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samba-mirror/source4/auth/kerberos/kerberos_verify.c
Andrew Bartlett 7ea6543ce5 r7257: Ensure the error message can never be uninitialised.
Andrew Bartlett
(This used to be commit fdd964582a)
2007-10-10 13:17:32 -05:00

506 lines
15 KiB
C

/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
kerberos utility library
Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2001
Copyright (C) Remus Koos 2001
Copyright (C) Luke Howard 2003
Copyright (C) Guenther Deschner 2003
Copyright (C) Jim McDonough (jmcd@us.ibm.com) 2003
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2004-2005
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "system/network.h"
#include "system/kerberos.h"
#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
#include "asn_1.h"
#include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h"
#include "secrets.h"
#include "pstring.h"
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5
#if !defined(HAVE_KRB5_PRINC_COMPONENT)
const krb5_data *krb5_princ_component(krb5_context, krb5_principal, int );
#endif
static DATA_BLOB unwrap_pac(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB *auth_data)
{
DATA_BLOB out;
DATA_BLOB pac_contents = data_blob(NULL, 0);
struct asn1_data data;
int data_type;
if (!auth_data->length) {
return data_blob(NULL, 0);
}
asn1_load(&data, *auth_data);
asn1_start_tag(&data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0));
asn1_start_tag(&data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0));
asn1_start_tag(&data, ASN1_CONTEXT(0));
asn1_read_Integer(&data, &data_type);
asn1_end_tag(&data);
asn1_start_tag(&data, ASN1_CONTEXT(1));
asn1_read_OctetString(&data, &pac_contents);
asn1_end_tag(&data);
asn1_end_tag(&data);
asn1_end_tag(&data);
asn1_free(&data);
out = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, pac_contents.data, pac_contents.length);
data_blob_free(&pac_contents);
return out;
}
/**********************************************************************************
Try to verify a ticket using the system keytab... the system keytab has kvno -1 entries, so
it's more like what microsoft does... see comment in utils/net_ads.c in the
ads_keytab_add_entry function for details.
***********************************************************************************/
static krb5_error_code ads_keytab_verify_ticket(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_context context,
krb5_auth_context auth_context,
const char *service,
const DATA_BLOB *ticket, krb5_data *p_packet,
krb5_ticket **pp_tkt,
krb5_keyblock *keyblock)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
krb5_keytab keytab = NULL;
krb5_kt_cursor kt_cursor;
krb5_keytab_entry kt_entry;
char *valid_princ_formats[7] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
char *entry_princ_s = NULL;
const char *my_name, *my_fqdn;
int i;
int number_matched_principals = 0;
const char *last_error_message;
/* Generate the list of principal names which we expect
* clients might want to use for authenticating to the file
* service. We allow name$,{host,service}/{name,fqdn,name.REALM}.
* (where service is specified by the caller) */
my_name = lp_netbios_name();
my_fqdn = name_to_fqdn(mem_ctx, my_name);
asprintf(&valid_princ_formats[0], "%s$@%s", my_name, lp_realm());
asprintf(&valid_princ_formats[1], "host/%s@%s", my_name, lp_realm());
asprintf(&valid_princ_formats[2], "host/%s@%s", my_fqdn, lp_realm());
asprintf(&valid_princ_formats[3], "host/%s.%s@%s", my_name, lp_realm(), lp_realm());
asprintf(&valid_princ_formats[4], "%s/%s@%s", service, my_name, lp_realm());
asprintf(&valid_princ_formats[5], "%s/%s@%s", service, my_fqdn, lp_realm());
asprintf(&valid_princ_formats[6], "%s/%s.%s@%s", service, my_name, lp_realm(), lp_realm());
ZERO_STRUCT(kt_entry);
ZERO_STRUCT(kt_cursor);
ret = krb5_kt_default(context, &keytab);
if (ret) {
last_error_message = smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, mem_ctx);
DEBUG(1, ("ads_keytab_verify_ticket: krb5_kt_default failed (%s)\n",
last_error_message));
goto out;
}
/* Iterate through the keytab. For each key, if the principal
* name case-insensitively matches one of the allowed formats,
* try verifying the ticket using that principal. */
ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context, keytab, &kt_cursor);
if (ret == KRB5_KT_END || ret == ENOENT ) {
last_error_message = smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, mem_ctx);
} else if (ret) {
last_error_message = smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, mem_ctx);
DEBUG(1, ("ads_keytab_verify_ticket: krb5_kt_start_seq_get failed (%s)\n",
last_error_message));
} else {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; /* Pick an error... */
last_error_message = "No principals in Keytab";
while (ret && (krb5_kt_next_entry(context, keytab, &kt_entry, &kt_cursor) == 0)) {
krb5_error_code upn_ret;
upn_ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, kt_entry.principal, &entry_princ_s);
