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13dbee3ffe
Break up auth/auth.h not to include the world. Add credentials_krb5.h with the kerberos dependent prototypes. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit 2b569c42e0fbb596ea82484d0e1cb22e193037b9)
219 lines
6.9 KiB
C
219 lines
6.9 KiB
C
/*
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Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
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User credentials handling
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Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2001
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Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2001-2005
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Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher 2005
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This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
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(at your option) any later version.
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This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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GNU General Public License for more details.
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You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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#include "librpc/gen_ndr/samr.h" /* for struct samrPassword */
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#include "lib/crypto/crypto.h"
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#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
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#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
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void cli_credentials_get_ntlm_username_domain(struct cli_credentials *cred, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
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const char **username,
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const char **domain)
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{
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if (cred->principal_obtained > cred->username_obtained) {
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*domain = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, "");
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*username = cli_credentials_get_principal(cred, mem_ctx);
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} else {
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*domain = cli_credentials_get_domain(cred);
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*username = cli_credentials_get_username(cred);
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}
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}
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NTSTATUS cli_credentials_get_ntlm_response(struct cli_credentials *cred, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
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int *flags,
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DATA_BLOB challenge, DATA_BLOB target_info,
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DATA_BLOB *_lm_response, DATA_BLOB *_nt_response,
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DATA_BLOB *_lm_session_key, DATA_BLOB *_session_key)
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{
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const char *user, *domain;
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DATA_BLOB lm_response, nt_response;
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DATA_BLOB lm_session_key, session_key;
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const struct samr_Password *nt_hash;
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lm_session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
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nt_hash = cli_credentials_get_nt_hash(cred, mem_ctx);
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cli_credentials_get_ntlm_username_domain(cred, mem_ctx, &user, &domain);
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/* If we are sending a username@realm login (see function
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* above), then we will not send LM, it will not be
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* accepted */
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if (cred->principal_obtained > cred->username_obtained) {
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*flags = *flags & ~CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH;
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}
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/* Likewise if we are a machine account (avoid protocol downgrade attacks) */
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if (cred->machine_account) {
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*flags = *flags & ~CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH;
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}
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if (cred->use_kerberos == CRED_MUST_USE_KERBEROS) {
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return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
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}
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if (!nt_hash) {
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static const uint8_t zeros[16];
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/* do nothing - blobs are zero length */
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/* session key is all zeros */
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session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, zeros, 16);
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lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, zeros, 16);
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lm_response = data_blob(NULL, 0);
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nt_response = data_blob(NULL, 0);
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/* not doing NTLM2 without a password */
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*flags &= ~CLI_CRED_NTLM2;
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} else if (*flags & CLI_CRED_NTLMv2_AUTH) {
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if (!target_info.length) {
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/* be lazy, match win2k - we can't do NTLMv2 without it */
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DEBUG(1, ("Server did not provide 'target information', required for NTLMv2\n"));
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return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
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}
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/* TODO: if the remote server is standalone, then we should replace 'domain'
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with the server name as supplied above */
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if (!SMBNTLMv2encrypt_hash(mem_ctx,
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user,
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domain,
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nt_hash->hash, &challenge,
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&target_info,
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&lm_response, &nt_response,
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NULL, &session_key)) {
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return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
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}
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/* LM Key is incompatible... */
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*flags &= ~CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH;
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} else if (*flags & CLI_CRED_NTLM2) {
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struct MD5Context md5_session_nonce_ctx;
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uint8_t session_nonce[16];
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uint8_t session_nonce_hash[16];
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uint8_t user_session_key[16];
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lm_response = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 24);
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generate_random_buffer(lm_response.data, 8);
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memset(lm_response.data+8, 0, 16);
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memcpy(session_nonce, challenge.data, 8);
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memcpy(&session_nonce[8], lm_response.data, 8);
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MD5Init(&md5_session_nonce_ctx);
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MD5Update(&md5_session_nonce_ctx, challenge.data, 8);
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MD5Update(&md5_session_nonce_ctx, lm_response.data, 8);
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MD5Final(session_nonce_hash, &md5_session_nonce_ctx);
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DEBUG(5, ("NTLMSSP challenge set by NTLM2\n"));
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DEBUG(5, ("challenge is: \n"));
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dump_data(5, session_nonce_hash, 8);
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nt_response = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 24);
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SMBOWFencrypt(nt_hash->hash,
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session_nonce_hash,
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nt_response.data);
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session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
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SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(nt_hash->hash, user_session_key);
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hmac_md5(user_session_key, session_nonce, sizeof(session_nonce), session_key.data);
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dump_data_pw("NTLM2 session key:\n", session_key.data, session_key.length);
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/* LM Key is incompatible... */
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*flags &= ~CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH;
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} else {
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uint8_t lm_hash[16];
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nt_response = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 24);
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SMBOWFencrypt(nt_hash->hash, challenge.data,
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nt_response.data);
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session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
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SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(nt_hash->hash, session_key.data);
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dump_data_pw("NT session key:\n", session_key.data, session_key.length);
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/* lanman auth is insecure, it may be disabled.
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We may also not have a password */
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if (*flags & CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH) {
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const char *password;
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password = cli_credentials_get_password(cred);
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if (!password) {
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lm_response = nt_response;
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} else {
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lm_response = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 24);
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if (!SMBencrypt(password,challenge.data,
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lm_response.data)) {
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/* If the LM password was too long (and therefore the LM hash being
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of the first 14 chars only), don't send it.
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We don't have any better options but to send the NT response
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*/
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data_blob_free(&lm_response);
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lm_response = nt_response;
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/* LM Key is incompatible with 'long' passwords */
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*flags &= ~CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH;
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} else {
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E_deshash(password, lm_hash);
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lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
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memcpy(lm_session_key.data, lm_hash, 8);
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memset(&lm_session_key.data[8], '\0', 8);
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if (!(*flags & CLI_CRED_NTLM_AUTH)) {
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session_key = lm_session_key;
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}
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}
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}
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} else {
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const char *password;
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/* LM Key is incompatible... */
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lm_response = nt_response;
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*flags &= ~CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH;
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password = cli_credentials_get_password(cred);
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if (password) {
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E_deshash(password, lm_hash);
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lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
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memcpy(lm_session_key.data, lm_hash, 8);
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memset(&lm_session_key.data[8], '\0', 8);
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}
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}
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}
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if (_lm_response) {
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*_lm_response = lm_response;
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}
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if (_nt_response) {
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*_nt_response = nt_response;
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}
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if (_lm_session_key) {
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*_lm_session_key = lm_session_key;
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}
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if (_session_key) {
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*_session_key = session_key;
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}
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return NT_STATUS_OK;
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}
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