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samba-mirror/source/heimdal/lib/gssapi/arcfour.c
Andrew Bartlett 6b75573df4 r11995: A big kerberos-related update.
This merges Samba4 up to current lorikeet-heimdal, which includes a
replacement for some Samba-specific hacks.

In particular, the credentials system now supplies GSS client and
server credentials.  These are imported into GSS with
gss_krb5_import_creds().  Unfortunetly this can't take an MEMORY
keytab, so we now create a FILE based keytab as provision and join
time.

Because the keytab is now created in advance, we don't spend .4s at
negprot doing sha1 s2k calls.  Also, because the keytab is read in
real time, any change in the server key will be correctly picked up by
the the krb5 code.

To mark entries in the secrets which should be exported to a keytab,
there is a new kerberosSecret objectClass.  The new routine
cli_credentials_update_all_keytabs() searches for these, and updates
the keytabs.

This is called in the provision.js via the ejs wrapper
credentials_update_all_keytabs().

We can now (in theory) use a system-provided /etc/krb5.keytab, if

krb5Keytab: FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab

is added to the secrets.ldb record.  By default the attribute

privateKeytab: secrets.keytab

is set, pointing to allow the whole private directory to be moved
without breaking the internal links.
2007-10-10 13:46:56 -05:00

692 lines
18 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (c) 2003 - 2005 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
* (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "gssapi_locl.h"
RCSID("$Id: arcfour.c,v 1.18 2005/11/01 06:55:55 lha Exp $");
/*
* Implements draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-04.txt
*
* The arcfour message have the following formats:
*
* MIC token
* TOK_ID[2] = 01 01
* SGN_ALG[2] = 11 00
* Filler[4]
* SND_SEQ[8]
* SGN_CKSUM[8]
*
* WRAP token
* TOK_ID[2] = 02 01
* SGN_ALG[2];
* SEAL_ALG[2]
* Filler[2]
* SND_SEQ[2]
* SGN_CKSUM[8]
* Confounder[8]
*/
static krb5_error_code
arcfour_mic_key(krb5_context context, krb5_keyblock *key,
void *cksum_data, size_t cksum_size,
void *key6_data, size_t key6_size)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
Checksum cksum_k5;
krb5_keyblock key5;
char k5_data[16];
Checksum cksum_k6;
char T[4];
memset(T, 0, 4);
cksum_k5.checksum.data = k5_data;
cksum_k5.checksum.length = sizeof(k5_data);
if (key->keytype == KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR_56) {
char L40[14] = "fortybits";
memcpy(L40 + 10, T, sizeof(T));
ret = krb5_hmac(context, CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5,
L40, 14, 0, key, &cksum_k5);
memset(&k5_data[7], 0xAB, 9);
} else {
ret = krb5_hmac(context, CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5,
T, 4, 0, key, &cksum_k5);
}
if (ret)
return ret;
key5.keytype = KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR;
key5.keyvalue = cksum_k5.checksum;
cksum_k6.checksum.data = key6_data;
cksum_k6.checksum.length = key6_size;
return krb5_hmac(context, CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5,
cksum_data, cksum_size, 0, &key5, &cksum_k6);
}
static krb5_error_code
arcfour_mic_cksum(krb5_keyblock *key, unsigned usage,
u_char *sgn_cksum, size_t sgn_cksum_sz,
const u_char *v1, size_t l1,
const void *v2, size_t l2,
const void *v3, size_t l3)
{
Checksum CKSUM;
u_char *ptr;
size_t len;
krb5_crypto crypto;
krb5_error_code ret;
assert(sgn_cksum_sz == 8);
len = l1 + l2 + l3;
ptr = malloc(len);
if (ptr == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