if (upn_ret) {
last_error_message = smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, mem_ctx);
DEBUG(1, ("ads_keytab_verify_ticket: krb5_unparse_name failed (%s)\n",
last_error_message));
ret = upn_ret;
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(valid_princ_formats); i++) {
if (!strequal(entry_princ_s, valid_princ_formats[i])) {
continue;
}
number_matched_principals++;
p_packet->length = ticket->length;
p_packet->data = (krb5_pointer)ticket->data;
*pp_tkt = NULL;
ret = krb5_rd_req(context, &auth_context, p_packet, kt_entry.principal, keytab, NULL, pp_tkt);
if (ret) {
last_error_message = smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, mem_ctx);
DEBUG(10, ("ads_keytab_verify_ticket: krb5_rd_req(%s) failed: %s\n",
entry_princ_s, last_error_message));
} else {
DEBUG(3,("ads_keytab_verify_ticket: krb5_rd_req succeeded for principal %s\n",
entry_princ_s));
break;
}
}
/* Free the name we parsed. */
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, entry_princ_s);
entry_princ_s = NULL;
/* Free the entry we just read. */
smb_krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &kt_entry);
ZERO_STRUCT(kt_entry);
}
krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, keytab, &kt_cursor);
}
ZERO_STRUCT(kt_cursor);
out:
if (ret) {
if (!number_matched_principals) {
DEBUG(3, ("ads_keytab_verify_ticket: no keytab principals matched expected file service name.\n"));
} else {
DEBUG(3, ("ads_keytab_verify_ticket: krb5_rd_req failed for all %d matched keytab principals\n",
number_matched_principals));
}
DEBUG(3, ("ads_keytab_verify_ticket: last error: %s\n", last_error_message));
}
if (entry_princ_s) {
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, entry_princ_s);
}
{
krb5_keytab_entry zero_kt_entry;
ZERO_STRUCT(zero_kt_entry);
if (memcmp(&zero_kt_entry, &kt_entry, sizeof(krb5_keytab_entry))) {
smb_krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &kt_entry);
}
}
{
krb5_kt_cursor zero_csr;
ZERO_STRUCT(zero_csr);
if ((memcmp(&kt_cursor, &zero_csr, sizeof(krb5_kt_cursor)) != 0) && keytab) {
krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, keytab, &kt_cursor);
}
}
if (keytab) {
krb5_kt_close(context, keytab);
}
return ret;
}
/**********************************************************************************
Try to verify a ticket using the secrets.tdb.
***********************************************************************************/
static krb5_error_code ads_secrets_verify_ticket(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct cli_credentials *machine_account,
krb5_context context,
krb5_auth_context auth_context,
krb5_principal salt_princ,
const DATA_BLOB *ticket, krb5_data *p_packet,
krb5_ticket **pp_tkt,
krb5_keyblock *keyblock)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
krb5_error_code our_ret;
krb5_data password;
krb5_enctype *enctypes = NULL;
int i;
char *password_s = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, cli_credentials_get_password(machine_account));
if (!password_s) {
DEBUG(1, ("ads_secrets_verify_ticket: Could not obtain password for our local machine account!\n"));
return ENOENT;
}
ZERO_STRUCTP(keyblock);
password.data = password_s;
password.length = strlen(password_s);
/* CIFS doesn't use addresses in tickets. This would break NAT. JRA */
if ((ret = get_kerberos_allowed_etypes(context, &enctypes))) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_secrets_verify_ticket: krb5_get_permitted_enctypes failed (%s)\n",
error_message(ret)));
krb5_free_principal(context, salt_princ);
return ret;
}
p_packet->length = ticket->length;
p_packet->data = (krb5_pointer)ticket->data;
/* We need to setup a auth context with each possible encoding type in turn. */
ret = KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE;
for (i=0;enctypes[i];i++) {
krb5_keyblock *key = NULL;
if (!(key = malloc_p(krb5_keyblock))) {
break;
}
if (create_kerberos_key_from_string(context, salt_princ, &password, key, enctypes[i])) {
SAFE_FREE(key);
continue;
}
krb5_auth_con_setuseruserkey(context, auth_context, key);
krb5_free_keyblock(context, key);
our_ret = krb5_rd_req(context, &auth_context, p_packet,
NULL,
NULL, NULL, pp_tkt);
if (!our_ret) {
DEBUG(10,("ads_secrets_verify_ticket: enc type [%u] decrypted message !\n",
(unsigned int)enctypes[i] ));
ret = our_ret;
break;
}
DEBUG((our_ret != KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE) ? 3 : 10,
("ads_secrets_verify_ticket: enc type [%u] failed to decrypt with error %s\n",
(unsigned int)enctypes[i], smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, our_ret, mem_ctx)));
if (our_ret != KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE) {
ret = our_ret;
}
}
free_kerberos_etypes(context, enctypes);
return ret;
}
/**********************************************************************************
Verify an incoming ticket and parse out the principal name and
authorization_data if available.
