has_privilege(token, SEC_PRIV_BACKUP)) {
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share_access |= SEC_RIGHTS_PRIV_BACKUP;
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}
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if (security_token_has_privilege(token, SEC_PRIV_TAKE_OWNERSHIP)) {
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share_access |= SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER;
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}
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return share_access;
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}
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/*******************************************************************
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Calculate access mask and if this user can access this share.
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********************************************************************/
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NTSTATUS check_user_share_access(connection_struct *conn,
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const struct auth_session_info *session_info,
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uint32_t *p_share_access,
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bool *p_readonly_share)
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{
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int snum = SNUM(conn);
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uint32_t share_access = 0;
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bool readonly_share = false;
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if (!user_ok_token(session_info->unix_info->unix_name,
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session_info->info->domain_name,
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session_info->security_token, snum)) {
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return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
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}
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readonly_share = is_share_read_only_for_token(
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session_info->unix_info->unix_name,
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session_info->info->domain_name,
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session_info->security_token,
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conn);
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share_access = create_share_access_mask(snum,
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readonly_share,
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session_info->security_token);
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if ((share_access & (FILE_READ_DATA|FILE_WRITE_DATA)) == 0) {
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/* No access, read or write. */
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DEBUG(3,("user %s connection to %s denied due to share "
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"security descriptor.\n",
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session_info->unix_info->unix_name,
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lp_servicename(talloc_tos(), snum)));
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return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
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}
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if (!readonly_share &&
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!(share_access & FILE_WRITE_DATA)) {
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/* smb.conf allows r/w, but the security descriptor denies
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* write. Fall back to looking at readonly. */
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readonly_share = True;
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DEBUG(5,("falling back to read-only access-evaluation due to "
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"security descriptor\n"));
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}
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*p_share_access = share_access;
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*p_readonly_share = readonly_share;
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return NT_STATUS_OK;
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}
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/*******************************************************************
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Check if a username is OK.
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This sets up conn->session_info with a copy related to this vuser that
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later code can then mess with.
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********************************************************************/
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static bool check_user_ok(connection_struct *conn,
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uint64_t vuid,
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const struct auth_session_info *session_info,
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int snum)
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{
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unsigned int i;
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bool readonly_share = false;
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bool admin_user = false;
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struct vuid_cache_entry *ent = NULL;
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uint32_t share_access = 0;
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NTSTATUS status;
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for (i=0; i<VUID_CACHE_SIZE; i++) {
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ent = &conn->vuid_cache->array[i];
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if (ent->vuid == vuid) {
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if (vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID) {
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/*
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* Slow path, we don't care
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* about the array traversal.
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*/
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continue;
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}
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free_conn_session_info_if_unused(conn);
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conn->session_info = ent->session_info;
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conn->read_only = ent->read_only;
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conn->share_access = ent->share_access;
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return(True);
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}
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}
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status = check_user_share_access(conn,
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session_info,
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&share_access,
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&readonly_share);
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if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
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return false;
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}
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admin_user = token_contains_name_in_list(
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session_info->unix_info->unix_name,
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session_info->info->domain_name,
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NULL, session_info->security_token, lp_admin_users(snum));
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ent = &conn->vuid_cache->array[conn->vuid_cache->next_entry];
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conn->vuid_cache->next_entry =
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(conn->vuid_cache->next_entry + 1) % VUID_CACHE_SIZE;
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TALLOC_FREE(ent->session_info);
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/*
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* If force_user was set, all session_info's are based on the same
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* username-based faked one.
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*/
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ent->session_info = copy_session_info(
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conn, conn->force_user ? conn->session_info : session_info);
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if (ent->session_info == NULL) {
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ent->vuid = UID_FIELD_INVALID;
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return false;
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}
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/*
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* It's actually OK to call check_user_ok() with
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* vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID as called from change_to_user_by_session().
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* All this will do is throw away one entry in the cache.
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*/
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ent->vuid = vuid;
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ent->read_only = readonly_share;
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ent->share_access = share_access;
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free_conn_session_info_if_unused(conn);
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conn->session_info = ent->session_info;
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if (vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID) {
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/*
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* Not strictly needed, just make it really
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* clear this entry is actually an unused one.
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*/
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ent->read_only = false;
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ent->share_access = 0;
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ent->session_info = NULL;
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}
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conn->read_only = readonly_share;
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conn->share_access = share_access;
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if (admin_user) {
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DEBUG(2,("check_user_ok: user %s is an admin user. "
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"Setting uid as %d\n",
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conn->session_info->unix_info->unix_name,
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sec_initial_uid() ));
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conn->session_info->unix_token->uid = sec_initial_uid();
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}
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return(True);
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}
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/****************************************************************************
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Become the user of a connection number without changing the security context
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stack, but modify the current_user entries.