memcpy(ptr, v1, l1);
memcpy(ptr + l1, v2, l2);
memcpy(ptr + l1 + l2, v3, l3);
ret = krb5_crypto_init(gssapi_krb5_context, key, 0, &crypto);
if (ret) {
free(ptr);
return ret;
}
ret = krb5_create_checksum(gssapi_krb5_context,
crypto,
usage,
0,
ptr, len,
&CKSUM);
free(ptr);
if (ret == 0) {
memcpy(sgn_cksum, CKSUM.checksum.data, sgn_cksum_sz);
free_Checksum(&CKSUM);
}
krb5_crypto_destroy(gssapi_krb5_context, crypto);
return ret;
}
OM_uint32
_gssapi_get_mic_arcfour(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
const gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
gss_buffer_t message_token,
krb5_keyblock *key)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
int32_t seq_number;
size_t len, total_len;
u_char k6_data[16], *p0, *p;
RC4_KEY rc4_key;
gssapi_krb5_encap_length (22, &len, &total_len, GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM);
message_token->length = total_len;
message_token->value = malloc (total_len);
if (message_token->value == NULL) {
*minor_status = ENOMEM;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
p0 = _gssapi_make_mech_header(message_token->value,
len,
GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM);
p = p0;
*p++ = 0x01; /* TOK_ID */
*p++ = 0x01;
*p++ = 0x11; /* SGN_ALG */
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = 0xff; /* Filler */
*p++ = 0xff;
*p++ = 0xff;
*p++ = 0xff;
p = NULL;
ret = arcfour_mic_cksum(key, KRB5_KU_USAGE_SIGN,
p0 + 16, 8, /* SGN_CKSUM */
p0, 8, /* TOK_ID, SGN_ALG, Filer */
message_buffer->value, message_buffer->length,
NULL, 0);
if (ret) {
gss_release_buffer(minor_status, message_token);
*minor_status = ret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
ret = arcfour_mic_key(gssapi_krb5_context, key,
p0 + 16, 8, /* SGN_CKSUM */
k6_data, sizeof(k6_data));
if (ret) {
gss_release_buffer(minor_status, message_token);
*minor_status = ret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_lock(&context_handle->ctx_id_mutex);
krb5_auth_con_getlocalseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context,
context_handle->auth_context,
&seq_number);
p = p0 + 8; /* SND_SEQ */
gssapi_encode_be_om_uint32(seq_number, p);
krb5_auth_con_setlocalseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context,
context_handle->auth_context,
++seq_number);
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&context_handle->ctx_id_mutex);
memset (p + 4, (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) ? 0 : 0xff, 4);
RC4_set_key (&rc4_key, sizeof(k6_data), k6_data);
RC4 (&rc4_key, 8, p, p);
memset(&rc4_key, 0, sizeof(rc4_key));
memset(k6_data, 0, sizeof(k6_data));
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
OM_uint32
_gssapi_verify_mic_arcfour(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
const gss_buffer_t token_buffer,
gss_qop_t * qop_state,
krb5_keyblock *key,
char *type)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
int32_t seq_number;
OM_uint32 omret;
char cksum_data[8], k6_data[16], SND_SEQ[8];
u_char *p;
int cmp;
if (qop_state)
*qop_state = 0;
p = token_buffer->value;
omret = gssapi_krb5_verify_header (&p,
token_buffer->length,
(u_char *)type,
GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM);
if (omret)
return omret;
if (memcmp(p, "\x11\x00", 2) != 0) /* SGN_ALG = HMAC MD5 ARCFOUR */
return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
p += 2;
if (memcmp (p, "\xff\xff\xff\xff", 4) != 0)
return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
p += 4;
ret = arcfour_mic_cksum(key, KRB5_KU_USAGE_SIGN,
cksum_data, sizeof(cksum_data),
p - 8, 8,
message_buffer->value, message_buffer->length,