***********************************************************************************/
NTSTATUS ads_verify_ticket(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
krb5_context context,
krb5_auth_context auth_context,
const char *realm, const char *service,
const DATA_BLOB *ticket,
char **principal, DATA_BLOB *auth_data,
DATA_BLOB *ap_rep,
krb5_keyblock *keyblock)
{
NTSTATUS sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
krb5_data packet;
krb5_ticket *tkt = NULL;
krb5_rcache rcache = NULL;
int ret;
BOOL got_replay_mutex = False;
char *malloc_principal;
char *machine_username;
krb5_principal salt_princ = NULL;
char *salt_princ_string;
NTSTATUS creds_nt_status;
struct cli_credentials *machine_account;
ZERO_STRUCT(packet);
ZERO_STRUCTP(auth_data);
ZERO_STRUCTP(ap_rep);
machine_account = cli_credentials_init(mem_ctx);
cli_credentials_set_conf(machine_account);
creds_nt_status = cli_credentials_set_machine_account(machine_account);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(creds_nt_status)) {
DEBUG(3, ("Could not obtain machine account credentials from the local database\n"));
/* This just becomes a locking key, if we don't have creds, we must be using the keytab */
salt_princ_string = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "host/%s@%s", lp_netbios_name(), lp_realm());
if (!salt_princ_string) {
ret = ENOMEM;
} else {
ret = krb5_parse_name(context, salt_princ_string, &salt_princ);
}
} else {
machine_username = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, cli_credentials_get_username(machine_account));
if (!machine_username) {
ret = ENOMEM;
} else {
char *salt_body;
char *lower_realm = strlower_talloc(mem_ctx, cli_credentials_get_realm(machine_account));;
if (machine_username[strlen(machine_username)-1] == '$') {
machine_username[strlen(machine_username)-1] = '\0';
}
if (!lower_realm) {
ret = ENOMEM;
} else {
salt_body = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s.%s", machine_username,
lower_realm);
if (!salt_body) {
ret = ENOMEM;
} else {
salt_princ_string = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "host/%s@%s", salt_body, cli_credentials_get_realm(machine_account));
if (!salt_princ_string) {
ret = ENOMEM;
} else {
ret = krb5_parse_name(context, salt_princ_string, &salt_princ);
}
}
}
}
}
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: maksing salt principal failed (%s)\n",
error_message(ret)));
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
/* This whole process is far more complex than I would
like. We have to go through all this to allow us to store
the secret internally, instead of using /etc/krb5.keytab */
/* Lock a mutex surrounding the replay as there is no locking in the MIT krb5
* code surrounding the replay cache... */
if (!grab_server_mutex("replay cache mutex")) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: unable to protect replay cache with mutex.\n"));
goto out;
}
got_replay_mutex = True;
/*
* JRA. We must set the rcache here. This will prevent replay attacks.
*/
ret = krb5_get_server_rcache(context, krb5_princ_component(context, salt_princ, 0), &rcache);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_get_server_rcache failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_auth_con_setrcache(context, auth_context, rcache);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_auth_con_setrcache failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
goto out;
}
ret = ads_keytab_verify_ticket(mem_ctx, context, auth_context,
service, ticket, &packet, &tkt, keyblock);
if (ret) {
ret = ads_secrets_verify_ticket(mem_ctx, machine_account, context, auth_context,
salt_princ, ticket,
&packet, &tkt, keyblock);
}
release_server_mutex();
got_replay_mutex = False;
if (ret) {
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_mk_rep(context, auth_context, &packet);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(3,("ads_verify_ticket: Failed to generate mutual authentication reply (%s)\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, mem_ctx)));
goto out;
}
*ap_rep = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, packet.data, packet.length);
SAFE_FREE(packet.data);
packet.length = 0;
#if 0
file_save("/tmp/ticket.dat", ticket->data, ticket->length);
#endif
*auth_data = get_auth_data_from_tkt(mem_ctx, tkt);
*auth_data = unwrap_pac(mem_ctx, auth_data);
#if 0
if (tkt->enc_part2) {
file_save("/tmp/authdata.dat",
tkt->enc_part2->authorization_data[0]->contents,
tkt->enc_part2->authorization_data[0]->length);
}
#endif
if ((ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, get_principal_from_tkt(tkt),
&malloc_principal))) {
DEBUG(3,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_unparse_name failed (%s)\n",
smb_get_krb5_error_message(context, ret, mem_ctx)));
sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
goto out;
}
*principal = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, malloc_principal);
SAFE_FREE(malloc_principal);
if (!principal) {
DEBUG(3,("ads_verify_ticket: talloc_strdup() failed\n"));
sret = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto out;
}
sret = NT_STATUS_OK;
out:
if (got_replay_mutex) {
release_server_mutex();
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(sret)) {
data_blob_free(auth_data);
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(sret)) {
data_blob_free(ap_rep);
}
if (tkt != NULL) {
krb5_free_ticket(context, tkt);
}
if (salt_princ != NULL) {
krb5_free_principal(context, salt_princ);
}
return sret;
}
#endif /* HAVE_KRB5 */