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****************************************************************************/
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static bool change_to_user_internal(connection_struct *conn,
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const struct auth_session_info *session_info,
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uint64_t vuid)
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{
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int snum;
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gid_t gid;
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uid_t uid;
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char group_c;
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int num_groups = 0;
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gid_t *group_list = NULL;
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bool ok;
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snum = SNUM(conn);
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ok = check_user_ok(conn, vuid, session_info, snum);
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if (!ok) {
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DEBUG(2,("SMB user %s (unix user %s) "
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"not permitted access to share %s.\n",
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session_info->unix_info->sanitized_username,
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session_info->unix_info->unix_name,
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lp_servicename(talloc_tos(), snum)));
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return false;
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}
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uid = conn->session_info->unix_token->uid;
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gid = conn->session_info->unix_token->gid;
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num_groups = conn->session_info->unix_token->ngroups;
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group_list = conn->session_info->unix_token->groups;
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/*
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* See if we should force group for this service. If so this overrides
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* any group set in the force user code.
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*/
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if((group_c = *lp_force_group(talloc_tos(), snum))) {
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SMB_ASSERT(conn->force_group_gid != (gid_t)-1);
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if (group_c == '+') {
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int i;
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/*
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* Only force group if the user is a member of the
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* service group. Check the group memberships for this
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* user (we already have this) to see if we should force
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* the group.
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
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if (group_list[i] == conn->force_group_gid) {
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conn->session_info->unix_token->gid =
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conn->force_group_gid;
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gid = conn->force_group_gid;
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gid_to_sid(&conn->session_info->security_token
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->sids[1], gid);
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break;
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}
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}
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} else {
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conn->session_info->unix_token->gid = conn->force_group_gid;
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gid = conn->force_group_gid;
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gid_to_sid(&conn->session_info->security_token->sids[1],
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gid);
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}
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}
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/*Set current_user since we will immediately also call set_sec_ctx() */
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current_user.ut.ngroups = num_groups;
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current_user.ut.groups = group_list;
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set_sec_ctx(uid,
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gid,
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current_user.ut.ngroups,
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current_user.ut.groups,
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conn->session_info->security_token);
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current_user.conn = conn;
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current_user.vuid = vuid;
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DEBUG(5, ("Impersonated user: uid=(%d,%d), gid=(%d,%d)\n",
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(int)getuid(),
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(int)geteuid(),
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(int)getgid(),
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(int)getegid()));
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return true;
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}
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bool change_to_user(connection_struct *conn, uint64_t vuid)
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{
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struct user_struct *vuser;
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int snum = SNUM(conn);
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if (!conn) {
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DEBUG(2,("Connection not open\n"));
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return(False);
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}
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vuser = get_valid_user_struct(conn->sconn, vuid);
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if ((current_user.conn == conn) &&
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(vuser != NULL) && (current_user.vuid == vuid) &&
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(current_user.ut.uid == vuser->session_info->unix_token->uid)) {
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DEBUG(4,("Skipping user change - already "
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"user\n"));
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return(True);
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}
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if (vuser == NULL) {
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/* Invalid vuid sent */
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DEBUG(2,("Invalid vuid %llu used on share %s.\n",
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(unsigned long long)vuid, lp_servicename(talloc_tos(),
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snum)));
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return false;
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}
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return change_to_user_internal(conn, vuser->session_info, vuid);
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}
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static bool change_to_user_by_session(connection_struct *conn,
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const struct auth_session_info *session_info)
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{
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SMB_ASSERT(conn != NULL);
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SMB_ASSERT(session_info != NULL);
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if ((current_user.conn == conn) &&
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(current_user.ut.uid == session_info->unix_token->uid)) {
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DEBUG(7, ("Skipping user change - already user\n"));
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return true;
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}
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return change_to_user_internal(conn, session_info, UID_FIELD_INVALID);
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}
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/****************************************************************************
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Go back to being root without changing the security context stack,
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but modify the current_user entries.
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****************************************************************************/
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bool smbd_change_to_root_user(void)
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{
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set_root_sec_ctx();
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DEBUG(5,("change_to_root_user: now uid=(%d,%d) gid=(%d,%d)\n",
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(int)getuid(),(int)geteuid(),(int)getgid(),(int)getegid()));
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current_user.conn = NULL;
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current_user.vuid = UID_FIELD_INVALID;
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return(True);
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}
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/****************************************************************************
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Become the user of an authenticated connected named pipe.
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When this is called we are currently running as the connection
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user. Doesn't modify current_user.
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****************************************************************************/
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bool smbd_become_authenticated_pipe_user(struct auth_session_info *session_info)
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{
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if (!push_sec_ctx())
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return False;
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set_sec_ctx(session_info->unix_token->uid, session_info->unix_token->gid,
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session_info->unix_token->ngroups, session_info->unix_token->groups,
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session_info->security_token);
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DEBUG(5, ("Impersonated user: uid=(%d,%d), gid=(%d,%d)\n",
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(int)getuid(),
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(int)geteuid(),
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(int)getgid(),
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(int)getegid()));
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return True;
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}
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/****************************************************************************
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Unbecome the user of an authenticated connected named pipe.