NULL, 0);
if (ret) {
*minor_status = ret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
ret = arcfour_mic_key(gssapi_krb5_context, key,
cksum_data, sizeof(cksum_data),
k6_data, sizeof(k6_data));
if (ret) {
*minor_status = ret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
cmp = memcmp(cksum_data, p + 8, 8);
if (cmp) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
}
{
RC4_KEY rc4_key;
RC4_set_key (&rc4_key, sizeof(k6_data), k6_data);
RC4 (&rc4_key, 8, p, SND_SEQ);
memset(&rc4_key, 0, sizeof(rc4_key));
memset(k6_data, 0, sizeof(k6_data));
}
gssapi_decode_be_om_uint32(SND_SEQ, &seq_number);
if (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL)
cmp = memcmp(&SND_SEQ[4], "\xff\xff\xff\xff", 4);
else
cmp = memcmp(&SND_SEQ[4], "\x00\x00\x00\x00", 4);
memset(SND_SEQ, 0, sizeof(SND_SEQ));
if (cmp != 0) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
}
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_lock(&context_handle->ctx_id_mutex);
omret = _gssapi_msg_order_check(context_handle->order, seq_number);
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&context_handle->ctx_id_mutex);
if (omret)
return omret;
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
OM_uint32
_gssapi_wrap_size_arcfour(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
OM_uint32 req_input_size,
OM_uint32 * output_size,
OM_uint32 * padlen,
krb5_keyblock *key)
{
size_t len, total_len, datalen;
*padlen = 0;
datalen = req_input_size;
len = GSS_ARCFOUR_WRAP_TOKEN_SIZE;
/* if GSS_C_DCE_STYLE is in use:
* - we only need to encapsulate the WRAP token
* - we should not add padding
*/
if (!(context_handle->flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE)) {
datalen += 1 /* padding */;
len += datalen;
}
_gssapi_encap_length(len, &len, &total_len, GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM);
if (context_handle->flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE) {
total_len += datalen;
}
*output_size = total_len;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
OM_uint32
_gssapi_wrap_arcfour(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
int * conf_state,
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer,
krb5_keyblock *key)
{
u_char Klocaldata[16], k6_data[16], *p, *p0;
size_t len, total_len, datalen;
krb5_keyblock Klocal;
krb5_error_code ret;
int32_t seq_number;
if (conf_state)
*conf_state = 0;
datalen = input_message_buffer->length;
len = GSS_ARCFOUR_WRAP_TOKEN_SIZE;
/* if GSS_C_DCE_STYLE is in use:
* - we only need to encapsulate the WRAP token
* - we should not add padding
*/
if (!(context_handle->flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE)) {
datalen += 1 /* padding */;
len += datalen;
}
_gssapi_encap_length(len, &len, &total_len, GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM);
if (context_handle->flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE) {
total_len += datalen;
}
output_message_buffer->length = total_len;
output_message_buffer->value = malloc (total_len);
if (output_message_buffer->value == NULL) {
*minor_status = ENOMEM;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
p0 = _gssapi_make_mech_header(output_message_buffer->value,
len,
GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM);
p = p0;
*p++ = 0x02; /* TOK_ID */
*p++ = 0x01;
*p++ = 0x11; /* SGN_ALG */
*p++ = 0x00;
if (conf_req_flag) {
*p++ = 0x10; /* SEAL_ALG */
*p++ = 0x00;
} else {
*p++ = 0xff; /* SEAL_ALG */
*p++ = 0xff;
}
*p++ = 0xff; /* Filler */
*p++ = 0xff;
p = NULL;
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_lock(&context_handle->ctx_id_mutex);
krb5_auth_con_getlocalseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context,
context_handle->auth_context,
&seq_number);
gssapi_encode_be_om_uint32(seq_number, p0 + 8);
krb5_auth_con_setlocalseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context,
context_handle->auth_context,
++seq_number);
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&context_handle->ctx_id_mutex);
memset (p0 + 8 + 4,
(context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) ? 0 : 0xff,
4);
krb5_generate_random_block(p0 + 24, 8); /* fill in Confounder */
/* p points to data */
p = p0 + GSS_ARCFOUR_WRAP_TOKEN_SIZE;
memcpy(p, input_message_buffer->value, input_message_buffer->length);
/* only add padding when GSS_C_DCE_STYLE is not in use */
if (!(context_handle->flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE)) {
p[input_message_buffer->length] = 1; /* PADDING */
}
ret = arcfour_mic_cksum(key, KRB5_KU_USAGE_SEAL,
p0 + 16, 8, /* SGN_CKSUM */
p0, 8, /* TOK_ID, SGN_ALG, SEAL_ALG, Filler */
p0 + 24, 8, /* Confounder */
p0 + GSS_ARCFOUR_WRAP_TOKEN_SIZE,
datalen);
if (ret) {
*minor_status = ret;
gss_release_buffer(minor_status, output_message_buffer);
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
{
int i;
Klocal.keytype = key->keytype;
Klocal.keyvalue.data = Klocaldata;
Klocal.keyvalue.length = sizeof(Klocaldata);
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
Klocaldata[i] = ((u_char *)key->keyvalue.data)[i] ^ 0xF0;
}
ret = arcfour_mic_key(gssapi_krb5_context, &Klocal,
p0 + 8, 4, /* SND_SEQ */
k6_data, sizeof(k6_data));
memset(Klocaldata, 0, sizeof(Klocaldata));
if (ret) {
gss_release_buffer(minor_status, output_message_buffer);
*minor_status = ret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
if(conf_req_flag) {
RC4_KEY rc4_key;
RC4_set_key (&rc4_key, sizeof(k6_data), k6_data);
/* XXX ? */
RC4 (&rc4_key, 8 + datalen, p0 + 24, p0 + 24); /* Confounder + data */
memset(&rc4_key, 0, sizeof(rc4_key));
}
memset(k6_data, 0, sizeof(k6_data));
ret = arcfour_mic_key(gssapi_krb5_context, key,
p0 + 16, 8, /* SGN_CKSUM */
k6_data, sizeof(k6_data));
if (ret) {
gss_release_buffer(minor_status, output_message_buffer);
*minor_status = ret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
{
RC4_KEY rc4_key;
RC4_set_key (&rc4_key, sizeof(k6_data), k6_data);
RC4 (&rc4_key, 8, p0 + 8, p0 + 8); /* SND_SEQ */
memset(&rc4_key, 0, sizeof(rc4_key));
memset(k6_data, 0, sizeof(k6_data));
}
if (conf_state)
*conf_state = conf_req_flag;
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
OM_uint32 _gssapi_unwrap_arcfour(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer,
int *conf_state,
gss_qop_t *qop_state,
krb5_keyblock *key)
{
u_char Klocaldata[16];
krb5_keyblock Klocal;
krb5_error_code ret;
int32_t seq_number;
size_t len, datalen;
OM_uint32 omret;
char k6_data[16], SND_SEQ[8], Confounder[8];
char cksum_data[8];
u_char *p, *p0;
int cmp;
int conf_flag;
size_t padlen = 0;
if (conf_state)
*conf_state = 0;
if (qop_state)
*qop_state = 0;
p0 = input_message_buffer->value;
len = input_message_buffer->length;
/* if we have GSS_C_DCE_STYLE in use, we only need to decapsulate the WRAP token */
if (context_handle->flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE) {
if (input_message_buffer->length < (GSS_ARCFOUR_WRAP_TOKEN_OFFSET+GSS_ARCFOUR_WRAP_TOKEN_SIZE)) {
return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
}
len = GSS_ARCFOUR_WRAP_TOKEN_OFFSET+GSS_ARCFOUR_WRAP_TOKEN_SIZE;
}
omret = _gssapi_verify_mech_header(&p0,
len,
GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM);
if (omret)
return omret;
p = p0;