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When this is called we are running as the authenticated pipe
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user and need to go back to being the connection user. Doesn't modify
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current_user.
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****************************************************************************/
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bool smbd_unbecome_authenticated_pipe_user(void)
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{
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return pop_sec_ctx();
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}
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/****************************************************************************
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Utility functions used by become_xxx/unbecome_xxx.
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****************************************************************************/
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static void push_conn_ctx(void)
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{
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struct conn_ctx *ctx_p;
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/* Check we don't overflow our stack */
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if (conn_ctx_stack_ndx == MAX_SEC_CTX_DEPTH) {
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DEBUG(0, ("Connection context stack overflow!\n"));
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smb_panic("Connection context stack overflow!\n");
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}
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/* Store previous user context */
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ctx_p = &conn_ctx_stack[conn_ctx_stack_ndx];
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ctx_p->conn = current_user.conn;
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ctx_p->vuid = current_user.vuid;
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DEBUG(4, ("push_conn_ctx(%llu) : conn_ctx_stack_ndx = %d\n",
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(unsigned long long)ctx_p->vuid, conn_ctx_stack_ndx));
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conn_ctx_stack_ndx++;
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}
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static void pop_conn_ctx(void)
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{
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struct conn_ctx *ctx_p;
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/* Check for stack underflow. */
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if (conn_ctx_stack_ndx == 0) {
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DEBUG(0, ("Connection context stack underflow!\n"));
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smb_panic("Connection context stack underflow!\n");
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}
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conn_ctx_stack_ndx--;
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ctx_p = &conn_ctx_stack[conn_ctx_stack_ndx];
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current_user.conn = ctx_p->conn;
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current_user.vuid = ctx_p->vuid;
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ctx_p->conn = NULL;
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ctx_p->vuid = UID_FIELD_INVALID;
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}
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/****************************************************************************
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Temporarily become a root user. Must match with unbecome_root(). Saves and
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restores the connection context.
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****************************************************************************/
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void smbd_become_root(void)
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{
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/*
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* no good way to handle push_sec_ctx() failing without changing
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* the prototype of become_root()
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*/
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if (!push_sec_ctx()) {
|
|
smb_panic("become_root: push_sec_ctx failed");
|
|
}
|
|
push_conn_ctx();
|
|
set_root_sec_ctx();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Unbecome the root user */
|
|
|
|
void smbd_unbecome_root(void)
|
|
{
|
|
pop_sec_ctx();
|
|
pop_conn_ctx();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Push the current security context then force a change via change_to_user().
|
|
Saves and restores the connection context.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
bool become_user(connection_struct *conn, uint64_t vuid)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!push_sec_ctx())
|
|
return False;
|
|
|
|
push_conn_ctx();
|
|
|
|
if (!change_to_user(conn, vuid)) {
|
|
pop_sec_ctx();
|
|
pop_conn_ctx();
|
|
return False;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return True;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool become_user_by_session(connection_struct *conn,
|
|
const struct auth_session_info *session_info)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!push_sec_ctx())
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
push_conn_ctx();
|
|
|
|
if (!change_to_user_by_session(conn, session_info)) {
|
|
pop_sec_ctx();
|
|
pop_conn_ctx();
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool unbecome_user(void)
|
|
{
|
|
pop_sec_ctx();
|
|
pop_conn_ctx();
|
|
return True;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Return the current user we are running effectively as on this connection.
|
|
I'd like to make this return conn->session_info->unix_token->uid, but become_root()
|
|
doesn't alter this value.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
uid_t get_current_uid(connection_struct *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
return current_user.ut.uid;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Return the current group we are running effectively as on this connection.
|
|
I'd like to make this return conn->session_info->unix_token->gid, but become_root()
|
|
doesn't alter this value.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
gid_t get_current_gid(connection_struct *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
return current_user.ut.gid;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Return the UNIX token we are running effectively as on this connection.
|
|
I'd like to make this return &conn->session_info->unix_token-> but become_root()
|
|
doesn't alter this value.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
const struct security_unix_token *get_current_utok(connection_struct *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
return ¤t_user.ut;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
Return the Windows token we are running effectively as on this connection.
|
|
If this is currently a NULL token as we're inside become_root() - a temporary
|
|
UNIX security override, then we search up the stack for the previous active
|
|
token.
|
|
****************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
const struct security_token *get_current_nttok(connection_struct *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
if (current_user.nt_user_token) {
|
|
return current_user.nt_user_token;
|
|
}
|
|
return sec_ctx_active_token();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint64_t get_current_vuid(connection_struct *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
return current_user.vuid;
|
|
}
|