datalen = input_message_buffer->length -
(p - ((u_char *)input_message_buffer->value)) -
GSS_ARCFOUR_WRAP_TOKEN_SIZE;
if (memcmp(p, "\x02\x01", 2) != 0)
return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
p += 2;
if (memcmp(p, "\x11\x00", 2) != 0) /* SGN_ALG = HMAC MD5 ARCFOUR */
return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
p += 2;
if (memcmp (p, "\x10\x00", 2) == 0)
conf_flag = 1;
else if (memcmp (p, "\xff\xff", 2) == 0)
conf_flag = 0;
else
return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
p += 2;
if (memcmp (p, "\xff\xff", 2) != 0)
return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
p = NULL;
ret = arcfour_mic_key(gssapi_krb5_context, key,
p0 + 16, 8, /* SGN_CKSUM */
k6_data, sizeof(k6_data));
if (ret) {
*minor_status = ret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
{
RC4_KEY rc4_key;
RC4_set_key (&rc4_key, sizeof(k6_data), k6_data);
RC4 (&rc4_key, 8, p0 + 8, SND_SEQ); /* SND_SEQ */
memset(&rc4_key, 0, sizeof(rc4_key));
memset(k6_data, 0, sizeof(k6_data));
}
gssapi_decode_be_om_uint32(SND_SEQ, &seq_number);
if (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL)
cmp = memcmp(&SND_SEQ[4], "\xff\xff\xff\xff", 4);
else
cmp = memcmp(&SND_SEQ[4], "\x00\x00\x00\x00", 4);
if (cmp != 0) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
}
{
int i;
Klocal.keytype = key->keytype;
Klocal.keyvalue.data = Klocaldata;
Klocal.keyvalue.length = sizeof(Klocaldata);
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
Klocaldata[i] = ((u_char *)key->keyvalue.data)[i] ^ 0xF0;
}
ret = arcfour_mic_key(gssapi_krb5_context, &Klocal,
SND_SEQ, 4,
k6_data, sizeof(k6_data));
memset(Klocaldata, 0, sizeof(Klocaldata));
if (ret) {
*minor_status = ret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
output_message_buffer->value = malloc(datalen);
if (output_message_buffer->value == NULL) {
*minor_status = ENOMEM;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
output_message_buffer->length = datalen;
if(conf_flag) {
RC4_KEY rc4_key;
RC4_set_key (&rc4_key, sizeof(k6_data), k6_data);
RC4 (&rc4_key, 8, p0 + 24, Confounder); /* Confounder */
RC4 (&rc4_key, datalen, p0 + GSS_ARCFOUR_WRAP_TOKEN_SIZE,
output_message_buffer->value);
memset(&rc4_key, 0, sizeof(rc4_key));
} else {
memcpy(Confounder, p0 + 24, 8); /* Confounder */
memcpy(output_message_buffer->value,
p0 + GSS_ARCFOUR_WRAP_TOKEN_SIZE,
datalen);
}
memset(k6_data, 0, sizeof(k6_data));
if (!(context_handle->flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE)) {
ret = _gssapi_verify_pad(output_message_buffer, datalen, &padlen);
if (ret) {
gss_release_buffer(minor_status, output_message_buffer);
*minor_status = 0;
return ret;
}
output_message_buffer->length -= padlen;
}
ret = arcfour_mic_cksum(key, KRB5_KU_USAGE_SEAL,
cksum_data, sizeof(cksum_data),
p0, 8,
Confounder, sizeof(Confounder),
output_message_buffer->value,
output_message_buffer->length + padlen);
if (ret) {
gss_release_buffer(minor_status, output_message_buffer);
*minor_status = ret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
cmp = memcmp(cksum_data, p0 + 16, 8); /* SGN_CKSUM */
if (cmp) {
gss_release_buffer(minor_status, output_message_buffer);
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
}
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_lock(&context_handle->ctx_id_mutex);
omret = _gssapi_msg_order_check(context_handle->order, seq_number);
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&context_handle->ctx_id_mutex);
if (omret)
return omret;
if (conf_state)
*conf_state = conf_flag;
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}